Advertising Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD) Discriminators in the Layer Two Tunneling Protocol Version 3 (L2TPv3)

Abstract

This document defines a new Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) that allows L2TP Control Connection Endpoints (LCCEs) to advertise one or more Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD) Discriminator values using the Layer Two Tunneling Protocol version 3 (L2TPv3).

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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1. Introduction

[RFC7880] defines a simplified mechanism to use Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [RFC5880], referred to as Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD). The S-BFD mechanism depends on network nodes knowing the BFD Discriminators that each node in the network has reserved for this purpose. S-BFD requires the usage of unique discriminators within an administrative domain. The use of the Layer Two Tunneling Protocol version 3 (L2TPv3) [RFC3931] is one possible means of advertising these discriminators.

This document specifies the encoding to be used when S-BFD Discriminators are advertised using L2TPv3.

1.1. Terminology

The reader is expected to be very familiar with the terminology and protocol constructs defined in S-BFD (see Section 2 of [RFC7880]) and L2TPv3 (see Section 1.3 of [RFC3931]).

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP

The S-BFD Target Discriminator Identifier (ID) Attribute Value Pair (AVP) is exchanged using the ICRQ (Incoming-Call-Request), ICRP (Incoming-Call-Reply), OCRQ (Outgoing-Call-Request), and OCRP (Outgoing-Call-Reply) control messages during session negotiation.
2.1. Encoding Format

The S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP, Attribute Type 102, is an identifier used to advertise the S-BFD target discriminator(s) supported by an L2TP Control Connection Endpoint (LCCE) for the S-BFD reflector operation. This AVP indicates that the advertiser implements an S-BFD reflector supporting the specified target discriminator(s) and is ready for S-BFD reflector operation. The receiving LCCE MAY use this AVP if it wants to monitor connectivity to the advertising LCCE using S-BFD.

The Attribute Value field for this AVP has the following format:

S-BFD Target Discriminator ID (ICRQ, ICRP, OCRQ, OCRP):

| Discriminator Value(s) | 4/Discriminator |
|------------------------|-----------------
|                        |                 |

An LCCE MAY include the S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP advertisement in an L2TP control message (ICRQ, ICRP, OCRQ, OCRP) [RFC3931]. If the other LCCE does not wish to monitor connectivity using S-BFD, it MAY safely discard this AVP without affecting the rest of session negotiation. While [RFC7880] concerns itself with the advertisement of only one discriminator unless the mapping of discriminators to entities is specified, the AVP encoding allows the specification of an arbitrary number of S-BFD Discriminators (at least one) for extensibility.

When an LCCE uses the S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP advertisement, multiple S-BFD Discriminators MAY be included, and at least one S-BFD Discriminator MUST be included. When one S-BFD Discriminator is advertised, such an S-BFD Discriminator is associated with the L2TPv3 session. When multiple S-BFD Discriminators are advertised, how a given discriminator is mapped to a specific use case is out of scope for this document.
The S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP allows for advertising at least one S-BFD Discriminator value:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+------------------------------------------+
| Discriminator 1                          |
+------------------------------------------+
| Discriminator 2 (Optional)               |
+------------------------------------------+
| ...                                       |
+------------------------------------------+
| Discriminator n (Optional)               |
+------------------------------------------+
```

The M bit of the L2TP control message (ICRQ, ICRP, OCRQ, OCRP) [RFC3931] MUST NOT be set inside the S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP.

3. IANA Considerations

IANA maintains the "Control Message Attribute Value Pairs" sub-registry as per [RFC3438]. IANA has assigned the following value to the S-BFD Target Discriminator ID:

Control Message Attribute Value Pairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type          Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102             S-BFD Target Discriminator ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Security Considerations

Security concerns for L2TP are addressed in [RFC3931]. The introduction of the S-BFD Target Discriminator ID AVP advertisement introduces no new security risks for L2TP.

Advertising the S-BFD Discriminators makes it possible for attackers to initiate S-BFD sessions using the advertised information. The vulnerabilities this poses and how to mitigate them are discussed in the Security Considerations section of [RFC7880].
5. References

5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References

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