| Network Working Group | P. Hallam-Baker |
| Internet-Draft | August 13, 2019 |
| Intended status: Informational | |
| Expires: February 14, 2020 |
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol-02
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and reference data.
This document is also available online at http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol.html .
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This document describes the Mesh Service protocol supported by Mesh Services, an account-based protocol that facilitates exchange of data between devices connected to a Mesh profile and between Mesh accounts.
Mesh Service Accounts support the following services:
A Mesh Profile MAY be bound to multiple Mesh Service Accounts at the same time but only one Mesh Service Account is considered to be authoritative at a time. Users may add or remove Mesh Service Accounts and change the account designated as authoritative at any time.
The Mesh Services are build from a very small set of primitives which provide a surprisingly extensive set of capabilities. These primitives are:
Although these functions could in principle be used to replace many if not most existing Internet application protocols, the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of the audience it allows them to communicate with. Thus, while the Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols if at all.
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the terms used as requirements language.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
The terms of art used in this document are described in the Mesh Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] .
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the Mesh Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] . The Mesh documentation set and related specifications are described in this document.
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] .
A Mesh Service is a minimally trusted service. In particular a user does not need to trust a Mesh service to protect the confidentiality or integrity of most data stored in the account catalogs and spools.
Unless the use of the Mesh Service is highly restricted, a user does need to trust the Mesh Service in certain respects:
The need to trust the Mesh Service in these respects is mitigated by accountability and the user's ability to change Mesh Service providers at any time they choose with minimal inconvenience.
It is possible that some of these risks will be reduced in future versions of the Mesh Service Protocol but it is highly unlikely that these can be eliminated entirely without compromising practicality or efficiency.
The design of the Mesh Service model followed a quasi-formal approach in which the system was reduced to schemas which could in principle be rendered in a formal development method but without construction of proofs.
Like the contents of Mesh Accounts, a Mesh Service may be represented by a collection of catalogs and spools, for example:
Backup of the service MAY be implemented using the same container synchronization mechanism used to synchronize account catalogs and spools.
Mesh Services supporting a large number of accounts or large activity volume MAY partition the account catalog between one or more hosts using the usual tiered service model in which a front-end server receives traffic for any account hosted at the server and routes the request to the back-end service that provides the persistence store for that account.
In addition, the Mesh Service Protocol supports a 'direct connection' partitioning model in which devices are given a DNS name which MAY allow for direct connection to the persistence host or to a front-end service offering service that is in some way specific to that account.
Mesh Service transactions are mapped to an underlying messaging and transport protocol. The following binding
Mesh Services MUST support the Web Service binding specified in this document and MAY support the UDP binding currently in development.
The DNS Web Service discovery mechanism is used to discover Mesh Services regardless of the protocol binding .The service name, DNS prefix and and .well-known service suffix are specified as follows:
The Web Service Protocol binding makes use of the most widely deployed and used protocols:
The chief limitations of the Web Service Protocol Binding are that the use of TCP based transport results in unsatisfactory latency for some applications and that the HTTP application layer only serves to allow a host to support multiple services on the same TCP/IP port.
Mesh Services MUST offer TLS transport and MAY offer non TLS transport. MESH clients SHOULD use TLS transport when connecting to a MESH service.
TLS version 1.3 [RFC8446] or higher MUST be supported. Client authentication SHOULD NOT be used.
All messages are exchanged as HTTP POST transactions. Support for and use of HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] is REQUIRED. Services MAY support HTTP/2.
In contrast to other approaches to the design of Web Services, the only use made of the HTTP transport is to distinguish between different services on the same host using the Host header and .well-known convention and for message framing. No use is made of the URI request line to identify commands, nor are the caching or proxy capabilities of HTTP made use of.
The HTTP request MAY contain any valid HTTP header specified in [RFC7230] .
[Note, this is showing the payload, not the binding as is intended because the current code doesn't implement it as intended yet]
{
"Hello": {}}
The response MAY contain any HTTP response header but since JWB services do not make use of HTTP caching and messages are not intended to be modified by HTTP intermediaries, only a limited number of headers have significance:
[Note, this is showing the payload, not the binding as is intended because the current code doesn't implement it as intended yet]
{
"MeshHelloResponse": {
"Version": {
"Major": 3,
"Minor": 0,
"Encodings": [{
"ID": ["application/json"]}]},
"EnvelopedProfileService": [{
"dig": "S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlU2VydmljZSI6IHsKICAgICJLZXlPZmZsaW5lU2l
nbmF0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVURGIjogIk1CQ1AtT0dGWS1LRkFRLTZFTzMtV
lg2Uy02VjRHLUVOTlUiLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICA
gICAgICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0N
DgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJtSGxST1NhenBVVHp3Rk5aMHFJMU1
iWGpwdGhPVXhwbGUwVzhOVWFxOE03MVZUNWVOd1hqCiAgY2ZRLXRNbExnd3FfV
WZmMUZHbW1sSC1BIn19fX19",
{
"signatures": [{
"signature": "T1N3-fnOitSUDFezSINPbh76AtbmL2ghN-antjwUrmCL0z_S-
IcArALioAMEaDECg2Q4bgE8IZ4Apgf9SVoj58M_dqeMEWra3mavkV3NEScBcQG
Tn_TxS468u9CxfKBDK9NxI7k6c1XUc4xTZGKejR8A"}],
"PayloadDigest": "JZHVlp6xFPQ3WG9AQrRYVkLbLiM51nEKo7ryZMnK8TJAv
oVKL7kQYlP3dBtayIEvGowVxFURj_vRs0EXo08Blw"}],
"EnvelopedProfileHost": [{
"dig": "S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlSG9zdCI6IHsKICAgICJLZXlPZmZsaW5lU2lnbmF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",
{
"signatures": [{
"signature": "POQFQQOpcuNWxUAyi3DSGtaC9yJJJ9J6wr79Qzij8jN52gx4n
8MitwM1T2rYMgJp6WqpSKWJfaUA2wafnkmQvVkiVT-35Mbog22krLD-HySbJAP
a1lUXnzzOzbLSsBwRqPyJS0m60HFxKx0h0gZh0xIA"}],
"PayloadDigest": "C716Q-5VPWfV5imuX-_rgmST2-J8SjFxQ_EQAPrGDD1Mr
UKex_wn2cckWa_qyGsHrYPMKDt_2C4U7ZU9iyUdfw"}]}}
The payload of the HTTP requests and responses is a DARE Message whose payload contains the Mesh Service request or response.
The DARE Message encapsulation is used to authenticate the request or response data. The form of the authentication depending on the credentials available to the sender at the time the request is made.
Mesh Service MUST support the use of Mutually Authenticated Key Exchange [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] to establish the Master Key used for authentication of requests and responses.
Requests and Responses MUST be authenticated. Requests and Responses MUST be encrypted if the transport is not encrypted and MAY be encrypted otherwise.
Null Authentication MAY be used to make a Hello Request.
The Null Authentication mechanism MUST NOT be used for any Mesh Service request or response other than a Hello request.
Since the Mutually Authenticated key exchange requires both parties to know the public key of the other, it is not possible for a client to authenticate itself to the service until it has obtained the service public key. One means by which the client MAY obtain the service public key is by requesting the service return the credential in a Hello transaction.
Device Authentication is used in two circumstances
Profile Authentication has the same form as Device Authentication except that the client provides its Device Connection Assertion as part of the request:
Ticket Authentication is used after a device has obtained an authentication ticket from a service. The ticket is returned in the response to a previous Profile Authentication exchange.
The Dare Message payload of a Hello request MUST be encoded in JSON encoding. The payload of all other requests MUST be in either JSON encoding or one of the encodings advertised as being accepted in a Hello response from the Service. Services MUST accept JSON encoding and MAY support the JSON-B or JSON-C encodings as specified in this document. Services MUST generate a response that is compatible with the DARE Message Content-Type specified in the request.
JSON was originally developed to provide a serialization format for the JavaScript programming language [ECMA-262] . While this approach is generally applicable to the type systems of scripting programming languages, it is less well matched to the richer type systems of modern object oriented programming languages such as Java and C#.
Working within a subset of the capabilities of JSON allows a Web Service protocol to be accessed with equal ease from either platform type. The following capabilities of JSON are avoided:
The ability to use arbitrary strings as field names.
The use of JSON objects to define maps directly
The following data field types are used:
It is possible for an error to occur at any of the three layers in the Web Service binding:
Service Layer
HTTP Layer
Transport Layer
Services SHOULD always attempt to return error codes at the highest level possible. However, it is clearly impossible for a connection that is refused at the Transport layer to return an error code at the HTTP layer. It is however possible for a HTTP layer error response to contain a content body.
In the case that a response contains both a HTTP response code and a well-formed payload containing a response, the payload response SHALL have precedence.
The Hello transaction is used to determine the features supported by the service and obtain the service credentials
The request payload:
{
"Hello": {}}
The response payload:
{
"MeshHelloResponse": {
"Version": {
"Major": 3,
"Minor": 0,
"Encodings": [{
"ID": ["application/json"]}]},
"EnvelopedProfileService": [{
"dig": "S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlU2VydmljZSI6IHsKICAgICJLZXlPZmZsaW5lU2l
nbmF0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVURGIjogIk1CQ1AtT0dGWS1LRkFRLTZFTzMtV
lg2Uy02VjRHLUVOTlUiLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICA
gICAgICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0N
DgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJtSGxST1NhenBVVHp3Rk5aMHFJMU1
iWGpwdGhPVXhwbGUwVzhOVWFxOE03MVZUNWVOd1hqCiAgY2ZRLXRNbExnd3FfV
WZmMUZHbW1sSC1BIn19fX19",
{
"signatures": [{
"signature": "T1N3-fnOitSUDFezSINPbh76AtbmL2ghN-antjwUrmCL0z_S-
IcArALioAMEaDECg2Q4bgE8IZ4Apgf9SVoj58M_dqeMEWra3mavkV3NEScBcQG
Tn_TxS468u9CxfKBDK9NxI7k6c1XUc4xTZGKejR8A"}],
"PayloadDigest": "JZHVlp6xFPQ3WG9AQrRYVkLbLiM51nEKo7ryZMnK8TJAv
oVKL7kQYlP3dBtayIEvGowVxFURj_vRs0EXo08Blw"}],
"EnvelopedProfileHost": [{
"dig": "S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlSG9zdCI6IHsKICAgICJLZXlPZmZsaW5lU2lnbmF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",
{
"signatures": [{
"signature": "POQFQQOpcuNWxUAyi3DSGtaC9yJJJ9J6wr79Qzij8jN52gx4n
8MitwM1T2rYMgJp6WqpSKWJfaUA2wafnkmQvVkiVT-35Mbog22krLD-HySbJAP
a1lUXnzzOzbLSsBwRqPyJS0m60HFxKx0h0gZh0xIA"}],
"PayloadDigest": "C716Q-5VPWfV5imuX-_rgmST2-J8SjFxQ_EQAPrGDD1Mr
UKex_wn2cckWa_qyGsHrYPMKDt_2C4U7ZU9iyUdfw"}]}}
A Mesh Account is bound to a Mesh Service by completing a CreateAccount transaction with the service.
The client requesting the account creation specifies the ProfileMesh profile describing the requested account and lists of initial entries to populate the devices and contacts catalogs. Additional catalogs MAY be synchronized if the account creation request is accepted.
The request payload:
{
"CreateAccount": {
"ServiceID": "alice@example.com",
"SignedProfileMesh": [{
"dig": "S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlUGVyc29uYWwiOiB7CiAgICAiS2V5T2ZmbGluZVN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",
{
"signatures": [{
"signature": "VALT2etUKtiTIYngz7uaXF3OxOFiE_VpdeHHLe1Rpz6HjuyQ4
j7WWJf2Aj7rmhMTYRW2H9NcjdAAd80TRAuxvtIRZhqLl5HL7UHwkzRumbPGic2
7dqudEyGp-FD6VYqHxD7WztJMzHklLk-COjbP4y8A"}],
"PayloadDigest": "8QolTaruD1-DZwTZ-aB7olA1eit5fb7TUhRSI1heCNYjR
FJ1vSAArAq4h_Wr7AVBnk1WzLLDnEaF8xZezfz2MA"}],
"SignedAssertionAccount": [{
"dig": "S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlQWNjb3VudCI6IHsKICAgICJTZXJ2aWNlSURzIjo
gWyJhbGljZUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbSJdLAogICAgIk1lc2hQcm9maWxlVURGIjogI
k1BT1otM01WRS1HNUVOLTY0QkktSTNSTS1PREZKLUg1VzQiLAogICAgIktleUV
uY3J5cHRpb24iOiB7CiAgICAgICJVREYiOiAiTUFGWi1WVU1QLTdQVTMtNFRQN
y03TVJaLUJLQlEtVk1OTiIsCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewo
gICAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJFZ
DQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljIjogIjFsY1pVTmpIR0pXa1BXbVM5TUh
lR1lOZkRTWkdVTzRsR2s1WHBxN1hnSC0tU0dMUUU0RV8KICBzLTBiMFBJOG0wZ
mp0eklNVUVZRElfSUEifX19fX0",
{
"signatures": [{
"signature": "0tYuHZB3Xmk_MaOGK09khjSHr9jHUx_JLTixvYDZ7zEGCN_nD
TcLLeZujb8-wqMJalMjb_7aAggAmapk0tPfnGGbYnWmwBIKamrdpbnfMHtFm-i
Ny4S2rfaVLNEHSH9s42mYsdw9eitPX8xZEgXUIQ8A"}],
"PayloadDigest": "alXz9HJmuEpu2PglvnL5U-_nm4PLrWlWGIMlP5rfRUE4f
heefPxgiqG8rBAGahZPyGSpIzCK-7Sgh0sxx7-pgw"}]}}
<t>
The response payload: </t>
<figure anchor="s-6-6" suppress-title="true">
<artwork>
<![CDATA[{
"CreateResponse": {
"Status": 201,
"StatusDescription": "Operation completed successfully"}}
An account registration is deleted using the DeleteAccount transaction.
All the state associated with a Mesh profile is stored as a sequence of DARE Messages in a Dare Container. The Mesh Service holding the master copy of the persistence stores and the devices connected to the profile containing complete copies (replicas) or partial copies (redactions).
Thus, the only primitive needed to achieve synchronization of the profile state are those required for synchronization of a DARE Container. These steps are:
To ensure a satisfactory user experience, Mesh Messages are intentionally limited in size to 64 KB or less, thus ensuring that an application can retrieve the most recent 100 messages almost instantaneously on a high bandwidth connection and without undue delay on a slower one.
The status transaction returns the status of the containers the device is authorized to access for the specified account together with the updated Device Connection Entry if this has been modified since the entry presented to authenticate the request was issued.
The download transaction returns a collection of entries from one or more containers associated with the profile.
Optional filtering criteria MAY be specified to only return objects matching specific criteria and/or only return certain parts of the selected messages.
The service MAY limit the number of entries returned in an individual response for performance reasons.
Clients SHOULD check to determine if updates to a container conflict with pending updates on the device waiting to be uploaded. For example, if a contact that the user modified on the device attempting to synchronize was subsequently deleted.
The means of resolving such conflicts is not in the scope of this specification.
Clients may request container updates be filtered to redact catalog entries that have been updated or deleted or spool entries that have been read, deleted or were received before a certain date.
The upload transaction upload objects to a catalog or spool.
Multiple objects MAY be uploaded at once. Object updates MAY be conditional on the successful completion of other upload requests.
The transaction MAY be performed in one request/response round trip or with separate round trips to confirm that the transaction is accepted by the service before sending large number of updates.
Devices request connection to a Mesh profile using the Connect transaction. Three connection mechanisms are currently defined. All three of which offer strong mutual authentication.
Device Authenticated
Pin Authenticated
EARL Connection Mode
The first two of these mechanisms are initiated from the device being connected which requires that the Mesh Service Account it is being connected to be entered into it. Use of these mechanisms thus requires keyboard and display affordances or accessibility equivalents.
The last mechanism is initiated from an administration device that is already connected to the account. It is intended for use in circumstances where the device being connected does not have the necessary affordances to allow the Device or PIN authenticated modes.
In either case, the connection request is completed by the device requesting synchronization with the Mesh Account using its device credential for authentication. If the connection request was accepted, the device will be provisioned with the Device Connection Assertion allowing it to complete the process.
The Device Connection Assertion includes an overlay device profile containing a set of private key contributions to be used to perform key cogeneration on the original set of device keys to create a new device profile to be used for all purposes associated with the Mesh Profile to which it has just been connected. This assures the user that the keys the device uses for performing operation in the context of their profile are not affected by any compromise that might have occurred during manufacture or at any point after up to the time it was connected to their profile.
The direct connection mechanism requires that both the administration device and the device originating the connection request have data entry and output affordances and that it is possible for the user to compare the authentication codes presented by the two devices to check that they are identical.
The PIN Connection mechanism is similar to the Direct connection mechanism except that the process is initiated on an administration device by requesting assignment of a new authentication PIN. The PIN is then input to the connecting device to authenticate the request.
The EARL/QR code connection mechanisms are used to connect a constrained device to a Mesh profile by means of an Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator, typically presented as a QR code on the device itself or its packaging.
Mesh Messages provide a means of communication between Mesh Service Accounts with capabilities that are not possible or poorly supported in traditional SMTP mail messaging:
Note that although Mesh Messaging is designed to facilitate the transfer of very large data sets, the size of Mesh Messages themselves is severely restricted. The current default maximum size being 64 KB. This approach allows Mesh
In addition, the platform anticipates but does not currently support additional cryptographic security capabilities:
While these capabilities might in time cause Mesh Messaging to replace SMTP, this is not a near term goal. The short-term goal of Mesh Messaging is to support the Contact Exchange and Confirmation applications.
Two important classes of application that are not currently supported directly are payments and presence. While prototypes of these applications have been considered, it is not clear if these are best implemented as special cases of the Confirmation and Contact Exchange applications or as separate applications in their own right.
To enable effective abuse mitigation, Mesh Messaging enforces a four corner communication model in which all outbound and inbound messages pass through a Mesh Service which accredits and authorizes the messages on the user's behalf.
[[This figure is not viewable in this format. The figure is available at http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol.html.]]
The Post transaction is used for client-service and service-service messaging transactions.
To send a message, the client creates the Mesh Message structure, encapsulates it in a DARE Message and forwards this to its service using a Post transaction.
The Post transaction is authenticated to the service by device using the usual means of profile or ticket authentication.
The DARE Message MUST be signed under a device signature key accredited by a Device Connection Assertion provided in the message signature block.
The Mesh Service receiving the message from the user's device MAY attempt immediate retransmission or queue it to be sent at a future time. Mesh Services SHOULD forward messages without undue delay.
The Post transaction forwarding the message to the destination service carries the same payload as the original request but is authenticated by the service forwarding it. This authentication MAY be my means of either profile or ticket authentication.
Services SHOULD implement Denial of Service mitigation strategies including limiting the maximum time taken to complete a transaction and refusing connections from clients that engage in patterns of behavior consistent with abuse.
The limitation in message size allows Mesh Services to aggressively time out connections that take too long to complete a transaction. A Mesh Service that hosted on a 10Mb/s link should be able to transfer 20 messages a second. If the service is taking more than 5 seconds to complete a transaction, either the source or the destination service is overloaded or the message itself is an attack.
Imposing hard constraints on Mesh Service performance requires deployments to scale and apply resources appropriately. If a service is attempting to transfer 100 messages simultaneously and 40% are taking 4 seconds or more, this indicates that the number of simultaneous transfers being attempted should be reduced. Contrawise, if 90% are completinin less than a second, the number of threads allocated to sending outbound messages might be increased.
The inbound service MUST subject inbound messages to Access Control according to the credentials presented in the DARE Message payload.
After verifying the signature and checking that the key is properly accredited in accordance with site policy, the service applies authorization controls taking account of:
The final recipient receives the message by synchronizing their inbound spool.
Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Service or the Mesh itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary to perform a Hello transaction prior to any other transaction.
A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding, the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host field.
Base class for all request messages.
[No fields]
Base class for all request messages made by a user.
A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding, the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP response message. However the response code returned in the payload object MUST always be considered authoritative.
Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code and status description fields.
[No fields]
The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications and in the DARE Data At Rest Encryption extensions to JOSE.
The following common structures are used in the protocol messages:
Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records matching one or more selection criteria.
Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc.
Specifies constraints on the data to be sent.
Describes the account creation policy including constraints on account names, whether there is an open account creation policy, etc.
Report service and version information.
The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by the service.
The PostConstraints field MAY be used to advise senders of a maximum size of payload that MAY be sent in an initial Post request.
Request objects from the specified container with the specified search criteria.
Request objects from the specified container(s).
A client MAY request only objects matching specified search criteria be returned and MAY request that only specific fields or parts of the payload be returned.
Return the set of objects requested.
Services SHOULD NOT return a response that is disproportionately large relative to the speed of the network connection without a clear indication from the client that it is relevant. A service MAY limit the number of objects returned. A service MAY limit the scope of each response.
Request objects from the specified container with the specified search criteria.
Upload entries to a container. This request is only valid if it is issued by the owner of the account
Response to an upload request.
Request to post to a spool from an external party. The request and response messages are extensions of the corresponding messages for the Upload transaction. It is expected that additional fields will be added as the need arises.
[No fields]
Request information necessary to begin making a connection request.
Request creation of a new service account.
Attempt
Request binding of an account to a service address.
Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction.
Request deletion of a new service account.
Attempt
Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated with the account.
[No fields]
Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction.
[No fields]
The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh services and applications are described in the Mesh Security Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] .
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in this document
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] .
| [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] | Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide", Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-09, July 2019. |
| [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] | Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh Part VII: Security Considerations", Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-01, July 2019. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC3339] | Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002. |
| [RFC4648] | Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006. |
| [RFC7230] | Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014. |
| [RFC8446] | Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018. |
| [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] | Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference Implementation", Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer-08, April 2019. |
| [ECMA-262] | Ecma International, "ECMAScript(R) 2017 Language Specification", June 2017. |