| DOTS | T. Reddy |
| Internet-Draft | McAfee |
| Intended status: Standards Track | M. Boucadair |
| Expires: June 19, 2020 | Orange |
| E. Doron | |
| Radware Ltd. | |
| M. Chen | |
| CMCC | |
| December 17, 2019 |
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-00
This document aims to enrich DOTS signal channel protocol with various telemetry attributes allowing optimal DDoS attack mitigation. This document specifies the normal traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server. The telemetry attributes can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 19, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The Internet security 'battle' between the adversary and security countermeasures is an everlasting one. DDoS attacks have become more vicious and sophisticated in almost all aspects of their maneuvers and malevolent intentions. IT organizations and service providers are facing DDoS attacks that fall into two broad categories: Network/Transport layer attacks and Application layer attacks. Network/Transport layer attacks target the victim's infrastructure. These attacks are not necessarily aimed at taking down the actual delivered services, but rather to eliminate various network elements (routers, switches, firewalls, transit links, and so on) from serving legitimate user traffic. The main method of such attacks is to send a large volume or high PPS of traffic toward the victim's infrastructure. Typically, attack volumes may vary from a few 100 Mbps/PPS to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps. Attacks are commonly carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for amplification attacks, such as NTP, DNS, SNMP, SSDP, and so on. Application layer attacks target various applications. Typical examples include attacks against HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, SIP, SMTP, and so on. However, all valid applications with their port numbers open at network edges can be attractive attack targets. Application layer attacks are considered more complex and hard to categorize, therefore harder to detect and mitigate efficiently.
To compound the problem, attackers also leverage multi-vectored attacks. These merciless attacks are assembled from dynamic attack vectors (Network/Application) and tactics. As such, multiple attack vectors formed by multiple attack types and volumes are launched simultaneously towards a victim. Multi-vector attacks are harder to detect and defend. Multiple and simultaneous mitigation techniques are needed to defeat such attack campaigns. It is also common for attackers to change attack vectors right after a successful mitigation, burdening their opponents with changing their defense methods.
The ultimate conclusion derived from these real scenarios is that modern attacks detection and mitigation are most certainly complicated and highly convoluted tasks. They demand a comprehensive knowledge of the attack attributes, the targeted normal behavior/ traffic patterns, as well as the attacker's on-going and past actions. Even more challenging, retrieving all the analytics needed for detecting these attacks is not simple to obtain with the industry's current capabilities.
The DOTS signal channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is used to carry information about a network resource or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to one or multiple DOTS servers so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. Various use cases are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
Typically, DOTS clients can be integrated within a DDoS attack detector, or network and security elements that have been actively engaged with ongoing attacks. The DOTS client mitigation environment determines that it is no longer possible or practical for it to handle these attacks. This can be due to lack of resources or security capabilities, as derived from the complexities and the intensity of these attacks. In this circumstance, the DOTS client has invaluable knowledge about the actual attacks that need to be handled by the DOTS server. By enabling the DOTS client to share this comprehensive knowledge of an ongoing attack under specific circumstances, the DOTS server can drastically increase its abilities to accomplish successful mitigation. While the attack is being handled by the DOTS server associated mitigation resources, the DOTS server has the knowledge about the ongoing attack mitigation. The DOTS server can share this information with the DOTS client so that the client can better assess and evaluate the actual mitigation realized.
In some deployments, DOTS clients can send mitigation hints derived from attack details to DOTS servers, with the full understanding that the DOTS server may ignore mitigation hints, as described in [RFC8612] (Gen-004). Mitigation hints will be transmitted across the DOTS signal channel, as the data channel may not be functional during an attack. How a DOTS server is handling normal and attack traffic attributes, and mitigation hints is implementation-specific.
Both DOTS client and server can benefit this information by presenting various information in relevant management, reporting, and portal systems.
This document defines DOTS telemetry attributes the DOTS client can convey to the DOTS server, and vice versa. The DOTS telemetry attributes are not mandatory fields. Nevertheless, when DOTS telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent any policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall mitigation service provisioned using DOTS. Some of the DOTS telemetry data is not shared during an attack time.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].
"DOTS Telemetry" is defined as the collection of attributes that are used to characterize normal traffic baseline, attacks and their mitigation measures, and any related information that may help in enforcing countermeasures. The DOTS Telemetry is an optional set of attributes that can be signaled in the DOTS signal channel protocol.
The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].
When signaling a mitigation request, it is most certainly beneficial for the DOTS client to signal to the DOTS server any knowledge regarding ongoing attacks. This can happen in cases where DOTS clients are asking the DOTS server for support in defending against attacks that they have already detected and/or mitigated. These actions taken by DOTS clients are referred to as "signaling the DOTS Telemetry".
If attacks are already detected and categorized by the DOTS client domain, the DOTS server, and its associated mitigation services, can proactively benefit this information and optimize the overall service delivered. It is important to note that DOTS client and server detection and mitigation approaches can be different, and can potentially outcome different results and attack classifications. The DDoS mitigation service treats the ongoing attack details from the client as hints and cannot completely rely or trust the attack details conveyed by the DOTS client.
A basic requirement of security operation teams is to be aware and get visibility into the attacks they need to handle. The DOTS server security operation teams benefit from the DOTS telemetry, especially from the reports of ongoing attacks. Even if some mitigation can be automated, operational teams can use the DOTS telemetry to be prepared for attack mitigation and to assign the correct resources (operation staff, networking and mitigation) for the specific service. Similarly, security operation personnel at the DOTS client side ask for feedback about their requests for protection. Therefore, it is valuable for the DOTS server to share DOTS telemetry with the DOTS client. Thus mutual sharing of information is crucial for "closing the mitigation loop" between the DOTS client and server. For the server side team, it is important to realize that the same attacks that the DOTS server's mitigation resources are seeing are those that the DOTS client is asking to mitigate. For the DOTS client side team, it is important to realize that the DOTS clients receive the required service. For example: understanding that "I asked for mitigation of two attacks and my DOTS server detects and mitigates only one...". Cases of inconsistency in attack classification between DOTS client and server can be high-lighted, and maybe handled, using the DOTS telemetry attributes.
In addition, management and orchestration systems, at both DOTS client and server sides, can potentially use DOTS telemetry as a feedback to automate various control and management activities derived from ongoing information signaled.
If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adopts its protection strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately (automation enabled). The overall results of this adoption are optimized attack mitigation decisions and actions.
The DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators with the correct state of the attack. During the last few years, DDoS attack detection technologies have evolved from threshold-based detection (that is, cases when all or specific parts of traffic cross a pre-defined threshold for a certain period of time is considered as an attack) to an "anomaly detection" approach. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior. Machine learning approaches are used such that the actual "traffic thresholds" are "automatically calculated" by learning the protected entity normal traffic behavior during peace time. The normal traffic characterization learned is referred to as the "normal traffic baseline". An attack is detected when the victim's actual traffic is deviating from this normal baseline.
In addition, subsequent activities toward mitigating an attack are much more challenging. The ability to distinguish legitimate traffic from attacker traffic on a per packet basis is complex. This complexity originates from the fact that the packet itself may look "legitimate" and no attack signature can be identified. The anomaly can be identified only after detailed statistical analysis. DDoS attack mitigators use the normal baseline during the mitigation of an attack to identify and categorize the expected appearance of a specific traffic pattern. Particularly the mitigators use the normal baseline to recognize the "level of normality" needs to be achieved during the various mitigation process.
Normal baseline calculation is performed based on continuous learning of the normal behavior of the protected entities. The minimum learning period varies from hours to days and even weeks, depending on the protected application behavior. The baseline cannot be learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.
If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its protected entities, signaling this attribute to the DOTS server along with the attack traffic levels is significantly valuable. The DOTS server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation resources with the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of normality they need to achieve. Consequently, the overall mitigation performances obtained are dramatically improved in terms of time to mitigate, accuracy, false-negative, false-positive, and other measures.
Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]). In addition, the highly diverse types of use-cases where DOTS clients are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of client behavior. Consequently, common global thresholds for attack detection practically cannot be realized. Each DOTS client can have its own levels of traffic and normal behavior. Without facilitating normal baseline signaling, it may be very difficult for DOTS servers in some cases to detect and mitigate the attacks accurately. It is important to emphasize that it is practically impossible for the server's mitigators to calculate the normal baseline, in cases they do not have any knowledge of the traffic beforehand. In addition, baseline learning requires a period of time that cannot be afforded during active attack. Of course, this information can provided using out-of-band mechanisms or manual configuration at the risk to maintain inaccurate information as the network evolves and "normal" patterns change. The use of a dynamic and collaborative means between the DOTS client and server to identify and share key parameters for the sake of efficient DDoS protect is valuable.
During a high volume attack, DOTS client pipes can be totally saturated. The DOTS client asks the DOTS server to handle the attack upstream so that DOTS client pipes return to a reasonable load level (normal pattern, ideally). At this point, it is essential to ensure that the mitigator does not overwhelm the DOTS client pipes by sending back "clean traffic", or what it believes is "clean". This can happen when the mitigator has not managed to detect and mitigate all the attacks launched towards the client. In this case, it can be valuable to clients to signal to server the "Total pipe capacity", which is the level of traffic the DOTS client domain can absorb from the upstream network. Dynamic updating of the condition of pipes between DOTS agents while they are under a DDoS attack is essential. For example, for cases of multiple DOTS clients share the same physical connectivity pipes. It is important to note, that the term "pipe" noted here does not necessary represent physical pipe, but rather represents the current level of traffic client can observe from server. The server should activate other mechanisms to ensure it does not saturate the client's pipes unintentionally. The rate-limit action defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] is a reasonable candidate to achieve this objective; the client can ask for the type of traffic (such as ICMP, UDP, TCP port number 80) it prefers to limit. The rate-limit action can be controlled via the signal-channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] even when the pipe is overwhelmed.
To summarize, timely and effective signaling of up-to-date DOTS telemetry to all elements involved in the mitigation process is essential and absolutely improves the overall service effectiveness. Bi-directional feedback between DOTS agents is required for the increased awareness of each party, supporting superior and highly efficient attack mitigation service.
Following the rules in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], a unique identifier is generated by a DOTS client to prevent request collisions.
DOTS gateways may be located between DOTS clients and servers. The considerations elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] must be followed. In particular, 'cdid' attribute is used to unambiguously identify a DOTS client domain.
There are two broad types of DDoS attacks, one is bandwidth consuming attack, the other is target resource consuming attack. This section outlines the set of DOTS telemetry attributes that covers both the types of attacks. The ultimate objective of these attributes is to allow for the complete knowledge of attacks and the various particulars that can best characterize attacks.
The description and motivation behind each attribute were presented in Section 3. DOTS telemetry attributes are optionally signaled and therefore MUST NOT be treated as mandatory fields in the DOTS signal channel protocol.
The pre-mitigation telemetry attributes are indicated by the path-suffix '/telemetry'. The '/telemetry' is appended to the path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to signal the DOTS telemetry. The following pre-mitigation telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS client to the DOTS server.
The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values (100th percentile) of "Total traffic normal baselines" measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second. For example, 90th percentile says that 90% of the time, the total normal traffic is below the limit specified. The traffic normal baseline is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.
The limit of traffic volume, in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and in kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second. These attributes represents the DOTS client domain pipe limit.
The total attack traffic can be identified by the DOTS client domain's DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) or DDoS Detector. The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of total attack traffic measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second. The total attack traffic is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.
The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of total traffic during a DDoS attack measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second gigabytes per second. The total traffic is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.
If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attack, the following optional attributes for the target per transport-protocol are useful to detect resource consuming DDoS attacks:
If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attack, the low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of following optional attributes for the target per transport-protocol are included to represent the attack characteristics:
Various information and details that describe the on-going attacks that needs to be mitigated by the DOTS server. The attack details need to cover well-known and common attacks (such as a SYN Flood) along with new emerging or vendor-specific attacks. The attack details can also be signaled from the DOTS server to the DOTS client. For example, the DOTS server co-located with a DDoS detector collects monitoring information from the target network, identifies DDoS attack using statistical analysis or deep learning techniques, and signals the attack details to the DOTS client. The client can use the attack details to decide whether to trigger the mitigation request or not. Further, the security operation personnel at the DOTS client domain can use the attack details to determine the protection strategy and select the appropriate DOTS server for mitigating the attack. The DOTS client can receive asynchronous notifications of the attack details from the DOTS server using the Observe option defined in [RFC7641].
The following new fields describing the on-going attack are discussed:
The following existing fields are re-defined describing the on-going attack are discussed:
This is an optional sub-attribute.
The mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS client to the DOTS server as part of the periodic mitigation efficacy updates to the server.
The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile), and peak values of total attack traffic the DOTS client still sees during the active mitigation service measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second.
The overall attack details as observed from the DOTS client perspective during the active mitigation service. The same attributes defined in Section 5.1.7 are applicable here.
The mitigation status telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS server to the DOTS client as part of the periodic mitigation status update.
As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include several countermeasure mechanisms. The DOTS server SHOULD signal the current operational status to each relevant countermeasure. A list of attacks detected by each countermeasure. The same attributes defined for Section 5.1.7 are applicable here for describing the attacks detected and mitigated.
PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the telemetry data (e.g., low, mid, or high percentile values). For example, a DOTS client may contact its DOTS server to change the default percentiles values used as baseline for telemetry data. In reference to the example shown in Figure 1, the DOTS client modifies all percentile reference values.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "telemetry"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tcid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-config": {
"low-percentile": 5.00,
"mid-percentile": 65.00,
"high-percentile": 95.00
}
}
Figure 1: PUT to Convey the DOTS Telemetry Configuration
'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for PUT requests.
The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:
At least one configurable attribute MUST be present in the PUT request.
Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request and render the entire request invalid.
The PUT request with a higher numeric 'tcid' value overrides the DOTS telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric 'tcid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tcid' requests from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tcid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes:
A DOTS client may issue a GET message with 'tcid' Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the negotiated configuration. The response does not need to include 'tcid' in its message body.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "telemetry"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tcid=569"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-config": {
"low-percentile": 0.00,
"mid-percentile": 0.00,
"high-percentile": 95.00
}
}
Figure 2: PUT to Disable Low- and Mid-Percentiles
Setting 'low-percentile' to '0.00' indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving low-percentiles. Likewise, setting 'mid-percentile' (or 'high-percentile') to the same value as 'low-percentile' (or 'mid-percentile') indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving mid-percentiles (or high-percentiles). For example, a DOTS client can send the request depicted in Figure 2 to inform the server that it is interested in receiving only high-percentiles.
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS telemetry configuration data (Figure 3).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Uri-Path: ".well-known" Uri-Path: "dots" Uri-Path: "telemetry" Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw" Uri-Path: "tcid=123"
Figure 3: Delete Telemetry Configuration
The DOTS server resets the DOTS telemetry configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the DOTS telemetry configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code.
Upon bootstrapping or reboot, a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request to set the telemetry parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any 'tcid'.
This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-telemetry".
The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module augments the "mitigation-scope" type message defined in "ietf-dots-signal" with telemetry data as depicted in following tree structure:
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type
/ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope:
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit] {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw low-percentile-c
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-c
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-c
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw attack-detail {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw vendor-id? uint32
+--rw attack-id? string
+--rw attack-name? string
+--rw attack-severity? attack-severity
+--rw start-time? uint64
+--rw end-time? uint64
+--rw source-count
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw top-talker
+--rw source-prefix* [source-prefix]
+--rw spoofed-status? boolean
+--rw source-prefix inet:ip-prefix
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection
+--rw low-percentile-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw mid-percentile-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw high-percentile-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw peak-c
+--rw connection? yang:gauge64
+--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
+--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
Also, the "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module augments the "ietf-dots-signal" with a new message type called "telemetry". The tree structure of the "telemetry" message type is shown below:
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw telemetry* [cuid tcid]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw tcid uint32
+--rw telemetry-config
| +--rw low-percentile? percentile
| +--rw mid-percentile? percentile
| +--rw high-percentile? percentile
| +--rw unit-config* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw unit-status? boolean
+--rw total-pipe-capability* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw pipe? uint64
+--rw pre-mitigation* [telemetry-id]
+--rw telemetry-id uint32
+--rw target
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
+--rw total-traffic-normal-baseline* [unit protocol]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--ro total-attack-traffic* [unit protocol]
| +--ro unit unit
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--ro total-traffic* [unit protocol]
| +--ro unit unit
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-connection-capacity* [protocol]
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? uint64
| +--rw connection-client? uint64
| +--rw embryonic? uint64
| +--rw embryonic-client? uint64
| +--rw connection-ps? uint64
| +--rw connection-client-ps? uint64
| +--rw request-ps? uint64
| +--rw request-client-ps? uint64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? uint64
| +--rw partial-request-client-ps? uint64
+--ro total-attack-connection
| +--ro low-percentile-l* [protocol]
| | +--ro protocol uint8
| | +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile-l* [protocol]
| | +--ro protocol uint8
| | +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile-l* [protocol]
| | +--ro protocol uint8
| | +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak-l* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro attack-detail
+--ro vendor-id? uint32
+--ro attack-id? string
+--ro attack-name? string
+--ro attack-severity? attack-severity
+--ro start-time? uint64
+--ro end-time? uint64
+--ro source-count
| +--ro low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--ro top-talker
+--ro source-prefix* [source-prefix]
+--ro spoofed-status? boolean
+--ro source-prefix inet:ip-prefix
+--ro total-attack-traffic* [unit]
| +--ro unit unit
| +--ro low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--ro total-attack-connection
+--ro low-percentile-l* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro mid-percentile-l* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro high-percentile-l* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro peak-l* [protocol]
+--ro protocol uint8
+--ro connection? yang:gauge64
+--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
+--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
This module uses types defined in [RFC6991].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-telemetry@2019-11-08.yang"
module ietf-dots-telemetry {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry";
prefix dots-telemetry;
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
prefix ietf-signal;
reference
"RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
prefix ietf-data;
reference
"RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference "Section 3 of RFC 6991";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
}
organization
"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
Author: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
<mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";
description
"This module contains YANG definitions for the signaling
of DOTS telemetry exchanged between a DOTS client and
a DOTS server, by means of the DOTS signal channel.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2019-11-08 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}
feature dots-telemetry {
description
"This feature means that the DOTS signal channel is able
to convey DOTS telemetry data between DOTS clients and
servers.";
}
typedef attack-severity {
type enumeration {
enum "emergency" {
value 1;
description
"The attack is severe: emergency.";
}
enum "critical" {
value 2;
description
"The attack is critical.";
}
enum "alert" {
value 3;
description
"This is an alert.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration for attack severity.";
}
typedef unit {
type enumeration {
enum "pps" {
value 1;
description
"Packets per second (PPS).";
}
enum "kilo-pps" {
value 2;
description
"Kilo packets per second (Kpps).";
}
enum "bps" {
value 3;
description
"Bits per Second (BPS).";
}
enum "kilobytes-ps" {
value 4;
description
"Kilobytes per second.";
}
enum "megabytes-ps" {
value 5;
description
"Megabytes per second.";
}
enum "gigabytes-ps" {
value 6;
description
"Gigabytes per second.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate which unit is used.";
}
typedef percentile {
type decimal64 {
fraction-digits 2;
}
description
"The nth percentile of a set of data is the
value at which n percent of the data is below it.";
}
grouping percentile-config {
description
"Configuration of low, mid, and high percentile values.";
leaf low-percentile {
type percentile;
default "10.00";
description
"Low percentile. If set to '0', this means low-percentiles
are disabled.";
}
leaf mid-percentile {
type percentile;
must '. >= ../low-percentile' {
error-message
"The mid-percentile must be greater than
or equal to the low-percentile.";
}
default "50.00";
description
"Mid percentile. If set to the same value as low-percentiles,
this means mid-percentiles are disabled.";
}
leaf high-percentile {
type percentile;
must '. >= ../mid-percentile' {
error-message
"The high-percentile must be greater than
or equal to the mid-percentile.";
}
default "90.00";
description
"High percentile. If set to the same value as mid-percentiles,
this means high-percentiles are disabled.";
}
}
grouping percentile {
description
"Generic grouping for percentile.";
leaf low-percentile-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Low traffic.";
}
leaf mid-percentile-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Mid percentile.";
}
leaf high-percentile-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"High percentile.";
}
leaf peak-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Peak";
}
}
grouping traffic-unit {
description
"Grouping of traffic as a function of measurement unit.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
uses percentile;
}
grouping traffic-unit-protocol {
description
"Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as
a function of measurement unit.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.
For example, this field contains 6 for TCP,
17 for UDP, 33 for DCCP, or 132 for SCTP.";
}
uses percentile;
}
grouping total-connection-capacity {
description
"Total Connections Capacity. If the target is subjected
to resource consuming DDoS attack, these attributes are
useful to detect resource consuming DDoS attacks";
leaf connection {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
are allowed to the target server. The threshold is
transport-protocol specific because the target server
could support multiple protocols.";
}
leaf connection-client {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
are allowed to the target server per client.";
}
leaf embryonic {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
that are allowed to the target server. The term 'embryonic
connection' refers to a connection whose connection handshake
is not finished and embryonic connection is only possible in
connection-oriented transport protocols like TCP or SCTP.";
}
leaf embryonic-client {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
that are allowed to the target server per client.";
}
leaf connection-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of connections allowed per second
to the target server.";
}
leaf connection-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of connections allowed per second
to the target server per client.";
}
leaf request-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of requests allowed per second
to the target server.";
}
leaf request-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of requests allowed per second
to the target server per client.";
}
leaf partial-request-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of partial requests allowed per
second to the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of partial requests allowed per
second to the target server per client.";
}
}
grouping connection {
description
"A set of attributes which represent the attack
characteristics";
leaf connection {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of simultaneous attack connections to
the target server.";
}
leaf embryonic {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
the target server.";
}
leaf connection-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack connections per second to
the target server.";
}
leaf request-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack requests per second to
the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack partial requests to
the target server.";
}
}
grouping connection-percentile {
description
"Total attack connections.";
container low-percentile-c {
description
"Low percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container mid-percentile-c {
description
"Mid percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container high-percentile-c {
description
"High percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container peak-c {
description
"Peak attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
}
grouping connection-protocol-percentile {
description
"Total attack connections.";
list low-percentile-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Low percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list mid-percentile-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Mid percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list high-percentile-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Highg percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list peak-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Peak attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
}
grouping attack-detail {
description
"Various information and details that describe the on-going
attacks that needs to be mitigated by the DOTS server.
The attack details need to cover well-known and common attacks
(such as a SYN Flood) along with new emerging or vendor-specific
attacks.";
leaf vendor-id {
type uint32;
description
"Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
}
leaf attack-id {
type string;
description
"Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.";
}
leaf attack-name {
type string;
description
"Textual representation of attack description. Natural Language
Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) can possibly be used
to map the attack description to an attack type.";
}
leaf attack-severity {
type attack-severity;
description
"Severity level of an attack";
}
leaf start-time {
type uint64;
description
"The time the attack started. Start time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
leaf end-time {
type uint64;
description
"The time the attack ended. End time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
container source-count {
description
"Indicates the count of unique sources involved
in the attack.";
uses percentile;
}
}
grouping top-talker-aggregate {
description
"Top attack sources.";
list source-prefix {
key "source-prefix";
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
leaf spoofed-status {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether this address is spoofed.";
}
leaf source-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections issued from this source.";
uses connection-percentile;
}
}
}
grouping top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
list source-prefix {
key "source-prefix";
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
leaf spoofed-status {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether this address is spoofed.";
}
leaf source-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections issued from this source.";
uses connection-protocol-percentile;
}
}
}
grouping pre-mitigation {
description
"Grouping for the telemetry data.";
list total-traffic-normal-baseline {
key "unit protocol";
description
"Total traffic normal baselines.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
config false;
description
"Total attack traffic per protocol.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
config false;
description
"Total traffic.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-connection-capacity {
key "protocol";
description
"Total connection capacity.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses total-connection-capacity;
}
container total-attack-connection {
config false;
description
"Total attack connections.";
uses connection-protocol-percentile;
}
container attack-detail {
config false;
description
"Attack details.";
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
uses top-talker;
}
}
}
augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type/"
+ "ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope" {
if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Extends mitigation scope with telemetry update data.";
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections.";
uses connection-percentile;
}
container attack-detail {
description
"Atatck details";
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
uses top-talker-aggregate;
}
}
}
augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type" {
if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Add a new choice to enclose telemetry data in DOTS
signal channel.";
case telemetry {
description
"Indicates the message is about telemetry.";
list telemetry {
key "cuid tcid";
description
"The telemetry data per DOTS client.";
leaf cuid {
type string;
description
"A unique identifier that is
generated by a DOTS client to prevent
request collisions. It is expected that the
cuid will remain consistent throughout the
lifetime of the DOTS client.";
}
leaf cdid {
type string;
description
"The cdid should be included by a server-domain
DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
identification information from the
gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
server-facing-side, and from the gateway's
server-facing-side to the DOTS server.
It may be used by the final DOTS server
for policy enforcement purposes.";
}
leaf tcid {
type uint32;
description
"An identifier for the DOTS telemetry configuration
data.";
}
container telemetry-config {
description
"Uses to set low, mid, and high percentile values.";
uses percentile-config;
list unit-config {
key "unit";
description
"Controls which units are allowed when sharing telemetry
data.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf unit-status {
type boolean;
description
"Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit.";
}
}
}
list total-pipe-capability {
key "unit";
description
"Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf pipe {
type uint64;
description
"Mid traffic percentile.";
}
}
list pre-mitigation {
key "telemetry-id";
description
"Pre-mitigation telemetry.";
leaf telemetry-id {
type uint32;
description
"An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data send using
the same message.";
}
container target {
description
"Indicates the target.";
uses ietf-data:target;
}
uses pre-mitigation;
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
This specification registers the DOTS telemetry attributes in the IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings" registry established by [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
The DOTS telemetry attributes defined in this specification are comprehension-optional parameters.
+----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+ | Parameter Name | YANG | CBOR | CBOR Major | JSON | | | Type | Key | Type & | Type | | | | | Information | | +----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+ | ietf-dots-signal-cha | | | | | | nnel:telemetry | container |0x8008| 5 map | Object | | tcid | uint32 |0x8009| 0 unsigned | Number | | telemetry-config | container |0x800A| 5 map | Object | | low-percentile | decimal64 |0x800B| 6 tag 4 | | | | | | [-2, integer]| String | | mid-percentile | decimal64 |0x800C| 6 tag 4 | | | | | | [-2, integer]| String | | high-percentile | decimal64 |0x800D| 6 tag 4 | | | | | | [-2, integer]| String | | unit-config | list |0x800E| 4 array | Array | | unit | enumeration |0x800F| 0 unsigned | String | | unit-status | boolean |0x8010| 7 bits 20 | False | | | | | 7 bits 21 | True | | total-pipe-capability| list |0x8011| 4 array | Array | | pipe | uint64 |0x8012| 0 unsigned | String | | pre-mitigation | list |0x8013| 4 array | Array | | telemetry-id | uint32 |0x8014| 0 unsigned | Number | | total-traffic- | | | | | | normal-baseline | list |0x8015| 4 array | Array | | low-percentile-g | yang:gauge64|0x8016| 0 unsigned | String | | mid-percentile-g | yang:gauge64|0x8017| 0 unsigned | String | | high-percentile-g | yang:gauge64|0x8018| 0 unsigned | String | | peak-g | yang:gauge64|0x8019| 0 unsigned | String | | total-attack-traffic | list |0x801A| 4 array | Array | | total-traffic | list |0x801B| 4 array | Array | | total-connection- | | | | | | capacity | list |0x801C| 4 array | Array | | connection | uint64 |0x801D| 0 unsigned | String | | connection-client | uint64 |0x801E| 0 unsigned | String | | embryonic | uint64 |0x801F| 0 unsigned | String | | embryonic-client | uint64 |0x8020| 0 unsigned | String | | connection-ps | uint64 |0x8021| 0 unsigned | String | | connection-client-ps | uint64 |0x8022| 0 unsigned | String | | request-ps | uint64 |0x8023| 0 unsigned | String | | request-client-ps | uint64 |0x8024| 0 unsigned | String | | partial-request-ps | uint64 |0x8025| 0 unsigned | String | | partial-request- | | | | | | client-ps | uint64 |0x8026| 0 unsigned | String | | total-attack- | | | | | | connection | container |0x8027| 5 map | Object | | low-percentile-l | list |0x8028| 4 array | Array | | mid-percentile-l | list |0x8029| 4 array | Array | | high-percentile-l | list |0x802A| 4 array | Array | | peak-l | list |0x802B| 4 array | Array | | attack-detail | container |0x802C| 5 map | Object | | vendor-id | uint32 |0x802D| 0 unsigned | Number | | attack-id | string |0x802E| 3 text string | String | | attack-name | string |0x802F| 3 text string | String | | attack-severity | enumeration |0x8030| 0 unsigned | String | | start-time | uint64 |0x8031| 0 unsigned | String | | end-time | uint64 |0x8032| 0 unsigned | String | | source-count | container |0x8033| 5 map | Object | | top-talker | container |0x8034| 5 map | Object | | spoofed-status | boolean |0x8035| 7 bits 20 | False | | | | | 7 bits 21 | True | | low-percentile-c | container |0x8036| 5 map | Object | | mid-percentile-c | container |0x8037| 5 map | Object | | high-percentile-c | container |0x8038| 5 map | Object | | peak-c | container |0x8039| 5 map | Object | +----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
name: ietf-dots-telemetry
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry
maintained by IANA: N
prefix: dots-telemetry
reference: RFC XXXX
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: [RFC7950] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.
Security considerations in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] need to be taken into consideration.
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
The authors would like to thank Flemming Andreasen, Liang Xia, and Kaname Nishizuka co-authors of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-doron-dots-telemetry-00 draft and everyone who had contributed to that document.
Authors would like to thank Kaname Nishizuka, Jon Shallow, Wei Pan and Yuuhei Hayashi for comments and review.
| [Enterprise-Numbers] | "Private Enterprise Numbers", 2005. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] | Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-31, July 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] | Reddy.K, T., Boucadair, M. and J. Shallow, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Call Home", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home-07, November 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] | Reddy.K, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A. and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-39, November 2019. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC3688] | Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004. |
| [RFC6991] | Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013. |
| [RFC7049] | Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, October 2013. |
| [RFC7641] | Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641, DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015. |
| [RFC7950] | Bjorklund, M., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] | Nishizuka, K., Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T. and T. Nagata, "Controlling Filtering Rules Using Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control-02, September 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] | Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia, L. and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20, September 2019. |
| [RFC8340] | Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018. |
| [RFC8612] | Mortensen, A., Reddy, T. and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612, DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019. |