Network Working Group P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track W. Denniss
Expires: February 12, 2017 Google
M. Ansari
Cisco
August 11, 2016

Security Event Token (SET)
draft-hunt-idevent-token-02

Abstract

This specification defines the Security Event token which may be distributed via a protocol such as HTTP. A Security Event Token (SET) is based on the JSON Web Token and may be optionally signed and/or encrypted. A SET describes a statement of fact that may be shared by an event publisher with registered subscribers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 12, 2017.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction and Overview

This specification defines an extensible security event token (SET) format which may be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. The specification builds on the JSON Web Token format [RFC7519] in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally signed using JSON Web Signature [RFC7515] and/or encrypted using JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516].

For the purpose of this specification an event is a statement of fact by a publisher (also known as the event issuer) that the state of a security subject (e.g. a web resource, token, IP address) it controls or is aware of, has changed in some way (explicitly or implicitly). A security subject may be permanent (e.g. a User account) or temporary (e.g. a login session) in nature. A state change may include direct changes of entity state, implicit changes to state or other higher-level security statements such as:

Based on some agreed upon criteria for an event feed, the publisher distributes events to the appropriate subscribers. While an event may be delivered via synchronous means (e.g. HTTP POST), the distribution of the event often happens asynchronously to the change of state which generated the security event. As an example, an OAuth2 Authorization server [RFC6749], having received a token revocation request [RFC7009], may issue a token revocation event to downstream web resource providers. Having been informed of a token revocation, the OAuth2 web resource service provider may add the token identifier to its local revocation list assuming the token has not already expired.

A subscriber having received an event, validates and interprets the event and takes its own independent action, if any. For example, having been informed of a personal identifier now being associated with a different security subject (i.e. is being used by someone-else), the subscriber may choose to ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources associated with the previous user. Or it may not have any relationship with the subject and no action is taken.

While subscribers will often take actions upon receiving one or more events, events MUST NOT be assumed to be commands or requests. To do so requires complex bi-directional signals and error recovery mechanisms which fall outside the scope of this specification. The intent of this specification is to define a way of exchanging statements of fact that subscribers may interpret for their own purposes. Since events are typically historical statements by a publisher and are not commands, idempotency or lack there of, does not apply.

Unless otherwise specified, this specification uses example events intended as non-normative examples showing how an event may be used. It is expected that other specifications will use this specification to define normative events.

This specification is scoped to security and identity related events. While event tokens may be used for other purposes, the specification only considers security and privacy concerns relevant to identity and personal information.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously specify requirements of the protocol or application features and behavior that affect the inter-operability and security of implementations. When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their natural-language sense.

For purposes of readability examples are not URL encoded. Implementers MUST percent encode URLs as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC3986].

Throughout this documents all figures MAY contain spaces and extra line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some URI's contained within examples, have been shortened for space and readability reasons.

1.2. Definitions

The following definitions are used with Identity Events:

Feed Publisher

The Feed Publisher provides events to be distributed to registered subscribers. In JWT terminology, the Feed Publisher is also known as the issuer iss).
Event

An event is a security event token that is a statement that is to be distributed to one or more registered subscribers. An event is constructed as a JWT token and MAY be signed or encrypted using JWS/JWE for authentication and confidentiality reasons.
Feed

A feed a logical grouping of events or a context under which events may be issued. An interested client registers with the Feed Publisher to subscribe to events associated with a feed. How a feed is defined or the method for subscription is out-of-scope of this specification.
Subscriber

A Subscriber registers to receive event notifications from a Feed Publisher using a protocol such as HTTP. The method of registration and delivery is out-of-scope of this specification.
Security Subject

The security subject about which the event is about. A security subject may be a principle (e.g. Section 4.1.2 [RFC7519]), a web resource, or other thing such as an IP address about which an Event is about.

2. Events

A SET conveys a statement (in the form of a JWT token [RFC7519]) about a Security Subject that may be of interest to a subscriber or set of subscribers receiving events from a Feed Publisher.

The schema and structure of an event follows the JWT [RFC7519] specification. An event token has the following characteristics: iss and aud, an SET contains the attribute events with at least one URI value used to indicate the type of event that has occurred and what information (attributes) may be present in the event token. and what type of event (e.g. resource modified) is contained in the event token.

In addition to the JWT attributes

An event MAY contain an attribute for each value of events whose value is a JSON object (also known as an event extension object) that contains additional attributes relevant to the specified event URI. For example, many events will include an iss that identifies the context of the Security Subject being reported (as distinct from the issuer of the SET), and a sub or jti or some other attribute that uniquely identifies the Security Subject.

The following is a non-normative example showing a password change event that conveys a SCIM event (see [idevent-scim]):

{ 
  "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
  "events":[
    "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset",
    "https://example.com/scim/event/password"
  ],
  "iat": 1458496025,
  "iss": "https://scim.example.com",  
  "aud":[
    "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
    "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
  ],  
  "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset":{
    "id":"44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
    "sub": 
      "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"
  },
  "https://example.com/scim/event/password":{
     "resetAttempts":5
  }
}

Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event

The event in the figure above expresses hypothetical password reset event for SCIM [RFC7644]. The JWT consists of:

Additional extensions to an event may be added by adding more values to the events attribute. For each event URI value specified, there MAY be a corresponding attribute that has a JSON object that contains the attributes associated with that event (e.g. https://example.com/scim/event/password). In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the value for "resetAttempts" is actually part of its own JSON object https://example.com/scim/event/password.

Here is another example event token, this one for a Logout Token:

{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
  "iat": 1458668180,
  "exp": 1458668580,
  "events": [
    "https://specs.openid.net/logout"
  ],
  "https://specs.openid.net/logout": {
    "iss": "https://token.example.com",
    "sub": "248289761001",
    "jti": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02"
  }
}

Figure 2: Example OpenID Logout Event

In the following example, a fictional medical service collects consent for medical actions and notifies other parties. The individual for whom consent is identified was originally authenticated via OpenID Connect. In this case, the issuer of the SET event is an application rather than the OpenID provider:

{ 
  "jti": "fb4e75b5411e4e19b6c0fe87950f7749",
  "events":[
    "https://openid.net/heart/consent.html"
  ],
  "iat": 1458496025,
  "iss": "https://my.examplemed.com",  
  "aud":[
    "https://examplemedlab/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754"
  ],  
  "https://openid.net/heart/consent":{
    "iss": "https://token.example.com",
    "sub": "248289761001",
    "consentUri":[
      "https://terms.examplemed.com/labdisclosure.html#Agree"
    ]
  }
}

Figure 3: Example Consent Event

2.1. Core Event Attributes

The following are attributes that are based on [RFC7519] claim definitions and are profiled for use in an event token:

jti

As defined by Section 4.1.7 [RFC7519] contains a unique identifier for an event. The identifier SHOULD be unique within a particular event feed and MAY be used by clients to track whether a particular event has already been received. This attribute is REQUIRED.
iss

A single valued String containing the URI of the service provider publishing the event (the issuer). This attribute is REQUIRED.
aud

A multi-valued String containing the URIs representing the audience of the event. Values are typically URLs of the feeds the event is associated with. When an event has multiple audiences that go to the same subscriber, the publisher is not obligated to deliver repeated events to the same subscriber. This attribute is RECOMMENDED.
iat

As defined by Section 4.1.6 [RFC7519], a value containing a NumericDate which represents when the event was issued. Unless otherwise specified, the value SHOULD be interpreted by the subscriber as equivalent to the actual time of the event. This attribute is REQUIRED.
nbf

As defined by Section 4.1.5 [RFC7519], a value containing a NumericDate which represents a future date when the event will occur. This attribute is OPTIONAL.

The following is a new attribute defined by this specification:

events

A multi-valued String that contains the URIs of event types contained within the JWT. Values in this attribute further indicate what other JSON objects are present within the parent JSON event structure. Each OPTIONAL JSON sub-object is denoted by an attribute that matches a value in events. This attribute is REQUIRED.

2.2. Security Event Token Construction

A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is constructed by building a JSON structure that constitutes an event object and which is then used as the body of a JWT.

While this specification uses JWT to convey a SET, implementers SHALL NOT use SETs to convey authentication or authorization assertions.

The following is an example event token (it has been modified for readability):

{  
  "jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
  "iat": 1458496404,
  "iss": "https://scim.example.com",  
  "aud":[
   "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
   "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
  ],  
  
  "events":[
    "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create"
  ],
  "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create":{
    "ref": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
    "attributes":["id","name","userName","password","emails"],
    "values":{
      "emails":[
       {"type":"work","value":"jdoe@example.com"}
      ],
      "password":"not4u2no",
      "userName":"jdoe",
      "id":"44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
      "name":{
        "givenName":"John",
        "familyName":"Doe"
      }
    }  
  }
}

Figure 4: Example Event JSON Data

When transmitted, the above JSON body must be converted into a JWT as per [RFC7519]. In this example, because the event contains attribute values, the token MUST be encrypted per JWE (see [RFC7516]) before transmission.

The following is an example of a SCIM Event expressed in an unsecured JWT token. The JWT header of:

{"alg":"none"}

Base64url encoding of the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the header yields:

eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0

The example JSON Event Data is encoded as follows:
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The encoded JWS signature is the empty string. Concatenating the parts yields:

eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
.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.

Figure 5: Example Unsecured Event Token

To create and or validate a signed or encrypted SET follow the instructions in section 7 of [RFC7519].

3. Security Considerations

SETs may often contain sensitive information. Therefore methods for distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].

Security Events distributed through third-parties or that carry personally identifiable information, SHOULD be encrypted using JWE [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.

Security Events distributed without authentication over the channel, such as via TLS ([RFC5246] and [RFC6125]), and/or OAuth2 [RFC6749], or Basic Authentication [RFC7617], MUST be signed using JWS [RFC7515] so that individual events MAY be authenticated and validated by the subscriber.

4. Privacy Considerations

If an SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to provide verification of its authenticity.

Event Publishers should attempt to specialize feeds so that the content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.

When sharing personally identifiable information or information that is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, the publishers and subscribers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements and user consent in place.

The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally identifiable information. Where possible, publishers and subscribers should devise approaches the prevents propagation. For example the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to already know the subject.

5. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA requirements.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R. and P. Saint-Andre, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015.

6.2. Informative References

[idevent-scim] Oracle Corporation, "SCIM Event Extensions (work in progress)"
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Dronia, S. and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 2014.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015.
[RFC7644] Hunt, P., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E. and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644, September 2015.

Appendix A. Contributors

Appendix B. Acknowledgments

The editor would like to thank the participants in the id-events mailing list and related working groups for their support of this specification.

Appendix C. Change Log

Draft 00 - PH - First Draft

Draft 01 - PH - Fixed some alignment issues with JWT. Remove event type attribute.

Draft 02 - PH - Renamed to Security Events, Removed questions, clarified examples and intro text, and added security and privacy section.

Authors' Addresses

Phil Hunt (editor) Oracle Corporation EMail: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
William Denniss Salesforce.com EMail: wdenniss@google.com
Morteza Ansari Cisco EMail: morteza.ansari@cisco.com