Registration Protocols Extensions S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Updates: 7484 (if approved) A. Newton
Intended status: Best Current Practice ARIN
Expires: April 6, 2017 October 3, 2016

Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Object Tagging
draft-hollenbeck-regext-rdap-object-tag-00

Abstract

The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) includes a method that can be used to identify the authoritative server for processing domain name, IP address, and autonomous system number queries. The method does not describe how to identify the authoritative server for processing other RDAP query types, such as entity queries. This limitation exists because the identifiers associated with these query types are typically unstructured. This document describes an operational practice that can be used to add structure to RDAP identifiers that makes it possible to identify the authoritative server for additional RDAP queries.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) includes a method ([RFC7484]) that can be used to identify the authoritative server for processing domain name, IP address, and autonomous system number (ASN) queries. This method works because each of these data elements is structured in a way that facilitates automated parsing of the element and association of the data element with a particular RDAP service provider. For example, domain names include labels (such as "com", "net", and "org") that are associated with specific service providers.

As noted in Section 9 of RFC 7484 [RFC7484], the method does not describe how to identify the authoritative server for processing entity queries, name server queries, help queries, or queries using certain search patterns. This limitation exists because the identifiers bound to these queries are typically not structured in a way that makes it easy to associate an identifier with a specific service provider. This document describes an operational practice that can be used to add structure to RDAP identifiers that makes it possible to identify the authoritative server for additional RDAP queries.

2. Object Naming Practice

Tagging object identifiers with a service provider tag makes it possible to identify the authoritative server for processing an RDAP query using the method described in RFC 7484 [RFC7484]. A service provider tag is constructed by concatenating the Unicode HYPHEN-MINUS character '-' (U+002D) to an IANA-registered value that represents the service provider. For example, a tag for a service provider identified by the string value "ARIN" is represented as "-ARIN".

Service provider tags are concatenated to the end of RDAP query object identifiers to unambiguously identify the authoritative server for processing an RDAP query. Building on the example from Section 3.1.5 of RFC 7482 [RFC7482], an RDAP entity handle can be constructed that allows an RDAP client to bootstrap an entity query. The following identifier is used to find information for the entity associated with handle "XXXX" at service provider "ARIN":

XXXX-ARIN

Clients that wish to bootstrap an entity query can parse this identifier into distinct handle and service provider identifier elements. Handles can themselves contain HYPHEN-MINUS characters; the service provider identifier is found following the last (reading from left to right) HYPHEN-MINUS character in the tagged identifier. The service provider identifier is used to retrieve a base RDAP URL from an IANA registry. The base URL and entity handle are then used to form a complete RDAP query path segment. For example, if the base RDAP URL "https://example.com/rdap/" is associated with service provider "YYYY" in an IANA registry, an RDAP client will parse a tagged entity identifier "XXXX-YYYY" into distinct handle ("XXXX") and service provider ("YYYY") identifiers. The service provider identifier "YYYY" is used to query an IANA registry to retrieve the base RDAP URL "https://example.com/rdap/". The base RDAP URL is concatenated to the entity handle to create a complete RDAP query path segment of "https://example.com/rdap/entity/XXXX-YYYY".

Implementation of this practice requires tagging of unstructured potential query identifiers in RDAP responses. Consider these elided examples from Section 5.3 of RFC 7483 [RFC7483] in which the handle identifiers have been tagged with a service provider tag:

{
  "objectClassName" : "domain",
  "handle" : "XXXX-RIR",
  "ldhName" : "0.2.192.in-addr.arpa",
  "nameservers" :
  [
    ...
  ],
  "secureDNS":
  {
    ...
  },
  "remarks" :
  [
    ...
  ],
  "links" :
  [
    ...
  ],
  "events" :
  [
    ...
  ],
  "entities" :
  [
    {
      "objectClassName" : "entity",
      "handle" : "XXXX-RIR",
      "vcardArray":
      [
        ...
      ],
      "roles" : [ "registrant" ],
      "remarks" :
      [
        ...
      ],
      "links" :
      [
        ...
      ],
      "events" :
      [
        ...
      ]
    }
  ],
  "network" :
  {
    "objectClassName" : "ip network",
    "handle" : "XXXX-RIR",
    "startAddress" : "192.0.2.0",
    "endAddress" : "192.0.2.255",
    "ipVersion" : "v6",
    "name": "NET-RTR-1",
    "type" : "DIRECT ALLOCATION",
    "country" : "AU",
    "parentHandle" : "YYYY-RIR",
    "status" : [ "active" ]
  }
}
        

Figure 1

{
  "objectClassName" : "domain",
  "handle" : "XXXX-DNR",
  "ldhName" : "xn--fo-5ja.example",
  "unicodeName" : "foo.example",
  "variants" :
  [
    ...
  ],
  "status" : [ "locked", "transfer prohibited" ],
  "publicIds":
  [
    ...
  ],
  "nameservers" :
  [
    {
      "objectClassName" : "nameserver",
      "handle" : "XXXX-DNR",
      "ldhName" : "ns1.example.com",
      "status" : [ "active" ],
      "ipAddresses" :
      {
        ...
      },
      "remarks" :
      [
        ...
      ],
      "links" :
      [
        ...
      ],
      "events" :
      [
        ...
      ]
    },
    {
      "objectClassName" : "nameserver",
      "handle" : "XXXX-DNR",
      "ldhName" : "ns2.example.com",
      "status" : [ "active" ],
      "ipAddresses" :
      {
        ...
      },
      "remarks" :
      [
        ...
      ],
      "links" :
      [
        ...
      ],
      "events" :
      [
        ...
      ]
    }
   ],
   "secureDNS":
   {
     ...
   },
   "remarks" :
   [
     ...
   ],
   "links" :
   [
     ...
   ],
   "port43" : "whois.example.net",
   "events" :
   [
     ...
   ],
   "entities" :
   [
     {
       "objectClassName" : "entity",
       "handle" : "XXXX-8",
       "vcardArray":
       [
         ...
       ],
       "status" : [ "validated", "locked" ],
       "roles" : [ "registrant" ],
       "remarks" :
       [
         ...
       ],
       "links" :
       [
         ...
       ],
       "events" :
       [
         ...
       ]
     }
   ]
}
        

Figure 2

3. Bootstrap Service Registry for RDAP Service Providers

The bootstrap service registry for the RDAP service provider space is represented using the structure specified in Section 3 of RFC 7484 [RFC7484]. The JSON output of this registry contains alphanumeric identifiers that identify RDAP service providers, grouped by base RDAP URLs, as shown in this example.

{
  "version": "1.0",
  "publication": "YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ",
  "description": "RDAP bootstrap file for service provider allocations",
  "services": [
    [
      ["YYYY"],
      [
        "https://example.com/rdap/"
      ]
    ],
    [
      ["ZZ54"],
      [
        "http://rdap.example.org/"
      ]
    ],
    [
      ["1754"],
      [
        "https://example.net/rdap/",
        "http://example.net/rdap/"
      ]
    ]
  ]
 }
          

Figure 3

Alphanumeric service provider identifiers conform to the syntax specified in the IANA registry of Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Repository Identifiers, with one exception: identifiers always start with a letter to avoid confusion with network handles of the form "NET-192-0-0-0-1" that always end with a HYPHEN-MINUS character followed by a number.

3.1. Registration Procedure

The service provider registry is populated using the "First Come First Served" policy defined in RFC 5226 [RFC5226]. Provider identifier values can be derived and assigned by IANA on request. Registration requests include the requested service provider identifier (or an indication that IANA should assign an identifier) and the base RDAP URL to be associated with the service provider identifier.

4. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to create the RDAP Bootstrap Services Registry listed below and make it available as JSON objects. The contents of this registry is described in Section 3, with the formal syntax specified in Section 10 of RFC 7484 [RFC7484].

4.1. Bootstrap Service Registry for RDAP Service Providers

Entries in this registry contain at least the following:

  • An alpanumeric value that identifies the RDAP service provider being registered.
  • One or more URLs that provide the RDAP service regarding this registration.

5. Security Considerations

This practice helps to ensure that end users will get RDAP data from an authoritative source using a bootstrap method to find authoritative RDAP servers, reducing the risk of sending queries to non-authoritative sources. The method has the same security properties as the RDAP protocols themselves. The transport used to access the IANA registries can be more secure by using TLS [RFC5246], which IANA supports. Additional considerations associated with RDAP are described in RFC 7481 [RFC7481].

6. Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to the development of this document: TBD. In addition, the authors would like to recognize the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) operators (AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, and RIPE) that have been implementing and using the practice of tagging handle identifiers for several years. Their experience provided significant inspiration for the development of this document.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data (RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March 2015.

7.2. Informative References

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008.
[RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015.
[RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015.
[RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483, DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015.

Appendix A. Change Log

00:
Initial version.

Authors' Addresses

Scott Hollenbeck Verisign Labs 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 USA EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
Andrew Lee Newton American Registry for Internet Numbers PO Box 232290 Centreville, VA 20120 US EMail: andy@arin.net URI: http://www.arin.net