| Internet-Draft | Constrained Voucher | November 2020 |
| Richardson, et al. | Expires 6 May 2021 | [Page] |
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an owner, using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher".¶
This document builds upon the work in [RFC8366], encoding the resulting artifact in CBOR. Use with two signature technologies are described.¶
Additionally, this document explains how constrained vouchers may be transported as an extension to the [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] protocol.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2021.¶
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.¶
Enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodes present unique challenges.¶
There are bandwidth and code space issues to contend. A solution such as [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] may be too large in terms of code space or bandwidth required.¶
This document defines a constrained version of [RFC8366]. Rather than serializing the YANG definition in JSON, it is serialized into CBOR ([RFC7049]).¶
This document follows a similar, but not identical structure as [RFC8366] and supplements the brski part to [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].¶
There are three constrained situations described in this document: 1. CMS signed CBOR encoded vouchers transported using CoAP, protected by DTLS (coaps). 2. COSE signed CBOR encoded vouchers transported using CoAP, protected by EDHOC or DTLS. 3. COSE signed CBOR encoded vouchers, integrated into the key exchange as described by [I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz]¶
Additional sections have been added concerning:¶
The CBOR definitions for this constrained voucher format are defined using the mechanism describe in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] using the SID mechanism explained in [I-D.ietf-core-sid]. As the tooling to convert YANG documents into an list of SID keys is still in its infancy, the table of SID values presented here should be considered normative rather than the output of the pyang tool.¶
Two methods of signing the resulting CBOR object are described in this document:¶
The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), pledge, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
[RFC8366] provides for vouchers that assert proximity, that authenticate the registrar and that include different amounts of anti-replay protection.¶
This document does not make any extensions to the types of vouchers.¶
Time based vouchers are included in this definition, but given that constrained devices are extremely unlikely to have accurate time, their use is very unlikely. Most users of these constrained vouchers will be online and will use live nonces to provide anti-replay protection.¶
[RFC8366] defined only the voucher artifact, and not the Voucher Request artifact, which was defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].¶
This document defines both a constrained voucher and a constrained voucher-request. They are presented in the order "voucher-request", followed by a "voucher" response as this is the time order that they occur.¶
This document defines both CMS-signed voucher requests and responses, and COSE signed voucher requests and responses. The use of CMS signatures implies the use of PKIX format certificates. The pinned-domain-cert present in a voucher, is the certificate of the Registrar.¶
The constrained voucher and constrained voucher request MUST be signed.¶
The use of the two signing formats permit the use of both PKIX format certificates, and raw public keys (RPK).¶
When RPKs are used, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the raw public key of the Registrar: the pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info in a voucher, is the raw public key of the Registrar. This is described in the YANG definition for the constrained voucher.¶
This section describes the BRSKI extensions to EST-coaps [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] to transport the voucher between registrar, proxy and pledge over CoAP. The extensions are targeted to low-resource networks with small packets. Saving header space is important and the EST-coaps URI is shorter than the EST URI.¶
The presence and location of (path to) the management data are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value "ace.est" [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of the EST resources. It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this document the example root resource /est is used.¶
The EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URI by replacing the scheme https by coaps and by specifying shorter resource path names:¶
coaps://www.example.com/est/short-name¶
Figure 5 in section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and corresponding paths which are supported by EST. Table 1 provides the mapping from the BRSKI extension URI path to the EST-coaps URI path.¶
| BRSKI | EST-coaps |
|---|---|
| /requestvoucher | /rv |
| /voucher_status | /vs |
| /enrollstatus | /es |
| /requestauditlog | /ra |
/requestvoucher, /voucher_status and /enrollstatus are needed between pledge and Registrar.¶
When discovering the root path for the EST resources, the server MAY return the full resource paths and the used content types. This is useful when multiple content types are specified for EST-coaps server. For example, the following more complete response is possible.¶
[ EDNOTE: spell out where voucher artifacts are used in BRSKI flows since the APIs ]¶
[ EDNOTE: The /requestauditlog and /voucher-status are exchanged by the Registrar and MASA. The JRC will likely talk to MASA over a normal (not constrained) medium. Do we need /ra and /vs? Do we need to remove them from the example too? Also what happens to the voucher-request and response in this case? Is MASA supposed to support contrained vouchers? ]¶
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski* RES: 2.05 Content </b>; rt="brski" </b/rv>; rt="brski.rv";ct=TBD2 TBD3 </b/vs>; rt="brski.vs";ct=50 60 </b/es>; rt="brski.es";ct=50 60¶
The return of the content-types allows the client to choose the most appropriate one from multiple content types.¶
ct=TBD2 stands for Content-Format "application/voucher-cms+cbor, and ct=TBD3 stands for Content-Format "application/voucher-cose+cbor".¶
Content-Formats TBD2 and TBD3 are defined in this document.¶
The Content-Format ("application/json") 50 MAY be supported. Content-Formats ("application/cbor") 60, TBD2, and TBD3 MUST be supported by the Registrar.¶
The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats for the voucher. The MASA needds to support whatever formats that the pledge's produced by that manufacturer supports.¶
This section describes the abstract (tree) definition as explained in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] first. This provides a high-level view of the contents of each artifact.¶
Then the assigned SID values are presented. These have been assigned using the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-sid], with an allocation that was made via the http://comi.space service.¶
The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [RFC8366], with the addition of proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info, proximity-registrar-cert, and prior-signed-voucher-request.¶
prior-signed-voucher-request is only used between the Registrar and the MASA. proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces proximity-registrar-cert for the extremely constrained cases.¶
module: ietf-constrained-voucher-request
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping
+-- voucher
+-- created-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- assertion
| enumeration
+-- serial-number
| string
+-- idevid-issuer?
| binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert?
| binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?
| boolean
+-- nonce?
| binary
+-- last-renewal-date?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info?
| binary
+-- proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info?
| binary
+-- proximity-registrar-cert?
| binary
+-- prior-signed-voucher-request?
binary
¶
SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2501 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher
2502 data .../assertion
2503 data .../created-on
2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2505 data .../expires-on
2506 data .../idevid-issuer
2507 data .../last-renewal-date
2508 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher/nonce
2509 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request
2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert
2512 data mity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
2513 data .../proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info
2514 data .../serial-number
WARNING, obsolete definitions
¶
In the constrained-voucher-request YANG module, the voucher is "augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher-request module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher-request attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional.¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher-request@2019-09-01.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher-request {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request";
prefix "constrained";
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix "v";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Peter van der Stok
<mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org>
Author: Panos Kampanakis
<mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher request,
which is produced by a pledge to request a voucher.
The voucher-request is sent to the potential owner's
Registrar, which in turn sends the voucher request to
the manufacturer or delegate (MASA).
A voucher is then returned to the pledge, binding the
pledge to the owner. This is a constrained version of the
voucher-request present in
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra.txt.
This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
for very constrained devices.
In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
by a pinned Raw Public Key.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119.";
revision "2019-09-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}
rc:yang-data voucher-request-constrained-artifact {
// YANG data template for a voucher.
uses voucher-request-constrained-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
refine voucher/created-on {
mandatory false;
}
refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
mandatory false;
}
augment "voucher" {
description "Base the constrained voucher-request upon the
regular one";
leaf proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces
the proximit-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher-request.
The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info is the
Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is MAY, but due to
size is discouraged.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
is an alternative to
proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info.
and pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted
during the key agreement protocol, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specifications which define new leaf for other hash
types.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by
RFC 5280,
Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by
the Registrar to the Pledge. This MUST be populated in a
Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is
populated.";
}
leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
type binary;
description
"If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and
forward a voucher that was previously provided along a
protocol path, then the previously signed voucher
SHOULD be included in this field.
For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher,
which an intermediate registrar then re-signs to
make its own proximity assertion. This is a simple
mechanism for a chain of trusted parties to change a
voucher, while maintaining the prior signature
information.
The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information
when accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other
parties MAY examine the prior signed voucher
information for the purposes of policy decisions.
For example this information could be useful to a
MASA to determine that both pledge and registrar
agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD
remove all prior-signed-voucher-request information when
signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the
final voucher size.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>¶
Below is a CBOR serialization of the constrained-voucher-request is shown in diagnostic CBOR notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950].¶
{
2501: {
+2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2503, created-on /
+4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2505, expires-on /
+1 : 2, / SID= 2502, assertion /
/ "proximity" /
+13: "JADA123456789", / SID= 2514, serial-number /
+5 : h'01020D0F', / SID= 2506, idevid-issuer /
+10: h'cert.der', / SID=2511, proximity-registrar-cert/
+3 : true, / SID= 2504, domain-cert
-revocation-checks/
+6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2507, last-renewal-date /
+12: h'key_info' / SID= 2513, proximity-registrar
-subject-public-key-info /
}
}
¶
The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a pledge to an owner. The voucher informs the pledge which entity it should consider to be its owner.¶
This document defines a voucher that is a CBOR encoded instance of the YANG module defined in Section 5.3 that has been signed with CMS or with COSE.¶
The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [RFC8366], with only the addition of pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info.¶
module: ietf-constrained-voucher
grouping voucher-constrained-grouping
+-- voucher
+-- created-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- assertion enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- nonce? binary
+-- last-renewal-date?
| yang:date-and-time
+-- pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info? binary
+-- pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info? binary
¶
SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2451 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher
2452 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/assertion
2453 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/created-on
2454 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2455 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/expires-on
2456 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer
2457 data .../last-renewal-date
2458 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/nonce
2459 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2460 data .../pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
2461 data .../pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info
2462 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/serial-number
WARNING, obsolete definitions
¶
In the constrained-voucher YANG module, the voucher is "augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional.¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher@2019-09-01.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher";
prefix "constrained";
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix "v";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Peter van der Stok
<mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org>
Author: Panos Kampanakis
<mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced
by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign
one or more pledges to an 'owner', so that the pledges may
establis a secure connection to the owner's network
infrastructure.
This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
for very constrained devices.
In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
by a pinned Raw Public Key.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119.";
revision "2019-09-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}
rc:yang-data voucher-constrained-artifact {
// YANG data template for a voucher.
uses voucher-constrained-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-constrained-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
refine voucher/created-on {
mandatory false;
}
refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
mandatory false;
}
augment "voucher" {
description "Base the constrained voucher
upon the regular one";
leaf pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info replaces the
pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher. The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.
This field is encoded as specified in RFC7250,
section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";
}
leaf pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-hash-subject-public-key-info is a second
alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted
during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specifications which define new leaf for other hash types";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>¶
Below a the CBOR serialization of the constrained-voucher is shown in diagnostic CBOR notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950].¶
{
2451: {
+2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2453, created-on /
+4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on /
+1 : 0, / SID = 2452, assertion /
/ "verified" /
+11: "JADA123456789", / SID = 2462, serial-number /
+5 : h'01020D0F', / SID = 2456, idevid-issuer /
+8 : h'cert.der', / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert/
+3 : true, / SID = 2454, domain-cert
-revocation-checks /
+6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2457, last-renewal-date /
+9 : h'key-info' / SID = 2460, pinned-domain
-subject-public-key-info /
}
}
¶
The signing of the example is shown in Appendix B.3.¶
The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS [RFC5652]. The CMS signed voucher is much like the equivalent voucher defined in [RFC8366].¶
A different eContentType of TBD1 is used to indicate that the contents are in a different format than in [RFC8366]. The id-ct-animaJSONVoucher allocated by [RFC8366] indicates a voucher and voucher-request encoded in JSON, and the new value TBD1 indicates that the voucher and voucher-request are encoded in CBOR.¶
The ContentInfo structure contains a payload consisting of the CBOR encoded voucher. The [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] use of delta encoding creates a canonical ordering for the keys on the wire. This canonical ordering is not important as there is no expectation that the content will be reproduced during the validation process.¶
Normally the recipient is the pledge and the signer is the MASA.¶
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] supports both signed and unsigned voucher requests from the pledge to the JRC. In this specification, voucher-request artifact is not signed from the pledge to the registrar. [EDNOTE: Confirm that voucher requests do not need to be signed ] From the JRC to the MASA, the voucher-request artifact MUST be signed by the domain owner key which is requesting ownership.¶
The considerations of [RFC5652] section 5.1, concerning validating CMS objects which are really PKCS7 objects (cmsVersion=1) applies.¶
The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all the certificates leading up to and including the signer's trust anchor certificate known to the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many applications, but without it third parties can not accurately audit the transaction.¶
The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between the voucher-issuer and the trust anchor known to the recipient. However, the use of CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the pledge is unlikely to be able to perform online checks, and is unlikely to have a trusted clock source. As described below, the use of short-lived vouchers and/or pledge provided nonce provides a freshness guarantee.¶
The COSE-Sign1 structure is discussed in section 4.2 of [RFC8152]. The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one signature is used on the body. Support for ECDSA with sha256 (secp256k1 and prime256v1 curves) is compulsory.¶
The supported COSE-sign1 object stucture is shown in Figure 1. Support for EdDSA is encouraged. [EDNOTE: Expand and add a reference why. ]¶
COSE_Sign1(
[
h'A101382E', # { "alg": EC256K1 }
{
“kid” : h'789' # hash256(public key)
},
h'123', #voucher-request binary content
h'456', #voucher-request binary public signature
]
)
The [COSE-registry] specifies the integers that replace the strings and the mnemonics in Figure 1. The value of the "kid" parameter is an example value. Usually a hash of the public key is used to idientify the public key. The public key and its hash are derived from the relevant certificate (Pledge, Registrar or MASA certificate).¶
In Appendix C a binary cose-sign1 object is shown based on the voucher-request example of Section 6.1.4.¶
The design considerations for the CBOR encoding of vouchers is much the same as for [RFC8366].¶
One key difference is that the names of the leaves in the YANG does not have a material effect on the size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID translation process assigns integers to the names.¶
Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Resource Type", within the "CoRE parameters" registry are specified below. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999).¶
ace.rt.rv needs registration with IANA ace.rt.vs needs registration with IANA ace.rt.es needs registration with IANA ace.rt.ra needs registration with IANA¶
This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:¶
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the the following registration is requested:¶
name: ietf-constrained-voucher
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher
prefix: vch
reference: RFC XXXX
name: ietf-constrained-voucher-request
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained
-voucher-request
prefix: vch
reference: RFC XXXX
¶
------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------
Entry-point | Size | Module name | RFC Number
------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------
2450 50 ietf-constrained-voucher [ThisRFC]
2500 50 ietf-constrained-voucher [ThisRFC}
-request
----------- ------ --------------------------- ------------
¶
Warning: These SID values are defined in [I-D.ietf-core-sid], not as an Early Allocation.¶
This document registers an OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type" registry (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), with the value:¶
Decimal Description References ------- -------------------------------------- ---------- 46 id-ct-animaCBORVoucher [ThisRFC]¶
This section registers the 'application/voucher-cms+cbor' media type and the 'application/voucher-cose+cbor' in the "Media Types" registry. These media types are used to indicate that the content is a CBOR voucher either signed with a cms structure or a COSE_Sign1 structure [RFC8152].¶
Type name: application Subtype name: voucher-cms+cbor Required parameters: none Optional parameters: none Encoding considerations: CMS-signed CBOR vouchers are CBOR encoded. Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be broadly interoperable. Published specification: THIS RFC. Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other zero-touch imprinting systems Additional information: Magic number(s): None File extension(s): .vch Macintosh file type code(s): none Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF ANIMA WG Intended usage: LIMITED Restrictions on usage: NONE Author: ANIMA WG Change controller: IETF Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO¶
Type name: application
Subtype name: voucher-cose+cbor
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: cose-type
Encoding considerations: COSE_Sign1 CBOR vouchers are COSE objects
signed with one signer.
Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section
Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be
broadly interoperable.
Published specification: THIS RFC.
Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other
zero-touch imprinting systems
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .vch
Macintosh file type code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF
ANIMA WG
Intended usage: LIMITED
Restrictions on usage: NONE
Author: ANIMA WG
Change controller: IETF
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO
¶
Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the "CoRE Parameters" registry are needed for two media types. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999).¶
Media type mime type Encoding ID References ---------------------------- ----------- --------- ---- ---------- application/voucher-cms+cbor - - CBOR TBD2 [This RFC] application/voucher-cose+cbor "COSE-Sign1" CBOR TBD3 [This RFC]¶
We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE and CMS choices. Also thanks to Jim Schaad for correctinging earlier version of the COSE Sign1 objects.¶
Michel Veillette did extensive work on pyang to extend it to support the SID allocation process, and this document was among the first users.¶
We are grateful for the suggestions done by Esko Dijk.¶
-08 Examples for cose_sign1 are completed and improved.¶
-06 New SID values assigned; regenerated examples¶
-04 voucher and request-voucher MUST be signed examples for signed request are added in appendix IANA SID registration is updated SID values in examples are aligned signed cms examples aligned with new SIDs¶
-03¶
Examples are inverted.¶
-02¶
Example of requestvoucher with unsigned appllication/cbor is added attributes of voucher "refined" to optional CBOR serialization of vouchers improved Discovery port numbers are specified¶
-01¶
application/json is optional, application/cbor is compulsory Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced¶
This section extends the examples from Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CoAP headers are only worked out for the enrollstatus example.¶
A coaps enrollstatus message can be :¶
GET coaps://[192.0.2.1:8085]/est/es
¶
The corresponding coap header fields are shown below.¶
Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
Options
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0xb (option nr = 11)
Option Length = 0x3
Option Value = "est"
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = "es"
Payload = [Empty]
¶
The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide with the transport protocol destination address and port respectively.¶
A 2.05 Content response with an unsigned voucher status (ct=60) will then be:¶
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)¶
With CoAP fields and payload:¶
Ver=1
T=2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Options
Option1 (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option nr 12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 60 (application/cbor)
Payload (CBOR diagnostic) =
{
"version":"1",
"Status": 1, / 1 = Success, 0 = Fail /
"Reason":"Informative human readable message",
"reason-context": "Additional information"
}
¶
The binary payload is:¶
A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822
496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D
6573736167656e726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874
764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E
¶
The binary payload disassembles to the above CBOR diagnostic code.¶
A coaps voucher_status message can be:¶
GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/vs¶
A 2.05 Content response with a non signed CBOR voucher status (ct=60) will then be:¶
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
Payload =
A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822
496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D
6573736167656e726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874
764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E
¶
Signed request-voucher-request payloads are sent from pledge to Registrar, as explained in Section 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].¶
A CMS signed requestvoucher message from JRC to MASA is shown below. It would be CoAP POSTED to /est/rv.¶
POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
¶
The payload would be in binary, but is presented in base64 in this document.¶
MIIDugYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIDqzCCA6cCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQcBoIICQTCCAj0wggHioAMCAQICCH52Yde1TkYyMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhh bXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgw Mi4xQVIgQ0EwIBcNMTkwMTMxMTEyOTE2WhgPOTk5OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMFwx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTELMAkGA1UEBwwCTEExFDASBgNV BAoMC2V4YW1wbGUgSW5jMQwwCgYDVQQLDANJb1QxDzANBgNVBAUTBld0MTIz NDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABMi0IfEcJeR+OsVxI78tn9xJ TwKLw1HMgMA/FQv1DP+VjXVBnYGmokXf+ueQvpXPdfYC+RUmGPgWorI7Vjjl n9mjgYowgYcwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUlmANhxa/f9DnUtCsdgd3 rWZdAqAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaNFlUflRv8gqQx0Nnwi8LSBbEWAwDgYDVR0P AQH/BAQDAgWgMCoGA1UdEQQjMCGgHwYIKwYBBQUHCASgEzARBgkrBgEEAbQ7 CgEEBAECAwQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAMDYGZbSUH1pPzxI6qXulJG9 ptshQJnZgRfGOzYTdM2GAiEAp3SYn0wyGlzyXYMqTTNqCK1n3yDxUGQhGIoK 3m00kjYxggE/MIIBOwIBATBpMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJD QTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRp b24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgwMi4xQVIgQ0ECCH52Yde1TkYyMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQC AaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTE5MDQwODEwNDgzNlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEILEdCTOLs2Zy7w3LgvSZ XZEadz3LbznoFBs6FMFN91RaMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEcwRQIgASjDsIpr0tW/ n6dRHqvvqsqgZlHbtFnErUbWfhS0KD4CIQDDUEqc5wTmRGf0adEQVQzqmIgh MEgF10vqXv02gL1jLw==¶
A 2.04 Changed response returning CBOR voucher signed with a cms structure(ct=TBD2) will then be:¶
2.04 Changed (Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
¶
MIIDuwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIDrDCCA6gCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQcBoIICQTCCAj0wggHioAMCAQICCH52Yde1TkYyMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhh bXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgw Mi4xQVIgQ0EwIBcNMTkwMTMxMTEyOTE2WhgPOTk5OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMFwx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTELMAkGA1UEBwwCTEExFDASBgNV BAoMC2V4YW1wbGUgSW5jMQwwCgYDVQQLDANJb1QxDzANBgNVBAUTBld0MTIz NDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABMi0IfEcJeR+OsVxI78tn9xJ TwKLw1HMgMA/FQv1DP+VjXVBnYGmokXf+ueQvpXPdfYC+RUmGPgWorI7Vjjl n9mjgYowgYcwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUlmANhxa/f9DnUtCsdgd3 rWZdAqAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaNFlUflRv8gqQx0Nnwi8LSBbEWAwDgYDVR0P AQH/BAQDAgWgMCoGA1UdEQQjMCGgHwYIKwYBBQUHCASgEzARBgkrBgEEAbQ7 CgEEBAECAwQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAMDYGZbSUH1pPzxI6qXulJG9 ptshQJnZgRfGOzYTdM2GAiEAp3SYn0wyGlzyXYMqTTNqCK1n3yDxUGQhGIoK 3m00kjYxggFAMIIBPAIBATBpMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJD QTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRp b24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgwMi4xQVIgQ0ECCH52Yde1TkYyMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQC AaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTE5MDQwODA3MzQxMFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIP2rKa+J8LVdwYEmB2he uxsz05As0zoAAYkeyNqsh4fiMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEgwRgIhALOd2FKbe9FG kN4Pg7FIgF+//cQv/N+v7tDZMzGBAFN0AiEAu5BI0oQ4o0wZcrDyKoU2GbeX hlG/g+OgTUftYMJ32so=¶
A coaps requestauditing message contains the signed CBOR voucher :¶
POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/ra
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
Payload =
TO BE FILLED
¶
A 2.05 Content response returning a log of the voucher (ct=60) will then be:¶
2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor)
Payload =
{
"version":"1",
"events":[
{
"date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
"assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
"truncated":"<the number of domainID entries truncated>"
},
{
"date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<anotherDomainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
"assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
}
],
"truncation": {
"nonced duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
"nonceless duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
"arbitrary": "<number of domainID entries removed entirely>"
}
}
[EDNOTE: Change JSON to CBOR; Serialize CBOR payload to binary]
¶
The voucher-request example, visualized in CBOR diagnostic notation in Section 6.1.4 is shown as a hexadecimal dump of the binary file.¶
a11909c5a90274323031362d31302d30375431393a33313a34325a0474323031
362d31302d32315431393a33313a34325a01020d6d4a414441313233343536
373839054401020d0f0a4401020d0f03f50674323031372d31302d30375431
393a33313a34325a0c4401020d0f
¶
The voucher-request example has been signed by using the WT1234 certificate and key pair shown in Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CMS signing of the binary voucher-request leads to a binary signed voucher-request, shown with a hexadecimal representation shown in the payload of the request part of Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2.¶
The breakdown of the CMS signed binary voucher-request file is visualized below:¶
CMS_ContentInfo:
contentType: pkcs7-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
d.signedData:
version: 1
digestAlgorithms:
algorithm: sha256 (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)
parameter: <ABSENT>
encapContentInfo:
eContentType: pkcs7-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1)
eContent: <ABSENT>
certificates:
d.certificate:
cert_info:
version: 2
serialNumber: 9112578475118446130
signature:
algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
parameter: <ABSENT>
issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification,
CN=802.1AR CA
validity:
notBefore: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT
notAfter: Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
key:
algor:
algorithm: id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameter: OBJECT:prime256v1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
public_key: (0 unused bits)
0000 - 04 c8 b4 21 f1 1c 25 e4-7e 3a c5 71 23 bf
000e - 2d 9f dc 49 4f 02 8b c3-51 cc 80 c0 3f 15
001c - 0b f5 0c ff 95 8d 75 41-9d 81 a6 a2 45 df
002a - fa e7 90 be 95 cf 75 f6-02 f9 15 26 18 f8
0038 - 16 a2 b2 3b 56 38 e5 9f-d9
issuerUID: <ABSENT>
subjectUID: <ABSENT>
extensions:
object: X509v3 Basic Constraints (2.5.29.19)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 30
0002 - <SPACES/NULS>
object: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier (2.5.29.14)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 04 14 96 60 0d 87 16 bf-7f d0 e7 52 d0
000d - ac 76 07 77 ad 66 5d 02-a0
object: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier (2.5.29.35)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 30 16 80 14 68 d1 65 51-f9 51 bf c8 2a
000d - 43 1d 0d 9f 08 bc 2d 20-5b 11 60
object: X509v3 Key Usage (2.5.29.15)
critical: TRUE
value:
0000 - 03 02 05 a0
object: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name (2.5.29.17)
critical: BOOL ABSENT
value:
0000 - 30 21 a0 1f 06 08 2b 06-01 05 05 07 08
000d - 04 a0 13 30 11 06 09 2b-06 01 04 01 b4
001a - 3b 0a 01 04 04 01 02 03-04
sig_alg:
algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
parameter: <ABSENT>
signature: (0 unused bits)
0000 - 30 46 02 21 00 c0 d8 19-96 d2 50 7d 69 3f 3c
000f - 48 ea a5 ee 94 91 bd a6-db 21 40 99 d9 81 17
001e - c6 3b 36 13 74 cd 86 02-21 00 a7 74 98 9f 4c
002d - 32 1a 5c f2 5d 83 2a 4d-33 6a 08 ad 67 df 20
003c - f1 50 64 21 18 8a 0a de-6d 34 92 36
crls:
<EMPTY>
signerInfos:
version: 1
d.issuerAndSerialNumber:
issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification,
CN=802.1AR CA
serialNumber: 9112578475118446130
digestAlgorithm:
algorithm: sha256 (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)
parameter: <ABSENT>
signedAttrs:
object: contentType (1.2.840.113549.1.9.3)
value.set:
OBJECT:pkcs7-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1)
object: signingTime (1.2.840.113549.1.9.5)
value.set:
UTCTIME:Jul 3 08:53:30 2019 GMT
object: messageDigest (1.2.840.113549.1.9.4)
value.set:
OCTET STRING:
0000 - d4 b0 5c dd c8 b4 91 28-4a 18 ca 25 9d
000d - be d0 60 23 cf ad a0 aa-c2 95 ac e9 3f
001a - 0b 4f 44 9e 25
0020 - <SPACES/NULS>
signatureAlgorithm:
algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
parameter: <ABSENT>
signature:
0000 - 30 46 02 21 00 e5 e1 7f-23 c3 aa 14 9f 35 64
000f - 1e c4 4a 0f 68 fe b0 16-3b e6 7c 06 51 af bf
001e - 5a a0 99 59 e0 28 1f 02-21 00 b4 07 2f 7c c4
002d - f9 26 0c 6d 47 a7 93 56-de b8 da f7 23 f0 af
003c - 2b 59 16 cc 36 63 e7 91-89 39 df df
unsignedAttrs:
<EMPTY>
¶
These examples are generated on a pie 4 and a PC running BASH. Keys and Certificates have been generated with openssl with the following shell script:¶
#!/bin/bash
#try-cert.sh
export dir=./brski/intermediate
export cadir=./brski
export cnfdir=./conf
export format=pem
export default_crl_days=30
sn=8
DevID=pledge.1.2.3.4
serialNumber="serialNumber=$DevID"
export hwType=1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1
export hwSerialNum=01020304
export subjectAltName="otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hmodname"
echo $hwType - $hwSerialNum
echo $serialNumber
# remove all files
rm -r ./brski/*
#
# initialize file structure
# root level
cd $cadir
mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private
chmod 700 private
touch index.txt
touch serial
echo 11223344556600 >serial
echo 1000 > crlnumber
# intermediate level
mkdir intermediate
cd intermediate
mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private
chmod 700 private
touch index.txt
echo 11223344556600 >serial
echo 1000 > crlnumber
cd ../..
# file structure is cleaned start filling
echo "#############################"
echo "create registrar keys and certificates "
echo "#############################"
echo "create root registrar certificate using ecdsa with sha256"
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey \
-noout -out $cadir/private/ca-regis.key
openssl req -new -x509 \
-key $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt \
-extensions v3_ca\
-days 365 \
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok\
"/OU=consultancy/CN=registrar.stok.nl"
# Combine authority certificate and key
echo "Combine authority certificate and key"
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet \
-passout pass:watnietweet \
-inkey $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \
-in $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt -export \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx
# converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem
echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem"
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx \\
-out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -nodes
#show certificate in registrar combined certificate
openssl x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -text
#
# Certificate Authority for MASA
#
echo "#############################"
echo "create MASA keys and certificates "
echo "#############################"
echo "create root MASA certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout \
-out $cadir/private/ca-masa.key
openssl req -new -x509 \
-days 365 -key $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt \
-extensions v3_ca\
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/\
OU=manufacturer/CN=masa.stok.nl"
# Combine authority certificate and key
echo "Combine authority certificate and key for masa"
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet \
-passout pass:watnietweet\
-inkey $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \
-in $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt -export \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx
# converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa
echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa"
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet \
-passout pass:watnietweet\
-in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -nodes
#show certificate in pledge combined certificate
openssl x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -text
#
# Certificate for Pledge derived from MASA certificate
#
echo "#############################"
echo "create pledge keys and certificates "
echo "#############################"
# Pledge derived Certificate
echo "create pledge derived certificate using ecdsa with sha256"
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey \
-noout -out $dir/private/pledge.key
echo "create pledge certificate request"
openssl req -nodes -new -sha256 \
-key $dir/private/pledge.key -out $dir/csr/pledge.csr \
-subj \
"/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturing\
/CN=uuid:$DevID/$serialNumber"
# Sign pledge derived Certificate
echo "sign pledge derived certificate "
openssl ca -config $cnfdir/openssl-pledge.cnf \
-extensions 8021ar_idevid\
-days 365 -in $dir/csr/pledge.csr -out $dir/certs/pledge.crt
# Add pledge key and pledge certificate to pkcs12 file
echo "Add pledge key and pledge certificate to pkcs12 file"
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet\
-passout pass:watnietweet\
-inkey $dir/private/pledge.key \
-in $dir/certs/pledge.crt -export \
-out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx
# converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem
echo "converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem"
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet \
-passout pass:watnietweet\
-in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx \
-out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -nodes
#show certificate in pledge-comb.crt
openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text
#show private key in pledge-comb.crt
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 \
-in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text
¶
The xxxx-comb certificates have been generated as required by libcoap for the DTLS connection generation.¶
This first section documents the public and private keys used in the subsequent test vectors below. These keys come from test code and are not used in any production system, and should only be used only to validate implementations.¶
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgIpP20ud7muTl460b
xFzupPkaMoaCIIIFwSOf0hvhQByhRANCAASKnIauvAtx6ZFWQniQOqvP0Zpdaudy
Ve6Vrc80AjyWRGnN3oyQ0rnr5dXynfG2xq8+cY+uGwTrAJYp9OyoZCAs
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
22:93:f6:d2:e7:7b:9a:e4:e5:e3:ad:1b:c4:5c:ee:
a4:f9:1a:32:86:82:20:82:05:c1:23:9f:d2:1b:e1:
40:1c
pub:
04:8a:9c:86:ae:bc:0b:71:e9:91:56:42:78:90:3a:
ab:cf:d1:9a:5d:6a:e7:72:55:ee:95:ad:cf:34:02:
3c:96:44:69:cd:de:8c:90:d2:b9:eb:e5:d5:f2:9d:
f1:b6:c6:af:3e:71:8f:ae:1b:04:eb:00:96:29:f4:
ec:a8:64:20:2c
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256¶
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgHCCOKLhln+l8pLnx
gWtMUm7zRY4ugkznuFimYDKbrNihRANCAARqJKniS+I00XrUfnYMlLXh3E7hFa2J
ESrUpqZLsb9o+Rd9cOkQnLSMmw3H3yZBGZ0MLb/yHtWEA4rIP0eBvhOO
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
1c:20:8e:28:b8:65:9f:e9:7c:a4:b9:f1:81:6b:4c:
52:6e:f3:45:8e:2e:82:4c:e7:b8:58:a6:60:32:9b:
ac:d8
pub:
04:6a:24:a9:e2:4b:e2:34:d1:7a:d4:7e:76:0c:94:
b5:e1:dc:4e:e1:15:ad:89:11:2a:d4:a6:a6:4b:b1:
bf:68:f9:17:7d:70:e9:10:9c:b4:8c:9b:0d:c7:df:
26:41:19:9d:0c:2d:bf:f2:1e:d5:84:03:8a:c8:3f:
47:81:be:13:8e
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256¶
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgQODnSgB7xR/aa3Ea
JrPGz9lZhJ1aEc/56OEPiBr86SKhRANCAASB9HLsnEeyjtHrODNBANNi9khQ2gLQ
VrIie8hLgFmVdwfQw1iMPPI8WwCDeVTaDdGwr6HC6M0sO9CGRZ+JcwrL
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
40:e0:e7:4a:00:7b:c5:1f:da:6b:71:1a:26:b3:c6:
cf:d9:59:84:9d:5a:11:cf:f9:e8:e1:0f:88:1a:fc:
e9:22
pub:
04:81:f4:72:ec:9c:47:b2:8e:d1:eb:38:33:41:00:
d3:62:f6:48:50:da:02:d0:56:b2:22:7b:c8:4b:80:
59:95:77:07:d0:c3:58:8c:3c:f2:3c:5b:00:83:79:
54:da:0d:d1:b0:af:a1:c2:e8:cd:2c:3b:d0:86:45:
9f:89:73:0a:cb
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256¶
Below the certificates that accompany the keys. The certificate description is followed by the hexadecimal DER of the certificate¶
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 4822678189204992 (0x11223344556600)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl
Validity
Not Before: Sep 9 07:42:03 2020 GMT
Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=manufacturing,
CN=uuid:pledge.1.2.3.4/serialNumber=pledge.1.2.3.4
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:8a:9c:86:ae:bc:0b:71:e9:91:56:42:78:90:3a:
ab:cf:d1:9a:5d:6a:e7:72:55:ee:95:ad:cf:34:02:
3c:96:44:69:cd:de:8c:90:d2:b9:eb:e5:d5:f2:9d:
f1:b6:c6:af:3e:71:8f:ae:1b:04:eb:00:96:29:f4:
ec:a8:64:20:2c
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
59:B1:E1:19:F4:68:53:E9:0E:7C:9F:29:D0:FB:5B:1F:AC:C3:82:49
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
22:BC:B8:20:D9:C5:6D:2D:5B:B3:BB:64:8B:E0:8B:A7:86:5E:CE:B4
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:20:4d:fd:a8:83:78:31:d2:62:a4:e5:48:a2:e0:a7:
3b:c5:14:e9:7e:46:13:45:bc:30:fd:1d:e5:d6:63:3e:d8:f4:
02:21:00:a8:e5:1e:c2:79:77:90:fc:40:a8:7a:bf:b1:bd:81:
8b:ee:d7:56:1a:04:4d:8f:c8:3d:76:5f:4d:6e:36:a2:c2
¶
This is the hexadecimal representation in (request-)voucher examples referred to as pledge-cert-hex.¶
30820254308201faa003020102020711223344556600300a06082a8648ce3d04 0302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110 300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e6465 7273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e75666163747572657231153013 06035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3020170d323030393039303734 3230335a180f39393939313233313233353935395a308190310b300906035504 0613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c 6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31163014060355 040b0c0d6d616e75666163747572696e67311c301a06035504030c1375756964 3a706c656467652e312e322e332e34311730150603550405130e706c65646765 2e312e322e332e343059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703 4200048a9c86aebc0b71e991564278903aabcfd19a5d6ae77255ee95adcf3402 3c964469cdde8c90d2b9ebe5d5f29df1b6c6af3e718fae1b04eb009629f4eca8 64202ca35d305b30090603551d1304023000301d0603551d0e0416041459b1e1 19f46853e90e7c9f29d0fb5b1facc38249301f0603551d2304183016801422bc b820d9c56d2d5bb3bb648be08ba7865eceb4300e0603551d0f0101ff04040302 05a0300a06082a8648ce3d040302034800304502204dfda8837831d262a4e548 a2e0a73bc514e97e461345bc30fd1de5d6633ed8f4022100a8e51ec2797790fc 40a87abfb1bd818beed7561a044d8fc83d765f4d6e36a2c2¶
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
39:73:74:f3:fa:81:2a:0d:37:10:3b:68:c1:84:81:c5:01:bc:7c:fe
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=consultancy, CN=registrar.stok.nl
Validity
Not Before: Sep 9 07:42:03 2020 GMT
Not After : Sep 9 07:42:03 2021 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=consultancy, CN=registrar.stok.nl
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:6a:24:a9:e2:4b:e2:34:d1:7a:d4:7e:76:0c:94:
b5:e1:dc:4e:e1:15:ad:89:11:2a:d4:a6:a6:4b:b1:
bf:68:f9:17:7d:70:e9:10:9c:b4:8c:9b:0d:c7:df:
26:41:19:9d:0c:2d:bf:f2:1e:d5:84:03:8a:c8:3f:
47:81:be:13:8e
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
25:CD:93:71:B5:A1:5F:6D:1E:E8:C3:7A:51:13:BE:0B:8F:13:2C:C2
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
25:CD:93:71:B5:A1:5F:6D:1E:E8:C3:7A:51:13:BE:0B:8F:13:2C:C2
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:a6:6d:9e:24:f9:de:08:b7:f0:cf:43:c3:c0:
ee:57:cc:b6:60:de:ae:2e:70:cc:61:a1:a2:b3:35:35:02:5b:
ba:02:21:00:bf:fd:74:6a:99:eb:da:01:77:fc:6c:37:95:75:
8a:f4:a0:9f:99:8e:bc:4a:90:62:49:f0:7a:c9:65:96:dc:75
¶
This the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples referred to as regis-cert-hex¶
30820239308201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501 bc7cfe300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b 300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330 11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e 73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f 6b2e6e6c301e170d3230303930393037343230335a170d323130393039303734 3230335a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e42 3110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e 64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a30 1806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a 8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e76 0c94b5e1dc4ee115ad89112ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df 2641199d0c2dbff21ed584038ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e04 16041425cd9371b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d230418 3016801425cd9371b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d1304 0530030101ff300a06082a8648ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de 08b7f0cf43c3c0ee57ccb660deae2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd74 6a99ebda0177fc6c3795758af4a09f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc75¶
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
70:5a:34:7e:67:d2:4d:70:b0:c6:ca:60:ff:fb:75:d9:46:82:e6:0e
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl
Validity
Not Before: Sep 9 07:42:03 2020 GMT
Not After : Sep 9 07:42:03 2021 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:81:f4:72:ec:9c:47:b2:8e:d1:eb:38:33:41:00:
d3:62:f6:48:50:da:02:d0:56:b2:22:7b:c8:4b:80:
59:95:77:07:d0:c3:58:8c:3c:f2:3c:5b:00:83:79:
54:da:0d:d1:b0:af:a1:c2:e8:cd:2c:3b:d0:86:45:
9f:89:73:0a:cb
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
22:BC:B8:20:D9:C5:6D:2D:5B:B3:BB:64:8B:E0:8B:A7:86:5E:CE:B4
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
22:BC:B8:20:D9:C5:6D:2D:5B:B3:BB:64:8B:E0:8B:A7:86:5E:CE:B4
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:20:04:ac:8d:48:62:a2:a5:04:4f:61:fd:38:83:53:
9f:00:e7:d6:4b:4d:30:1b:84:29:d4:2d:35:58:b0:a0:0c:7d:
02:21:00:8c:f1:f4:f9:a2:11:fe:64:46:a9:87:9f:58:ca:ea:
da:4f:0a:42:32:c2:6a:e8:c5:9d:62:c0:67:f0:b8:44:43
¶
This is the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples referred to as masa-cert-hex.¶
30820230308201d6a0030201020214705a347e67d24d70b0c6ca60fffb75d946 82e60e300a06082a8648ce3d040302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b 300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330 11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e 7566616374757265723115301306035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c 301e170d3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335a 306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e 06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273 746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e756661637475726572311530130603 5504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d02010608 2a8648ce3d0301070342000481f472ec9c47b28ed1eb38334100d362f64850da 02d056b2227bc84b8059957707d0c3588c3cf23c5b00837954da0dd1b0afa1c2 e8cd2c3bd086459f89730acba350304e301d0603551d0e0416041422bcb820d9 c56d2d5bb3bb648be08ba7865eceb4301f0603551d2304183016801422bcb820 d9c56d2d5bb3bb648be08ba7865eceb4300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a 06082a8648ce3d0403020348003045022004ac8d4862a2a5044f61fd3883539f 00e7d64b4d301b8429d42d3558b0a00c7d0221008cf1f4f9a211fe6446a9879f 58caeada4f0a4232c26ae8c59d62c067f0b84443¶
In this example the voucher request has been signed by the pledge, and has been sent to the JRC over CoAPS. This example uses the proximity-registrar-cert mechanism to request a voucher that pins the certificate of the registrar.¶
POST coaps://registrar.example.com/est/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
signed_request_voucher
¶
The payload signed_request_voucher is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):¶
d28444a101382ea1045820f8926f5ba385b7bccf23592b97a73c1b00bffc01023 0f647f06960870b1fd6ee5902aca11909c5a61909c77818323032302d31302d35 5431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c97818323032322d31302d355431333 a34363a31332d30303a30301909c6021909cc5029c7bafb81a2c6160d3357d229 11f5101909d26e706c656467652e312e322e332e341909cf59023d30820239308 201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501bc7cfe300a06 082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b3009060355040 80c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c 0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e637 9311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d 3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335a3073310b3 009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603550407 0c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143 012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265 676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a864 8ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e760c94b5e1dc4ee115ad8911 2ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df2641199d0c2dbff21ed5840 38ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e0416041425cd9371b5a15f6d1e e8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d2304183016801425cd9371b5a15f6d1 ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a06082a8648 ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de08b7f0cf43c3c0ee57ccb660dea e2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd746a99ebda0177fc6c3795758af4a0 9f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc7558473045022100fc28be418e5f25152590e 872b4bbdbe334cd31d1ebb0a806e7a172cad5cff604022056ee414ddac438e7f5 1dda9ddf6ec6e31a78cdde6574717fe46dd3a7c60f5bb5¶
The representiation of signed_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic format is:¶
Diagnose(signed_request_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47}
{4:h'F8926F5BA385B7BCCF23592B97A73C1B00BFFC010230F647F06960870B1F
D6EE'},
h'request_voucher'
h'3045022100FC28BE418E5F25152590E872B4BBDBE334CD31D1EBB0A806E7A17
2CAD5CFF604022056EE414DDAC438E7F51DDA9DDF6EC6E31A78CDDE6574717FE4
6DD3A7C60F5BB5'])
Diagnose(request_voucher) =
{2501: {2503: "2020-10-5T13:46:13-00:00",
2505: "2022-10-5T13:46:13-00:00",
2502: 2,
2508: h'29C7BAFB81A2C6160D3357D22911F510',
2514: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
2511: h'regis-cert-hex'}},
¶
In this example the voucher request has been signed by the JRC using the private key from Appendix C.1.2. Contained within this voucher request is the voucher request from the pledge to JRC.¶
POST coaps://masa.example.com/est/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
signed_masa_request_voucher
¶
The payload signed_masa_voucher_request is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):¶
d28444a101382ea1045820b86ae808f79af17e5948cbda731f158d04bd091c73f 485f2409eac08ee7ddb5c5903fea11909c5a61909c77818323032302d31302d35 5431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c97818323032322d31302d355431333 a34363a31332d30303a30301909cc5029c7bafb81a2c6160d3357d22911f51019 09d26e706c656467652e312e322e332e341909ca586b433d4e4c2c2053543d4e4 22c204c3d48656c6d6f6e642c204f3d76616e64657273746f6b2c204f553d6d61 6e75666163747572696e672c20434e3d757569643a706c656467652e312e322e3 32e342c2073657269616c4e756d6265723d706c656467652e312e322e332e3419 09ce590323d28444a101382ea1045820f8926f5ba385b7bccf23592b97a73c1b0 0bffc010230f647f06960870b1fd6ee5902aca11909c5a61909c7781832303230 2d31302d355431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c97818323032322d31302 d355431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c6021909cc5029c7bafb81a2c616 0d3357d22911f5101909d26e706c656467652e312e322e332e341909cf59023d3 0820239308201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501bc 7cfe300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300 906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e643113301106 0355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756 c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e 6c301e170d3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335 a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e 06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e646572737 46f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504 030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020 106082a8648ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e760c94b5e1dc4e e115ad89112ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df2641199d0c2db ff21ed584038ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e0416041425cd9371 b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d2304183016801425cd937 1b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a 06082a8648ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de08b7f0cf43c3c0ee5 7ccb660deae2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd746a99ebda0177fc6c37 95758af4a09f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc7558473045022100fc28be418e5 f25152590e872b4bbdbe334cd31d1ebb0<<a806e7a172cad5cff604022056ee41 4ddac438e7f51dda9ddf6ec6e31a78cdde6574717fe46dd3a7c60f5bb55847304 5022047b5314c72cbb2d1212e51198061167c79e1002874cd2665a5b643fa6436 3c30022100ce49ac309f760bd0e75660a7e29edee82f0251724c124150f5326b9 b2654927c¶
The representiation of signed_masa_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic format is:¶
Diagnose(signed_masa_request_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47}
{4:h'B86AE808F79AF17E5948CBDA731F158D04BD091C73F485F2409EAC08EE7D
DB5C'},
h'masa_request_voucher',
h'3045022047B5314C72CBB2D1212E51198061167C79E1002874CD2665A5B643F
A64363C30022100CE49AC309F760BD0E75660A7E29EDEE82F0251724C124150F5
326B9B2654927C'])
Diagnose(masa_request_voucher) =
{2501:
{2503: "2020-10-5T13:46:13-00:00",
2505: "2022-10-5T13:46:13-00:00",
2508: h'29C7BAFB81A2C6160D3357D22911F510',
2514: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
2506:h'433D4E4C2C2053543D4E422C204C3D48656C6D6F6E642C
204F3D76616E64657273746F6B2C204F553D6D616E75666163747572696E672C2
0434E3D757569643A706C656467652E312E322E332E342C2073657269616C4E75
6D6265723D706C656467652E312E322E332E34',
2510: h'request_voucher'}},
¶
The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned via the JRC to the Pledge. It is signed by the MASA's private key Appendix C.1.3 and can be verified by the pledge using the MASA's public key contained within the MASA certificate.¶
This is the raw binary signed_voucher, encoded in hexadecimal (with lf added):¶
d28444a101382ea1045820ab59b0679fcf65d5223d4ce4266a27a9c7432702466 ff5f3648e822a64d61b145902b0a1190993a71909957818323032302d31302d35 5431333a34363a31342d30303a30301909977818323032322d31302d355431333 a34363a31342d30303a30301909940319099a5029c7bafb81a2c6160d3357d229 11f51019099e6e706c656467652e312e322e332e3419099b59023d30820239308 201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501bc7cfe300a06 082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b3009060355040 80c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c 0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e637 9311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d 3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335a3073310b3 009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603550407 0c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143 012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265 676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a864 8ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e760c94b5e1dc4ee115ad8911 2ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df2641199d0c2dbff21ed5840 38ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e0416041425cd9371b5a15f6d1e e8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d2304183016801425cd9371b5a15f6d1 ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a06082a8648 ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de08b7f0cf43c3c0ee57ccb660dea e2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd746a99ebda0177fc6c3795758af4a0 9f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc751909960058483046022100d07cadc5c2836 e7845d6d2e2652527386bd40258d20ab24b6bbce5515df915e9022100aba68a07 b2295c4b49d53f73ea370ca66f761ad5d8d8c11c19a2d505729285cb¶
The representiation of signed_voucher in CBOR diagnostic format is:¶
Diagnose (signed_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47}
{4: h'AB59B0679FCF65D5223D4CE4266A27A9C7432702466FF5F3648E822A64D61
B14'},
h'voucher',
h'3046022100D07CADC5C2836E7845D6D2E2652527386BD40258D20AB24B6BBCE
5515DF915E9022100ABA68A07B2295C4B49D53F73EA370CA66F761AD5D8D8C11C
19A2D505729285CB'])
Diagnose (voucher) =
{2451:
{2453: "2020-10-5T13:46:14-00:00",
2455: "2022-10-5T13:46:14-00:00",
2452: 3,
2458: h'29C7BAFB81A2C6160D3357D22911F510',
2462: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
2459: h'regis-cert-hex',
2454: 0}}
¶