| anima Working Group | M. Richardson |
| Internet-Draft | Sandelman Software Works |
| Intended status: Standards Track | P. van der Stok |
| Expires: July 17, 2020 | vanderstok consultancy |
| P. Kampanakis | |
| Cisco Systems | |
| January 14, 2020 |
Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-06
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an owner, using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge’s manufacturer. This artifact is known as a “voucher”.
This document builds upon the work in [RFC8366], encoding the resulting artifact in CBOR. Use with two signature technologies are described.
Additionally, this document explains how constrained vouchers may be transported as an extension to the [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] protocol.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodes present unique challenges.
There are bandwidth and code space issues to contend. A solution such as [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] may be too large in terms of code space or bandwidth required.
This document defines a constrained version of [RFC8366]. Rather than serializing the YANG definition in JSON, it is serialized into CBOR ([RFC7049]).
This document follows a similar, but not identical structure as [RFC8366]. Some sections are left out entirely. Additional sections have been added concerning:
The CBOR definitions for this constrained voucher format are defined using the mechanism describe in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] using the SID mechanism explained in [I-D.ietf-core-sid]. As the tooling to convert YANG documents into an list of SID keys is still in its infancy, the table of SID values presented here should be considered normative rather than the output of the pyang tool.
Two methods of signing the resulting CBOR object are described in this document:
The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), pledge, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
[RFC8366] provides for vouchers that assert proximity, that authenticate the registrar and that include different amounts of anti-replay protection.
This document does not make any extensions to the types of vouchers.
Time based vouchers are included in this definition, but given that constrained devices are extremely unlikely to have accurate time, their use is very unlikely. Most users of these constrained vouchers will be online and will use live nonces to provide anti-replay protection.
[RFC8366] defined only the voucher artifact, and not the Voucher Request artifact, which was defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
This document defines both a constrained voucher and a constrained voucher-request. They are presented in the order voucher-request, followed by a voucher response as this is the time order that they occur.
This document defines both CMS-signed voucher requests and responses, and COSE signed voucher requests and responses. The use of CMS signatures implies the use of PKIX format certificates. The pinned-domain-cert present in such a voucher, is the certificate of the Registrar.
The constrained voucher and constrained voucher request MUST be signed.
The use of the two signing formats permit the use of both PKIX format certificates, and raw public keys (RPK). When RPKs are used, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the raw public key of the Registrar: the pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info in such a voucher, is the raw public key of the Registrar. This is described in the YANG definition for the constrained voucher.
This section describes the BRSKI extensions to EST-coaps [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] to transport the voucher between registrar, proxy and pledge over CoAP. The extensions are targeted to low-resource networks with small packets. Saving header space is important and the EST-coaps URI is shorter than the EST URI.
The presence and location of (path to) the management data are discovered by sending a GET request to “/.well-known/core” including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value “ace.est” [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of the EST resources. It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this document the example root resource /est is used.
The EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URI by replacing the scheme https by coaps and by specifying shorter resource path names:
coaps://www.example.com/est/short-name
Figure 5 in section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and corresponding paths which are supported by EST. Table 1 provides the mapping from the BRSKI extension URI path to the EST-coaps URI path.
| BRSKI | EST-coaps |
|---|---|
| /requestvoucher | /rv |
| /voucher_status | /vs |
| /enrollstatus | /es |
| /requestauditlog | /ra |
/requestvoucher, /voucher_status and /enrollstatus are needed between pledge and Registrar.
When discovering the root path for the EST resources, the server MAY return the full resource paths and the used content types. This is useful when multiple content types are specified for EST-coaps server. For example, the following more complete response is possible.
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est* RES: 2.05 Content </est>; rt="ace.est" </est/rv>; rt="ace.est/rv";ct=TBD2 TBD3 </est/vs>; rt="ace.est/vs";ct=50 60 </est/es>; rt="ace.est/es";ct=50 60 </est/ra>; rt="ace.est/ra";ct=TBD2 TBD3
The return of the content-types allows the client to choose the most appropriate one from multiple content types.
ct=TBD2 stands for Content-Format “application/voucher-cms+cbor, and ct=TBD3 stands for Content-Format “application/voucher-cose+cbor”.
Content-Formats TBD2 and TBD3 are defined in this document.
The Content-Format (“application/json”) 50 MAY be supported. Content-Formats (“application/cbor”) 60, TBD2, and TBD3 MUST be supported.
This section describes the abstract (tree) definition as explained in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] first. This provides a high-level view of the contents of each artifact.
Then the assigned SID values are presented. These have been assigned using the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-sid], with an allocation that was made via the http://comi.space service.
The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [RFC8366], with the addition of proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info, proximity-registrar-cert, and prior-signed-voucher-request.
prior-signed-voucher-request is only used between the Registrar and the MASA. proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces proximity-registrar-cert for the extremely constrained cases.
module: ietf-constrained-voucher-request
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping
+-- voucher
+-- created-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- assertion
| enumeration
+-- serial-number
| string
+-- idevid-issuer?
| binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert?
| binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?
| boolean
+-- nonce?
| binary
+-- last-renewal-date?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info?
| binary
+-- proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info?
| binary
+-- proximity-registrar-cert?
| binary
+-- prior-signed-voucher-request?
binary
SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2501 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher
2502 data .../assertion
2503 data .../created-on
2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2505 data .../expires-on
2506 data .../idevid-issuer
2507 data .../last-renewal-date
2508 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher/nonce
2509 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request
2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert
2512 data mity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
2513 data .../proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info
2514 data .../serial-number
In the constrained-voucher-request YANG module, the voucher is “augmented” within the “used” grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher-request module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher-request attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are “refined” to be optional.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher-request@2019-09-01.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher-request {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request";
prefix "constrained";
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix "v";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Peter van der Stok
<mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org>
Author: Panos Kampanakis
<mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher request,
which is produced by a pledge to request a voucher.
The voucher-request is sent to the potential owner's
Registrar, which in turn sends the voucher request to
the manufacturer or delegate (MASA).
A voucher is then returned to the pledge, binding the
pledge to the owner. This is a constrained version of the
voucher-request present in
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra.txt.
This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
for very constrained devices.
In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
by a pinned Raw Public Key.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119.";
revision "2019-09-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}
rc:yang-data voucher-request-constrained-artifact {
// YANG data template for a voucher.
uses voucher-request-constrained-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
refine voucher/created-on {
mandatory false;
}
refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
mandatory false;
}
augment "voucher" {
description "Base the constrained voucher-request upon the
regular one";
leaf proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces
the proximit-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher-request.
The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info is the
Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is MAY, but due to
size is discouraged.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
is an alternative to
proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info.
and pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted
during the key agreement protocol, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specifications which define new leaf for other hash
types.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by
RFC 5280,
Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by
the Registrar to the Pledge. This MUST be populated in a
Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is
populated.";
}
leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
type binary;
description
"If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and
forward a voucher that was previously provided along a
protocol path, then the previously signed voucher
SHOULD be included in this field.
For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher,
which an intermediate registrar then re-signs to
make its own proximity assertion. This is a simple
mechanism for a chain of trusted parties to change a
voucher, while maintaining the prior signature
information.
The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information
when accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other
parties MAY examine the prior signed voucher
information for the purposes of policy decisions.
For example this information could be useful to a
MASA to determine that both pledge and registrar
agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD
remove all prior-signed-voucher-request information when
signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the
final voucher size.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Below is a CBOR serialization of the constrained-voucher-request is shown in diagnostic CBOR notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950].
{
2501: {
+2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2503, created-on /
+4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2505, expires-on /
+1 : 2, / SID= 2502, assertion /
/ "proximity" /
+13: "JADA123456789", / SID= 2514, serial-number /
+5 : h'01020D0F', / SID= 2506, idevid-issuer /
+10: h'01020D0F', / SID=2511, proximity-registrar-cert/
+3 : true, / SID= 2504, domain-cert
-revocation-checks/
+6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2507, last-renewal-date /
+12: h'01020D0F' / SID= 2513, proximity-registrar
-subject-public-key-info /
}
}
The voucher’s primary purpose is to securely assign a pledge to an owner. The voucher informs the pledge which entity it should consider to be its owner.
This document defines a voucher that is a CBOR encoded instance of the YANG module defined in Section 5.3 that has been signed with CMS or with COSE.
The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [RFC8366], with only the addition of pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info.
module: ietf-constrained-voucher
grouping voucher-constrained-grouping
+-- voucher
+-- created-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- assertion enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- nonce? binary
+-- last-renewal-date?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info? binary
+-- pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info? binary
SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2451 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher
2452 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/assertion
2453 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/created-on
2454 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2455 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/expires-on
2456 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer
2457 data .../last-renewal-date
2458 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/nonce
2459 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2460 data .../pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
2461 data .../pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
2462 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/serial-number
In the constrained-voucher YANG module, the voucher is “augmented” within the “used” grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are “refined” to be optional.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher@2019-09-01.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher";
prefix "constrained";
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix "v";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Peter van der Stok
<mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org>
Author: Panos Kampanakis
<mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced
by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign
one or more pledges to an 'owner', so that the pledges may
establis a secure connection to the owner's network
infrastructure.
This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
for very constrained devices.
In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
by a pinned Raw Public Key.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119.";
revision "2019-09-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}
rc:yang-data voucher-constrained-artifact {
// YANG data template for a voucher.
uses voucher-constrained-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-constrained-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
refine voucher/created-on {
mandatory false;
}
refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
mandatory false;
}
augment "voucher" {
description "Base the constrained voucher
upon the regular one";
leaf pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info replaces the
pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher. The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.
This field is encoded as specified in RFC7250,
section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";
}
leaf pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-hash-subject-public-key-info is a second
alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted
during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specifications which define new leaf for other hash types";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Below a the CBOR serialization of the constrained-voucher is shown in diagnostic CBOR notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950].
{
2451: {
+2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2453, created-on /
+4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on /
+1 : 0, / SID = 2452, assertion /
/ "verified" /
+11: "JADA123456789", / SID = 2462, serial-number /
+5 : h'01020D0F', / SID = 2456, idevid-issuer /
+8 : h'01020D0F', / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert/
+3 : true, / SID = 2454, domain-cert
-revocation-checks /
+6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2457, last-renewal-date /
+9 : h'01020D0F' / SID = 2460, pinned-domain
-subject-public-key-info /
}
}
The signing of the example is shown in Appendix B.1.
The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS [RFC5652]. The CMS signed voucher is much like the equivalent voucher defined in [RFC8366].
A different eContentType of TBD1 is used to indicate that the contents are in a different format than in [RFC8366]. The id-ct-animaJSONVoucher allocated by [RFC8366] indicates a voucher and voucher-request encoded in JSON, and the new value TBD1 indicates that the voucher and voucher-request are encoded in CBOR.
The ContentInfo structure contains a payload consisting of the CBOR encoded voucher. The [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] use of delta encoding creates a canonical ordering for the keys on the wire. This canonical ordering is not important as there is no expectation that the content will be reproduced during the validation process.
Normally the recipient is the pledge and the signer is the MASA.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] supports both signed and unsigned voucher requests from the pledge to the JRC. In this specification, voucher-request artifact MUST be signed from the pledge to the registrar. From the JRC to the MASA, the voucher-request artifact MUST be signed by the domain owner key which is requesting ownership.
The considerations of [RFC5652] section 5.1, concerning validating CMS objects which are really PKCS7 objects (cmsVersion=1) applies.
The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all the certificates leading up to and including the signer’s trust anchor certificate known to the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many applications, but without it third parties can not accurately audit the transaction.
The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between the voucher-issuer and the trust anchor known to the recipient. However, the use of CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the pledge is unlikely to be able to perform online checks, and is unlikely to have a trusted clock source. As described below, the use of short-lived vouchers and/or pledge provided nonce provides a freshness guarantee.
[EDnote: compulsory signing algorithms are ......]
In Appendix B.1 an example for the CMS signing of the voucher-request is shown.
The COSE-Sign1 structure is discussed in section 4.2 of [RFC8152]. The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one signature is used on the body. Support for EdDSA with Ed25519 is compulsory.
The supported COSE-sign1 object stucture is shown in Figure 1.
COSE_Sign1(
[
h'a10127', # { "alg": EDdsa }
{
“kid” : h'789' # hash(pblic key)
},
h'123', #voucher-request binary content
h'456', #voucher-request binary public signature
]
)
Figure 1: cose-sign1 example
The [COSE-registry] specifies the integers that replace the strings and the mnemonics in Figure 1. The value of the “kid” parameter is an example value. Usually a hash of the public key is used to idientify the public key. The distribution of the public key and its hash is done out of band.
In Appendix C a binary cose-sign1 object is shown based on the voucher-request example of Section 6.1.4.
The design considerations for the CBOR encoding of vouchers is much the same as for [RFC8366].
One key difference is that the names of the leaves in the YANG does not have a material effect on the size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID translation process assigns integers to the names.
TBD.
TBD.
TBD.
Additions to the sub-registry “CoAP Resource Type”, within the “CoRE parameters” registry are specified below. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999).
ace.rt.rv needs registration with IANA ace.rt.vs needs registration with IANA ace.rt.es needs registration with IANA ace.rt.ra needs registration with IANA
This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the the following registration is requested:
name: ietf-constrained-voucher
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher
prefix: vch
reference: RFC XXXX
name: ietf-constrained-voucher-request
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained
-voucher-request
prefix: vch
reference: RFC XXXX
------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------
Entry-point | Size | Module name | RFC Number
------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------
2450 50 ietf-constrained-voucher [ThisRFC]
2500 50 ietf-constrained-voucher [ThisRFC}
-request
----------- ------ --------------------------- ------------
Warning: These SID values are defined in [I-D.ietf-core-sid].
This document registers an OID in the “SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type” registry (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), with the value:
Decimal Description References ------- -------------------------------------- ---------- TBD1 id-ct-animaCBORVoucher [ThisRFC]
EDNOTE: should a separate value be used for Voucher Requests?
This section registers the ‘application/voucher-cms+cbor’ media type and the ‘application/voucher-cose+cbor’ in the “Media Types” registry. These media types are used to indicate that the content is a CBOR voucher either signed with a cms structure or a COSE_Sign1 structure [RFC8152].
Type name: application Subtype name: voucher-cms+cbor Required parameters: none Optional parameters: none Encoding considerations: CMS-signed CBOR vouchers are CBOR encoded. Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be broadly interoperable. Published specification: THIS RFC. Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other zero-touch imprinting systems Additional information: Magic number(s): None File extension(s): .vch Macintosh file type code(s): none Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF ANIMA WG Intended usage: LIMITED Restrictions on usage: NONE Author: ANIMA WG Change controller: IETF Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO
Type name: application
Subtype name: voucher-cose+cbor
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: cose-type
Encoding considerations: COSE_Sign1 CBOR vouchers are COSE objects
signed with one signer.
Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section
Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be
broadly interoperable.
Published specification: THIS RFC.
Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other
zero-touch imprinting systems
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .vch
Macintosh file type code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF
ANIMA WG
Intended usage: LIMITED
Restrictions on usage: NONE
Author: ANIMA WG
Change controller: IETF
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO
Additions to the sub-registry “CoAP Content-Formats”, within the “CoRE Parameters” registry are needed for two media types. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999).
Media type mime type Encoding ID References ---------------------------- ----------- --------- ---- ---------- application/voucher-cms+cbor - - CBOR TBD2 [This RFC] application/voucher-cose+cbor "COSE-Sign1" CBOR TBD3 [This RFC]
We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE and CMS choices. Also thanks to Jim Schaad for correctinging earlier version of the COSE Sign1 objects.
Michel Veillette did extensive work on pyang to extend it to support the SID allocation process, and this document was among the first users.
We are grateful for the suggestions done by Esko Dijk.
-06 New SID values assigned; regenerated examples
-04 voucher and request-voucher MUST be signed examples for signed request are added in appendix IANA SID registration is updated SID values in examples are aligned signed cms examples aligned with new SIDs
-03
Examples are inverted.
-02
Example of requestvoucher with unsigned appllication/cbor is added attributes of voucher "refined" to optional CBOR serialization of vouchers improved Discovery port numbers are specified
-01
application/json is optional, application/cbor is compulsory Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced
| [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] | Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M. and S. Raza, "EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-18, January 2020. |
| [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] | Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M. and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-34, January 2020. |
| [I-D.ietf-core-sid] | Veillette, M., Pelov, A. and I. Petrov, "YANG Schema Item iDentifier (SID)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-core-sid-08, January 2020. |
| [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] | Veillette, M., Petrov, I. and A. Pelov, "CBOR Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-core-yang-cbor-11, September 2019. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC3688] | Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004. |
| [RFC5652] | Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009. |
| [RFC6020] | Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010. |
| [RFC7049] | Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, October 2013. |
| [RFC7950] | Bjorklund, M., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016. |
| [RFC8152] | Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
| [RFC8366] | Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M. and T. Eckert, "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols", RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018. |
| [COSE-registry] | IANA, ., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) registry", 2017. |
| [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] | Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-06, February 2018. |
| [RFC6690] | Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012. |
| [RFC7030] | Pritikin, M., Yee, P. and D. Harkins, "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013. |
This section extends the examples from Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CoAP headers are only worked out for the enrollstatus example.
A coaps enrollstatus message can be :
GET coaps://[192.0.2.1:8085]/est/es
The corresponding coap header fields are shown below.
Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
Options
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0xb (option nr = 11)
Option Length = 0x3
Option Value = "est"
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = "es"
Payload = [Empty]
The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide with the transport protocol destination address and port respectively.
A 2.05 Content response with an unsigned voucher status (ct=60) will then be:
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
With CoAP fields and payload:
Ver=1
T=2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Options
Option1 (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option nr 12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 60 (application/cbor)
Payload (CBOR diagnostic) =
{
"version":"1",
"Status": 1, / 1 = Success, 0 = Fail /
"Reason":"Informative human readable message",
"reason-context": "Additional information"
}
The binary payload is:
A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822
496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D
6573736167656e726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874
764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E
The binary payload disassembles to the above CBOR diagnostic code.
A coaps voucher_status message can be:
GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/vs
A 2.05 Content response with a non signed CBOR voucher status (ct=60) will then be:
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
Payload =
A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822
496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D
6573736167656e726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874
764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E
Signed request-voucher-request payloads are sent from pledge to Registrar, as explained in Section 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
A CMS signed requestvoucher message from JRC to MASA is shown below. It would be CoAP POSTED to /est/rv.
POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
The payload would be in binary, but is presented in base64 in this document.
MIIDugYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIDqzCCA6cCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQcBoIICQTCCAj0wggHioAMCAQICCH52Yde1TkYyMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhh bXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgw Mi4xQVIgQ0EwIBcNMTkwMTMxMTEyOTE2WhgPOTk5OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMFwx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTELMAkGA1UEBwwCTEExFDASBgNV BAoMC2V4YW1wbGUgSW5jMQwwCgYDVQQLDANJb1QxDzANBgNVBAUTBld0MTIz NDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABMi0IfEcJeR+OsVxI78tn9xJ TwKLw1HMgMA/FQv1DP+VjXVBnYGmokXf+ueQvpXPdfYC+RUmGPgWorI7Vjjl n9mjgYowgYcwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUlmANhxa/f9DnUtCsdgd3 rWZdAqAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaNFlUflRv8gqQx0Nnwi8LSBbEWAwDgYDVR0P AQH/BAQDAgWgMCoGA1UdEQQjMCGgHwYIKwYBBQUHCASgEzARBgkrBgEEAbQ7 CgEEBAECAwQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAMDYGZbSUH1pPzxI6qXulJG9 ptshQJnZgRfGOzYTdM2GAiEAp3SYn0wyGlzyXYMqTTNqCK1n3yDxUGQhGIoK 3m00kjYxggE/MIIBOwIBATBpMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJD QTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRp b24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgwMi4xQVIgQ0ECCH52Yde1TkYyMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQC AaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTE5MDQwODEwNDgzNlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEILEdCTOLs2Zy7w3LgvSZ XZEadz3LbznoFBs6FMFN91RaMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEcwRQIgASjDsIpr0tW/ n6dRHqvvqsqgZlHbtFnErUbWfhS0KD4CIQDDUEqc5wTmRGf0adEQVQzqmIgh MEgF10vqXv02gL1jLw==
A 2.04 Changed response returning CBOR voucher signed with a cms structure(ct=TBD2) will then be:
2.04 Changed (Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
MIIDuwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIDrDCCA6gCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQcBoIICQTCCAj0wggHioAMCAQICCH52Yde1TkYyMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhh bXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgw Mi4xQVIgQ0EwIBcNMTkwMTMxMTEyOTE2WhgPOTk5OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMFwx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTELMAkGA1UEBwwCTEExFDASBgNV BAoMC2V4YW1wbGUgSW5jMQwwCgYDVQQLDANJb1QxDzANBgNVBAUTBld0MTIz NDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABMi0IfEcJeR+OsVxI78tn9xJ TwKLw1HMgMA/FQv1DP+VjXVBnYGmokXf+ueQvpXPdfYC+RUmGPgWorI7Vjjl n9mjgYowgYcwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUlmANhxa/f9DnUtCsdgd3 rWZdAqAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaNFlUflRv8gqQx0Nnwi8LSBbEWAwDgYDVR0P AQH/BAQDAgWgMCoGA1UdEQQjMCGgHwYIKwYBBQUHCASgEzARBgkrBgEEAbQ7 CgEEBAECAwQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAMDYGZbSUH1pPzxI6qXulJG9 ptshQJnZgRfGOzYTdM2GAiEAp3SYn0wyGlzyXYMqTTNqCK1n3yDxUGQhGIoK 3m00kjYxggFAMIIBPAIBATBpMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJD QTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRp b24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgwMi4xQVIgQ0ECCH52Yde1TkYyMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQC AaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTE5MDQwODA3MzQxMFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIP2rKa+J8LVdwYEmB2he uxsz05As0zoAAYkeyNqsh4fiMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEgwRgIhALOd2FKbe9FG kN4Pg7FIgF+//cQv/N+v7tDZMzGBAFN0AiEAu5BI0oQ4o0wZcrDyKoU2GbeX hlG/g+OgTUftYMJ32so=
A coaps requestauditing message contains the signed CBOR voucher :
POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/ra
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
Payload =
TO BE FILLED
A 2.05 Content response returning a log of the voucher (ct=60) will then be:
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
Payload =
{
"version":"1",
"events":[
{
"date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
"assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
"truncated":"<the number of domainID entries truncated>"
},
{
"date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<anotherDomainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
"assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
}
],
"truncation": {
"nonced duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
"nonceless duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
"arbitrary": "<number of domainID entries removed entirely>"
}
}
[EDNOTE: Change JSON to CBOR; Serialize CBOR payload to binary]
The voucher-request example, visualized in CBOR diagnostic notation in Section 6.1.4 is shown as a hexadecimal dump of the binary file.
a11909c5a90274323031362d31302d30375431393a33313a34325a0474323031
362d31302d32315431393a33313a34325a01020d6d4a414441313233343536
373839054401020d0f0a4401020d0f03f50674323031372d31302d30375431
393a33313a34325a0c4401020d0f
The voucher-request example has been signed by using the WT1234 certificate and key pair shown in Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CMS signing of the binary voucher-request leads to a binary signed voucher-request, shown with a hexadecimal representation shown in the payload of the request part of Appendix A.3.1 and Appendix A.4.
The breakdown of the CMS signed binary voucher-request file is visualized below:
CMS_ContentInfo:
contentType: pkcs7-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
d.signedData:
version: 1
digestAlgorithms:
algorithm: sha256 (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)
parameter: <ABSENT>
encapContentInfo:
eContentType: pkcs7-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1)
eContent: <ABSENT>
certificates:
d.certificate:
cert_info:
version: 2
serialNumber: 9112578475118446130
signature:
algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
parameter: <ABSENT>
issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification,
CN=802.1AR CA
validity:
notBefore: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT
notAfter: Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
key:
algor:
algorithm: id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameter: OBJECT:prime256v1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
public_key: (0 unused bits)
0000 - 04 c8 b4 21 f1 1c 25 e4-7e 3a c5 71 23 bf
000e - 2d 9f dc 49 4f 02 8b c3-51 cc 80 c0 3f 15
001c - 0b f5 0c ff 95 8d 75 41-9d 81 a6 a2 45 df
002a - fa e7 90 be 95 cf 75 f6-02 f9 15 26 18 f8
0038 - 16 a2 b2 3b 56 38 e5 9f-d9
issuerUID: <ABSENT>
subjectUID: <ABSENT>
extensions:
object: X509v3 Basic Constraints (2.5.29.19)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 30
0002 - <SPACES/NULS>
object: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier (2.5.29.14)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 04 14 96 60 0d 87 16 bf-7f d0 e7 52 d0
000d - ac 76 07 77 ad 66 5d 02-a0
object: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier (2.5.29.35)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 30 16 80 14 68 d1 65 51-f9 51 bf c8 2a
000d - 43 1d 0d 9f 08 bc 2d 20-5b 11 60
object: X509v3 Key Usage (2.5.29.15)
critical: TRUE
value:
0000 - 03 02 05 a0
object: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name (2.5.29.17)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 30 21 a0 1f 06 08 2b 06-01 05 05 07 08
000d - 04 a0 13 30 11 06 09 2b-06 01 04 01 b4
001a - 3b 0a 01 04 04 01 02 03-04
sig_alg:
algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
parameter: <ABSENT>
signature: (0 unused bits)
0000 - 30 46 02 21 00 c0 d8 19-96 d2 50 7d 69 3f 3c
000f - 48 ea a5 ee 94 91 bd a6-db 21 40 99 d9 81 17
001e - c6 3b 36 13 74 cd 86 02-21 00 a7 74 98 9f 4c
002d - 32 1a 5c f2 5d 83 2a 4d-33 6a 08 ad 67 df 20
003c - f1 50 64 21 18 8a 0a de-6d 34 92 36
crls:
<EMPTY>
signerInfos:
version: 1
d.issuerAndSerialNumber:
issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification,
CN=802.1AR CA
serialNumber: 9112578475118446130
digestAlgorithm:
algorithm: sha256 (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)
parameter: <ABSENT>
signedAttrs:
object: contentType (1.2.840.113549.1.9.3)
value.set:
OBJECT:pkcs7-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1)
object: signingTime (1.2.840.113549.1.9.5)
value.set:
UTCTIME:Jul 3 08:53:30 2019 GMT
object: messageDigest (1.2.840.113549.1.9.4)
value.set:
OCTET STRING:
0000 - d4 b0 5c dd c8 b4 91 28-4a 18 ca 25 9d
000d - be d0 60 23 cf ad a0 aa-c2 95 ac e9 3f
001a - 0b 4f 44 9e 25
0020 - <SPACES/NULS>
signatureAlgorithm:
algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
parameter: <ABSENT>
signature:
0000 - 30 46 02 21 00 e5 e1 7f-23 c3 aa 14 9f 35 64
000f - 1e c4 4a 0f 68 fe b0 16-3b e6 7c 06 51 af bf
001e - 5a a0 99 59 e0 28 1f 02-21 00 b4 07 2f 7c c4
002d - f9 26 0c 6d 47 a7 93 56-de b8 da f7 23 f0 af
003c - 2b 59 16 cc 36 63 e7 91-89 39 df df
unsignedAttrs:
<EMPTY>
These examples are from the https://minerva.sandelman.ca/ reference code, using the unit test case key pairs, with a flow between pledge (“reach” code), JRC (“fountain”) code, and MASA (“highway”) code. This example comes from the spec/files/product/00-D0-E5-F2-00-03 directory.
This first section documents the public and private keys used in the subsequent test vectors below. These keys come from test code and are not used in any production system, and should only be used only to validate implementations.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 787697345 (0x2ef34ec1)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C = Canada, ST = Ontario, OU = Sandelman, CN = h
ighway-test.example.com CA
Validity
Not Before: Feb 14 17:05:09 2019 GMT
Not After : Dec 31 00:00:00 2999 GMT
Subject: serialNumber = 00-D0-E5-F2-00-03
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:82:c4:28:5b:7c:f0:37:18:c7:90:14:dc:cb:f4:
4d:7e:b0:00:ed:c0:de:bd:4d:25:55:4e:35:f9:d5:
6a:57:14:b4:94:af:ce:6d:53:c8:60:c2:ce:53:3f:
2c:1b:42:f1:c0:8b:5f:c1:7b:3d:f3:29:54:87:46:
86:a4:0c:8b:b7
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
C8:A3:87:72:82:82:E6:EA:90:D0:E1:81:BC:C7:51:08:78:0
F:D7:52
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
othername:<unsupported>
1.3.6.1.4.1.46930.2:
..highway-test.example.com:9443
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:65:02:31:00:b2:9a:7a:1a:74:20:8f:e9:e0:5d:fc:af:d6:
4a:80:1f:66:e3:bf:17:2e:3e:07:87:39:be:65:bd:94:57:71:
1f:df:e5:fc:4d:ef:96:8a:3a:03:5b:d1:ca:a1:72:55:a3:02:
30:13:43:08:a4:af:c8:28:19:d2:a0:93:3d:ed:53:fa:09:7d:
76:9c:b7:0b:95:2b:8f:2f:b4:fa:87:02:ec:b4:2d:19:92:5b:
b2:bb:79:04:63:6e:17:0e:79:8a:65:f5:a3
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MHcCAQEEIA1sa0l4bkj/rJxPUN1bKSBNYolVVzx+T28wo60cYpuaoAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAEgsQoW3zwNxjHkBTcy/RNfrAA7cDevU0lVU41+dVqVxS0lK/ObVPI YMLOUz8sG0LxwItfwXs98ylUh0aGpAyLtw== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIB0TCCAVagAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzBxMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYC Y2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xQDA+BgNVBAMMNyM8U3lzdGVt VmFyaWFibGU6MHgwMDAwMDAwNGY5MTFhMD4gVW5zdHJ1bmcgRm91bnRhaW4gQ0Ew HhcNMTcxMTA3MjM0NTI4WhcNMTkxMTA3MjM0NTI4WjBDMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQB GRYCY2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2Fs aG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABJZlUHI0up/l3eZf9vCBb+lI noEMEgc7Ro+XZCtjAI0CD1fJfJR/hIyyDmHWyYiNFbRCH9fyarfkzgX4p0zTizqj DTALMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMDaQAwZgIxALQMNurf8tv50lROD5DQ XHEOJJNW3QV2g9QEdDSk2MY+AoSrBSmGSNjh4olEOhEuLgIxAJ4nWfNw+BjbZmKi IiUEcTwHMhGVXaMHY/F7n39wwKcBBSOndNPqCpOELl6bq3CZqQ== -----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MHcCAQEEIFZodk+PC5Mu24+ra0sbOjKzan+dW5rvDAR7YuJUOC1YoAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAElmVQcjS6n+Xd5l/28IFv6UiegQwSBztGj5dkK2MAjQIPV8l8lH+E jLIOYdbJiI0VtEIf1/Jqt+TOBfinTNOLOg== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIB3zCCAWSgAwIBAgIEG5lfVDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBdMQ8wDQYDVQQGEwZDYW5h ZGExEDAOBgNVBAgMB09udGFyaW8xEjAQBgNVBAsMCVNhbmRlbG1hbjEkMCIGA1UE AwwbaGlnaHdheS10ZXN0LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMjIyMjI0MVoX DTIxMDIxMTIyMjI0MVowXzEPMA0GA1UEBhMGQ2FuYWRhMRAwDgYDVQQIDAdPbnRh cmlvMRIwEAYDVQQLDAlTYW5kZWxtYW4xJjAkBgNVBAMMHWhpZ2h3YXktdGVzdC5l eGFtcGxlLmNvbSBNQVNBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEqgQVo0S5 4kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrpsqbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszf WXK4rLgJS2mnpaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNpADBmAjEA vVXlmw77/F6VKeOBsxU1qpMYogS+RHKyUX1NbevR1cEQOrI5e1c/xcywow7nmUa6 AjEA9n9EfbcU+tFnatQRw0uu5vuamFb6hSEuXEhM8D/ymz+uiCCnrvly/1v5eGjP D0jJ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MHcCAQEEIFhdd0eDdzip67kXx72K+KHGJQYJHNy8pkiLJ6CcvxMGoAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrpsqbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+ gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpQ== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
EDNote: These examples do not parse
This voucher request has been signed by the pledge, and has been sent to the JRC over CoAPS. This example uses the proximity-registrar-cert mechanism to request a voucher that pins the certificate of the registrar.
This is the CBOR diagnostic format, folded to 60 characters:
18([h'A0', {}, h'A11A000F46C2A5016970726F78696D69747902C11A5
D1E49970A5130302D44302D45352D46322D30302D303307765F715674477
738565342626C65394D34557036354C770C5901D4308201D030820157A00
30201020204228ECD27300A06082A8648CE3D040302306E31123010060A0
** KNOWN TO BE BAD, NOT YET VALIDATED **
0340F4E6D0F9F702553FA53BE572ACF0EED858275B6AC75994332FB25FB3
A54411E9FA02E6F75FD1AADB7EA9A61F5409E02303E615E75C8F07432A59
0C8D48798BEDA1EB49E5E7D8E0EA118BD17A02D02F0313D144816002F756
B528ABD1B0ADB749D', h'96B82530AC57650346C2BFFB5A6CC16B28F16F
ACFE5A2FD1BCF3D5F5D62733F7F7812D67D43BE1CF9906E356FB0C2BDD36
777FD7DBAE22B8CEB07D51D8F55AD3'])
This is the raw binary, shown as hex dump:
0oRBoKBZAhyhGgAPRsKlAWlwcm94aW1pdHkCwRpdHkmXClEwMC1EMC1FNS1G Mi0wMC0wMwd2X3FWdEd3OFZTQmJsZTlNNFVwNjVMdwxZAdQwggHQMIIBV6AD ** KNOWN TO BE BAD, NOT YET VALIDATED ** NA9ObQ+fcCVT+lO+VyrPDu2FgnW2rHWZQzL7Jfs6VEEen6Aub3X9Gq236pph 9UCeAjA+YV51yPB0MqWQyNSHmL7aHrSeXn2ODqEYvRegLQLwMT0USBYAL3Vr Uoq9GwrbdJ1YQJa4JTCsV2UDRsK/+1pswWso8W+s/lov0bzz1fXWJzP394Et Z9Q74c+ZBuNW+wwr3TZ3f9fbriK4zrB9Udj1WtM=
These example do not parse
This voucher request has been signed by the JRC using the private key from Appendix C.1.4. Contained within this voucher request is the pledge voucher request above.
This is the CBOR diagnostic format, folded to 60 characters:
18([h'A0', {}, h'A11A000F46C2A5016970726F78696D69747902C11A5
9DD3BFD0A5130302D44302D45352D46322D30302D303307765F715674477
738565342626C65394D34557036354C770B590266D28441A0A059021CA11
A000F46C2A5016970726F78696D69747902C11A5D1E49970A5130302D443
** KNOWN TO BE BAD, NOT YET VALIDATED **
AADB7EA9A61F5409E02303E615E75C8F07432A590C8D48798BEDA1EB49E5
E7D8E0EA118BD17A02D02F0313D144816002F756B528ABD1B0ADB749D584
096B82530AC57650346C2BFFB5A6CC16B28F16FACFE5A2FD1BCF3D5F5D62
733F7F7812D67D43BE1CF9906E356FB0C2BDD36777FD7DBAE22B8CEB07D5
1D8F55AD3', h'EAE868ECC176883766C5DC5BA5B8DCA25DAB3C2E56A551
CE5705B793914348E1F93C2B81E88CCBE28E90800F66945EFBBECE4F741D
0EDE18EB1008EF7E9A279C'])
This is the raw binary, encoded in base64:
0oRBoKBZAq6hGgAPRsKlAWlwcm94aW1pdHkCwRpZ3Tv9ClEwMC1EMC1FNS1G Mi0wMC0wMwd2X3FWdEd3OFZTQmJsZTlNNFVwNjVMdwtZAmbShEGgoFkCHKEa AA9GwqUBaXByb3hpbWl0eQLBGl0eSZcKUTAwLUQwLUU1LUYyLTAwLTAzB3Zf ** KNOWN TO BE BAD, NOT YET VALIDATED ** U75XKs8O7YWCdbasdZlDMvsl+zpUQR6foC5vdf0arbfqmmH1QJ4CMD5hXnXI 8HQypZDI1IeYvtoetJ5efY4OoRi9F6AtAvAxPRRIFgAvdWtSir0bCtt0nVhA lrglMKxXZQNGwr/7WmzBayjxb6z+Wi/RvPPV9dYnM/f3gS1n1Dvhz5kG41b7 DCvdNnd/19uuIrjOsH1R2PVa01hA6uho7MF2iDdmxdxbpbjcol2rPC5WpVHO VwW3k5FDSOH5PCuB6IzL4o6QgA9mlF77vs5PdB0O3hjrEAjvfponnA==
The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned via the JRC to the Pledge. It is signed by the MASA’s private key Appendix C.1.6 and can be verified by the pledge using the MASA’s publie key.
This is the CBOR diagnostic format, folded to 60 characters:
18([h'A0', {}, h'A11A000F468CA505666C6F6767656406C11A5D1E499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', h'7468FB16A4035FDAF510DBF5
A88F67B6FB849CFBA8B094B77AD5248900E4BCD6E892FE74B39AB787637B
121944BED4D1CB4B8DC8F59212EAC2AD20469C71C1F6'])
This is the raw binary, encoded in base64:
0oRBoKBZArmhGgAPRoylBWZsb2dnZWQGwRpdHkmaDnEwMC1EMC1FNS1GMi0w MC0wMwt2X3FWdEd3OFZTQmJsZTlNNFVwNjVMdwx5AnRNSUlCMFRDQ0FWYWdB d0lCQWdJQkFqQUtCZ2dxaGtqT1BRUURBekJ4TVJJd0VBWUtDWkltaVpQeUxH UUJHUllDWTJFeEdUQVhCZ29Ka2lhSmsvSXNaQUVaRmdsellXNWtaV3h0WVc0 eFFEQStCZ05WQkFNTU55TThVM2x6ZEdWdFZtRnlhV0ZpYkdVNk1IZ3dNREF3 TURBd05HWTVNVEZoTUQ0Z1ZXNXpkSEoxYm1jZ1JtOTFiblJoYVc0Z1EwRXdI aGNOTVRjeE1UQTNNak0wTlRJNFdoY05NVGt4TVRBM01qTTBOVEk0V2pCRE1S SXdFQVlLQ1pJbWlaUHlMR1FCR1JZQ1kyRXhHVEFYQmdvSmtpYUprL0lzWkFF WkZnbHpZVzVrWld4dFlXNHhFakFRQmdOVkJBTU1DV3h2WTJGc2FHOXpkREJa TUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUFCSlpsVUhJMHVwL2wz ZVpmOXZDQmIrbElub0VNRWdjN1JvK1haQ3RqQUkwQ0QxZkpmSlIvaEl5eURt SFd5WWlORmJSQ0g5ZnlhcmZremdYNHAwelRpenFqRFRBTE1Ba0dBMVVkRXdR Q01BQXdDZ1lJS29aSXpqMEVBd01EYVFBd1pnSXhBTFFNTnVyZjh0djUwbFJP RDVEUVhIRU9KSk5XM1FWMmc5UUVkRFNrMk1ZK0FvU3JCU21HU05qaDRvbEVP aEV1TGdJeEFKNG5XZk53K0JqYlptS2lJaVVFY1R3SE1oR1ZYYU1IWS9GN24z OXd3S2NCQlNPbmROUHFDcE9FTGw2YnEzQ1pxUT09WEB0aPsWpANf2vUQ2/Wo j2e2+4Sc+6iwlLd61SSJAOS81uiS/nSzmreHY3sSGUS+1NHLS43I9ZIS6sKt IEacccH2
The headecimal dump of request-voucher shown in Appendix B.1 is used for this example. The cose sign1 object of Figure 1 provides the structure of the cose sign1 example. To identify the public key a hash of the public key is made using murmur3 with seed 42.
public key: 84 44 de 3a b7 b5 a0 2f 20 ed e7 80 1a f0 76 d6 52 0a e5 c8 a1 04 41 61 b2 64 57 fe 0e ae 08 4d murmur3 hash of public key: 0x4727e669 or 1193797225
Using the values “kid” = 4, EDdsa = -8, “alg” = 2, COSE_Sign1 = 18, and using the murmur3 hash value for the “kid” parameter, the CBOR object is:
18([h'A10127', {4: 1193797225},
h'A11909C5A90274323031362D31302D30375431393A33313A34325A04743
23031362D31302D32315431393A33313A34325A01020D6D4A414441313233
343536373839054401020D0F0A4401020D0F03F50674323031372D31302D3
0375431393A33313A34325A0C4401020D0F',
h'955D82A26B7C0869EE8FE5A09EE3D68DDFFE8FE39E3BCADFA80F2F9A6E13F
F0349A2CA131C8F6A9AAF7780BAB671F63CBB158EC17322323C1AB82B1CDC
B62A06'])
The corresponding hexadecimal dump is:
d28443a10127a1041a4727e669586ca11909c5a90274323031362d31302d 30375431393a33313a34325a0474323031362d31302d32315431393a3331 3a34325a01020d6d4a414441313233343536373839054401020d0f0a4401 020d0f03f50674323031372d31302d30375431393a33313a34325a0c4401 020d0f5840955d82a26b7c0869ee8fe5a09ee3d68ddffe8fe39e3bcadfa8 0f2f9a6e13ff0349a2ca131c8f6a9aaf7780bab671f63cbb158ec1732232 3c1ab82b1cdcb62a06