+--------+     +--------+                  +--------+     +--------+
|Diameter| AVP |Diameter|   AVP, {AVP}k    |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
|Client  +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server  |
+--------+     +--------+                  +--------+     +--------+			  

        

Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.

Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection there is the possibility for password sniffing, confidentiality violation, AVP insertion, deletion or modification. Additionally, applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment. Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act of malicious behavior but could also be the result of misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and (potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.

5. Requirements

Requirement #1:

Solutions MUST support an extensible set of cryptographic algorithms.

• Motivation: Crypto-agility is the ability of a protocol to adapt to evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements. This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial disruption to deployed implementations.

Requirement #2:

Solutions MUST support confidentiality, integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with existing Diameter applications.

Requirement #3:

Solutions MUST support replay protection. Any Diameter node has an access to network time and thus can synchronise their clocks.

Requirement #4:

Solutions MUST support the ability to delegate security functionality to another entity

• Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all clients within the same administrative domain is important for incremental deployability. The same applies to the other communication side where a load balancer terminates security services for the servers it interfaces.

Requirement #5:

Solutions MUST be able to selectively apply their cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.

• Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it MUST be possible to apply security protection selectively.

Requirement #6:

Solutions MUST recommend a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm.

• Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified (unless profiles for specific usage environments specify otherwise).

Requirement #7:

Solutions MUST support symmetric keys and asymmetric keys.

• Motivation: Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms, for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.

Requirement #8:

A solution for dynamic key management MUST be included in the overall solution framework. However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management actions and (b) expiring keying material.

Requirement #9:

The ability to statically provisioned keys (symmetric as well as asymmetric keys) has to be supported to simplify management for small-scale deployments that typically do not have a back-end network management infrastructure.

6. Open Issues

Open Issue #1:

Capability/Policy Discovery: This document talks about selectively protecting Diameter AVPs between different Diameter nodes. A Diameter node has to be configured such that it applies security protection to a certain number of AVPs. A number of policy related questions arise: What keying material should be used so that the intended recipient is also able to verify it? What AVPs shall be protected so that the result is not rejected by the recipient? In case of confidentiality protection the Diameter node encrypting AVPs needs to know ahead of time what other node is intended to decrypt them. Should the list of integrity protected AVP be indicated in the protected payload itself (or is it known based on out-of-band information)? Is this policy / capability information assumed to be established out-of-band (manually) or is there a protocol mechanism to distribute this information?

Open Issue #2:

Command-Line Support: Should solutions allow the provisioning of long-term shared symmetric credentials via a command-line interface / text file? This allows easier management for small-scale deployments.

7. Security Considerations

This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.

8. IANA Considerations

This document does not require actions by IANA.

9. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, for his review comments.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[1]	Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2]	Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.

10.2. Informative References

[1]	Calhoun, P., Farrell, S. and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS Security Application", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04, March 2002.
[2]	Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, August 2005.

Authors' Addresses