Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)

3.1. OAuth 2.0

The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a client to obtain scoped access to a resource with the permission of a resource owner. Authorization information, or references to it, is passed between the nodes using access tokens. These access tokens are issued to clients by an authorization server with the approval of the resource owner. The client uses the access token to access the protected resources hosted by the resource server.¶

A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this specification:¶

The token and introspection Endpoints:

The AS hosts the token endpoint that allows a client to request access tokens. The client makes a POST request to the token endpoint on the AS and receives the access token in the response (if the request was successful).¶

In some deployments, a token introspection endpoint is provided by the AS, which can be used by the RS if it needs to request additional information regarding a received access token. The RS makes a POST request to the introspection endpoint on the AS and receives information about the access token in the response. (See "Introspection" below.)¶

Access Tokens:

Access tokens are credentials needed to access protected resources. An access token is a data structure representing authorization permissions issued by the AS to the client. Access tokens are generated by the AS and consumed by the RS. The access token content is opaque to the client.¶

Access tokens can have different formats, and various methods of utilization e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security requirements of the given deployment.¶

Refresh Tokens:

Refresh tokens are credentials used to obtain access tokens. Refresh tokens are issued to the client by the authorization server and are used to obtain a new access token when the current access token becomes invalid or expires, or to obtain additional access tokens with identical or narrower scope (such access tokens may have a shorter lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by the resource owner). Issuing a refresh token is optional at the discretion of the authorization server. If the authorization server issues a refresh token, it is included when issuing an access token (i.e., step (B) in Figure 1).¶

A refresh token in OAuth 2.0 is a string representing the authorization granted to the client by the resource owner. The string is usually opaque to the client. The token denotes an identifier used to retrieve the authorization information. Unlike access tokens, refresh tokens are intended for use only with authorization servers and are never sent to resource servers. In this framework, refresh tokens are encoded in binary instead of strings, if used.¶

Proof of Possession Tokens:

A token may be bound to a cryptographic key, which is then used to bind the token to a request authorized by the token. Such tokens are called proof-of-possession tokens (or PoP tokens).¶

The proof-of-possession (PoP) security concept used here assumes that the AS acts as a trusted third party that binds keys to tokens. In the case of access tokens, these so called PoP keys are then used by the client to demonstrate the possession of the secret to the RS when accessing the resource. The RS, when receiving an access token, needs to verify that the key used by the client matches the one bound to the access token. When this specification uses the term "access token" it is assumed to be a PoP access token token unless specifically stated otherwise.¶

The key bound to the token (the PoP key) may use either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. The appropriate choice of the kind of cryptography depends on the constraints of the IoT devices as well as on the security requirements of the use case.¶

Symmetric PoP key:

The AS generates a random symmetric PoP key. The key is either stored to be returned on introspection calls or encrypted and included in the token. The PoP key is also encrypted for the token recipient and sent to the recipient together with the token.¶

Asymmetric PoP key:

An asymmetric key pair is generated on the token's recipient and the public key is sent to the AS (if it does not already have knowledge of the recipient's public key). Information about the public key, which is the PoP key in this case, is either stored to be returned on introspection calls or included inside the token and sent back to the requesting party. The consumer of the token can identify the public key from the information in the token, which allows the recipient of the token to use the corresponding private key for the proof of possession.¶

The token is either a simple reference, or a structured information object (e.g., CWT [RFC8392]) protected by a cryptographic wrapper (e.g., COSE [RFC8152]). The choice of PoP key does not necessarily imply a specific credential type for the integrity protection of the token.¶

Scopes and Permissions:

In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is seeking to obtain (via the scope parameter) in the access token request. In turn, the AS may use the scope response parameter to inform the client of the scope of the access token issued. As the client could be a constrained device as well, this specification defines the use of CBOR encoding, see Section 5, for such requests and responses.¶

The values of the scope parameter in OAuth 2.0 are expressed as a list of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings, with a semantic that is well-known to the AS and the RS. More details about the concept of scopes is found under Section 3.3 in [RFC6749].¶

Claims:

Information carried in the access token or returned from introspection, called claims, is in the form of name-value pairs. An access token may, for example, include a claim identifying the AS that issued the token (via the "iss" claim) and what audience the access token is intended for (via the "aud" claim). The audience of an access token can be a specific resource or one or many resource servers. The resource owner policies influence what claims are put into the access token by the authorization server.¶

While the structure and encoding of the access token varies throughout deployments, a standardized format has been defined with the JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] where claims are encoded as a JSON object. In [RFC8392], an equivalent format using CBOR encoding (CWT) has been defined.¶

Introspection:

Introspection is a method for a resource server to query the authorization server for the active state and content of a received access token. This is particularly useful in those cases where the authorization decisions are very dynamic and/or where the received access token itself is an opaque reference rather than a self-contained token. More information about introspection in OAuth 2.0 can be found in [RFC7662].¶

3.2. CoAP

CoAP is an application layer protocol similar to HTTP, but specifically designed for constrained environments. CoAP typically uses datagram-oriented transport, such as UDP, where reordering and loss of packets can occur. A security solution needs to take the latter aspects into account.¶

While HTTP uses headers and query strings to convey additional information about a request, CoAP encodes such information into header parameters called 'options'.¶

CoAP supports application-layer fragmentation of the CoAP payloads through blockwise transfers [RFC7959]. However, blockwise transfer does not increase the size limits of CoAP options, therefore data encoded in options has to be kept small.¶

Transport layer security for CoAP can be provided by DTLS or TLS [RFC6347][RFC8446] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. CoAP defines a number of proxy operations that require transport layer security to be terminated at the proxy. One approach for protecting CoAP communication end-to-end through proxies, and also to support security for CoAP over a different transport in a uniform way, is to provide security at the application layer using an object-based security mechanism such as COSE [RFC8152].¶

One application of COSE is OSCORE [RFC8613], which provides end-to-end confidentiality, integrity and replay protection, and a secure binding between CoAP request and response messages. In OSCORE, the CoAP messages are wrapped in COSE objects and sent using CoAP.¶

This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CoAP as replacement for HTTP for use in constrained environments. For communication security this framework does not make an explicit protocol recommendation, since the choice depends on the requirements of the specific application. DTLS [RFC6347], [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] and OSCORE [RFC8613] are mentioned as examples, other protocols fulfilling the requirements from Section 6.5 are also applicable.¶

5.1. Discovering Authorization Servers

C must discover the AS in charge of RS to determine where to request the access token. To do so, C must 1. find out the AS URI to which the token request message must be sent and 2. MUST validate that the AS with this URI is authorized to provide access tokens for this RS.¶

In order to determine the AS URI, C MAY send an initial Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS. RS then denies the request and sends the address of its AS back to C (see Section 5.2). How C validates the AS authorization is not in scope for this document. C may, e.g., ask it's owner if this AS is authorized for this RS. C may also use a mechanism that addresses both problems at once.¶

5.2. Unauthorized Resource Request Message

An Unauthorized Resource Request message is a request for any resource hosted by RS for which the client does not have authorization granted. RSes MUST treat any request for a protected resource as an Unauthorized Resource Request message when any of the following hold:¶

• The request has been received on an unprotected channel.¶
• The RS has no valid access token for the sender of the request regarding the requested action on that resource.¶
• The RS has a valid access token for the sender of the request, but that token does not authorize the requested action on the requested resource.¶

Note: These conditions ensure that the RS can handle requests autonomously once access was granted and a secure channel has been established between C and RS. The authz-info endpoint, as part of the process for authorizing to protected resources, is not itself a protected resource and MUST NOT be protected as specified above (cf. Section 5.10.1).¶

Unauthorized Resource Request messages MUST be denied with an "unauthorized_client" error response. In this response, the Resource Server SHOULD provide proper AS Request Creation Hints to enable the Client to request an access token from RS's AS as described in Section 5.3.¶

The handling of all client requests (including unauthorized ones) by the RS is described in Section 5.10.2.¶

5.3. AS Request Creation Hints

The AS Request Creation Hints message is sent by an RS as a response to an Unauthorized Resource Request message (see Section 5.2) to help the sender of the Unauthorized Resource Request message acquire a valid access token. The AS Request Creation Hints message is a CBOR map, with an OPTIONAL element "AS" specifying an absolute URI (see Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]) that identifies the appropriate AS for the RS.¶

The message can also contain the following OPTIONAL parameters:¶

• A "audience" element containing a suggested audience that the client should request at the AS.¶
• A "kid" element containing the key identifier of a key used in an existing security association between the client and the RS. The RS expects the client to request an access token bound to this key, in order to avoid having to re-establish the security association.¶
• A "cnonce" element containing a client-nonce. See Section 5.3.1.¶
• A "scope" element containing the suggested scope that the client should request towards the AS.¶

Figure 2 summarizes the parameters that may be part of the AS Request Creation Hints.¶

        /-----------+----------+---------------------\
        | Name      | CBOR Key | Value Type          |
        |-----------+----------+---------------------|
        | AS        |     1    | text string         |
        | kid       |     2    | byte string         |
        | audience  |     5    | text string         |
        | scope     |     9    | text or byte string |
        | cnonce    |    39    | byte string         |
        \-----------+----------+---------------------/

Note that the schema part of the AS parameter may need to be adapted to the security protocol that is used between the client and the AS. Thus the example AS value "coap://as.example.com/token" might need to be transformed to "coaps://as.example.com/token". It is assumed that the client can determine the correct schema part on its own depending on the way it communicates with the AS.¶

Figure 3 shows an example for an AS Request Creation Hints message payload using CBOR [RFC8949] diagnostic notation, using the parameter names instead of the CBOR keys for better human readability.¶

    4.01 Unauthorized
    Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    Payload :
    {
     "AS" : "coaps://as.example.com/token",
     "audience" : "coaps://rs.example.com"
     "scope" : "rTempC",
     "cnonce" : h'e0a156bb3f'
    }

In the example above, the response parameter "AS" points the receiver of this message to the URI "coaps://as.example.com/token" to request access tokens. The RS sending this response (i.e., RS) uses an internal clock that is only loosely synchronized with the clock of the AS. Therefore it can not reliably verify the expiration time of access tokens it receives. To ensure a certain level of access token freshness nevetheless, the RS has included a cnonce parameter (see Section 5.3.1) in the response.¶

Figure 4 illustrates the mandatory to use binary encoding of the message payload shown in Figure 3.¶

a4                                   # map(4)
   01                                # unsigned(1) (=AS)
   78 1c                             # text(28)
      636f6170733a2f2f61732e657861
      6d706c652e636f6d2f746f6b656e   # "coaps://as.example.com/token"
   05                                # unsigned(5) (=audience)
   76                                # text(22)
      636f6170733a2f2f72732e657861
      6d706c652e636f6d               # "coaps://rs.example.com"
   09                                # unsigned(9) (=scope)
   66                                # text(6)
      7254656d7043                   # "rTempC"
   18 27                             # unsigned(39) (=cnonce)
   45                                # bytes(5)
      e0a156bb3f                     #

5.4. Authorization Grants

To request an access token, the client obtains authorization from the resource owner or uses its client credentials as a grant. The authorization is expressed in the form of an authorization grant.¶

The OAuth framework [RFC6749] defines four grant types. The grant types can be split up into two groups, those granted on behalf of the resource owner (password, authorization code, implicit) and those for the client (client credentials). Further grant types have been added later, such as [RFC7521] defining an assertion-based authorization grant.¶

The grant type is selected depending on the use case. In cases where the client acts on behalf of the resource owner, the authorization code grant is recommended. If the client acts on behalf of the resource owner, but does not have any display or has very limited interaction possibilities, it is recommended to use the device code grant defined in [RFC8628]. In cases where the client acts autonomously the client credentials grant is recommended.¶

For details on the different grant types, see section 1.3 of [RFC6749]. The OAuth 2.0 framework provides an extension mechanism for defining additional grant types, so profiles of this framework MAY define additional grant types, if needed.¶

5.5. Client Credentials

Authentication of the client is mandatory independent of the grant type when requesting an access token from the token endpoint. In the case of the client credentials grant type, the authentication and grant coincide.¶

Client registration and provisioning of client credentials to the client is out of scope for this specification.¶

The OAuth framework defines one client credential type in section 2.3.1 of [RFC6749]: client id and client secret. [I-D.erdtman-ace-rpcc] adds raw-public-key and pre-shared-key to the client credentials types. Profiles of this framework MAY extend with an additional client credentials type using client certificates.¶

5.6. AS Authentication

The client credential grant does not, by default, authenticate the AS that the client connects to. In classic OAuth, the AS is authenticated with a TLS server certificate.¶

Profiles of this framework MUST specify how clients authenticate the AS and how communication security is implemented. By default, server side TLS certificates, as defined by OAuth 2.0, are required.¶

5.7. The Authorization Endpoint

The OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource owner and obtain an authorization grant, in certain grant flows. The primary use case for the ACE-OAuth framework is for machine-to-machine interactions that do not involve the resource owner in the authorization flow; therefore, this endpoint is out of scope here. Future profiles may define constrained adaptation mechanisms for this endpoint as well. Non-constrained clients interacting with constrained resource servers can use the specification in section 3.1 of [RFC6749] and the attack countermeasures suggested in section 4.2 of [RFC6819].¶

5.8. The Token Endpoint

In standard OAuth 2.0, the AS provides the token endpoint for submitting access token requests. This framework extends the functionality of the token endpoint, giving the AS the possibility to help the client and RS to establish shared keys or to exchange their public keys. Furthermore, this framework defines encodings using CBOR, as a substitute for JSON.¶

The endpoint may, however, be exposed over HTTPS as in classical OAuth or even other transports. A profile MUST define the details of the mapping between the fields described below, and these transports. If HTTPS is used, JSON or CBOR payloads may be supported. If JSON payloads are used, the semantics of Section 4 of the OAuth 2.0 specification MUST be followed (with additions as described below). If CBOR payload is supported, the semantics described below MUST be followed.¶

For the AS to be able to issue a token, the client MUST be authenticated and present a valid grant for the scopes requested. Profiles of this framework MUST specify how the AS authenticates the client and how the communication between client and AS is protected, fulfilling the requirements specified in Section 5.¶

The default name of this endpoint in an url-path is '/token', however implementations are not required to use this name and can define their own instead.¶

The figures of this section use CBOR diagnostic notation without the integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for illustrative purposes. Note that implementations MUST use the integer abbreviations and the binary CBOR encoding, if the CBOR encoding is used.¶

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "client_id" : "myclient",
  "audience" : "tempSensor4711"
 }

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
OSCORE: 0x09, 0x05, 0x44, 0x6C
  (h=0, k=1, n=001, partialIV= 0x05, kid=[0x44, 0x6C])
Content-Format: "application/oscore"
Payload:
  0x44025d1 ... (full payload omitted for brevity) ... 68b3825e

Decrypted payload:
{
  "client_id" : "myclient",
  "req_cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : "EC",
      "kid" : h'11',
      "crv" : "P-256",
      "x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
      "y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
    }
  }
}

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "client_id" : "myclient",
  "audience" : "valve424",
  "scope" : "read",
  "req_cnf" : {
    "kid" : b64'6kg0dXJM13U'
  }
}W

        /-------------------+-------------------------------\
        | Parameter name    | Specified in                  |
        |-------------------+-------------------------------|
        | access_token      |  RFC 6749                     |
        | token_type        |  RFC 6749                     |
        | expires_in        |  RFC 6749                     |
        | refresh_token     |  RFC 6749                     |
        | scope             |  RFC 6749                     |
        | state             |  RFC 6749                     |
        | error             |  RFC 6749                     |
        | error_description |  RFC 6749                     |
        | error_uri         |  RFC 6749                     |
        | ace_profile       | [this document]               |
        | cnf               | [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]   |
        | rs_cnf           | [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]   |
        \-------------------+-------------------------------/

Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
   (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
   CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)',
  "ace_profile" : "coap_dtls",
  "expires_in" : "3600",
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : "Symmetric",
      "kid" : b64'39Gqlw',
      "k" : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxCcQh'
    }
  }
}

        /---------------------------+-------------\
        | Name                      | CBOR Values |
        |---------------------------+-------------|
        | invalid_request           |      1      |
        | invalid_client            |      2      |
        | invalid_grant             |      3      |
        | unauthorized_client       |      4      |
        | unsupported_grant_type    |      5      |
        | invalid_scope             |      6      |
        | unsupported_pop_key       |      7      |
        | incompatible_ace_profiles |      8      |
        \---------------------------+-------------/

        /--------------------+------------+------------------------\
        | Name               | CBOR Value | Original Specification |
        |--------------------+------------+------------------------|
        | password           |      0     |      [RFC6749]         |
        | authorization_code |      1     |      [RFC6749]         |
        | client_credentials |      2     |      [RFC6749]         |
        | refresh_token      |      3     |      [RFC6749]         |
        \--------------------+------------+------------------------/

        /-------------------+----------+---------------------\
        | Name              | CBOR Key | Value Type          |
        |-------------------+----------+---------------------|
        | access_token      | 1        | byte string         |
        | expires_in        | 2        | unsigned integer    |
        | audience          | 5        | text string         |
        | scope             | 9        | text or byte string |
        | client_id         | 24       | text string         |
        | client_secret     | 25       | byte string         |
        | response_type     | 26       | text string         |
        | redirect_uri      | 27       | text string         |
        | state             | 28       | text string         |
        | code              | 29       | byte string         |
        | error             | 30       | integer             |
        | error_description | 31       | text string         |
        | error_uri         | 32       | text string         |
        | grant_type        | 33       | unsigned integer    |
        | token_type        | 34       | integer             |
        | username          | 35       | text string         |
        | password          | 36       | text string         |
        | refresh_token     | 37       | byte string         |
        | ace_profile       | 38       | integer             |
        | cnonce            | 39       | byte string         |
        \-------------------+----------+---------------------/

5.9. The Introspection Endpoint

Token introspection [RFC7662] can be OPTIONALLY provided by the AS, and is then used by the RS and potentially the client to query the AS for metadata about a given token, e.g., validity or scope. Analogous to the protocol defined in [RFC7662] for HTTP and JSON, this section defines adaptations to more constrained environments using CBOR and leaving the choice of the application protocol to the profile.¶

Communication between the requesting entity and the introspection endpoint at the AS MUST be integrity protected and encrypted. The communication security protocol MUST also provide a binding between requests and responses. Furthermore the two interacting parties MUST perform mutual authentication. Finally the AS SHOULD verify that the requesting entity has the right to access introspection information about the provided token. Profiles of this framework that support introspection MUST specify how authentication and communication security between the requesting entity and the AS is implemented.¶

The default name of this endpoint in an url-path is '/introspect', however implementations are not required to use this name and can define their own instead.¶

The figures of this section uses CBOR diagnostic notation without the integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for better readability.¶

Note that supporting introspection is OPTIONAL for implementations of this framework.¶

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "introspect"
OSCORE: 0x09, 0x05, 0x25
Content-Format: "application/oscore"
Payload:
... COSE content ...

{
  "token" : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',
  "token_type_hint" : "PoP"
}

Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload:
{
  "active" : true,
  "scope" : "read",
  "ace_profile" : "coap_dtls",
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : "Symmetric",
      "kid" : b64'39Gqlw',
      "k" : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxCcQh'
    }
  }
}

    /-------------------+----------+-------------------------\
    | Parameter name    | CBOR Key | Value Type              |
    |-------------------+----------+-------------------------|
    | iss               | 1        | text string             |
    | sub               | 2        | text string             |
    | aud               | 3        | text string             |
    | exp               | 4        | integer or              |
    |                   |          |   floating-point number |
    | nbf               | 5        | integer or              |
    |                   |          |   floating-point number |
    | iat               | 6        | integer or              |
    |                   |          |   floating-point number |
    | cti               | 7        | byte string             |
    | scope             | 9        | text or byte string     |
    | active            | 10       | True or False           |
    | token             | 11       | byte string             |
    | client_id         | 24       | text string             |
    | error             | 30       | integer                 |
    | error_description | 31       | text string             |
    | error_uri         | 32       | text string             |
    | token_type_hint   | 33       | text string             |
    | token_type        | 34       | integer                 |
    | username          | 35       | text string             |
    | ace_profile       | 38       | integer                 |
    | cnonce            | 39       | byte string             |
    | exi               | 40       | unsigned integer        |
    \-------------------+----------+-------------------------/

5.10. The Access Token

This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CBOR web token (CWT) as specified in [RFC8392].¶

In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens, this document uses the "cnf" claim from [RFC8747] and the "scope" claim from [RFC8693] for JWT- and CWT-encoded tokens. In addition to string encoding specified for the "scope" claim, a binary encoding MAY be used. The syntax of such an encoding is explicitly not specified here and left to profiles or applications, specifically note that a binary encoded scope does not necessarily use the space character '0x20' to delimit scope-tokens.¶

If the AS needs to convey a hint to the RS about which profile it should use to communicate with the client, the AS MAY include an "ace_profile" claim in the access token, with the same syntax and semantics as defined in Section 5.8.4.3.¶

If the client submitted a client-nonce parameter in the access token request Section 5.8.4.4, the AS MUST include the value of this parameter in the "cnonce" claim specified here. The "cnonce" claim uses binary encoding.¶

6.1. Protecting Tokens

A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents of the access token by using a digital signature or a keyed message digest (MAC) or an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm. Consequently, the token integrity protection MUST be applied to prevent the token from being modified, particularly since it contains a reference to the symmetric key or the asymmetric key used for proof-of-possession. If the access token contains the symmetric key, this symmetric key MUST be encrypted by the authorization server so that only the resource server can decrypt it. Note that using an AEAD algorithm is preferable over using a MAC unless the token needs to be publicly readable.¶

If the token is intended for multiple recipients (i.e. an audience that is a group), integrity protection of the token with a symmetric key, shared between the AS and the recipients, is not sufficient, since any of the recipients could modify the token undetected by the other recipients. Therefore a token with a multi-recipient audience MUST be protected with an asymmetric signature.¶

It is important for the authorization server to include the identity of the intended recipient (the audience), typically a single resource server (or a list of resource servers), in the token. The same shared secret MUST NOT be used as proof-of-possession key with multiple resource servers since the benefit from using the proof-of-possession concept is then significantly reduced.¶

If clients are capable of doing so, they should frequently request fresh access tokens, as this allows the AS to keep the lifetime of the tokens short. This allows the AS to use shorter proof-of-possession key sizes, which translate to a performance benefit for the client and for the resource server. Shorter keys also lead to shorter messages (particularly with asymmetric keying material).¶

When authorization servers bind symmetric keys to access tokens, they SHOULD scope these access tokens to a specific permission.¶

In certain situations it may be necessary to revoke an access token that is still valid. Client-initiated revocation is specified in [RFC7009] for OAuth 2.0. Other revocation mechanisms are currently not specified, as the underlying assumption in OAuth is that access tokens are issued with a relatively short lifetime. This may not hold true for disconnected constrained devices, needing access tokens with relatively long lifetimes, and would therefore necessitate further standardization work that is out of scope for this document.¶

6.2. Communication Security

Communication with the authorization server MUST use confidentiality protection. This step is extremely important since the client or the RS may obtain the proof-of-possession key from the authorization server for use with a specific access token. Not using confidentiality protection exposes this secret (and the access token) to an eavesdropper thereby completely negating proof-of-possession security. The requirements for communication security of profiles are specified in Section 5.¶

Additional protection for the access token can be applied by encrypting it, for example encryption of CWTs is specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC8392]. Such additional protection can be necessary if the token is later transferred over an insecure connection (e.g. when it is sent to the authz-info endpoint).¶

Developers MUST ensure that the ephemeral credentials (i.e., the private key or the session key) are not leaked to third parties. An adversary in possession of the ephemeral credentials bound to the access token will be able to impersonate the client. Be aware that this is a real risk with many constrained environments, since adversaries can often easily get physical access to the devices. This risk can also be mitigated to some extent by making sure that keys are refreshed more frequently.¶

6.3. Long-Term Credentials

Both clients and RSs have long-term credentials that are used to secure communications, and authenticate to the AS. These credentials need to be protected against unauthorized access. In constrained devices, deployed in publicly accessible places, such protection can be difficult to achieve without specialized hardware (e.g. secure key storage memory).¶

If credentials are lost or compromised, the operator of the affected devices needs to have procedures to invalidate any access these credentials give and to revoke tokens linked to such credentials. The loss of a credential linked to a specific device MUST NOT lead to a compromise of other credentials not linked to that device, therefore secret keys used for authentication MUST NOT be shared between more than two parties.¶

Operators of clients or RS SHOULD have procedures in place to replace credentials that are suspected to have been compromised or that have been lost.¶

Operators also SHOULD have procedures for decommissioning devices, that include securely erasing credentials and other security critical material in the devices being decommissioned.¶

6.4. Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints

Initially, no secure channel exists to protect the communication between C and RS. Thus, C cannot determine if the AS Request Creation Hints contained in an unprotected response from RS to an unauthorized request (see Section 5.3) are authentic. C therefore MUST determine if an AS is authorized to provide access tokens for a certain RS.¶

A compromised RS may use the hints for attempting to trick a client into contacting an AS that is not supposed to be in charge of that RS. Therefore, C must not communicate with an AS if it cannot determine that this AS has the authority to issue access tokens for this RS. Otherwise, a compromised RS may use this to perform a denial of service attack against a specific AS, by redirecting a large number of client requests to that AS.¶

6.5. Minimal security requirements for communication

This section summarizes the minimal requirements for the communication security of the different protocol interactions.¶

C-AS

All communication between the client and the Authorization Server MUST be encrypted, integrity and replay protected. Furthermore responses from the AS to the client MUST be bound to the client's request to avoid attacks where the attacker swaps the intended response for an older one valid for a previous request. This requires that the client and the Authorization Server have previously exchanged either a shared secret or their public keys in order to negotiate a secure communication. Furthermore the client MUST be able to determine whether an AS has the authority to issue access tokens for a certain RS. This can for example be done through pre-configured lists, or through an online lookup mechanism that in turn also must be secured.¶

RS-AS

The communication between the Resource Server and the Authorization Server via the introspection endpoint MUST be encrypted, integrity and replay protected. Furthermore responses from the AS to the RS MUST be bound to the RS's request. This requires that the RS and the Authorization Server have previously exchanged either a shared secret, or their public keys in order to negotiate a secure communication. Furthermore the RS MUST be able to determine whether an AS has the authority to issue access tokens itself. This is usually configured out of band, but could also be performed through an online lookup mechanism provided that it is also secured in the same way.¶

C-RS

The initial communication between the client and the Resource Server can not be secured in general, since the RS is not in possession of on access token for that client, which would carry the necessary parameters. If both parties support DTLS without client authentication it is RECOMMEND to use this mechanism for protecting the initial communication. After the client has successfully transmitted the access token to the RS, a secure communication protocol MUST be established between client and RS for the actual resource request. This protocol MUST provide confidentiality, integrity and replay protection as well as a binding between requests and responses. This requires that the client learned either the RS's public key or received a symmetric proof-of-possession key bound to the access token from the AS. The RS must have learned either the client's public key or a shared symmetric key from the claims in the token or an introspection request. Since ACE does not provide profile negotiation between C and RS, the client MUST have learned what profile the RS supports (e.g. from the AS or pre-configured) and initiate the communication accordingly.¶

6.6. Token Freshness and Expiration

An RS that is offline faces the problem of clock drift. Since it cannot synchronize its clock with the AS, it may be tricked into accepting old access tokens that are no longer valid or have been compromised. In order to prevent this, an RS may use the nonce-based mechanism defined in Section 5.3 to ensure freshness of an Access Token subsequently presented to this RS.¶

Another problem with clock drift is that evaluating the standard token expiration claim "exp" can give unpredictable results.¶

Acceptable ranges of clock drift are highly dependent on the concrete application. Important factors are how long access tokens are valid, and how critical timely expiration of access token is.¶

The expiration mechanism implemented by the "exi" claim, based on the first time the RS sees the token was defined to provide a more predictable alternative. The "exi" approach has some drawbacks that need to be considered:¶

• A malicious client may hold back tokens with the "exi" claim in order to prolong their lifespan.¶
• If an RS loses state (e.g. due to an unscheduled reboot), it may loose the current values of counters tracking the "exi" claims of tokens it is storing.¶

The first drawback is inherent to the deployment scenario and the "exi" solution. It can therefore not be mitigated without requiring the the RS be online at times. The second drawback can be mitigated by regularly storing the value of "exi" counters to persistent memory.¶

6.7. Combining profiles

There may be use cases were different profiles of this framework are combined. For example, an MQTT-TLS profile is used between the client and the RS in combination with a CoAP-DTLS profile for interactions between the client and the AS. The security of a profile MUST NOT depend on the assumption that the profile is used for all the different types of interactions in this framework.¶

6.8. Unprotected Information

Communication with the authz-info endpoint, as well as the various error responses defined in this framework, all potentially include sending information over an unprotected channel. These messages may leak information to an adversary, or may be manipulated by active attackers to induce incorrect behavior. For example error responses for requests to the Authorization Information endpoint can reveal information about an otherwise opaque access token to an adversary who has intercepted this token.¶

As far as error messages are concerned, this framework is written under the assumption that, in general, the benefits of detailed error messages outweigh the risk due to information leakage. For particular use cases, where this assessment does not apply, detailed error messages can be replaced by more generic ones.¶

In some scenarios it may be possible to protect the communication with the authz-info endpoint (e.g. through DTLS with only server-side authentication). In cases where this is not possible this framework RECOMMENDS to use encrypted CWTs or tokens that are opaque references and need to be subjected to introspection by the RS.¶

If the initial unauthorized resource request message (see Section 5.2) is used, the client MUST make sure that it is not sending sensitive content in this request. While GET and DELETE requests only reveal the target URI of the resource, POST and PUT requests would reveal the whole payload of the intended operation.¶

Since the client is not authenticated at the point when it is submitting an access token to the authz-info endpoint, attackers may be pretending to be a client and trying to trick an RS to use an obsolete profile that in turn specifies a vulnerable security mechanism via the authz-info endpoint. Such an attack would require a valid access token containing an "ace_profile" claim requesting the use of said obsolete profile. Resource Owners should update the configuration of their RS's to prevent them from using such obsolete profiles.¶

6.9. Identifying audiences

The audience claim as defined in [RFC7519] and the equivalent "audience" parameter from [RFC8693] are intentionally vague on how to match the audience value to a specific RS. This is intended to allow application specific semantics to be used. This section attempts to give some general guidance for the use of audiences in constrained environments.¶

URLs are not a good way of identifying mobile devices that can switch networks and thus be associated with new URLs. If the audience represents a single RS, and asymmetric keys are used, the RS can be uniquely identified by a hash of its public key. If this approach is used this framework RECOMMENDS to apply the procedure from section 3 of [RFC6920].¶

If the audience addresses a group of resource servers, the mapping of group identifier to individual RS has to be provisioned to each RS before the group-audience is usable. Managing dynamic groups could be an issue, if any RS is not always reachable when the groups' memberships change. Furthermore, issuing access tokens bound to symmetric proof-of-possession keys that apply to a group-audience is problematic, as an RS that is in possession of the access token can impersonate the client towards the other RSs that are part of the group. It is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED to issue access tokens bound to a group audience and symmetric proof-of possession keys.¶

Even the client must be able to determine the correct values to put into the "audience" parameter, in order to obtain a token for the intended RS. Errors in this process can lead to the client inadvertently obtaining a token for the wrong RS. The correct values for "audience" can either be provisioned to the client as part of its configuration, or dynamically looked up by the client in some directory. In the latter case the integrity and correctness of the directory data must be assured. Note that the "audience" hint provided by the RS as part of the "AS Request Creation Hints" Section 5.3 is not typically source authenticated and integrity protected, and should therefore not be treated a trusted value.¶

6.10. Denial of service against or with Introspection

The optional introspection mechanism provided by OAuth and supported in the ACE framework allows for two types of attacks that need to be considered by implementers.¶

First, an attacker could perform a denial of service attack against the introspection endpoint at the AS in order to prevent validation of access tokens. To maintain the security of the system, an RS that is configured to use introspection MUST NOT allow access based on a token for which it couldn't reach the introspection endpoint.¶

Second, an attacker could use the fact that an RS performs introspection to perform a denial of service attack against that RS by repeatedly sending tokens to its authz-info endpoint that require an introspection call. RS can mitigate such attacks by implementing rate limits on how many introspection requests they perform in a given time interval for a certain client IP address submitting tokens to /authz-info. When that limit has been reached, incoming requests from that address are rejected for a certain amount of time. A general rate limit on the introspection requests should also be considered, to mitigate distributed attacks.¶

8.1. ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints

This specification establishes the IANA "ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, be supplied as well.¶

The columns of the registry are:¶

Name

The name of the parameter¶

CBOR Key

CBOR map key for the parameter. Different ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.¶

Value Type

The CBOR data types allowable for the values of this parameter.¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the request creation hint abbreviation, if one exists.¶

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 2. The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.¶

8.2. CoRE Resource Type registry

IANA is requested to register a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" subregistry under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" [IANA.CoreParameters] registry:¶

rt="ace.ai". This resource type describes an ACE-OAuth authz-info endpoint resource.¶

Specific ACE-OAuth profiles can use this common resource type for defining their profile-specific discovery processes.¶

8.3. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

This specification registers the following error values in the OAuth Extensions Error registry [IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry].¶

• Error name: unsupported_pop_key¶
• Error usage location: token error response¶
• Related protocol extension: [this document]¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 5.8.3 of [this document]¶

• Error name: incompatible_ace_profiles¶
• Error usage location: token error response¶
• Related protocol extension: [this document]¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 5.8.3 of [this document]¶

8.4. OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings Registry

This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126], except for the value range designated for private use.¶

The columns of the registry are:¶

Name

The OAuth Error Code name, refers to the name in Section 5.2. of [RFC6749], e.g., "invalid_request".¶

CBOR Value

CBOR abbreviation for this error code. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as "Private Use", all other values use the registration policy "Expert Review" [RFC8126].¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the error code abbreviation, if one exists.¶

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 10. The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.¶

8.5. OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings

This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126], except for the value range designated for private use.¶

The columns of this registry are:¶

Name

The name of the grant type as specified in Section 1.3 of [RFC6749].¶

CBOR Value

CBOR abbreviation for this grant type. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as "Private Use", all other values use the registration policy "Expert Review" [RFC8126].¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the grant type abbreviation, if one exists.¶

Original Specification

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the grant type, if one exists.¶

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 11. The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.¶

8.6. OAuth Access Token Types

This section registers the following new token type in the "OAuth Access Token Types" registry [IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes].¶

• Type name: PoP¶
• Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: "cnf", "rs_cnf" see section 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params].¶
• HTTP Authentication Scheme(s): N/A¶
• Change Controller: IETF¶
• Specification document(s): [this document]¶

8.7. OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings

This specification established the IANA "OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126], except for the value range designated for private use.¶

The columns of this registry are:¶

Name

The name of token type as registered in the OAuth Access Token Types registry, e.g., "Bearer".¶

CBOR Value

CBOR abbreviation for this token type. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as "Private Use", all other values use the registration policy "Expert Review" [RFC8126].¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the OAuth token type abbreviation, if one exists.¶

Original Specification

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the OAuth token type, if one exists.¶

8.8. ACE Profile Registry

This specification establishes the IANA "ACE Profile" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126]. It should be noted that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, be supplied as well.¶

The columns of this registry are:¶

Name

The name of the profile, to be used as value of the profile attribute.¶

Description

Text giving an overview of the profile and the context it is developed for.¶

CBOR Value

CBOR abbreviation for this profile name. Different ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as "Expert Review". Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the profile abbreviation, if one exists.¶

This registry will be initially empty and will be populated by the registrations from the ACE framework profiles.¶

8.9. OAuth Parameter Registration

This specification registers the following parameter in the "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]:¶

• Name: ace_profile¶
• Parameter Usage Location: token response¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.8.2 and Section 5.8.4.3 of [this document]¶

8.10. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry

This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126], except for the value range designated for private use.¶

The columns of this registry are:¶

Name

The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth parameter registry, e.g., "client_id".¶

CBOR Key

CBOR map key for this parameter. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as "Private Use", all other values use the registration policy "Expert Review" [RFC8126].¶

Value Type

The allowable CBOR data types for values of this parameter.¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the OAuth parameter abbreviation, if one exists.¶

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 12. The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.¶

8.11. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration

This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth Token Introspection Response registry [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse].¶

• Name: ace_profile¶
• Description: The ACE profile used between client and RS.¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.9.2 of [this document]¶

• Name: cnonce¶
• Description: "client-nonce". A nonce previously provided to the AS by the RS via the client. Used to verify token freshness when the RS cannot synchronize its clock with the AS.¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.9.2 of [this document]¶

• Name: exi¶
• Description: "Expires in". Lifetime of the token in seconds from the time the RS first sees it. Used to implement a weaker from of token expiration for devices that cannot synchronize their internal clocks.¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.9.2 of [this document]¶

8.12. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings Registry

This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings" registry. The registry has been created to use the "Expert Review" registration procedure [RFC8126], except for the value range designated for private use.¶

The columns of this registry are:¶

Name

The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth parameter registry, e.g., "client_id".¶

CBOR Key

CBOR map key for this parameter. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as "Private Use", all other values use the registration policy "Expert Review" [RFC8126].¶

Value Type

The allowable CBOR data types for values of this parameter.¶

Reference

This contains a pointer to the public specification of the introspection response parameter abbreviation, if one exists.¶

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 16. The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.¶

Note that the mappings of parameters corresponding to claim names intentionally coincide with the CWT claim name mappings from [RFC8392].¶

8.13. JSON Web Token Claims

This specification registers the following new claims in the JSON Web Token (JWT) registry of JSON Web Token Claims [IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]:¶

• Claim Name: ace_profile¶
• Claim Description: The ACE profile a token is supposed to be used with.¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.10 of [this document]¶

• Claim Name: cnonce¶
• Claim Description: "client-nonce". A nonce previously provided to the AS by the RS via the client. Used to verify token freshness when the RS cannot synchronize its clock with the AS.¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.10 of [this document]¶

• Claim Name: exi¶
• Claim Description: "Expires in". Lifetime of the token in seconds from the time the RS first sees it. Used to implement a weaker from of token expiration for devices that cannot synchronize their internal clocks.¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Reference: Section 5.10.3 of [this document]¶

8.14. CBOR Web Token Claims

This specification registers the following new claims in the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims].¶

• Claim Name: ace_profile¶
• Claim Description: The ACE profile a token is supposed to be used with.¶
• JWT Claim Name: ace_profile¶
• Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 38)¶
• Claim Value Type(s): integer¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 5.10 of [this document]¶

• Claim Name: cnonce¶
• Claim Description: The client-nonce sent to the AS by the RS via the client.¶
• JWT Claim Name: cnonce¶
• Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 39)¶
• Claim Value Type(s): byte string¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 5.10 of [this document]¶

• Claim Name: exi¶
• Claim Description: The expiration time of a token measured from when it was received at the RS in seconds.¶
• JWT Claim Name: exi¶
• Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 40)¶
• Claim Value Type(s): integer¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 5.10.3 of [this document]¶

• Claim Name: scope¶
• Claim Description: The scope of an access token as defined in [RFC6749].¶
• JWT Claim Name: scope¶
• Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 9)¶
• Claim Value Type(s): byte string or text string¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [RFC8693]¶

8.15. Media Type Registrations

This specification registers the 'application/ace+cbor' media type for messages of the protocols defined in this document carrying parameters encoded in CBOR. This registration follows the procedures specified in [RFC6838].¶

Type name: application¶

Subtype name: ace+cbor¶

Required parameters: N/A¶

Optional parameters: N/A¶

Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as CBOR map containing the protocol parameters defined in [this document].¶

Security considerations: See Section 6 of [this document]¶

Interoperability considerations: N/A¶

Published specification: [this document]¶

Applications that use this media type: The type is used by authorization servers, clients and resource servers that support the ACE framework as specified in [this document].¶

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A¶

Additional information: N/A¶

Person & email address to contact for further information: <iesg@ietf.org>¶

Intended usage: COMMON¶

Restrictions on usage: none¶

Author: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@combitech.se>¶

Change controller: IESG¶

8.16. CoAP Content-Format Registry

This specification registers the following entry to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry:¶

Media Type: application/ace+cbor¶

Encoding: -¶

ID: TBD (suggested: 19)¶

Reference: [this document]¶

8.17. Expert Review Instructions

All of the IANA registries established in this document are defined to use a registration policy of Expert Review. This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason, so they should be given substantial latitude.¶

Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:¶

• Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered, and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as private use are intended for testing purposes and closed environments; code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.¶
• Specifications are needed for the first-come, first-serve range if they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an interoperable way. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is being used for.¶
• Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range for standards track documents does not mean that a standards track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range. The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on.¶
• Since a high degree of overlap is expected between these registries and the contents of the OAuth parameters [IANA.OAuthParameters] registries, experts should require new registrations to maintain alignment with parameters from OAuth that have comparable functionality. Deviation from this alignment should only be allowed if there are functional differences, that are motivated by the use case and that cannot be easily or efficiently addressed by comparable OAuth parameters.¶

E.1. Local Token Validation

In this scenario, the case where the resource server is offline is considered, i.e., it is not connected to the AS at the time of the access request. This access procedure involves steps A, B, C, and F of Figure 1.¶

Since the resource server must be able to verify the access token locally, self-contained access tokens must be used.¶

This example shows the interactions between a client, the authorization server and a temperature sensor acting as a resource server. Message exchanges A and B are shown in Figure 17.¶

A: The client first generates a public-private key pair used for communication security with the RS.¶

The client sends a CoAP POST request to the token endpoint at the AS. The security of this request can be transport or application layer. It is up the the communication security profile to define. In the example it is assumed that both client and AS have performed mutual authentication e.g. via DTLS. The request contains the public key of the client and the Audience parameter set to "tempSensorInLivingRoom", a value that the temperature sensor identifies itself with. The AS evaluates the request and authorizes the client to access the resource.¶

B: The AS responds with a 2.05 Content response containing the Access Information, including the access token. The PoP access token contains the public key of the client, and the Access Information contains the public key of the RS. For communication security this example uses DTLS RawPublicKey between the client and the RS. The issued token will have a short validity time, i.e., "exp" close to "iat", in order to mitigate attacks using stolen client credentials. The token includes the claim such as "scope" with the authorized access that an owner of the temperature device can enjoy. In this example, the "scope" claim, issued by the AS, informs the RS that the owner of the token, that can prove the possession of a key is authorized to make a GET request against the /temperature resource and a POST request on the /firmware resource. Note that the syntax and semantics of the scope claim are application specific.¶

Note: In this example it is assumed that the client knows what resource it wants to access, and is therefore able to request specific audience and scope claims for the access token.¶

         Authorization
  Client    Server
    |         |
    |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
    |         |   and mutual authentication
    |         |
A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
    |  POST   | Uri-Path:"token"
    |         | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
    |         |
B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
    |  2.05   | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    |         | Payload: <Response-Payload>
    |         |

The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-Payload is shown in Figure 18 Note that the parameter "rs_cnf" from [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params] is used to inform the client about the resource server's public key.¶

Request-Payload :
{
  "audience" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "client_id" : "myclient",
  "req_cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kid" : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8',
      "kty" : "EC",
      "crv" : "P-256",
      "x" : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
      "y" : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
    }
  }
}

Response-Payload :
{
  "access_token" : b64'0INDoQEKoQVNKkXfb7xaWqMTf6 ...',
  "rs_cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kid" : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
      "kty" : "EC",
      "crv" : "P-256",
      "x"   : b64'MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4',
      "y"   : b64'4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM'
    }
  }
}

The content of the access token is shown in Figure 19.¶

{
  "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "iat" : "1563451500",
  "exp" : "1563453000",
  "scope" :  "temperature_g firmware_p",
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kid" : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8',
      "kty" : "EC",
      "crv" : "P-256",
      "x" : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
      "y" : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
    }
  }
}

Messages C and F are shown in Figure 20 - Figure 21.¶

C: The client then sends the PoP access token to the authz-info endpoint at the RS. This is a plain CoAP POST request, i.e., no transport or application layer security is used between client and RS since the token is integrity protected between the AS and RS. The RS verifies that the PoP access token was created by a known and trusted AS, that it applies to this RS, and that it is valid. The RS caches the security context together with authorization information about this client contained in the PoP access token.¶

           Resource
 Client     Server
    |         |
C:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
    |  POST   | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
    |         | Payload: 0INDoQEKoQVN ...
    |         |
    |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
    |  2.04   |
    |         |

¶

The client and the RS runs the DTLS handshake using the raw public keys established in step B and C.¶

The client sends a CoAP GET request to /temperature on RS over DTLS. The RS verifies that the request is authorized, based on previously established security context.¶

F: The RS responds over the same DTLS channel with a CoAP 2.05 Content response, containing a resource representation as payload.¶

           Resource
 Client     Server
    |         |
    |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
    |         |   using Raw Public Keys
    |         |
    +-------->| Header: GET (Code=0.01)
    | GET     | Uri-Path: "temperature"
    |         |
    |         |
    |         |
F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
    | 2.05    | Payload: <sensor value>
    |         |

E.2. Introspection Aided Token Validation

In this deployment scenario it is assumed that a client is not able to access the AS at the time of the access request, whereas the RS is assumed to be connected to the back-end infrastructure. Thus the RS can make use of token introspection. This access procedure involves steps A-F of Figure 1, but assumes steps A and B have been carried out during a phase when the client had connectivity to AS.¶

Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain period of time, a pre-provisioned access token has to be long-lived. Since the client is constrained, the token will not be self contained (i.e. not a CWT) but instead just a reference. The resource server uses its connectivity to learn about the claims associated to the access token by using introspection, which is shown in the example below.¶

In the example interactions between an offline client (key fob), an RS (online lock), and an AS is shown. It is assumed that there is a provisioning step where the client has access to the AS. This corresponds to message exchanges A and B which are shown in Figure 22.¶

Authorization consent from the resource owner can be pre-configured, but it can also be provided via an interactive flow with the resource owner. An example of this for the key fob case could be that the resource owner has a connected car, he buys a generic key that he wants to use with the car. To authorize the key fob he connects it to his computer that then provides the UI for the device. After that OAuth 2.0 implicit flow can used to authorize the key for his car at the the car manufacturers AS.¶

Note: In this example the client does not know the exact door it will be used to access since the token request is not send at the time of access. So the scope and audience parameters are set quite wide to start with, while tailored values narrowing down the claims to the specific RS being accessed can be provided to that RS during an introspection step.¶

A: The client sends a CoAP POST request to the token endpoint at AS. The request contains the Audience parameter set to "PACS1337" (PACS, Physical Access System), a value the that identifies the physical access control system to which the individual doors are connected. The AS generates an access token as an opaque string, which it can match to the specific client and the targeted audience. It furthermore generates a symmetric proof-of-possession key. The communication security and authentication between client and AS is assumed to have been provided at transport layer (e.g. via DTLS) using a pre-shared security context (psk, rpk or certificate).¶

B: The AS responds with a CoAP 2.05 Content response, containing as playload the Access Information, including the access token and the symmetric proof-of-possession key. Communication security between C and RS will be DTLS and PreSharedKey. The PoP key is used as the PreSharedKey.¶

Note: In this example we are using a symmetric key for a multi-RS audience, which is not recommended normally (see Section 6.9). However in this case the risk is deemed to be acceptable, since all the doors are part of the same physical access control system, and therefore the risk of a malicious RS impersonating the client towards another RS is low.¶

         Authorization
 Client     Server
    |         |
    |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
    |         |   and mutual authentication
    |         |
A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
    |  POST   | Uri-Path:"token"
    |         | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
    |         |
B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
    |         | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    |  2.05   | Payload: <Response-Payload>
    |         |

The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-Payload is shown in Figure 23.¶

Request-Payload:
{
  "client_id" : "keyfob",
  "audience" : "PACS1337"
}

Response-Payload:
{
  "access_token" : b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg==',
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kid" : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
      "kty" : "oct",
      "alg" : "HS256",
      "k": b64'ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE'
    }
  }
}

The access token in this case is just an opaque byte string referencing the authorization information at the AS.¶

C: Next, the client POSTs the access token to the authz-info endpoint in the RS. This is a plain CoAP request, i.e., no DTLS between client and RS. Since the token is an opaque string, the RS cannot verify it on its own, and thus defers to respond the client with a status code until after step E.¶

D: The RS sends the token to the introspection endpoint on the AS using a CoAP POST request. In this example RS and AS are assumed to have performed mutual authentication using a pre shared security context (psk, rpk or certificate) with the RS acting as DTLS client.¶

E: The AS provides the introspection response (2.05 Content) containing parameters about the token. This includes the confirmation key (cnf) parameter that allows the RS to verify the client's proof of possession in step F. Note that our example in Figure 25 assumes a pre-established key (e.g. one used by the client and the RS for a previous token) that is now only referenced by its key-identifier 'kid'.¶

After receiving message E, the RS responds to the client's POST in step C with the CoAP response code 2.01 (Created).¶

           Resource
  Client    Server
    |         |
C:  +-------->| Header: POST (T=CON, Code=0.02)
    |  POST   | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
    |         | Payload: b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg=='
    |         |
    |         |     Authorization
    |         |       Server
    |         |          |
    |      D: +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
    |         |  POST    | Uri-Path: "introspect"
    |         |          | Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
    |         |          | Payload: <Request-Payload>
    |         |          |
    |      E: |<---------+ Header: 2.05 Content
    |         |  2.05    | Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
    |         |          | Payload: <Response-Payload>
    |         |          |
    |         |
    |<--------+ Header: 2.01 Created
    |  2.01   |
    |         |

¶

The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-Payload is shown in Figure 25.¶

Request-Payload:
{
  "token" : b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg==',
  "client_id" : "FrontDoor",
}

Response-Payload:
{
  "active" : true,
  "aud" : "lockOfDoor4711",
  "scope" : "open, close",
  "iat" : 1563454000,
  "cnf" : {
    "kid" : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk'
  }
}

The client uses the symmetric PoP key to establish a DTLS PreSharedKey secure connection to the RS. The CoAP request PUT is sent to the uri-path /state on the RS, changing the state of the door to locked.¶

F: The RS responds with a appropriate over the secure DTLS channel.¶

           Resource
  Client    Server
    |         |
    |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
    |         |   using Pre Shared Key
    |         |
    +-------->| Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
    | PUT     | Uri-Path: "state"
    |         | Payload: <new state for the lock>
    |         |
F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
    | 2.04    | Payload: <new state for the lock>
    |         |

F.1. Version -21 to 22

• Provided section numbers in references to OAuth RFC.¶
• Updated IANA mapping registries to only use "Private Use" and "Expert Review".¶
• Made error messages optional for RS at token submission since it may not be able to send them depending on the profile.¶
• Corrected errors in examples.¶

F.2. Version -20 to 21

• Added text about expiration of RS keys.¶

F.3. Version -19 to 20

• Replaced "req_aud" with "audience" from the OAuth token exchange draft.¶
• Updated examples to remove unnecessary elements.¶

F.4. Version -18 to -19

• Added definition of "Authorization Information".¶
• Explicitly state that ACE allows encoding refresh tokens in binary format in addition to strings.¶
• Renamed "AS Information" to "AS Request Creation Hints" and added the possibility to specify req_aud and scope as hints.¶
• Added the "kid" parameter to AS Request Creation Hints.¶
• Added security considerations about the integrity protection of tokens with multi-RS audiences.¶
• Renamed IANA registries mapping OAuth parameters to reflect the mapped registry.¶
• Added JWT claim names to CWT claim registrations.¶
• Added expert review instructions.¶
• Updated references to TLS from 1.2 to 1.3.¶

F.5. Version -17 to -18

• Added OSCORE options in examples involving OSCORE.¶
• Removed requirement for the client to send application/cwt, since the client has no way to know.¶
• Clarified verification of tokens by the RS.¶
• Added exi claim CWT registration.¶

F.6. Version -16 to -17

• Added references to (D)TLS 1.3.¶
• Added requirement that responses are bound to requests.¶
• Specify that grant_type is OPTIONAL in C2AS requests (as opposed to REQUIRED in OAuth).¶
• Replaced examples with hypothetical COSE profile with OSCORE.¶
• Added requirement for content type application/ace+cbor in error responses for token and introspection requests and responses.¶
• Reworked abbreviation space for claims, request and response parameters.¶
• Added text that the RS may indicate that it is busy at the authz-info resource.¶
• Added section that specifies how the RS verifies an access token.¶
• Added section on the protection of the authz-info endpoint.¶
• Removed the expiration mechanism based on sequence numbers.¶
• Added reference to RFC7662 security considerations.¶
• Added considerations on minimal security requirements for communication.¶
• Added security considerations on unprotected information sent to authz-info and in the error responses.¶

F.7. Version -15 to -16

• Added text the RS using RFC6750 error codes.¶
• Defined an error code for incompatible token request parameters.¶
• Removed references to the actors draft.¶
• Fixed errors in examples.¶

F.8. Version -14 to -15

• Added text about refresh tokens.¶
• Added text about protection of credentials.¶
• Rephrased introspection so that other entities than RS can do it.¶
• Editorial improvements.¶

F.9. Version -13 to -14

• Split out the 'aud', 'cnf' and 'rs_cnf' parameters to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]¶
• Introduced the "application/ace+cbor" Content-Type.¶
• Added claim registrations from 'profile' and 'rs_cnf'.¶
• Added note on schema part of AS Information Section 5.3¶
• Realigned the parameter abbreviations to push rarely used ones to the 2-byte encoding size of CBOR integers.¶

F.10. Version -12 to -13

• Changed "Resource Information" to "Access Information" to avoid confusion.¶
• Clarified section about AS discovery.¶
• Editorial changes¶

F.11. Version -11 to -12

• Moved the Request error handling to a section of its own.¶
• Require the use of the abbreviation for profile identifiers.¶
• Added rs_cnf parameter in the introspection response, to inform RS' with several RPKs on which key to use.¶
• Allowed use of rs_cnf as claim in the access token in order to inform an RS with several RPKs on which key to use.¶
• Clarified that profiles must specify if/how error responses are protected.¶
• Fixed label number range to align with COSE/CWT.¶
• Clarified the requirements language in order to allow profiles to specify other payload formats than CBOR if they do not use CoAP.¶

F.12. Version -10 to -11

• Fixed some CBOR data type errors.¶
• Updated boilerplate text¶

F.13. Version -09 to -10

• Removed CBOR major type numbers.¶
• Removed the client token design.¶
• Rephrased to clarify that other protocols than CoAP can be used.¶
• Clarifications regarding the use of HTTP¶

F.14. Version -08 to -09

• Allowed scope to be byte strings.¶
• Defined default names for endpoints.¶
• Refactored the IANA section for briefness and consistency.¶
• Refactored tables that define IANA registry contents for consistency.¶
• Created IANA registry for CBOR mappings of error codes, grant types and Authorization Server Information.¶
• Added references to other document sections defining IANA entries in the IANA section.¶

F.15. Version -07 to -08

• Moved AS discovery from the DTLS profile to the framework, see Section 5.1.¶
• Made the use of CBOR mandatory. If you use JSON you can use vanilla OAuth.¶
• Made it mandatory for profiles to specify C-AS security and RS-AS security (the latter only if introspection is supported).¶
• Made the use of CBOR abbreviations mandatory.¶
• Added text to clarify the use of token references as an alternative to CWTs.¶
• Added text to clarify that introspection must not be delayed, in case the RS has to return a client token.¶
• Added security considerations about leakage through unprotected AS discovery information, combining profiles and leakage through error responses.¶
• Added privacy considerations about leakage through unprotected AS discovery.¶
• Added text that clarifies that introspection is optional.¶
• Made profile parameter optional since it can be implicit.¶
• Clarified that CoAP is not mandatory and other protocols can be used.¶
• Clarified the design justification for specific features of the framework in appendix A.¶
• Clarified appendix E.2.¶
• Removed specification of the "cnf" claim for CBOR/COSE, and replaced with references to [RFC8747]¶

F.16. Version -06 to -07

• Various clarifications added.¶
• Fixed erroneous author email.¶

F.17. Version -05 to -06

• Moved sections that define the ACE framework into a subsection of the framework Section 5.¶
• Split section on client credentials and grant into two separate sections, Section 5.4, and Section 5.5.¶
• Added Section 5.6 on AS authentication.¶
• Added Section 5.7 on the Authorization endpoint.¶

F.18. Version -04 to -05

• Added RFC 2119 language to the specification of the required behavior of profile specifications.¶
• Added Section 5.5 on the relation to the OAuth2 grant types.¶
• Added CBOR abbreviations for error and the error codes defined in OAuth2.¶
• Added clarification about token expiration and long-running requests in Section 5.10.3¶
• Added security considerations about tokens with symmetric PoP keys valid for more than one RS.¶
• Added privacy considerations section.¶
• Added IANA registry mapping the confirmation types from RFC 7800 to equivalent COSE types.¶
• Added appendix D, describing assumptions about what the AS knows about the client and the RS.¶

F.19. Version -03 to -04

• Added a description of the terms "framework" and "profiles" as used in this document.¶
• Clarified protection of access tokens in section 3.1.¶
• Clarified uses of the "cnf" parameter in section 6.4.5.¶
• Clarified intended use of Client Token in section 7.4.¶

F.20. Version -02 to -03

• Removed references to draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution since the status of this draft is unclear.¶
• Copied and adapted security considerations from draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution.¶
• Renamed "client information" to "RS information" since it is information about the RS.¶
• Clarified the requirements on profiles of this framework.¶
• Clarified the token endpoint protocol and removed negotiation of "profile" and "alg" (section 6).¶
• Renumbered the abbreviations for claims and parameters to get a consistent numbering across different endpoints.¶
• Clarified the introspection endpoint.¶
• Renamed token, introspection and authz-info to "endpoint" instead of "resource" to mirror the OAuth 2.0 terminology.¶
• Updated the examples in the appendices.¶

F.21. Version -01 to -02

• Restructured to remove communication security parts. These shall now be defined in profiles.¶
• Restructured section 5 to create new sections on the OAuth endpoints token, introspection and authz-info.¶
• Pulled in material from draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution in order to define proof-of-possession key distribution.¶
• Introduced the "cnf" parameter as defined in RFC7800 to reference or transport keys used for proof of possession.¶
• Introduced the "client-token" to transport client information from the AS to the client via the RS in conjunction with introspection.¶
• Expanded the IANA section to define parameters for token request, introspection and CWT claims.¶
• Moved deployment scenarios to the appendix as examples.¶

F.22. Version -00 to -01

• Changed 5.1. from "Communication Security Protocol" to "Client Information".¶

• Major rewrite of 5.1 to clarify the information exchanged between C and AS in the PoP access token request profile for IoT.¶

  • Allow the client to indicate preferences for the communication security protocol.¶
  • Defined the term "Client Information" for the additional information returned to the client in addition to the access token.¶
  • Require that the messages between AS and client are secured, either with (D)TLS or with COSE_Encrypted wrappers.¶
  • Removed dependency on OSCOAP and added generic text about object security instead.¶
  • Defined the "rpk" parameter in the client information to transmit the raw public key of the RS from AS to client.¶
  • (D)TLS MUST use the PoP key in the handshake (either as PSK or as client RPK with client authentication).¶
  • Defined the use of x5c, x5t and x5tS256 parameters when a client certificate is used for proof of possession.¶
  • Defined "tktn" parameter for signaling for how to transfer the access token.¶
• Added 5.2. the CoAP Access-Token option for transferring access tokens in messages that do not have payload.¶
• 5.3.2. Defined success and error responses from the RS when receiving an access token.¶
• 5.6.:Added section giving guidance on how to handle token expiration in the absence of reliable time.¶
• Appendix B Added list of roles and responsibilities for C, AS and RS.¶