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|
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2008.
Mobile IPv6 deployments may want to bootstrap their operations dynamically based on an interaction between the Home Agent and the Diameter server of the Mobile Service Provider (MSP). This document specifies the interaction between a Mobile IP Home Agent and the Diameter server.
Several different mechanisms for authenticating a Mobile Node are supported. The usage of the Internet Key Exchange v2 (IKEv2) protocol allows different mechanisms, such as the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), certificates and pre-shared secrets in IKEv2 to be used. Furthermore, another method makes use of the Mobile IPv6 Authentication protocol. In addition to authentication authorization, the configuration of Mobile IPv6 specific parameters and accounting is specified in this document.
1.
Introduction
2.
Terminology
3.
Advertising Application Support
4.
Protocol Description
4.1.
Support for Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and EAP
4.2.
Support for Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and Certificates
4.3.
Support for Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and Pre-Shared Secrets
4.4.
Support for the Mobile IPv6 Authentication Protocol
4.5.
Mobile IPv6 Session Management
4.5.1.
Session-Termination-Request Command
4.5.2.
Session-Termination-Answer Command
4.5.3.
Abort-Session-Request Command
4.5.4.
Abort-Session-Answer Command
4.6.
Accounting for Mobile IPv6 services
4.6.1.
Accounting-Request Command
4.6.2.
Accounting-Answer Command
5.
Command Codes
5.1.
Command Code for Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and EAP
5.1.1.
Diameter-EAP-Request (DER)
5.1.2.
Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA)
5.2.
Command Code for Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and Certificate- and PSK-based Authentication
5.2.1.
AA-Request (AAR)
5.2.2.
AA-Answer (AAA)
5.3.
Command Codes for MIPv6 Auth. Protocol Support
5.3.1.
MIP6-Request-Message
5.3.2.
MIP6-Answer-Message
6.
AVPs
6.1.
User-Name AVP
6.2.
MIP-MN-AAA-SPI AVP
6.3.
MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP
6.4.
MIP-Home-Agent-Address AVP
6.5.
MIP-Careof-Address AVP
6.6.
MIP-Authenticator AVP
6.7.
MIP-MAC-Mobility-Data AVP
6.8.
MIP-Session-Key AVP
6.9.
MIP-MSA-Lifetime AVP
6.10.
MIP-MN-to-HA-MSA AVP
6.11.
MIP-Algorithm-Type AVP
6.12.
MIP-Replay-Mode AVP
6.13.
MIP-nonce AVP
6.14.
MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP
6.15.
MIP-Timestamp AVP
6.16.
QoS-Capability AVP
6.17.
QoS-Resources AVP
6.18.
Accounting AVPs
7.
Result-Code AVP Values
7.1.
Transient Failures
7.2.
Permanent Failures
8.
AVP Occurence Tables
8.1.
AAR, AAA, DER, DEA, MRM and MAM AVP/Command-Code Table
8.2.
Accounting AVP Table
9.
IANA Considerations
9.1.
Command Codes
9.2.
AVP Codes
9.3.
Result-Code AVP Values
9.4.
Application Identifier
10.
Security Considerations
11.
Acknowledgements
12.
References
12.1.
Normative References
12.2.
Informative References
§
Authors' Addresses
§
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements
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Performing the Mobile IPv6 protocol [1] (Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, “Mobility Support in IPv6,” June 2004.), requires the Mobile Node (MN) to own a Home Address (HoA) and assignment of a Home Agent (HA) to the MN. The MN needs to register with the HA in order facilitate its reachability and mobility, when away from home. The registration process itself requires establishment of IPsec security associations (SA) and cryptographic material between the MN and HA. Providing the collection of home address, HA address and keying material is generally referred to as the Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping problem [2] (Patel, A. and G. Giaretta, “Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6),” September 2006.). The purpose of this specification is to provide Diameter support for the interaction between the HA and the AAA server, as it is required for bootstrapping in the split scenario [13] (Giaretta, G., “Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping in split scenario,” July 2007.) and in the integrated scenario [14] (Chowdhury, K. and A. Yegin, “MIP6-bootstrapping for the Integrated Scenario,” April 2008.) in a manner that satisfies the requirements defined in [15] (Giaretta, G., “AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6,” September 2006.).
From an operator (mobility service provider, MSP) perspective, it is important to verify that the MN is authenticated and authorized to utilize Mobile IPv6 service and that such services are accounted for. Only when the MN is authenticated and authorized, the MSP allows the boostrapping of Mobile IPv6 parameters. Thus, prior to processing the Mobile IPv6 service requests, the HA, participates in the authentication of the MN to verify the MN's identity. The HA also participates in the Mobile IPv6 authorization process involving the Diameter infrastrucure. The HA due to its role in traffic forwarding, also may also perform accounting for the Mobile IPv6 service provided to the MN.
This document enables the following functionality:
- Authentication:
- Asserting or helping in asserting of the correctness of the MN identity. As a Diameter client supporting the new Diameter Mobile IPv6 application, the HA may need to support more than one authentication type depending on the environment. Although the authentication is performed by the AAA server there is an impact for the HA as different set of command codes are needed for the respective authentication procedures.
- Authorization:
- The HA must verify that the user is authorized to use the Mobile IPv6 service using the assistance of the MSP Diameter servers. This is accomplised through the use of new Diameter commands specifically designed for performing Mobile IPv6 authorization decisions. This document defines these commands and requires the HA to support them and to participate in this authorization signaling.
- Accounting:
- For accounting purposes and capacity planning, it is required of the HA to provide accounting report to the Diameter infrastructure and thus to support the related Diameter accounting procedures.
Figure 1 (Architecture Overview) depicts the architecture.
+--------+
|Diameter|
|Server |
+--------+
^
Back-End | Diameter MIPv6
Protocol | HA<->AAA Server
Support | Interaction
| (this document)
v
+---------+ +--------------+
| Mobile | Front-End Protocol |Home Agent / |
| Node |<--------------------------|Diemter Client|
+---------+ IKEv2 or RFC 4285 +--------------+
| Figure 1: Architecture Overview |
Mobile IPv6 signaling between the MN and the HA can protected using two different mechanisms, namely using IPsec and via the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol. Note that the actual mechanism to protect the MIPv6 signaling messages is only indirectly relevant to this document. The important aspect is, however, that for these two approaches several different authentication and key exchange solutions are available. To establish IPsec security associations for protection of Mobile IPv6 signaling messages IKEv2 is used, see [3] (Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, “Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture,” April 2007.). IKEv2 supports EAP-based authentication, certificates and pre-shared secrets. For protecting using the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol [4] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” July 2008.) a mechanism has been designed that is very similar to the one used by Mobile IPv4.
The ability to use different credentials has an impact on the interaction between the HA (acting as a Diameter client) and the Diameter Server. For that reason this document illustrates the usage of these authentication mechanisms with different subsections for
For accounting of Mobile IPv6 services provided to the MN, this specification uses the accounting application defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.).
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [6] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
The MIPv6 bootstrapping terminology is taken from [2] (Patel, A. and G. Giaretta, “Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6),” September 2006.).
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Diameter nodes conforming to this specification MUST advertise support by including the Diameter Mobile IPv6 Application ID value of [TO BE ASSIGNED BY IANA] in the Auth-Application-Id AVP of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer command [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.). The Acct-Application-id AVP needs to include the Diameter Base Accounting Application ID value of 3 (to support the split accounting model [16] (Fajardo, V., Tschofenig, H., and L. Morand, “Diameter Applications Design Guidelines,” March 2010.)).
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The use of IKEv2 with EAP between the MN and the HA allows the AAA to authenticate the MN. When EAP is used with IKEv2, the Diameter EAP application, as defined in [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.), is re-used. EAP methods that do not establish a shared key SHOULD NOT be used, as they are subject to a number of man-in-the-middle attacks as stated in Section 2.16 and Section 5 of RFC 4306 [8] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.). AVPs specific to Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping are added to the EAP application commands.
Figure 2 (Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and EAP) shows the message flow involved during the authentication phase when EAP is used.
Mobile Home Diameter
Node Agent Server
| | |
| HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni (1) | |
|-------------------------------->| |
| | |
| HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ](2)| |
|<------------------------------->| |
| | |
| HDR, SK{IDi,[CERTREQ,] [IDr,] | |
| [CP(CFG_REQUEST),] | |
| SAi2, TSi, TSr} (3) | |
|-------------------------------->| DER (EAP-Response) (4) |
| |------------------------->|
| | |
| | DEA (EAP-Request) (5) |
| HDR, SK{IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, EAP} |<-------------------------|
|<------------------------------- | |
| | |
| HDR, SK{EAP} | |
|-------------------------------->| DER (EAP-Response) |
| |------------------------->|
| | |
| | DEA (EAP-Request) |
| HDR, SK{EAP-Request} |<-------------------------|
|<------------------------------- | |
| | |
| HDR, SK{EAP-Response} | |
|-------------------------------->| DER (EAP-Response) |
| |------------------------->|
| ... | ... |
| | |
| | DEA (EAP-Success) |
| |<-------------------------|
| HDR, SK{EAP-Success} | |
|<------------------------------- | |
| | |
| HDR, SK{AUTH} | |
|-------------------------------> | |
| | |
| HDR, SK{AUTH, [CP(CFG_REPLY,] | |
| SAr2, TSi, TSr} | |
|<------------------------------- | |
| | |
| Figure 2: Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and EAP |
The MN and the HA start the interaction with an IKE_SA_INIT exchange. In this phase cryptographic algorithms are negotiated, nonces and Diffie-Hellman parameters are exchanged. Message (3) starts the IKE_AUTH phase. This second phase authenticates the previous messages, exchanges identities and certificates and establishes the first CHILD_SA. It is used to mutually authenticate the MN (acting as an IKEv2 Initiator) and the HA (acting as an IKEv2 Responder). The identity of the user/MN is provided in the IDi field. The MN indicates its willingness to be authenticated via EAP by omitting the AUTH field in message (3) (see Section 2.16 of [8] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.)).
As part of the authentication process, the MN MAY request a Home-Address, a Home Prefix or suggests one, see [3] (Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, “Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture,” April 2007.), using a CFG_REQUEST payload in the message (3).
The HA extracts the IDi field from the message (3) and sends a Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) message (4) towards the authenticating Diameter server. The EAP-Payload AVP contains a EAP-Response/Identity with the identity extracted from the IDi field.
This message is routed to the MNs Diameter server/EAP server. The Diameter server selects the EAP method and replies with the DEA Message. Depending on the type of EAP method chosen, a number of DER and DEA messages carry the method specific exchanges between the MN and the Diameter server/EAP server.
At the end of the EAP authentication phase, the Diameter server indicates the result of the authentication in the Result-Code AVP and provides the corresponding EAP packet (EAP Success or EAP Failure). The last IKEv2 message sent by the HA contains the Home Address or the Home Prefix. In the latter case, a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is necessary to setup IPsec SAs for Mobile IPv6 signalling.
In some deployment scenario, the HA may also acts as a IKEv2 Responder for IPsec VPN access. A problem in this case is that the IKEv2 responder may not know if IKEv2 is used for MIP6 service or for IPsec VPN access. A network operator needs to be aware of this limitation.
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When IKEv2 is used with certificate-based authentication, the Diameter NASREQ application [9] (Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” August 2005.) is used to authorize the MN for the Mobile IPv6 service. The IDi payload extracted from the IKE_AUTH message MUST correspond to the identity in the MN's certificate. This identity is then used by the Home Agent to populate the User-Name AVP in the succeeding AA-Request message. Further PKI-related procedures such as certificate revocation checking are out of scope of this document.
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When IKEv2 is used with PSK-based initiator authentication, the Diameter NASREQ application [9] (Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” August 2005.) isused to authorize the MN for the Mobile IPv6 service. The IDi payload extracted from the IKE_AUTH message has to contain an identity that is meaningful for the Diameter infrastructure, such as a Network Access Identifier (NAI), and is then used by the Home Agent to populate the User-Name AVP is the succeeding AA-Request message.
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Figure 3 (MIPv6 Bootstrapping using the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol) describes the sequence of messages sent and received between the MN, the HA and the Diameter server during the registration when MIPv6 Auth. Protocol is used. Binding Update (BU) and Binding Acknowledgement (BA) messages are used in the registration process. This exchange triggers the Diameter interaction.
According to [4] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” July 2008.) the MN uses the Mobile Node Identifier Option, specifically the MN-NAI mobility option (as defined in [17] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Mobile Node Identifier Option for Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6),” November 2005.)) to identify itself.
The BU initiates a MIP6-Request-Message to the Diameter server and the corresponding response is carried in a MIP6-Answer-Message. The Home Agent also provides the assigned Home Address to the Diameter server in the MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP.
Mobile Home Diameter
Node Agent Server
| | |
| | |
| Binding Update |MIP6-Request-Message |
|------------------------------------>|-------------------->|
| (Mobile Node Identifier Option, | |
| Mobility Message Replay Protection | |
| Option, Authentication Option) | |
| | |
| | |
| Binding Acknowledgement |MIP6-Answer-Message |
|<------------------------------------|<--------------------|
| (Mobile Node Identifier Option | |
| Mobility Message Replay Protection | |
| Option, Authentication Option) | |
| Figure 3: MIPv6 Bootstrapping using the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol |
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The Diameter server may maintain state or may be stateless. This is indicated in the Auth-Session-State AVP (or its absence). The HA MUST support the Authorization Session State Machine defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.). Moreover, the following four commands may be exchanged between the HA and the Diameter server.
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The Session-Termination-Request (STR) message [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) is sent by the HA to inform the Diameter server that an authorized session is being terminated.
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The Session-Termination-Answer (STA) message [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) is sent by the Diameter server to acknowledge the notification that the session has been terminated.
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The Abort-Session-Request (ASR) message [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) is sent by the Diameter server to terminates the session. This fulfills one of the requirement described in [15] (Giaretta, G., “AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6,” September 2006.).
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The Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) message [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) is sent by the Home Agent in response to an ASR message.
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The HA MUST be able act as a Diameter client collecting accounting records needed for service control and charging. The HA MUST support the accounting procedures (specifically the command codes mentioned below) and the Accounting Session State Machine as defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.). The command codes, exchanged between the HA and Diameter server for accounting purposes, are provided in the following subsections.
The Diameter application design guideline [16] (Fajardo, V., Tschofenig, H., and L. Morand, “Diameter Applications Design Guidelines,” March 2010.) defines two separate models for accounting:
- Split accounting model:
According to this model, the accounting messages use the Diameter base accounting application ID (value of 3). Since accounting is treated as an independent application, accounting commands may be routed separately from the rest of application messages and thus the accounting messages generally end up in a central accounting server. Since Diameter Mobile IPv6 application does not define its own unique accounting commands, this is the prefered choice, since it permits use of centralized accounting for several applications.
- Coupled accounting model:
In this model, the accounting messages will use the application ID of the Mobile IPv6 application. This means that accounting messages will be routed like any other Mobile IPv6 application messages. This requires the Diameter server in charge of Mobile IPv6 application to handle the accounting records (e.g., sends them to a proper accounting server).
As mentioned above, the prefered choice is to use the split accounting model and thus to choose Diameter base accounting application ID (value of 3) for accounting messages.
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The Accounting-Request command [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) is sent by the HA to the Diameter server to exchange accounting information regarding the MN with the Diameter server.
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The Accounting-Answer command [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) is sent by the Diameter server to the HA to acknowledge receiving an Accounting-Request.
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For usage of Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 and EAP this document re-uses the Diameter EAP application [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.) commands. The following commands are used to carry MIPv6 related bootstrapping AVPs.
Command-Name Abbrev. Code Reference Application ------------------------------------------------------------------ Diameter-EAP-Request DER 268 RFC 4072 EAP Diameter-EAP-Answer DEA 268 RFC 4072 EAP
| Figure 4: Command Codes |
| TOC |
The Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) message [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.), indicated by the Command-Code field set to 268 and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is sent by the HA to the Diameter server to initiate a Mobile IPv6 service authentication and authorization procedure. The DER message format is the same as defined in [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.). The Application-ID field of the Diameter Header MUST be set to the Diameter Mobile IPv6 Application ID [TO BE ASSIGNED TO IANA].
<Diameter-EAP-Request> ::= < Diameter Header: 268, REQ, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Destination-Realm }
{ Auth-Request-Type }
[ Destination-Host ]
[ NAS-Identifier ]
[ NAS-IP-Address ]
[ NAS-IPv6-Address ]
[ NAS-Port-Type ]
[ User-Name ]
{ EAP-Payload }
[ MIP6-Feature-Vector ]
[ MIP-Home-Agent-Address ]
{ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address }
...
* [ AVP ]
| TOC |
The Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) message defined in [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.), indicated by the Command-Code field set to 268 and 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field, is sent in response to the Diameter-EAP-Request message (DER). If the Mobile IPv6 authentication procedure was successful then the response MAY include any set of bootstrapping AVPs.
The DEA message format is the same as defined in [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.). The Application-Id field in the Diameter header MUST be set to the Diameter Mobile IPv6 Application-Id [TO BE ASSIGNED BY IANA].
<Diameter-EAP-Answer> ::= < Diameter Header: 268, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Auth-Request-Type }
{ Result-Code }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
[ User-Name ]
{ EAP-Payload }
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address ]
[ MIP6-Feature-Vector ]
...
* [ AVP ]
| TOC |
This document re-uses the Diameter NASREQ application commands. The following commands are used to carry MIPv6 related bootstrapping AVPs.
Command-Name Abbrev. Code Reference Application ------------------------------------------------------------------ AA-Request AAR 265 RFC 4005 NASREQ AA-Answer AAA 265 RFC 4005 NASREQ
| Figure 5: Command Codes |
| TOC |
The AA-Request (AAR) message [9] (Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” August 2005.), indicated by the Command-Code field set to 265 and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is sent by the HA to the Diameter server to initiate a Mobile IPv6 service authentication and authorization procedure. The AAR message format is the same as defined in [9] (Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” August 2005.). The Application-ID field of the Diameter Header MUST be set to the Diameter Mobile IPv6 Application ID [TO BE ASSIGNED TO IANA].
<AA-Request> ::= < Diameter Header: 265, REQ, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Destination-Realm }
{ Auth-Request-Type }
[ Destination-Host ]
[ NAS-Identifier ]
[ NAS-IP-Address ]
[ NAS-IPv6-Address ]
[ NAS-Port-Type ]
[ User-Name ]
[ MIP6-Feature-Vector ]
[ MIP-Home-Agent-Address ]
{ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address }
...
* [ AVP ]
| TOC |
The AA-Answer (AAA) message defined in [9] (Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” August 2005.), indicated by the Command-Code field set to 265 and 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field, is sent in response to the AA-Request message (AAR). If the Mobile IPv6 authentication procedure was successful then the response MAY include any set of bootstrapping AVPs.
The AAA message format is the same as defined in [9] (Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” August 2005.). The Application-Id field in the Diameter header MUST be set to the Diameter Mobile IPv6 Application-Id [TO BE ASSIGNED BY IANA].
<AA-Answer> ::= < Diameter Header: 265, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Auth-Request-Type }
{ Result-Code }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
[ User-Name ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address ]
[ MIP6-Feature-Vector ]
...
* [ AVP ]
| TOC |
This section defines the commands that are used for support with the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol.
Command-Name Abbreviation Code Section
------------------------------------------------------------------
MIP6-Request-Message MRM TBD Section 6.2.1
MIP6-Answer-Message MAM TBD Section 6.2.2
| Command Codes |
| TOC |
The MIP6-Request-Message (MRM), indicated by the Command-Code field set to TBD and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is sent by the HA, acting as a Diameter client, in order to request the authentication and authorization of a MN. The HA uses information found in the Binding Update to construct the following AVPs, to be included as part of the MRM:
The message format is shown below.
<MIP6-Request-Message> ::= < Diameter Header: XXX, REQ, PXY >
< Session-ID >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ User-Name }
{ Destination-Realm }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
[ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ]
[ Destination-Host ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
[ NAS-Identifier ]
[ NAS-IP-Address ]
[ NAS-IPv6-Address ]
[ NAS-Port-Type ]
[ MIP6-Feature-Vector ]
{ MIP-MN-AAA-SPI }
{ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address ]
{ MIP-Home-Agent-Address }
{ MIP-Careof-Address }
{ MIP-Authenticator }
{ MIP-MAC-Mobility-Data }
[ MIP-Timestamp ]
[ QoS-Capability ]
* [ QoS-Resources ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ Route-Record ]
* [ AVP ]
| TOC |
The MIP6-Answer-Message (MAM) message, indicated by the Command-Code field set to TBD and the 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field, is sent by the Diameter server in response to the MIP6-Request-Message message. The User-Name MAY be included in the MAM if it is present in the MRM. The Result-Code AVP MAY contain one of the values defined in Section 7 (Result-Code AVP Values), in addition to the values defined in RFC 3588 [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.).
An MAM message with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_SUCCESS MUST include the MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP.
The message format is shown below.
<MIP6-Answer-Message> ::= < Diameter Header: XXX, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Result-Code }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
[ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ]
[ User-Name ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Error-Message ]
[ Error-Reporting-Host ]
[ Re-Auth-Request-Type ]
[ MIP6-Feature-Vector ]
[ MIP-Home-Agent-Address ]
{ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address }
{ MIP-Session-Key }
{ MIP-MSA-Lifetime }
{ MIP-MN-to-HA-MSA }
* [ QoS-Resources ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ AVP ]
The QoS-Resources AVP is defined in [10] (Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, “Traffic Classification and Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter,” December 2009.).
| TOC |
To provide support for RFC 4285 [4] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” July 2008.) and for RFC 4877 [3] (Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, “Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture,” April 2007.) the AVPs in the following subsections are needed. RFC 3588, RFC 4004 and RFC 4005 defined AVPs are reused whenever possible without violating the existing semantics of those AVPs.
+--------------------------+
| AVP Flag rules |
+----+-----+----+-----+----+
AVP Defined | | |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
Attribute Name Code in Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT| NOT|Encr|
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP6-Feature- TBD Note 1 Unsigned64 | | P | | M,V | Y |
| Vector | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Mobile- | | M,P | | V | Y |
|Node-Address 334 RFC4004 Address | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Home- 334 RFC4004 Address | | M,P | | V | Y |
| Agent-Address | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
| AVPs for Mobile IPv6 with IKEv2 |
Note 1: The MIP6-Feature-Vector is defined in Section 4.7.4 of [11] (Korhonen, J., Bournelle, J., Tschofenig, H., Perkins, C., and K. Chowdhury, “Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction,” January 2009.).
+--------------------------+
| AVP Flag rules |
+----+-----+----+-----+----+
AVP Section | | |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
Attribute Name Code Defined Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT| NOT|Encr|
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP6-Feature- TBD Note 1 Unsigned64 | | P | | M,V | Y |
| Vector | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Mobile- 333 RFC4004 Address | | M,P | | V | Y |
| Node-Address | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Home- 334 RFC4004 Address | | M,P | | V | Y |
| Agent-Address | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-MN-AAA-SPI 341 RFC4004 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Careof- TBD 5.4.5 Address | M | P | | V | Y |
| Address | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP- TBD 5.4.6 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
| Authenticator | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-MAC- TBD 5.4.7 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
| Mobility-Data | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Timestamp TBD TBD Time | | M,P | | V | Y |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-Session-Key 343 RFC4004 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-MSA- 367 RFC4004 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
| Lifetime | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|MIP-MN-to- 331 RFC4004 Grouped | M | P | | V | Y |
| HA-MSA | | | | | |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|QoS-Capability TBD Note 2 Groupe | | M,P | | V | Y |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
|QoS-Resources TBD Note 2 Grouped | | M,P | | V | Y |
+-----------------------------------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+
| AVPs for the Mobile IPv6 Authentication Protocol |
Note 1: The MIP6-Feature-Vector is defined in Section 4.7.4 of [11] (Korhonen, J., Bournelle, J., Tschofenig, H., Perkins, C., and K. Chowdhury, “Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction,” January 2009.).
Note 2: The QoS-Capability and QoS-Resource AVPs are defined in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 of [10] (Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, “Traffic Classification and Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter,” December 2009.).
| TOC |
The User-Name AVP (AVP Code 2) is of type UTF8String and contains an NAI extracted from the MN-NAI mobility option included in the received BU message. Alternatively, the NAI can be extracted from the IKEv2 IDi payload included in the IKE_SA_INIT message.
| TOC |
The MIP-MN-AAA-SPI AVP (AVP Code 341) is of type Unsigned32 and contains an SPI code extracted from the Mobility Message Authentication Option included in the received BU message.
This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP (AVP Code 333) is of type Address and contains the Home Agent assigned IPv6 Home Address of the Mobile Node.
If the MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP contains unspecified IPv6 address (0::0) in a request message, then the Home Agent expects the Diameter server to assign the Home Address in a subsequent reply message. In case the Diameter server assigns only a prefix to the Mobile Node the lower 64 bits of the MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP provided address are set to zero.
This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The MIP-Home-Agent-Address AVP (AVP Code 334) is of type Address and contains the IPv6 address of the Home Agent. This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The MIP-Careof-Address AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type Address and contains the IPv6 Care-of Address of the Mobile Node. The Home Agent extracts this IP address from the received BU message.
| TOC |
The MIP-Authenticator AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type OctetString and contains the Authenticator Data from the received BU message. The Home Agent extracts this data from the MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option included in the received BU message.
| TOC |
The MIP-MAC-Mobility-Data AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type OctetString and contains the calculated MAC_Mobility_Data, as defined in [4] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” July 2008.).
| TOC |
The AVP (AVP Code 343) is of type OctetString and contains the MN-HA shared secret (i.e., the session key) for the associated Mobile IPv6 MH-HA authentication option. When the Diameter server computes the session key it is placed in this AVP.
This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The AVP (AVP Code 367) is of type Unsigned32 and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the session key (see Section 6.8 (MIP-Session-Key AVP)) or nonce (see Section 6.13 (MIP-nonce AVP)) is valid. The associated session key or nonce MUST NOT be used if the lifetime has expired.
This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The AVP (AVP Code 331) is of type Grouped and contains the session related information for use with the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol.
MIP-MN-to-HA-MSA ::= < AVP Header: 331 >
{ MIP-Algorithm-Type }
{ MIP-Replay-Mode }
{ MIP-nonce }
* [ AVP ]
This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The AVP (AVP Code 345) is of type Enumerated and contains Algorithm identifier for the associated Mobile IPv6 MN-HA Authentication Option. The Diameter server selects the algorithm type. Existing algorithm types are defined in RFC 4004 that also fulfill current RFC 4285 requirements. This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The AVP (AVP Code 346) is of type Enumerated and contains the replay mode the Home Agent for authenticating the mobile node. The replay modes, defined in RFC 4004 [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.), are supported. This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.).
| TOC |
The AVP (AVP Code 335) is of type OctetString and contains the nonce sent to the Mobile Node. This AVP is re-used from [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.). At the time of writing the MIPv6 Auth. Protocol does not require use of nonces for replay protection between the MN and the Diameter server. Thus, the Home Agent is allowed to ignore the returned MIP-Nonce AVP.
| TOC |
This AVP is defined in [11] (Korhonen, J., Bournelle, J., Tschofenig, H., Perkins, C., and K. Chowdhury, “Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction,” January 2009.).
| TOC |
The MIP-Timestamp AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type Time and may contain the timestamp value from the Mobility message replay protection option, defined in [4] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” July 2008.). The Home Agent extracts this value from the received BU message, if available.
The support for replay protection is an optional feature in [4] (Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” July 2008.). When the Diameter server checks the timestamp provided by the MN via the HA and recognizes a clock-drift (outside a locally defined replay protection window) then it MUST initiate the re-synchronization procedure by returning a MIP6-Answer-Message with Result-Code set to MIP6-TIMESTAMP-MISMATCH and attaches the MIP-Timestamp AVP including it's current time back to the HA.
| TOC |
The QoS-Capability AVP is defined in [10] (Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, “Traffic Classification and Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter,” December 2009.) and contains a list of supported Quality of Service profiles.
| TOC |
The QoS-Resources AVP is defined in [10] (Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, “Traffic Classification and Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter,” December 2009.) and provides QoS and packet filtering capabilities.
| TOC |
This document reuses the accounting AVPs defined in Diameter Mobile IPv4 application [12] (Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” August 2005.), namely:
- Accounting-Input-Octets:
Number of octets in IP packets received from the user
- Accounting-Output-Octets:
Number of octets in IP packets sent by the user
- Accounting-Input-Packets:
Number of IP packets received from the user
- Accounting-Output-Packets:
Number of IP packets sent by the user.
| TOC |
This section defines new Result-Code [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.) values that MUST be supported by all Diameter implementations that conform to this specification.
| TOC |
Errors in the transient failures category are used to inform a peer that the request could not be satisfied at the time it was received, but that it may be able to satisfy the request in the future.
- MIP6-TIMESTAMP-MISMATCH TBD
This error code is used by the home agent to indicate to the HA that the timestamp value provided as part of the MN-AAA option has an inacceptable clock-drift.
| TOC |
Errors that fall within the permanent failures category are used to inform the peer that the request failed and SHOULD NOT be attempted again.
- DIAMETER_ERROR_END_TO_END_MIP6_KEY_ENCRYPTION TBD
This error is used by the Diameter server to inform the peer that the requested Mobile IPv6 session keys could not be delivered via a security association.
| TOC |
The following tables present the AVPs defined in this document and their occurrences in Diameter messages. Note that AVPs that can only be present within a Grouped AVP are not represented in this table.
The table uses the following symbols:
- 0:
The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
- 0+:
Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
- 0-1:
Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
- 1:
One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
| TOC |
+-----------------------------------+
| Command-Code |
|-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
AVP Name | AAR | AAA | DER | DEA | MRM | MAM |
-------------------------------|-----+-----|-----+-----+-----+-----+
MIP6-Feature-Vector | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
MIP-Mobile-Node-Address | 1 | 0-1 | 1 | 0-1 | 1 | 0-1 |
MIP-MN-AAA-SPI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
MIP-Home-Agent-Address | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
MIP-Careof-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
MIP-Authenticator | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
MIP-MAC-Mobility-Data | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
MIP-Session-Key | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
MIP-MSA-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
MIP-MN-to-HA-MSA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
MIP-Timestamp | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
QoS-Resources (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | *0 | *0 |
QoS-Capability (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Note (1): The QoS-Capability and QoS-Resources AVPs usage with Diameter EAP and Diameter NASREQ is already defined in [10] (Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, “Traffic Classification and Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter,” December 2009.).
| TOC |
The table in this section is used to represent which AVPs defined in this document are to be present in the Accounting messages, as defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.).
+-------------+
| Command-Code|
|------+------+
Attribute Name | ACR | ACA |
-------------------------------------|------+------+
Accounting-Input-Octets | 1 | 0-1 |
Accounting-Input-Packets | 1 | 0-1 |
Accounting-Output-Octets | 1 | 0-1 |
Accounting-Output-Packets | 1 | 0-1 |
Acct-Multi-Session-Id | 1 | 0-1 |
Acct-Session-Time | 1 | 0-1 |
MIP6-Feature-Vector | 1 | 0-1 |
MIP-Home-Agent-Address | 1 | 0-1 |
MIP-Mobile-Node-Address | 1 | 0-1 |
Event-Timestamp | 0-1 | 0 |
-------------------------------------|------+------+
| TOC |
This section contains the namespaces that have either been created in this specification or had their values assigned to existing namespaces managed by IANA.
| TOC |
IANA is requested to allocate a command code value for the MIP6-Request-Message (MRM) and for the MIP6-Answer-Message (MAM) from the Command Code namespace defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.). See Section 5 (Command Codes) for the assignment of the namespace in this specification.
| TOC |
This specification requires IANA to register the following new AVPs from the AVP Code namespace defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.).
The AVPs are defined in Section 6 (AVPs).
| TOC |
This specification requests IANA to allocate new values to the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 268) namespace defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.). See Section 7 (Result-Code AVP Values) for the assignment of the namespace in this specification.
| TOC |
This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value for "Diameter Mobile IPv6" from the Application Identifier namespace defined in [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.).
| TOC |
The security considerations for the Diameter interaction required to accomplish the split scenario are described in in [13] (Giaretta, G., “Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping in split scenario,” July 2007.). Additionally, the security considerations of the Diameter Base protocol [5] (Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” September 2003.), Diameter EAP application [7] (Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” August 2005.) are applicable to this document. This document does not introduce new security vulnerabilities.
| TOC |
The authors would like to thanks Jari Arkko, Tolga Asversen, Pasi Eronen, Santiago Zapata Hernandez, Anders Kristensen, Avi Lior, John Loughney, Ahmad Muhanna, Behcet Sarikaya, Basavaraj Patil, Vijay Devarapalli, Lionel Morand and Yoshihiro Ohba for all the useful discussions. Ahmad Muhanna provided a detailed review of the document in August 2007.
We would also like to thank our Area Director, Dan Romascanu, for his support.
Hannes Tschofenig would like to thank the European Commission support in the co-funding of the ENABLE project, where this work is partly being developed.
Julien Bournelle would like to thank GEN/INT since he began this work while he was under their employ.
| TOC |
| TOC |
| [1] | Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, “Mobility Support in IPv6,” RFC 3775, June 2004 (TXT). |
| [2] | Patel, A. and G. Giaretta, “Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6),” RFC 4640, September 2006 (TXT). |
| [3] | Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, “Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture,” RFC 4877, April 2007 (TXT). |
| [4] | Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6,” draft-ietf-mip6-rfc4285bis-03 (work in progress), July 2008 (TXT). |
| [5] | Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol,” RFC 3588, September 2003 (TXT). |
| [6] | Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML). |
| [7] | Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, “Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application,” RFC 4072, August 2005 (TXT). |
| [8] | Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” RFC 4306, December 2005 (TXT). |
| [9] | Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, “Diameter Network Access Server Application,” RFC 4005, August 2005 (TXT). |
| [10] | Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, “Traffic Classification and Quality of Service Attributes for Diameter,” draft-ietf-dime-qos-attributes-15 (work in progress), December 2009 (TXT). |
| [11] | Korhonen, J., Bournelle, J., Tschofenig, H., Perkins, C., and K. Chowdhury, “Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction,” draft-ietf-dime-mip6-integrated-12 (work in progress), January 2009 (TXT). |
| [12] | Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and P. McCann, “Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application,” RFC 4004, August 2005 (TXT). |
| TOC |
| [13] | Giaretta, G., “Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping in split scenario,” draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-07 (work in progress), July 2007 (TXT). |
| [14] | Chowdhury, K. and A. Yegin, “MIP6-bootstrapping for the Integrated Scenario,” draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-integrated-dhc-06 (work in progress), April 2008 (TXT). |
| [15] | Giaretta, G., “AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6,” draft-ietf-mip6-aaa-ha-goals-03 (work in progress), September 2006 (TXT). |
| [16] | Fajardo, V., Tschofenig, H., and L. Morand, “Diameter Applications Design Guidelines,” draft-ietf-dime-app-design-guide-11 (work in progress), March 2010 (TXT). |
| [17] | Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury, “Mobile Node Identifier Option for Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6),” RFC 4283, November 2005 (TXT). |
| TOC |
| Jouni Korhonen (editor) | |
| TeliaSonera | |
| Teollisuuskatu 13 | |
| Sonera FIN-00051 | |
| Finland | |
| Email: | jouni.korhonen@teliasonera.com |
| Hannes Tschofenig | |
| Nokia Siemens Networks | |
| Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 | |
| Munich, Bavaria 81739 | |
| Germany | |
| Email: | Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com |
| URI: | http://www.tschofenig.com |
| Julien Bournelle | |
| France Telecom R&D | |
| 38-4O rue du general Leclerc | |
| Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794 | |
| France | |
| Email: | julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com |
| Gerardo Giaretta | |
| Qualcomm | |
| Email: | gerardo.giaretta@gmail.com |
| Madjid Nakhjiri | |
| Motorola | |
| USA | |
| Email: | madjid.nakhjiri@motorola.com |
| TOC |
Copyright © The IETF Trust (2007).
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