Adaptive DNS Discovery Threats Here
draft-deen-add-threats-00

Abstract

DNS resolver discovery is designed to operate under a variety different levels of trust in the underlying network. This document describes the various trust types that DNS resolver discovery and selection may take place under. Internet Draft.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.

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Table of Contents

• 1. Introduction
• 1.1. Requirements Language
• 2. Classifications
• 2.1. Approach
• 2.2. Green or Trusted Networks
• 2.3. Yellow or Unknown Networks
• 2.4. Red or Hostile Networks
• 3. IANA Considerations
• 4. Security Considerations
• 5. References
• 5.1. Normative References
• 5.2. Informative References
• Appendix A. Additional Stuff
• Author's Address

1. Introduction

There are a variety of network environments users may interact with where they will be discovering and selecting a DNS resolver each of which presents a different threat level to the user. This document attempts to establish a common set of threats classifications for reference by Adaptive DNS Discovery (ADD) working group drafts.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

2. Classifications

2.1. Approach

There are many ways to classify and structure threat analysis the approach used here is centered on the perspective of the user and how much subjective trust they can place in different access network situations that they may encounter.

2.2. Green or Trusted Networks

These are networks in which the user has an high sense of trust. These are networks run by a trusted party who is known to the user and is trusted by the user to operate the network with security and operational integrity. While even the best run network can be compromised by attackers or malware, the user has subjective trust that the Green network is very unlikely to be compromised.

The user often has a relationship with the network operator - either personally, as an employee, or by contract they user has entered into such as with an ISP or Mobile Carrier.

Examples of Green Networks

• User's own home network
• User's organization, company, or enterprise network
• Mobile user's mobile network
• User's ISP network

2.3. Yellow or Unknown Networks

These are networks in which the user does not have any sense of trust and yet has no sense or expectation that the network maybe compromised or hostile. The network's threat level is simply unknown.

These are networks which provided a service to visitors such as public Wifi networks.

Examples of Yellow Networks

• School network
• Cafe or coffee shop network
• Airport network
• Hotel network
• Conference or event network

2.4. Red or Hostile Networks

These are networks in which the user has an high sense of potential threats being present, but the use may have no other choice but to use them.

These are networks which the user not only does not trust, but also expects the network maybe doing things that the user does not want.

Red Networks

• War zone region network
• Hostile regime network

3. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

All drafts are required to have an IANA considerations section (see Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs for a guide). If the draft does not require IANA to do anything, the section contains an explicit statement that this is the case (as above). If there are no requirements for IANA, the section will be removed during conversion into an RFC by the RFC Editor.

4. Security Considerations

All drafts are required to have a security considerations section. See RFC 3552 for a guide.

5. References

5.1. Normative References

5.2. Informative References

Appendix A. Additional Stuff

This becomes an Appendix.

Author's Address