| COSE Working Group | J. Schaad |
| Internet-Draft | August Cellars |
| Intended status: Informational | July 5, 2015 |
| Expires: January 6, 2016 |
CBOR Encoded Message Syntax
draft-ietf-cose-msg-01
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need for the ability to have the basic security services defined for this data format. This document specifies how to do signatures, message authentication codes and encryption using this data format.
The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/cose-wg/cose-spec>. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantial issues need to be discussed on the COSE mailing list.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2016.
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
There has been an increased focus on the small, constrained devices that make up the Internet of Things (IOT). One of the standards that has come of of this process is the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR). This standard extends the data model of the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) by allowing for binary data among other changes. CBOR is being adopted by several of the IETF working groups dealing with the IOT world to do their encoding of data structures. CBOR was designed specifically to be both small in terms of messages transport and implementation size. A need exists to provide basic message security services for IOT and using CBOR as the message encoding format makes sense.
The JOSE working group produced a set of documents [RFC7515][RFC7516][RFC7517][RFC7518] that defined how to perform encryption, signatures and message authentication (MAC) operations for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) documents and then to encode the results using the JSON format [RFC7159]. This document does the same work for use with the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] document format. While there is a strong attempt to keep the flavor of the original JOSE documents, two considerations are taken into account:
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
When the words appear in lower case, their natural language meaning is used.
There currently is no standard CBOR grammar available for use by specifications. In this document, we use the grammar defined in the CBOR data definition language (CDDL) [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl].
CDDL productions that together define the grammar are interspersed in the document like this:
start = COSE_MSG
The collected CDDL can be extracted from the XML version of this document via the following XPath expression below. (Depending on the XPath evaluator one is using, it may be necessary to deal with > as an entity.)
//artwork[@type='CDDL']/text()
NOTE: At some point we need to make some decisions about how we are using CDDL in this document. Since this draft has not been moving forward at a great rate, changing all references on it to informational is a good idea. On the other hand, having some type of syntax that can be examined by a machine to do syntax checking is a big win. The build system for this draft is currently using the latest version of CDDL to check that the syntax of the examples is correct. Doing this has found problems in both the syntax checker, the syntax and the examples.
label = int / tstr
In JSON, maps are called objects and only have one kind of map key: a string. In COSE, we use both strings and integers (both negative and non-negative integers) as map keys, as well as data items to identify specific choices. The integers (both positive and negative) are used for compactness of encoding and easy comparison. (Generally, in this document the value zero is going to be reserved and not used.) Since the work "key" is mainly used in its other meaning, as a cryptographic key, we use the term "label" for this usage of either an integer or a string to identify map keys and choice data items.
One of the standard issues that is specified in IETF cryptographic algorithms is a requirement that a standard specify a set of minimal algorithms that are required to be implemented. This is done to promote interoperability as it provides a minimal set of algorithms that all devices can be sure will exist at both ends. However, we have elected not to specify a set of mandatory algorithms in this document.
It is expected that COSE is going to be used in a wide variety of applications and on a wide variety of devices. Many of the constrained devices are going to be setup to used a small fixed set of algorithms, and this set of algorithms may not match those available on a device. We therefore have deferred to the application protocols the decision of what to specify for mandatory algorithms.
Since the set of algorithms in an environment of constrained devices may depend on what the set of devices are and how long they have been in operation, we want to highlight that application protocols will need to specify some type of discovery method of algorithm capabilities. The discovery method may be as simple as requiring preconfiguration of the set of algorithms to providing a discovery method built into the protocol. S/MIME provided a number of different ways to approach the problem:
The COSE_MSG structure is a top level CBOR object that corresponds to the DataContent type in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652]. This structure allows for a top level message to be sent that could be any of the different security services. The security service is identified within the message.
The COSE_Tagged_MSG CBOR type takes the COSE_MSG and prepends a CBOR tag of TBD1 to the encoding of COSE_MSG. By having both a tagged and untagged version of the COSE_MSG structure, it becomes easy to either use COSE_MSG as a top level object or embedded in another object. The tagged version allows for a method of placing the COSE_MSG structure into a choice, using a consistent tag value to determine that this is a COSE object.
The existence of the COSE_MSG and COSE_Tagged_MSG CBOR data types are not intended to prevent protocols from using the individual security primitives directly. Where only a single service is required, that structure can be used directly.
Each of the top-level security objects use a CBOR map as the base structure. Items in the map at the top level are identified by a label. This document defines a number of labels in the IANA “COSE Object Labels Registry” (defined in Section 9.2).
The set of labels present in a security object is not restricted to those defined in this document. However, it is not recommended that additional fields be added to a structure unless this is going to be done in a closed environment. When new fields need to be added, it is recommended that a new message type be created so that processing of the field can be ensured. Using an older structure with a new field means that any security properties of the new field will not be enforced. Before a new field is added at the outer level, strong consideration needs to be given to defining a new header field and placing it into the protected headers. Applications should make a determination if non-standardized fields are going to be permitted. It is suggested that libraries allow for an option to fail parsing if non-standardized fields exist, this is especially true if they do not allow for access to the fields in other ways.
A field 'msg_type' is defined to distinguish between the different structures when they appear as part of a COSE_MSG object. [CREF2]JLS: I have moved msg_type into the individual structures. However, they would not be necessary in the cases where a) the security service is known and b) security libraries can setup to take individual structures. Should they be moved back to just appearing if used in a COSE_MSG rather than on the individual structure? [CREF3]JLS: Should we create an IANA registries for the values of msg_type? This field is indexed by an integer value 1, the values defined in this document are:
Implementations MUST be prepared to find an integer under this label that does not correspond to the values 1 to 3. If this is found then the client MUST stop attempting to parse the structure and fail. The value of 0 is reserved and not to be used. If the value of 0 is found, then clients MUST fail processing the structure. Implementations need to recognize that the set of values might be extended at a later date, but they should not provide a security service based on guesses of what is there.
NOTE: Is there any reason to allow for a marker of a COSE_Key structure and allow it to be a COSE_MSG? Doing so does allow for a security risk, but may simplify the code. [CREF4]JLS: OPEN ISSUE
The CDDL grammar that corresponds to the above is:
COSE_MSG = COSE_Sign /
COSE_encrypt /
COSE_mac
COSE_Tagged_MSG = #6.999(COSE_MSG) ; Replace 999 with TBD1
; msg_type values
reserved=0
msg_type_signed=1
msg_type_encrypted=2
msg_type_mac=3
The top level of each of the COSE message structures are encoded as maps. We use an integer to distinguish between the different security message types. By searching for the integer under the label identified by msg_type (which is in turn an integer), one can determine which security message is being used and thus what syntax is for the rest of the elements in the map.
| name | number | comments |
|---|---|---|
| msg_type | 1 | Occurs only in top level messages |
| protected | 2 | Occurs in all structures |
| unprotected | 3 | Occurs in all structures |
| payload | 4 | Contains the content of the structure |
| signatures | 5 | For COSE_Sign - array of signatures |
| signature | 6 | For COSE_signature only |
| ciphertext | 4 | TODO: Should we reuse the same as payload or not? |
| recipients | 9 | For COSE_encrypt and COSE_mac |
| tag | 10 | For COSE_mac only |
The CDDL grammar that provides the label values is:
; message_labels msg_type=1 protected=2 unprotected=3 payload=4 signatures=5 signature=6 ciphertext=4 recipients=9 tag=10
The structure of COSE has been designed to have two buckets of information that are not considered to be part of the payload itself, but are used for holding information about algorithms, keys, or evaluation hints for the processing of the layer. These two buckets are available for use in all of the structures in this document except for keys. While these buckets can be present, they may not all be usable in all instances. For example, while the protected bucket is present for recipient structures, most of the algorithms that are used for recipients do not provide the necessary functionality to provide the needed protection and thus the element is not used.
Both buckets are implemented as CBOR maps. The map key is a 'label' (Section 1.4). The value portion is dependent on the definition for the label. Both maps use the same set of label/value pairs. The integer range for labels has been divided into several sections with a standard range, a private range, and a range that is dependent on the algorithm selected. The tables of labels can be found in Table 2.
Two buckets are provided for each layer: [CREF5]JLS: A completest version of this grammar would list the options available in the protected and unprotected headers. Do we want to head that direction?
Both of the buckets are optional and are omitted if there are no items contained in the map. The CDDL fragment that describes the two buckets is:
header_map = {+ label => any }
Headers = (
? protected => bstr,
? unprotected => header_map
)
The set of header fields defined in this document are:
The header values indicated by 'crit' can be processed by either the security library code or by an application using a security library, the only requirement is that the field is processed.
This table contains a list of all of the parameters for use in signature and encryption message types defined by the JOSE document set. In the table is the data value type to be used for CBOR as well as the integer value that can be used as a replacement for the name in order to further decrease the size of the sent item.
| name | label | value | registry | description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| alg | 1 | int / tstr | COSE Algorithm Registry | Integers are taken from table --POINT TO REGISTRY-- |
| crit | 2 | [+ label] | COSE Header Label Registry | integer values are from this table. |
| cty | 3 | tstr / int | media-types registry | Value is either a media-type or an integer from the media-type registry |
| jku | * | tstr | URL to COSE key object | |
| jwk | * | COSE_Key | contains a COSE key not a JWK key | |
| kid | 4 | bstr | key identifier | |
| x5c | * | bstr* | X.509 Certificate Chain | |
| x5t | * | bstr | SHA-1 thumbprint of key | |
| x5t#S256 | * | bstr | SHA-256 thumbprint of key | |
| x5u | * | tstr | URL for X.509 certificate | |
| zip | * | int / tstr | Integers are taken from the table --POINT TO REGISTRY-- | |
| nonce | 5 | bstr | Nonce or Initialization Vector (IV) |
OPEN ISSUES:
The signature structure allows for one or more signatures to be applied to a message payload. There are provisions for attributes about the content and attributes about the signature to be carried along with the signature itself. These attributes may be authenticated by the signature, or just present. Examples of attributes about the content would be the type of content, when the content was created, and who created the content. Examples of attributes about the signature would be the algorithm and key used to create the signature, when the signature was created, and counter-signatures.
When more than one signature is present, the successful validation of one signature associated with a given signer is usually treated as a successful signature by that signer. However, there are some application environments where other rules are needed. An application that employs a rule other than one valid signature for each signer must specify those rules. Also, where simple matching of the signer identifier is not sufficient to determine whether the signatures were generated by the same signer, the application specification must describe how to determine which signatures were generated by the same signer. Support of different communities of recipients is the primary reason that signers choose to include more than one signature. For example, the COSE_Sign structure might include signatures generated with the RSA signature algorithm and with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature algorithm. This allows recipients to verify the signature associated with one algorithm or the other. (The original source of this text is [RFC5652].) More detailed information on multiple signature evaluation can be found in [RFC5752].
The CDDL grammar for a signature message is:
COSE_Sign = {
msg_type => msg_type_signed,
Headers,
? payload => bstr,
signatures => [+ COSE_signature]
}
The fields is the structure have the following semantics:
We use the values in Table 1 as the labels in the COSE_Sign map. While other labels can be present in the map, it is not generally a recommended practice. The other labels can be either of integer or string type, use of other types SHOULD be treated as an error.
The CDDL grammar structure for a signature is:
COSE_signature = {
Headers,
signature => bstr
}
The fields in the structure have the following semantics:
The COSE structure used to create the byte stream to be signed uses the following CDDL grammar structure:
Sig_structure = [
body_protected: bstr,
sign_protected: bstr,
payload: bstr
]
How to compute a signature:
How to verify a signature:
In addition to performing the signature verification, one must also perform the appropriate checks to ensure that the key is correctly paired with the signing identity and that the appropriate authorization is done.
In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when doing an encryption in COSE. In COSE, we use the same techniques and structures for encrypting both the plain text and the keys used to protect the text. This is different from the approach used by both [RFC5652] and [RFC7516] where different structures are used for the plain text and for the different key management techniques.
One of the byproducts of using the same technique for encrypting and encoding both the content and the keys using the various key management techniques, is a requirement that all of the key management techniques use an Authenticated Encryption (AE) algorithm. (For the purpose of this document we use a slightly loose definition of AE algorithms.) When encrypting the plain text, it is normal to use an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm. For key management, either AE or AEAD algorithms can be used. See Appendix A for more details about the different types of algorithms. [CREF8]Ilari: I don't follow/understand this text
The CDDL grammar structure for encryption is:
COSE_encrypt = {
msg_type=>msg_type_encrypted,
COSE_encrypt_fields
}
COSE_encrypt_fields = (
Headers,
? ciphertext => bstr,
? recipients => [+{COSE_encrypt_fields}]
)
Description of the fields:
This section has moved. Still need to make some small comments here.
The encryption algorithm for AEAD algorithms is fairly simple. In order to get a consistent encoding of the data to be authenticated, the Enc_structure is used to have canonical form of the AAD.
Enc_structure = [
protected: bstr,
external_aad: bstr
]
In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when doing MAC authentication in COSE. JOSE used a variant of the signature structure for doing MAC operations and it is restricted to using a single pre-shared secret to do the authentication. [CREF9]JLS: Should this sentence be removed? This document allows for the use of all of the same methods of key management as are allowed for encryption.
When using MAC operations, there are two modes in which it can be used. The first is just a check that the content has not been changed since the MAC was computed. Any of the key management methods can be used for this purpose. The second mode is to both check that the content has not been changed since the MAC was computed, and to use key management to verify who sent it. The key management modes that support this are ones that either use a pre-shared secret, or do static-static key agreement. In both of these cases the entity MACing the message can be validated by a key binding. (The binding of identity assumes that there are only two parties involved and you did not send the message yourself.)
COSE_mac = {
msg_type=>msg_type_mac,
Headers,
? payload => bstr,
tag => bstr,
recipients => [+{COSE_encrypt_fields}]
}
Field descriptions:
MAC_structure = [
protected: bstr,
external_aad: bstr,
payload: bstr
]
How to compute a MAC:
There are only a few changes between JOSE and COSE for how keys are formatted. As with JOSE, COSE uses a map to contain the elements of a key. Those values, which in JOSE are base64url encoded because they are binary values, are encoded as bstr values in COSE.
For COSE we use the same set of fields that were defined in [RFC7517]. [CREF10]JLS: Do we remove this line and just define them ourselves? [CREF11]JLS: We can really simplify the grammar for COSE_Key to be just the kty (the one required field) and the generic item. The reason to do this is that it makes things simpler. The reason not to do this says that we really need to add a lot more items so that a grammar check can be done that is more tightly enforced.
COSE_Key = {
kty => tstr / int,
? key_ops => [+ tstr / int ],
? alg => tstr / int,
? kid => bstr,
* label => values
}
COSE_KeySet = [+COSE_Key]
The element “kty” is a required element in a COSE_Key map. All other elements are optional and not all of the elements listed in [RFC7517] or [RFC7518] have been listed here even though they can all appear in a COSE_Key map.
This document defines a set of common map elements for a COSE Key object. Table 3 provides a summary of the elements defined in this section. There are also a set of map elements that are defined for a specific key type.
| name | label | CBOR type | registry | description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| kty | 1 | tstr / int | COSE General Values | Identification of the key type |
| key_ops | 4 | [* (tstr/int)] | Restrict set of permissible operations | |
| alg | 3 | tstr / int | COSE Algorithm Values | Key usage restriction to this algorithm |
| kid | 2 | bstr | Key Identification value - match to kid in message | |
| x5u | * | tstr | ||
| x5c | * | bstr* | ||
| x5t | * | bstr | ||
| x5t#S256 | * | bstr | ||
| use | * | tstr | deprecated - don't use |
Only the 'kty' field MUST be present in a key object. All other members may be omitted if their behavior is not needed.
| name | value | description |
|---|---|---|
| sign | 1 | The key is used to create signatures. Requires private key fields. |
| verify | 2 | The key is used for verification of signatures. |
| encrypt | 3 | The key is used for key transport encryption. |
| decrypt | 4 | The key is used for key transport decryption. Requires private key fields. |
| wrap key | 5 | The key is used for key wrapping. |
| unwrap key | 6 | The key is used for key unwrapping. Requires private key fields. |
| key agree | 7 | The key is used for key agreement. |
The following provides a CDDL fragment which duplicates the assignment labels from Table 3 and Table 4.
;key_labels key_kty=1 key_kid=2 key_alg=3 key_ops=4 ;key_ops values key_ops_sign=1 key_ops_verify=2 key_ops_encrypt=3 key_ops_decrypt=4 key_ops_wrap=5 key_ops_unwrap=6 key_ops_agree=7
There as been an attempt to limit the number of places where the document needs to impose restrictions on how the CBOR Encoder needs to work. We have managed to narrow it down to the following restrictions:
It is requested that IANA assign a new tag from the “Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags” registry. It is requested that the tag be assigned in the 0 to 23 value range.
Tag Value: TBD1
Data Item: COSE_Msg
Semantics: COSE security message.
It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled “COSE Object Labels Registry”. [CREF12]JLS: Finish the registration process.
This table is initially populated by the table in Table 1.
It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled “COSE Header Labels”.
The initial contents of the registry can be found in Table 2. The specification column for all rows in that table should be this document.
Additionally, the value of 0 is to be marked as 'Reserved'.
NOTE: Need to review the range assignments. It does not necessarily make sense as specification required uses 1 byte positive integers and 2 byte strings.
It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled “COSE Header Algorithm Labels”.
The initial contents of the registry can be found in Appendix D. The specification column for all rows in that table should be this document.
It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled “COSE Algorithm Registry”.
The initial contents of the registry can be found in the following: . The specification column for all rows in that table should be this document.
It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled “COSE Key Map Registry”.
The columns of the registry are:
This registry will be initially populated by the values in Section 7.1. The specification column for all of these entries will be this document.
It is requested that IANA create a new registry “COSE Key Parameters”.
The columns of the table are:
This registry will be initially populated by the values in --Multiple Tables--. The specification column for all of these entries will be this document.
This section registers the "application/cose" and "application/cose+cbor" media types in the "Media Types" registry. [CREF13]JLS: Should we register both or just the cose+cbor one? These media types are used to indicate that the content is a COSE_MSG.
This section registers the "application/cose+json" and "application/cose-set+json" media types in the "Media Types" registry. These media types are used to indicate, respectively, that content is a COSE_Key or COSE_KeySet object.
There are security considerations:
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC7049] | Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013. |
The set of encryption algorithms that can be used with this specification is restricted to authenticated encryption (AE) and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) algorithms. This means that there is a strong check that the data decrypted by the recipient is the same as what was encrypted by the sender. Encryption modes such as counter have no check on this at all. The CBC encryption mode had a weak check that the data is correct, given a random key and random data, the CBC padding check will pass one out of 256 times. There have been several times that a normal encryption mode has been combined with an integrity check to provide a content encryption mode that does provide the necessary authentication. AES-GCM [AES-GCM], AES-CCM [RFC3610], AES-CBC-HMAC [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] are examples of these composite modes.
PKCS v1.5 RSA key transport does not qualify as an AE algorithm. There are only three bytes in the encoding that can be checked as having decrypted correctly, the rest of the content can only be probabilistically checked as having decrypted correctly. For this reason, PKCS v1.5 RSA key transport MUST NOT be used with this specification. RSA-OAEP was designed to have the necessary checks that that content correctly decrypted and does qualify as an AE algorithm.
When dealing with authenticated encryption algorithms, there is always some type of value that needs to be checked to see if the authentication level has passed. This authentication value may be:
All of the currently defined Key Management methods only use two levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure. The first level is the message content and the second level is the content key encryption. However, if one uses a key management technique such as RSA-KEM (see Appendix A of RSA-KEM [RFC5990], then it make sense to have three levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure.
These levels would be:
This is an example of what a triple layer message would look like. The message has the following layers:
In effect this example is a decomposed version of using the ECDH-ES+A128KW algorithm.
{
1: 2,
2: h'a10101',
3: {
-1: h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ce'
},
4: h'64f84d913ba60a76070a9a48f26e97e863e285295a44320878caceb076
3a334806857c67',
9: [
{
3: {
1: -3
},
4: h'5a15dbf5b282ecb31a6074ee3815c252405dd7583e078188',
9: [
{
3: {
1: "ECDH-ES",
5: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b
6c616e642e6578616d706c65',
4: {
1: 1,
-1: 4,
-2: h'b2add44368ea6d641f9ca9af308b4079aeb519f11e9b8
a55a600b21233e86e68',
-3: h'1a2cf118b9ee6895c8f415b686d4ca1cef362d4a7630a
31ef6019c0c56d33de0'
}
}
}
]
}
]
}
The examples can be found at https://github.com/cose-wg/Examples. I am currently still in the process of getting the examples up there along with some control information for people to be able to check and reproduce the examples.
Examples may have some features that are in questions but not yet incorporated in the document.
diag2cbor < inputfile > outputfile
To make it easier to read, the examples are presented using the CBOR's diagnostic notation rather than a binary dump. [CREF14]JLS: Do we want to keep this as diagnostic notation or should we switch to having "binary" examples instead? Using the Ruby based CBOR diagnostic tools at ????, the diagnostic notation can be converted into binary files using the following command line: (install command is?...)
This example users the following:
{
1: 3,
2: h'a1016f4145532d434d41432d3235362f3634',
4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
10: h'd9afa663dd740848',
9: [
{
3: {
1: -6,
5: h'6f75722d736563726574'
}
}
]
}
This example uses the following:
{
1: 3,
2: h'a10104',
4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
10: h'2ba937ca03d76c3dbad30cfcbaeef586f9c0f9ba616ad67e9205d3857
6ad9930',
9: [
{
3: {
1: "ECDH-SS",
5: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c61
6e642e6578616d706c65',
"spk": {
"kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"
},
"apu": h'4d8553e7e74f3c6a3a9dd3ef286a8195cbf8a23d19558ccf
ec7d34b824f42d92bd06bd2c7f0271f0214e141fb779ae2856abf585a58368b01
7e7f2a9e5ce4db5'
}
}
]
}
This example uses the following:
{
1: 3,
2: h'a1016e4145532d3132382d4d41432d3634',
4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
10: h'6d1fa77b2dd9146a',
9: [
{
3: {
1: -5,
5: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d6565
66333134626337303337'
},
4: h'711ab0dc2fc4585dce27effa6781c8093eba906f227b6eb0'
}
]
}
This example uses the following:
{
1: 3,
2: h'a10104',
4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
10: h'7aaa6e74546873061f0a7de21ff0c0658d401a68da738dd8937486519
83ce1d0',
9: [
{
3: {
1: "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
6d706c65',
4: {
1: 1,
-1: 5,
-2: h'43b12669acac3fd27898ffba0bcd2e6c366d53bc4db71f909
a759304acfb5e18cdc7ba0b13ff8c7636271a6924b1ac63c02688075b55ef2d61
3574e7dc242f79c3',
-3: h'812dd694f4ef32b11014d74010a954689c6b6e8785b333d1a
b44f22b9d1091ae8fc8ae40b687e5cfbe7ee6f8b47918a07bb04e9f5b1a51a334
a16bc09777434113'
}
},
4: h'1b120c848c7f2f8943e402cbdbdb58efb281753af4169c70d0126c
0d16436277160821790ef4fe3f'
},
{
3: {
1: -2,
5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
6d706c65'
},
4: h'46c4f88069b650909a891e84013614cd58a3668f88fa18f3852940
a20b35098591d3aacf91c125a2595cda7bee75a490579f0e2f20fd6bc956623bf
de3029c318f82c426dac3463b261c981ab18b72fe9409412e5c7f2d8f2b5abaf7
80df6a282db033b3a863fa957408b81741878f466dcc437006ca21407181a016c
a608ca8208bd3c5a1ddc828531e30b89a67ec6bb97b0c3c3c92036c0cb84aa0f0
ce8c3e4a215d173bfa668f116ca9f1177505afb7629a9b0b5e096e81d37900e06
f561a32b6bc993fc6d0cb5d4bb81b74e6ffb0958dac7227c2eb8856303d989f93
b4a051830706a4c44e8314ec846022eab727e16ada628f12ee7978855550249cc
b58'
},
{
3: {
1: -5,
5: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d6565
66333134626337303337'
},
4: h'0b2c7cfce04e98276342d6476a7723c090dfdd15f9a518e7736549
e998370695e6d6a83b4ae507bb'
}
]
}
This example uses the following:
{
1: 2,
2: h'a10101',
3: {
-1: h'c9cf4df2fe6c632bf7886413'
},
4: h'45fce2814311024d3a479e7d3eed063850f3f0b9f3f948677e3ae9869b
cf9ff4e1763812',
9: [
{
3: {
1: "ECDH-ES",
5: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c61
6e642e6578616d706c65',
4: {
1: 1,
-1: 4,
-2: h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf05
4e1c7b4d91d6280',
-3: h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d
924b7e03bf822bb'
}
}
}
]
}
This example uses the following:
{
1: 1,
4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
5: [
{
2: h'a20165505333383405581e62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f
626269746f6e2e6578616d706c65',
6: h'1b22515f96fd798a331c7b156e90bfea7f558ec6de840e05a8e5f4
b7be44ea1451c48517da7fd216c6143898673c232a96937ebcfb88264a58f5995
82d89cf8a4f20ef35fbfcfd2aad46ad8b99ea6425367afd898de1b712d558b0d2
49d6d180d0b1fb7256140ec3553556f3b5b95a49931a75998dfc23ca905efc7d8
e04deeb92d5936c0824e535aa344396f73913d8a65de0010600270ae5df7f5c8d
52ae525a7642d4c4ff9e219acaa52fd933df003be36b9e3c77ced37129d66745e
2a42baa3d0b3f2675cd51ae8a64fd024d126be5396c91b9236fb5f8548d09881b
b5d40a61c0d342bed9fe8058f36b8722b9e8465dc3b8bfa4f2fd138ce186b73e4
082'
}
]
}
This example uses the following:
{
1: 1,
4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
5: [
{
2: h'a10129',
3: {
5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
6d706c65'
},
6: h'028947ac3521f66f2506013007e2cd7b0cb09a209e76ab5b95f751
eb63f5730f1672a282419c49b9653d742577fb6a6cea9ab2e1d4d5d9e786e2240
4760663cc74a1c2c90160af92628e1ebbc3eeba552f757054b691ab17271396b7
ff2d86c100b94a2fce0438c0b50ca70bcdd3074a0f8dc40c2e44e9b26e9093287
b7245ee13171b28ea0f3e291c2cca64aa17f7094aee2be02b5fe5cd2cf343e18c
eec0c763cb76a128df9a9cbfc37b835f6467d98d74505eee1dccc9e6ebf2405ea
1329b41a33eeb13f1bbef3a272e42b3df96cdaea9016663e31ddff4603eb66a88
5c583b53977c1fb9707550717d7387f84616a6670e27d4007b08879109aaf3720
f33'
},
{
3: {
1: -9,
5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
6d706c65'
},
6: h'0195345953742c6725352a13cdc55402c895133525c9a3b16bb47d
02ca5f57f8a34aebf47298c602a8feb1dd71d1936886f21029a4142abf38c3aa3
94b3597c2f35c01987c801edc7022c8fddacbf25bc8794b9ffb7cb27f9f346ba4
4db6f5c9b60406530f62b378c5da3e7e2259327f4e55f48271873496497724492
d90ba67a4b65112'
}
]
}
This section disappears when we make a decision on password based key management.
| name | algorithm | label | CBOR type | description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| p2c | PBE | -1 | int | |
| p2s | PBE | -2 | bstr |