| Network Working Group | C. Filsfils, Ed. |
| Internet-Draft | Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| Intended status: Standards Track | S. Previdi |
| Expires: September 26, 2019 | Huawei |
| J. Leddy | |
| Individual | |
| S. Matsushima | |
| Softbank | |
| D. Voyer, Ed. | |
| Bell Canada | |
| March 25, 2019 |
IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)
draft-ietf-6man-segment-routing-header-17
Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane using a new type of Routing Extension Header. This document describes the Segment Routing Extension Header and how it is used by Segment Routing capable nodes.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 26, 2019.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane using a new type of Routing Extension Header (SRH). This document describes the Segment Routing Extension Header and how it is used by Segment Routing capable nodes.
The Segment Routing Architecture [RFC8402] describes Segment Routing and its instantiation in two data planes MPLS and IPv6.
The encoding of IPv6 segments in the Segment Routing Extension Header is defined in this document.
Terminology used within this document is defined in detail in [RFC8402]. Specifically, these terms: Segment Routing, SR Domain, SRv6, Segment ID (SID), SRv6 SID, Active Segment, and SR Policy.
Routing Headers are defined in [RFC8200]. The Segment Routing Header has a new Routing Type (suggested value 4) to be assigned by IANA.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Routing Type | Segments Left |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Last Entry | Flags | Tag |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Segment List[0] (128 bits IPv6 address) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
...
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Segment List[n] (128 bits IPv6 address) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// //
// Optional Type Length Value objects (variable) //
// //
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
where:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|U U U U U U U U|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is defined as follows:
This section defines TLVs of the Segment Routing Header.
TLVs are present when the Hdr Ext Len exceeds the Last Entry element in the Segment List.
While processing TLVs at a segment endpoint, TLVs MUST be fully contained within the SRH as determined by the Hdr Ext Len. Detection of TLVs exceeding the boundary of the SRH Hdr Ext Len results in an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the Source Address, pointing to the Hdr Ext Len field of the SRH, and the packet being discarded.
0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+----------------------- | Type | Length | Variable length data +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-----------------------
Type: An 8 bit value. Unrecognized Types MUST be ignored on receipt.
Length: The length of the Variable length data. It is RECOMMENDED that the total length of new TLVs be multiple of 8 bytes to avoid the use of Padding TLVs.
Variable length data: Length bytes of data that is specific to the Type.
Type Length Value (TLV) contain OPTIONAL information that may be used by the node identified in the Destination Address (DA) of the packet.
Each TLV has its own length, format and semantic. The code-point allocated (by IANA) to each TLV Type defines both the format and the semantic of the information carried in the TLV. Multiple TLVs may be encoded in the same SRH.
TLVs may change en route at each segment. To identify when a TLV type may change en route the most significant bit of the Type has the following significance: [RFC4302].
Identifying which TLVs change en route, without having to understand the Type, is required for Authentication Header Integrity Check Value (ICV) computation. Any TLV that changes en route is considered mutable for the purpose of ICV computation, the Type Length and Variable Length Data is ignored for the purpose of ICV Computation as defined in
The "Length" field of the TLV is used to skip the TLV while inspecting the SRH in case the node doesn't support or recognize the Type. The "Length" defines the TLV length in octets, not including the "Type" and "Length" fields.
The following TLVs are defined in this document:
Additional TLVs may be defined in the future.
There are two types of padding TLVs, pad0 and padN, the following applies to both:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A single Pad0 TLV MUST be used when a single byte of padding is required. If more than one byte of padding is required a Pad0 TLV MUST NOT be used, the PadN TLV MUST be used.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Padding (variable) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ // Padding (variable) // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The PadN TLV MUST be used when more than one byte of padding is required.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | RESERVED | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | HMAC Key ID (4 octets) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | // | HMAC (32 octets) // | // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ where:
The keyed Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) TLV is OPTIONAL and has the following format:
The HMAC TLV is used to verify the source of a packet is permitted to use the current segment in the destination address of the packet, and ensure the segment list is not modified in transit.
Local policy determines when to check for an HMAC and potentially provides an alternate composition of Text, and a requirement on where the HMAC TLV must appear (e.g. first TLV), and whether or not to verify the destination address is equal to the current segment. This local policy is outside the scope of this document. It may be based on the active segment at an SR Segment endpoint node, the result of an ACL that considers incoming interface, HMAC Key ID, or other packet fields.
An implementation that supports the generation and verification of the HMAC SHOULD support the following default behavior as defined in the remainder of this section.
The HMAC verification begins by checking the current segment is equal to the destination address of the IPv6 header, i.e. destination address is equal to Segment List [Segments Left] and Segments Left is less than or equal to Last Segment+1.
The HMAC field is the output of the HMAC computation as defined in [RFC2104], using:
The HMAC digest is truncated to 32 octets and placed in the HMAC field of the HMAC TLV.
For HMAC algorithms producing digests less than 32 octets, the digest is placed in the lowest order octets of the HMAC field. Remaining octets MUST be set to zero.
If HMAC verification is successful, the packet is forwarded to the next segment.
If HMAC verification fails, an ICMP error message (parameter problem, error code 0, pointing to the HMAC TLV) SHOULD be generated (but rate limited) and SHOULD be logged.
The HMAC Key ID field allows for the simultaneous existence of several hash algorithms (SHA-256, SHA3-256 ... or future ones) as well as pre-shared keys.
The HMAC Key ID field is opaque, i.e., it has neither syntax nor semantic except as an identifier of the right combination of pre-shared key and hash algorithm, and except that a value of 0 means that there is no HMAC field.
At the HMAC TLV verification node the Key ID uniquely identifies the pre-shared key and HMAC algorithm.
At the HMAC TLV generating node the Key ID and destination address uniquely identify the pre-shared key and HMAC algorithm. Utilizing the destination address with the Key ID allows for overlapping key IDs amongst different HMAC verification nodes. The Text for the HMAC computation is set to the IPv6 header fields and SRH fields as they would appear at the verification node, not necessarily the same as the source node sending a packet with the HMAC TLV.
Pre-shared key roll-over is supported by having two key IDs in use while the HMAC TLV generating node and verifying node converge to a new key.
SRH implementations can support multiple hash functions but MUST implement SHA-2 [FIPS180-4] in its SHA-256 variant.
The selection of pre-shared key and algorithm, and their distribution is outside the scope of this document, some options may include:
There are different types of nodes that may be involved in segment routing networks: source SR nodes originate packets with a segment in the destination address of the IPv6 header, transit nodes that forward packets destined to a remote segment, and SR segment endpoint nodes that process a local segment in the destination address of an IPv6 header.
A Source SR Node is any node that originates an IPv6 packet with a segment (i.e. SRv6 SID) in the destination address of the IPv6 header. The packet leaving the source SR Node may or may not contain an SRH. This includes either:
The mechanism through which a segment in the destination address of the IPv6 header and the Segment List in the SRH, is derived is outside the scope of this document.
A transit node is any node forwarding an IPv6 packet where the destination address of that packet is not locally configured as a segment nor a local interface. A transit node is not required to be capable of processing a segment nor SRH.
A SR segment endpoint node is any node receiving an IPv6 packet where the destination address of that packet is locally configured as a segment or local interface.
This section describes SRv6 packet processing at the SR source, Transit and SR segment endpoint nodes.
A Source node steers a packet into an SR Policy. If the SR Policy results in a segment list containing a single segment, and there is no need to add information to SRH flag or TLV, the DA is set to the single segment list entry and the SRH MAY be omitted.
When needed, the SRH is created as follows:
When a source does not require the entire SID list to be preserved in the SRH, a reduced SRH may be used.
A reduced SRH does not contain the first segment of the related SR Policy (the first segment is the one already in the DA of the IPv6 header), and the Last Entry field is set to n-2 where n is the number of elements in the SR Policy.
As specified in [RFC8200], the only node allowed to inspect the Routing Extension Header (and therefore the SRH), is the node corresponding to the DA of the packet. Any other transit node MUST NOT inspect the underneath routing header and MUST forward the packet toward the DA according to its IPv6 routing table.
When a SID is in the destination address of an IPv6 header of a packet, it's routed through an IPv6 network as an IPv6 address. SIDs, or the prefix(es) covering SIDs, and their reachability may be distributed by means outside the scope of this document. For example, [RFC5308] or [RFC5340] may be used to advertise a prefix covering the SIDs on a node.
Without constraining the details of an implementation, the SR segment endpoint node creates Forwarding Information Base (FIB) entries for its local SIDs.
A FIB entry that represents a locally instantiated SRv6 SID
A FIB entry that represents a local interface, not locally
instantiated as an SRv6 SID
A FIB entry that represents a non-local route
No Match
When an SRv6-capable node receives an IPv6 packet, it performs a longest-prefix-match lookup on the packets destination address. This lookup can return any of the following:
This document, and section, defines a single SRv6 SID called END. Future documents may define additional SRv6 SIDs. In which case, the entire content of this section will be defined in that document.
If the FIB entry represents a locally instantiated SRv6 SID, process the next header of the IPv6 header as defined in section 4 of [RFC8200]
The following sections describe the actions to take while processing next header fields of the IPv6, and subsequent extension headers in the order they are received.
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If Segments Left is equal to zero {
S03. Proceed to process the next header in the packet,
whose type is identified by the Next Header field in
the Routing header.
S04. }
S05. Else {
S06. If local policy requires TLV processing {
S07. Perform TLV processing (see TLV Processing)
S08. }
S09. max_last_entry = ( Hdr Ext Len / 2 ) - 1
S10. If ((Last Entry > max_last_entry) or
S11. (Segments Left is greater than (Last Entry+1)) {
S12. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to
the Source Address, pointing to the Segments Left
field, and discard the packet.
S13. }
S14. Else {
S15. Decrement Segments Left by 1.
S16. Copy Segment List[Segments Left] from the SRH to the
destination address of the IPv6 header.
S17. If the IPv6 Hop Limit is less than or equal to 1 {
S18. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded -- Hop Limit Exceeded in
Transit message to the Source Address and discard
the packet.
S19. }
S20. Else {
S21. Decrement the Hop Limit by 1
S22. Resubmit the packet to the IPv6 module for transmission
to the new destination.
S23. }
S24. }
S25. }
S26. }
Local policy determines how TLV's are to be processed when the Active Segment is a local END SID. The definition of local policy is outside the scope of this document.
For illustration purpose only, two example local policies that may be associated with an END SID are provided below.
Example 1:
For any packet received from interface I2
Skip TLV processing
Example 2:
For any packet received from interface I1
If first TLV is HMAC {
Process the HMAC TLV
}
Else {
Discard the packet
}
When processing the Upper-layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an SRv6 END SID.
IF (Upper-layer Header is IPv4 or IPv6) and local policy permits {
Perform IPv6 decapsulation
Resubmit the decapsulated packet to the IPv4 or IPv6 module
}
ELSE {
Send an ICMP parameter problem message to the Source Address and
discard the packet. Error code (TBD by IANA) "SR Upper-layer
Header Error", pointer set to the offset of the upper-layer
header.
}
A unique error code allows an SR Source node to recognize an error in SID processing at an endpoint.
If the FIB entry represents a local interface, not locally instantiated as an SRv6 SID, the SRH is processed as follows:
Processing is not changed by this document.
Processing is not changed by this document.
The use of the SIDs exclusively within the SR Domain and solely for packets of the SR Domain is an important deployment model.
This enables the SR Domain to act as a single routing system.
This section covers:
Nodes outside the SR Domain are not trusted: they cannot directly use the SID's of the domain. This is enforced by two levels of access control lists:
All intra SR Domain packets are of the SR Domain. The IP v6 header is originated by a node of the SR Domain, and is destined to a node of the SR Domain.
All inter domain packets are encapsulated for the part of the packet journey that is within the SR Domain. The outer IPv6 header is originated by a node of the SR Domain, and is destined to a node of the SR Domain.
As a consequence, any packet within the SR Domain is of the SR Domain.
The SR Domain is a system in which the operator may want to distribute or delegate different operations of the outer most header to different nodes within the system.
An operator of an SR domain may choose to delegate SRH addition to a host node within the SR domain, and validation of the contents of any SRH to a more trusted router or switch attached to the host. Consider a top of rack switch (T) connected to host (H) via interface (I). H receives an SRH (SRH1) with a computed HMAC via some SDN method outside the scope of this document. H classifies traffic it sources and adds SRH1 to traffic requiring a specific SLA. T is configured with an IACL on I requiring verification of the SRH for any packet destined to the SID block of the SR Domain (S/s). T checks and verifies that SRH1 is valid, contains an HMAC TLV and verifies the HMAC.
Within the SR Domain, well known mitigation techniques are RECOMMENDED, such as deploying a greater MTU value within the SR Domain than at the ingress edges.
Within the domain, an SR source node which includes SRH and AH extension headers can predict the content of the SRH and calculate the ICV at the SR source node, ensuring it can be confirmed at the destination.
Within the domain, an SR source node may include SRH and ESP extension headers. Only the data following the ESP header is included in ICV computation. SRH precedes ESP.
ICMP error packets generated within the SR Domain are sent to source nodes within the SR Domain. The invoking packet in the ICMP error message may contain an SRH. Since the destination address of a packet with an SRH changes as each segment is processed, it may not be the destination used by the socket or application that generated the invoking packet.
For the source of an invoking packet to process the ICMP error message, the correct destination address must be determined. The following logic is used to determine the destination address for use by protocol error handlers.
ICMP errors are then processed by upper layer transports as defined in [RFC4443].
For IP packets encapsulated in an outer IPv6 header, ICMP error handling is as defined in [RFC2473].
For any inter domain packet, the SR Source node MUST impose a flow label computed based on the inner packet. The computation of the flow label is as recommended in [RFC6438] for the sending Tunnel End Point.
For any intra domain packet, the SR Source node SHOULD impose a flow label computed as described in [RFC6437] to assist ECMP load balancing at transit nodes incapable of computing a 5-tuple beyond the SRH.
At any transit node within an SR domain, the flow label MUST be used as defined in [RFC6438] to calculate the ECMP hash toward the destination address. If flow label is not used, the transit node would likely hash all packets between a pair of SR Edge nodes to the same link.
At an SR segment endpoint node, the flow label MUST be used as defined in [RFC6438] to calculate any ECMP hash used to forward the processed packet to the next segment.
Other deployment models and their implications on security, MTU, HMAC, ICMP error processing and interaction with other extension headers are outside the scope of this document.
This section provides illustrations of SRv6 packet processing at SR source, transit and SR segment endpoint nodes.
For a node k, its IPv6 address is represented as Ak, its SRv6 SID is represented as Sk.
IPv6 headers are represented as the tuple of (source, destination). For example, a packet with source address A1 and destination address A2 is represented as (A1,A2). The payload of the packet is omitted.
An SR Policy is a list of segments. A list of segments is represented as <S1,S2,S3> where S1 is the first SID to visit, S2 is the second SID to visit and S3 is the last SID to visit.
(SA,DA) (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents an IPv6 packet with:
Segments Left=2
Last Entry=2
Flags=0
Tag=0
Segment List[0]=S3
Segment List[1]=S2
Segment List[2]=S1
At its SR Policy headend, the Segment List <S1,S2,S3> results in SRH (S3,S2,S1; SL=2) represented fully as:
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * +
* [8] [9] *
| |
* | | *
[1]----[3]--------[5]----------------[6]---------[4]---[2]
* | | *
| |
* | | *
+--------[7]-------+
* *
+ * * * * * * * SR Domain * * * * * * * +
Figure 3
The following topology is used in examples below:
When host 8 sends a packet to host 9 via an SR Policy <S7,A9> the packet is
P1: (A8,S7)(A9,S7; SL=1)
When host 8 sends a packet to host 9 via an SR Policy <S7,A9> and it wants to use a reduced SRH, the packet is
P2: (A8,S7)(A9; SL=1)
When host 1 sends a packet to host 2, the packet is
P3: (A1,A2)
The SR Domain ingress router 3 receives P3 and steers it to SR Domain egress router 4 via an SR Policy <S7, S4>. Router 3 encapsulates the received packet P3 in an outer header with an SRH. The packet is
P4: (A3, S7)(S4, S7; SL=1)(A1, A2)
If the SR Policy contains only one segment (the egress router 4), the ingress Router 3 encapsulates P3 into an outer header (A3, S4). The packet is
P5: (A3, S4)(A1, A2)
The SR Domain ingress router 3 receives P3 and steers it to SR Domain egress router 4 via an SR Policy <S7, S4>. If router 3 wants to use a reduced SRH, Router 3 encapsulates the received packet P3 in an outer header with a reduced SRH. The packet is
P6: (A3, S7)(S4; SL=1)(A1, A2)
When host 8 sends a packet to host 1, the packet is encapsulated for the portion of its journey within the SR Domain. From 8 to 3 the packet is
P7: (A8,S3)(A8,A1)
In the opposite direction, the packet generated from 1 to 8 is
P8: (A1,A8)
At node 3 P8 is encapsulated for the portion of its journey within the SR domain. Resulting in
P9: (A3,S8)(A1,A8)
At node 9 the outer IPv6 header is removed by S6 processing then processed again when received by A8.
Nodes 5 acts as transit nodes for packet P1, and sends packet
P1: (A8,S7)(A9,S7;SL=1)
on the interface toward node 7.
Node 7 receives packet P1 and, using the logic in Section 4.3.1, sends packet
P7: (A8,A9)(A9,S7; SL=0)
on the interface toward router 6.
This section describes how a function may be delegated within the SR Domain to non SR source nodes. In the following sections consider a host 8 connected to a top of rack 5.
An operator may prefer to add the SRH at source 8, while 5 verifies the SID list is valid.
For illustration purpose, an SDN controller provides 8 an SRH terminating at node 9, with segment list <S5,S7,S6,A9>, and HMAC TLV computed for the SRH. The HMAC key is shared with 5, node 8 does not know the key. Node 5 is configured with an IACL applied to the interface connected to 8, requiring HMAC verification for any packet destined to S/s.
Node 8 originates packets with the received SRH with HMAC TLV.
P15:(A8,S5)(A9,S6,S7,S5;SL=3;HMAC)
Node 5 receives and verifies the HMAC for the SRH, then forwards the packet to the next segment
P16:(A8,S7)(A9,S6,S7,S5;SL=2;HMAC)
Node 6 receives
P17:(A8,S6)(A9,S6,S7,S5;SL=1;HMAC)
Node 9 receives
P18:(A8,A9)(A9,S6,S7,S5;SL=0;HMAC)
This use of an HMAC is particularly valuable within an enterprise based SR Domain [SRN].
This section reviews security considerations related to the SRH, given the SRH processing and deployment models discussed in this document.
As describe in Section 5, it is necessary to filter packets ingress to the SR Domain destined to segments within the SR Domain. This ingress filtering is via an IACL at SR Domain ingress border nodes. Additional protection is applied via an IACL at each SR Segment Endpoint node, filtering packets not from within the SR Domain, destined to SIDs in the SR Domain. ACLs are easily supported for small numbers of prefixes, making summarization important, and when the prefixes requiring filtering is kept to a seldom changing set.
Additionally, ingress filtering of IPv6 source addresses as recommended in BCP38 SHOULD be used.
[RFC5095] deprecates the Type 0 Routing header due to a number of significant attacks that are referenced in that document. Such attacks include bypassing filtering devices, reaching otherwise unreachable Internet systems, network topology discovery, bandwidth exhaustion, and defeating anycast.
Because this document specifies that the SRH is for use within an SR domain protected by ingress filtering via IACLs; such attacks cannot be mounted from outside an SR Domain. As specified in this document, SR Domain ingress edge nodes drop packets entering the SR Domain destined to segments within the SR Domain.
Additionally, this document specifies the use of IACL on SR Segment Endpoint nodes within the SR Domain to limit the source addresses permitted to send packets to a SID in the SR Domain.
Such attacks may, however, be mounted from within the SR Domain, from nodes permitted to source traffic to SIDs in the domain. As such, these attacks and other known attacks on an IP network (e.g. DOS/DDOS, topology discovery, man-in-the-middle, traffic interception/siphoning), can occur from compromised nodes within an SR Domain.
Service theft is defined as the use of a service offered by the SR Domain by a node not authorized to use the service.
Service theft is not a concern within the SR Domain as all SR Source nodes and SR segment endpoint nodes within the domain are able to utilize the services of the Domain. If a node outside the SR Domain learns of segments or a topological service within the SR domain, IACL filtering denies access to those segments.
The SRH may contains SIDs of some intermediate SR-nodes in the path towards the destination, this reveals those addresses to attackers if they are able to intercept packets containing SRH.
This is applicable within an SR Domain but the disclosure is less relevant as an attacker has other means of learning topology.
The generation of ICMPv6 error messages may be used to attempt denial-of-service attacks by sending an error-causing destination address or SRH in back-to-back packets. An implementation that correctly follows Section 2.4 of [RFC4443] would be protected by the ICMPv6 rate-limiting mechanism.
Suggested Description Reference Value ---------------------------------------------------------- 4 Segment Routing Header (SRH) This document
This document makes the following registrations in the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters "Routing Type" registry maintained by IANA:
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the SRH, in accordance with BCP 26, [RFC8126].
The following terms are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "namespace", "assigned value", "registration".
The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private Use", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification Required", "IETF Consensus", "Standards Action".
For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be consulted, the responsible IESG area director should appoint the Designated Expert. The intention is that any allocation will be accompanied by a published RFC. In order to allow for the allocation of values prior to the RFC being approved for publication, the Designated Expert can approve allocations once it seems clear that an RFC will be published. The Designated expert will post a request to the 6man WG mailing list (or a successor designated by the Area Director) for comment and review, including an Internet-Draft. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and publish a notice of the decision to the 6man WG mailing list or its successor, as well as informing IANA. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation, and in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the request can be modified so as to become acceptable should be provided.
This document requests the creation of a new IANA managed registry to identify SRH Flags Bits. The registration procedure is "Expert Review" as defined in [RFC8126]. Suggested registry name is "Segment Routing Header Flags". Flags is 8 bits.
Suggested Description Reference Value ----------------------------------------------------- 5 HMAC TLV This document 128 Pad0 TLV This document 129 PadN TLV This document
This document requests the creation of a new IANA managed registry to identify SRH TLVs. The registration procedure is "Expert Review" as defined in [RFC8126]. Suggested registry name is "Segment Routing Header TLVs". A TLV is identified through an unsigned 8 bit codepoint value. The following codepoints are defined in this document:
This section is to be removed prior to publishing as an RFC.
Name: Linux Kernel v4.14
Status: Production
Implementation: adds SRH, performs END processing, supports HMAC TLV
Details: https://irtf.org/anrw/2017/anrw17-final3.pdf and [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-interop]
Name: IOS XR and IOS XE
Status: Production (IOS XR), Pre-protuction (IOS XE)
Implementation: adds SRH, performs END processing, no TLV processing
Details: [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-interop]
Name: VPP/Segment Routing for IPv6
Status: Production
Implementation: adds SRH, performs END processing, no TLV processing
Details: https://wiki.fd.io/view/VPP/Segment_Routing_for_IPv6 and [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-interop]
Name: Barefoot Networks Tofino NPU
Status: Prototype
Implementation: performs END processing, no TLV processing
Details: [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-interop]
Name: Juniper Networks Trio and vTrio NPU's
Status: Prototype & Experimental
Implementation: SRH insertion mode, Process SID where SID is an interface address, no TLV processing
Name: Huawei Systems VRP Platform
Status: Production
Implementation: adds SRH, performs END processing, no TLV processing
Kamran Raza, Darren Dukes, Brian Field, Daniel Bernier, Ida Leung, Jen Linkova, Ebben Aries, Tomoya Kosugi, Eric Vyncke, David Lebrun, Dirk Steinberg, Robert Raszuk, Dave Barach, John Brzozowski, Pierre Francois, Nagendra Kumar, Mark Townsley, Christian Martin, Roberta Maglione, James Connolly, Aloys Augustin contributed to the content of this document.
The authors would like to thank Ole Troan, Bob Hinden, Ron Bonica, Fred Baker, Brian Carpenter, Alexandru Petrescu, Punit Kumar Jaiswal, and David Lebrun for their comments to this document.