6man | R. Bonica |
Internet-Draft | Juniper Networks |
Intended status: Standards Track | J. Halpern |
Expires: May 23, 2020 | Ericsson |
Y. Kamite | |
NTT Communications Corporation | |
T. Niwa | |
KDDI | |
L. Jalil | |
Verizon | |
N. So | |
F. Xu | |
Reliance Jio | |
G. Chen | |
Baidu | |
Y. Zhu | |
China Telecom | |
Y. Zhou | |
ByteDance | |
November 20, 2019 |
The Per-Segment Service Instruction (PSSI) Option
draft-bonica-6man-seg-end-opt-06
SRm6 encodes Per-Segment Service Instructions (PSSI) in a new IPv6 option, called the PSSI Option. This document describes the PSSI Option.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 23, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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An SRm6 path provides unidirectional connectivity from its ingress node to its egress node. While an SRm6 path can follow the least cost path from ingress to egress, it can also follow any other path.
An SRm6 path contains one or more segments. A segment provides unidirectional connectivity from its ingress node to its egress node.
SRm6 paths are programmable. They support several instruction types, including Per-Segment Service Instructions (PSSI). The following are examples of PSSIs:
PSSIs are executed at segment egress nodes and can be used to implement limited service chains. However, they do not provide an alternative to the Network Service Header (NSH).
SRm6 encodes PSSIs in a new IPv6 option, called the PSSI Option. This document describes the PSSI Option.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
PSSI Identifiers identify PSSIs. They have domain-wide significance. When a controller creates a limited service chain, also allocates a PSSI Identifier. It then distributes the following information to each node that contributes to the limited service chain:
The PSSI Option contains the following fields:
The PSSI option MAY appear in any Destination Options header, regardless of whether that Destination Options header precedes a Routing header or an upper-layer header. The PSSI option MUST NOT appear in a Hop-by-hop Options header.
NOTE : The highest-order two bits of the Option Type (i.e., the "act" bits) are 00. These bits specify the action taken by a destination node that does not recognize the option. The required action is to skip over this option and continue processing the header.
The third highest-order bit of the Option Type (i.e., the "chg" bit) is 0. This indicates that Option Data cannot be modified along the path between the packet's source and its destination.
The PSSI option shares many security concerns with IPv6 routing headers. In particular, any boundary filtering protecting a domain from external routing headers should also protect against external PSSI options being processed inside a domain. This occurs naturally if encapsulation is used to add routing headers to a packet. If external routing headers are allowed, then protections must also include ensuring that any provided PSSI option is properly protected, e.g. with an IPSEC AH header or other suitable means.
As with Routing headers, the security assumption within a domain is that the domain is trusted to provide, and to avoid improperly modifying, the PSSI Option.
SRm6 implementations MUST comply with the ICMPv6 processing rules specified in Section 2.4 of [RFC4443]. For example:
IANA is requested to allocate a cod epoint from the Destination Options and Hop-by-hop Options registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2). This option is called "PSSI". The "act" bits are 00 and the "chg" bit is 0. (Suggested value: 0x10).
Thanks to Fred Baker, Shizhang Bi and Reji Thomas for their careful review of this document.
[I-D.bonica-spring-srv6-plus] | Bonica, R., Hegde, S., Kamite, Y., Alston, A., Henriques, D., Jalil, L., Halpern, J., Linkova, J. and G. Chen, "Segment Routing Mapped To IPv6 (SRm6)", Internet-Draft draft-bonica-spring-srv6-plus-06, October 2019. |
[RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
[RFC4443] | Conta, A., Deering, S. and M. Gupta, "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006. |
[RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
[RFC8200] | Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017. |
[RFC8300] | Quinn, P., Elzur, U. and C. Pignataro, "Network Service Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, DOI 10.17487/RFC8300, January 2018. |