| Internet-Draft | DNSSEC Algorithms Update Process | July 2024 |
| Hardaker & Kumari | Expires 8 January 2025 | [Page] |
<EDITOR NOTE: This document does not change the status (MUST, MAY, RECOMMENDED, etc) of any of the algorithms listed in [RFC8624]; that is the work of future documents. Instead, this document moves the canonical list of algorithms from [RFC8624] to an IANA registry. This is done for two reasons: 1) to allow the list to be updated more easily, and, much more importantly, 2) to allow the list to be more easily referenced.>¶
The DNSSEC protocol makes use of various cryptographic algorithms to provide authentication of DNS data and proof of non-existence. To ensure interoperability between DNS resolvers and DNS authoritative servers, it is necessary to specify both a set of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidelines to ensure that there is at least one algorithm that all implementations support. This document updates [RFC8624] by moving the canonical source of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for DNSSEC from [RFC8624] to an IANA registry. Future extensions to this registry can be made under new, incremental update RFCs.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 January 2025.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC9364] is used to provide authentication of DNS data. The DNSSEC signing algorithms are defined by various RFCs, including [RFC4034], [RFC4509], [RFC5155], [RFC5702], [RFC5933], [RFC6605], [RFC8080].¶
To ensure interoperability, a set of "mandatory-to-implement" DNSKEY algorithms are defined in [RFC8624]. To make the current status of the algorithms more easily accessible and understandable, and to make future changes to these recommendations easier to publish, this document moves the canonical status of the algorithms from [RFC8624] to the IANA DNSSEC algorithm registries. Additionally, as advice to operators, it adds recommendations for deploying and the usage of these algorithms.¶
<Editor: This is similar to the process used for the [TLS-ciphersuites] registry, where the canonical list of ciphersuites is in the IANA registry, and the RFCs reference the IANA registry.>¶
The recommendations columns added to the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" and "Digest Algorithms" IANA tables target DNSSEC operators and implementers.¶
Implementations need to meet both high security expectations as well as provide interoperability between various vendors and with different versions.¶
The field of cryptography evolves continuously. New, stronger algorithms appear, and existing algorithms may be found to be less secure then originally thought. Therefore, algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time in order to reflect the new reality, and to allow for a smooth transition to more secure algorithms, as well as deprecation of algorithms deemed to no longer be secure.¶
Cryptographic algorithm choices implemented in and required by software must be conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm compromise.¶
The perspective of implementers may differ from that of an operator who wishes to deploy and configure DNSSEC with only the safest algorithm. As such this document also adds new recommendations about which algorithms should be deploy regardless of implementation status. In general it is expected that deployment of aging algorithms should generally be reduced before implementations stop supporting them.¶
By the time a DNSSEC cryptographic algorithm is made mandatory-to-implement, it should already be available in most implementations. This document defines an IANA registration modification to allow future documents to specify the implementation recommendations for each algorithm, as the recommendation status of each DNSSEC cryptographic algorithm is expected to change over time. For example, there is no guarantee that newly introduced algorithms will become mandatory-to-implement in the future. Likewise, published algorithms are continuously subjected to cryptographic attack and may become too weak, or even be completely broken, and will require deprecation in the future.¶
It is expected that the deprecation of an algorithm will be performed gradually. This provides time for implementations to update their implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable. Unless there are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be downgraded from MUST to NOT RECOMMENDED or MAY, instead of directly from MUST to MUST NOT. Similarly, an algorithm that has not been mentioned as mandatory-to-implement is expected to be first introduced as RECOMMENDED instead of a MUST.¶
Since the effect of using an unknown DNSKEY algorithm is that the zone is treated as insecure, it is recommended that algorithms which have been downgraded to NOT RECOMMENDED or lower not be used by authoritative nameservers and DNSSEC signers to create new DNSKEY's. This will allow for deprecated algorithms to become used less and less over time. Once an algorithm has reached a sufficiently low level of deployment, it can be marked as MUST NOT, so that recursive resolvers can remove support for validating it.¶
Validating recursive resolvers are encouraged to retain support for all algorithms not marked as MUST NOT.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
[RFC2119] considers the term SHOULD equivalent to RECOMMENDED, and SHOULD NOT equivalent to NOT RECOMMENDED. The authors of this document have chosen to use the terms RECOMMENDED and NOT RECOMMENDED, as this more clearly expresses the recommendations to implementers.¶
Per this document, the following columns are being added to the following DNSSEC algorithm tables registered with IANA:¶
| Table | Column added |
|---|---|
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Use for DNSSSEC Signing |
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Use for DNSSSEC Validation |
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Implement for DNSSSEC Signing |
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Implement for DNSSSEC Validation |
| Digest Algorithsm | Use for DNSSSEC Delegation |
| Digest Algorithsm | Use for DNSSSEC Validation |
| Digest Algorithsm | Implement for DNSSSEC Delegation |
| Digest Algorithsm | Implement for DNSSSEC Validation |
Table 1
¶
Adding a new entry to the "DNS System Algorithm Numbers" registry with a recommended value of MAY in the "Use for DNSSSEC Signing", "Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Signing", or "Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns requires RFC publication. Adding a new entry to, or changing existing values in, the "DNS System Algorithm Numbers" registry for the "Use for DNSSSEC Signing", "Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Signing", or "Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns to any other value than MAY requires a Standards Action.¶
Adding a new entry to the "Digest Algorithms" registry with a recommended value of MAY in the "Use for DNSSSEC Delegation", "Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Delegation", or "Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns requires RFC publication. Adding a new entry to, or changing existing values in, the "DNS System Algorithm Numbers" registry for the "Use for DNSSSEC Delegation", "Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Delegation", or "Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns to any other value than MAY requires a Standards Action.¶
If an item is not marked as "RECOMMENDED", it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that the item either has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases.¶
The following sections state the initial values to be populated into these rows, with Implementation values transcribed from [RFC8624]. Use for columns was also set to the same values from [RFC8624], as there is no existing documented values and general interpretation of the tables to date indicate they should be the same, although may differ in the future.¶
Initial recommendation columns of use and implementation recommendations for the "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers" are show in Table 2.¶
<Editor's note: A space was deliberately added to "RSASHA1-NSEC3- SHA1" to make the table fit within the standard internet draft text width. Additionally the algorithm number column was abbreviated to 'N'.>¶
| N | Mnemonics | Use for DNSSEC Signing | Use for DNSSEC Validation | Implement for DNSSEC Signing | Implement for DNSSEC Validation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | RSAMD5 | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | MUST NOT |
| 3 | DSA | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | MUST NOT |
| 5 | RSASHA1 | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST |
| 6 | DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | MUST NOT |
| 7 | RSASHA1-NSEC3- SHA1 | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST |
| 8 | RSASHA256 | MUST | MUST | MUST | MUST |
| 10 | RSASHA512 | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST |
| 12 | ECC-GOST | MUST NOT | MAY | MUST NOT | MAY |
| 13 | ECDSAP256SHA256 | MUST | MUST | MUST | MUST |
| 14 | ECDSAP384SHA384 | MAY | RECOMMENDED | MAY | RECOMMENDED |
| 15 | ED25519 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED |
| 16 | ED448 | MAY | RECOMMENDED | MAY | RECOMMENDED |
Table 2
¶
Initial recommendation columns of use and implementation recommendations for the "DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms" registry are shown in Table 3.¶
| Number | Mnemonics | Use for DNSSEC Delegation | Use for DNSSEC Validation | Implement for DNSSEC Delegation | Implement for DNSSEC Validation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | NULL (CDS only) | MUST NOT [*] | MUST NOT [*] | MUST NOT [*] | MUST NOT [*] |
| 1 | SHA-1 | MUST NOT | MUST | MUST NOT | MUST |
| 2 | SHA-256 | MUST | MUST | MUST | MUST |
| 3 | GOST R 34.11-94 | MUST NOT | MAY | MUST NOT | MAY |
| 4 | SHA-384 | MAY | RECOMMENDED | MAY | RECOMMENDED |
Table 3
¶
This document makes no modifications to the security of the existing protocol or recommendations described in [RFC8624]. Thus the security considerations remain the same, which we quote below.¶
The security of cryptographic systems depends on both the strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on the engineering of the protocol used by the system to ensure that there are no non- cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the overall system.¶
This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic algorithms for the use of DNSSEC, specifically with the selection of "mandatory-to-implement" algorithms. The algorithms identified in this document as MUST or RECOMMENDED to implement are not known to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research so far leads us to believe that they are likely to remain secure into the foreseeable future. However, this isn't necessarily forever, and it is expected that future documents will be issued from time to time to reflect the current best practices in this area.¶
Retiring an algorithm too soon would result in a zone signed with the retired algorithm being downgraded to the equivalent of an unsigned zone. Therefore, algorithm deprecation must be done very slowly and only after careful consideration and measurement of its use.¶
DNSKEY algorithm rollover in a live zone is a complex process. See [RFC6781] and [RFC7583] for guidelines on how to perform algorithm rollovers.¶
DS algorithm rollover in a live zone is also a complex process. Upgrading algorithm at the same time as rolling the new KSK key will lead to DNSSEC validation failures, and users MUST upgrade the DS algorithm first before rolling the Key Signing Key.¶
The IANA is requested to update the [DNSKEY-IANA] and [DS-IANA] registries according the following sections.¶
This document requests IANA update the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry ([DNSKEY-IANA]) table with the following additional columns:¶
"Use for DNSSEC Signing"¶
"Use for DNSSEC Validation"¶
"Implement for DNSSEC Signing"¶
"Implement for DNSSEC Validation"¶
These values should be populated using values from Table 2 of this document.¶
Additional, the registration policy for the [DNSKEY-IANA] registy should match the text describing the requirements in this document.¶
This document requests IANA update the "Digest Algorithms" registry ([DS-IANA]) table with the following additional columns:¶
"Use for DNSSEC Delegation"¶
"Use for DNSSEC Validation"¶
"Implement for DNSSEC Delegation"¶
"Implement for DNSSEC Validation"¶
These values should be populated using values from Table 3 of this document.¶
Update the registration policy for the [DNSKEY-IANA] registry to match the text describing update requirements above.¶
This document is based on, and extends, RFC 8624, which was authored by Paul Wouters, and Ondrej Sury.¶
The contents of this document was heavily discussed by participants of the DNSOP working group. We appreciate the thoughtfulness of the many opinions expressed by working group participants that all helped shaped this document.¶
Changed the columns being added from 2 per table to 4, based on discussion within the dnsop working group mailing list. This was a fairly major set of changes.¶