| DOTS | M. Boucadair, Ed. |
| Internet-Draft | Orange |
| Intended status: Standards Track | T. Reddy, Ed. |
| Expires: August 3, 2020 | McAfee |
| E. Doron | |
| Radware Ltd. | |
| M. Chen | |
| CMCC | |
| January 31, 2020 |
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-01
This document aims to enrich DOTS signal channel protocol with various telemetry attributes allowing optimal DDoS attack mitigation. This document specifies the normal traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server. The telemetry attributes can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 3, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have become more vicious and sophisticated in almost all aspects of their maneuvers and malevolent intentions. IT organizations and service providers are facing DDoS attacks that fall into two broad categories: Network/Transport layer attacks and Application layer attacks:
To compound the problem, attackers also leverage multi-vectored attacks. These attacks are assembled from dynamic attack vectors (Network/Application) and tactics. As such, multiple attack vectors formed by multiple attack types and volumes are launched simultaneously towards a victim. Multi-vector attacks are harder to detect and defend. Multiple and simultaneous mitigation techniques are needed to defeat such attack campaigns. It is also common for attackers to change attack vectors right after a successful mitigation, burdening their opponents with changing their defense methods.
The ultimate conclusion derived from these real scenarios is that modern attacks detection and mitigation are most certainly complicated and highly convoluted tasks. They demand a comprehensive knowledge of the attack attributes, the targeted normal behavior/ traffic patterns, as well as the attacker's on-going and past actions. Even more challenging, retrieving all the analytics needed for detecting these attacks is not simple to obtain with the industry's current capabilities.
The DOTS signal channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is used to carry information about a network resource or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a DDoS attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to one or multiple DOTS servers so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. Various use cases are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
Typically, DOTS clients can be integrated within a DDoS attack detector, or network and security elements that have been actively engaged with ongoing attacks. The DOTS client mitigation environment determines that it is no longer possible or practical for it to handle these attacks. This can be due to lack of resources or security capabilities, as derived from the complexities and the intensity of these attacks. In this circumstance, the DOTS client has invaluable knowledge about the actual attacks that need to be handled by the DOTS server. By enabling the DOTS client to share this comprehensive knowledge of an ongoing attack under specific circumstances, the DOTS server can drastically increase its abilities to accomplish successful mitigation. While the attack is being handled by the DOTS server associated mitigation resources, the DOTS server has the knowledge about the ongoing attack mitigation. The DOTS server can share this information with the DOTS client so that the client can better assess and evaluate the actual mitigation realized.
In some deployments, DOTS clients can send mitigation hints derived from attack details to DOTS servers, with the full understanding that the DOTS server may ignore mitigation hints, as described in [RFC8612] (Gen-004). Mitigation hints will be transmitted across the DOTS signal channel, as the data channel may not be functional during an attack. How a DOTS server is handling normal and attack traffic attributes, and mitigation hints is implementation-specific.
Both DOTS client and server can benefit this information by presenting various information in relevant management, reporting, and portal systems.
This document defines DOTS telemetry attributes the DOTS client can convey to the DOTS server, and vice versa. The DOTS telemetry attributes are not mandatory fields. Nevertheless, when DOTS telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent any policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall mitigation service provisioned using DOTS. Some of the DOTS telemetry data is not shared during an attack time.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].
"DOTS Telemetry" is defined as the collection of attributes that are used to characterize normal traffic baseline, attacks and their mitigation measures, and any related information that may help in enforcing countermeasures. The DOTS Telemetry is an optional set of attributes that can be signaled in the DOTS signal channel protocol.
The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].
When signaling a mitigation request, it is most certainly beneficial for the DOTS client to signal to the DOTS server any knowledge regarding ongoing attacks. This can happen in cases where DOTS clients are asking the DOTS server for support in defending against attacks that they have already detected and/or mitigated. These actions taken by DOTS clients are referred to as "signaling the DOTS Telemetry".
If attacks are already detected and categorized by the DOTS client domain, the DOTS server, and its associated mitigation services, can proactively benefit this information and optimize the overall service delivered. It is important to note that DOTS client and server detection and mitigation approaches can be different, and can potentially outcome different results and attack classifications. The DDoS mitigation service treats the ongoing attack details from the client as hints and cannot completely rely or trust the attack details conveyed by the DOTS client.
A basic requirement of security operation teams is to be aware and get visibility into the attacks they need to handle. The DOTS server security operation teams benefit from the DOTS telemetry, especially from the reports of ongoing attacks. Even if some mitigation can be automated, operational teams can use the DOTS telemetry to be prepared for attack mitigation and to assign the correct resources (operation staff, networking and mitigation) for the specific service. Similarly, security operation personnel at the DOTS client side ask for feedback about their requests for protection. Therefore, it is valuable for the DOTS server to share DOTS telemetry with the DOTS client.
Thus mutual sharing of information is crucial for "closing the mitigation loop" between the DOTS client and server. For the server side team, it is important to realize that the same attacks that the DOTS server's mitigation resources are seeing are those that the DOTS client is asking to mitigate. For the DOTS client side team, it is important to realize that the DOTS clients receive the required service. For example: understanding that "I asked for mitigation of two attacks and my DOTS server detects and mitigates only one...". Cases of inconsistency in attack classification between DOTS client and server can be high-lighted, and maybe handled, using the DOTS telemetry attributes.
In addition, management and orchestration systems, at both DOTS client and server sides, can potentially use DOTS telemetry as a feedback to automate various control and management activities derived from ongoing information signaled.
If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adopts its protection strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately (automation enabled). The overall results of this adoption are optimized attack mitigation decisions and actions.
The DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators with the correct state of the attack. During the last few years, DDoS attack detection technologies have evolved from threshold-based detection (that is, cases when all or specific parts of traffic cross a pre-defined threshold for a certain period of time is considered as an attack) to an "anomaly detection" approach. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior. Machine learning approaches are used such that the actual "traffic thresholds" are "automatically calculated" by learning the protected entity normal traffic behavior during peace time. The normal traffic characterization learned is referred to as the "normal traffic baseline". An attack is detected when the victim's actual traffic is deviating from this normal baseline.
In addition, subsequent activities toward mitigating an attack are much more challenging. The ability to distinguish legitimate traffic from attacker traffic on a per packet basis is complex. This complexity originates from the fact that the packet itself may look "legitimate" and no attack signature can be identified. The anomaly can be identified only after detailed statistical analysis. DDoS attack mitigators use the normal baseline during the mitigation of an attack to identify and categorize the expected appearance of a specific traffic pattern. Particularly the mitigators use the normal baseline to recognize the "level of normality" needs to be achieved during the various mitigation process.
Normal baseline calculation is performed based on continuous learning of the normal behavior of the protected entities. The minimum learning period varies from hours to days and even weeks, depending on the protected application behavior. The baseline cannot be learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.
If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its protected entities, signaling this attribute to the DOTS server along with the attack traffic levels is significantly valuable. The DOTS server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation resources with the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of normality they need to achieve. Consequently, the overall mitigation performances obtained are dramatically improved in terms of time to mitigate, accuracy, false-negative, false-positive, and other measures.
Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]). In addition, the highly diverse types of use-cases where DOTS clients are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of client behavior. Consequently, common global thresholds for attack detection practically cannot be realized. Each DOTS client can have its own levels of traffic and normal behavior. Without facilitating normal baseline signaling, it may be very difficult for DOTS servers in some cases to detect and mitigate the attacks accurately:
During a high volume attack, DOTS client pipes can be totally saturated. The DOTS client asks the DOTS server to handle the attack upstream so that DOTS client pipes return to a reasonable load level (normal pattern, ideally). At this point, it is essential to ensure that the mitigator does not overwhelm the DOTS client pipes by sending back "clean traffic", or what it believes is "clean". This can happen when the mitigator has not managed to detect and mitigate all the attacks launched towards the client. In this case, it can be valuable to clients to signal to server the "Total pipe capacity", which is the level of traffic the DOTS client domain can absorb from the upstream network. Dynamic updating of the condition of pipes between DOTS agents while they are under a DDoS attack is essential. For example, for cases of multiple DOTS clients share the same physical connectivity pipes. It is important to note, that the term "pipe" noted here does not necessary represent physical pipe, but rather represents the current level of traffic client can observe from server. The server should activate other mechanisms to ensure it does not saturate the client's pipes unintentionally. The rate-limit action defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] is a reasonable candidate to achieve this objective; the client can ask for the type of traffic (such as ICMP, UDP, TCP port number 80) it prefers to limit. The rate-limit action can be controlled via the signal-channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] even when the pipe is overwhelmed.
To summarize:
Following the rules in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], a unique identifier is generated by a DOTS client to prevent request collisions.
DOTS gateways may be located between DOTS clients and servers. The considerations elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] must be followed. In particular, 'cdid' attribute is used to unambiguously identify a DOTS client domain.
Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in DOTS telemetry requests.
The DOTS server follows the same considerations discussed in Section of 4.5.3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] for managing DOTS telemetry configuration freshness and notification. Likewise, a DOTS client may control the selection of configuration and non-configuration data nodes when sending a GET request by means of the 'c' Uri-Query option and following the procedure specified in Section of 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. These considerations are not re-iterated in the following sections.
DOTS clients can use Block-wise transfer [RFC7959] with the recommendation detailed in Section 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] to control the size of a response when the data to be returned does not fit within a single datagram.
DOTS clients can also use Block1 Option in a PUT request (see Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]).
Messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR). CBOR-encoded payloads are used to carry signal channel-specific payload messages which convey request parameters and response information such as errors [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
This document specifies a YANG module for representing DOTS telemetry message types (Section 9). All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped to CBOR types as specified in Section 10.
Examples are provided for illustration purposes. The document does not aim to provide a comprehensive list of message examples.
The authoritative reference for validating telemetry messages is the YANG module (Section 9) and the mapping table established in Section 10.
As discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the intended operation. The operation path is appended to the path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the desired DOTS operation. The following telemetry path-suffixes are defined (Table 1):
| Operation | Operation Path | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Telemetry Setup | /tm-setup | Section 6 |
| Telemetry | /tm | Section 7.1 |
Consequently, the "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module defined in this document augments the "ietf-dots-signal" with two new message types called "telemetry-setup" and "telemetry". The tree structure of the "telemetry-setup" message type is shown below (more details are provided in the following sections about the exact structure of "telemetry-setup" and "telemetry" message types).
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| ...
| +--rw (setup-type)?
| +--:(telemetry-config)
| | ...
| +--:(pipe)
| | ...
| +--:(baseline)
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
...
Figure 1: New DOTS Message Types (YANG Tree Structure)
In reference to Figure 1, a DOTS telemetry setup message MUST include only telemetry-related configuration parameters (Section 6.1) or information about DOTS client domain pipe capacity (Section 6.2) or telemetry traffic baseline (Section 6.3). As such, requests that include a mix of telemetry configuration, pipe capacity, or traffic baseline MUST be rejected by DOTS servers with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
A DOTS client can reset all installed DOTS telemetry setup and configuration data following the considerations detailed in Section 6.4.
A DOTS server may detect conflicts when processing requests related to DOTS client domain pipe capacity or telemetry traffic baseline with requests from other DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. More details are included in Section 6.5.
DOTS telemetry setup and configuration request and response messages are marked as Confirmable messages.
A DOTS client can negotiate with its server(s) a set of telemetry configuration parameters to be used for telemetry. Such parameters include:
Section 11.3 of [RFC2330] includes more details about computing percentiles.
A GET request is used to obtain acceptable and current telemetry configuration parameters on the DOTS server. This request may include a 'cdid' Path-URI when the request is relayed by a DOTS gateway. An example of such request is depicted in Figure 2.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Uri-Path: ".well-known" Uri-Path: "dots" Uri-Path: "tm-setup" Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Figure 2: GET to Retrieve Current and Acceptable DOTS Telemetry Configuration
Upon receipt of such request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content) response that conveys the current and telemetry parameters acceptable by the DOTS server. The tree structure of the response message body is provided in Figure 3. Note that the response includes also any pipe (Section 6.2) and baseline information (Section 6.3) maintained by the DOTS server for this DOTS client.
DOTS servers that support the capability of sending pre-mitigation telemetry information to DOTS clients (Section 8) sets 'server-initiated-telemetry' under 'max-config-values' to 'true' ('false' is used otherwise). If 'server-initiated-telemetry' is not present in a response, this is equivalent to receiving a request with 'server-initiated-telemetry'' set to 'false'.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| ...
| +--rw (setup-type)?
| +--:(telemetry-config)
| | +--rw current-config
| | | +--rw measurement-interval? interval
| | | +--rw measurement-sample? sample
| | | +--rw low-percentile? percentile
| | | +--rw mid-percentile? percentile
| | | +--rw high-percentile? percentile
| | | +--rw unit-config* [unit]
| | | | +--rw unit unit
| | | | +--rw unit-status? boolean
| | | +--rw server-initiated-telemetry? boolean
| | | +--rw telemetry-notify-interval? uint32
| | +--ro max-config-values
| | | +--ro measurement-interval? interval
| | | +--ro measurement-sample? sample
| | | +--ro low-percentile? percentile
| | | +--ro mid-percentile? percentile
| | | +--ro high-percentile? percentile
| | | +--ro server-initiated-telemetry? boolean
| | | +--ro telemetry-notify-interval? uint32
| | +--ro min-config-values
| | | +--ro measurement-interval? interval
| | | +--ro measurement-sample? sample
| | | +--ro low-percentile? percentile
| | | +--ro mid-percentile? percentile
| | | +--ro high-percentile? percentile
| | | +--ro telemetry-notify-interval? uint32
| | +--ro supported-units
| | +--ro unit-config* [unit]
| | +--ro unit unit
| | +--ro unit-status? boolean
| +--:(pipe)
| ...
| +--:(baseline)
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
...
Figure 3: Telemetry Configuration Tree Structure
PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the telemetry data (e.g., low, mid, or high percentile values). For example, a DOTS client may contact its DOTS server to change the default percentile values used as baseline for telemetry data. Figure 3 lists the attributes that can be set by a DOTS client in such PUT request. An example of a DOTS client that modifies all percentile reference values is shown in Figure 4.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry-setup": {
"telemetry": [
{
"current-config": {
"low-percentile": 5.00,
"mid-percentile": 65.00,
"high-percentile": 95.00
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 4: PUT to Convey the DOTS Telemetry Configuration
'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for PUT requests.
The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:
At least one configurable attribute MUST be present in the PUT request.
Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request and render the entire request invalid.
The PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value overrides the DOTS telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid' requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using the following response codes:
Setting 'low-percentile' to '0.00' indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving low-percentiles. Likewise, setting 'mid-percentile' (or 'high-percentile') to the same value as 'low-percentile' (or 'mid-percentile') indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving mid-percentiles (or high-percentiles). For example, a DOTS client can send the request depicted in Figure 5 to inform the server that it is interested in receiving only high-percentiles. This assumes that the client will only use that percentile type when sharing telemetry data with the server.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=569"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry-setup": {
"telemetry": [
{
"current-config": {
"low-percentile": 0.00,
"mid-percentile": 0.00,
"high-percentile": 95.00
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 5: PUT to Disable Low- and Mid-Percentiles
DOTS clients that are interested to receive pre-mitigation telemetry information from a DOTS server (Section 8) MUST set 'server-initiated-telemetry' to 'true'. If 'server-initiated-telemetry' is not present in a PUT request, this is equivalent to receiving a request with 'server-initiated-telemetry'' set to 'false'. An example of a reques to enable pre-mitigation telemetry from DOTS servers is shown in Figure 6.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=569"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry-setup": {
"telemetry": [
{
"current-config": {
"server-initiated-telemetry": true
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 6: PUT to Enable Pre-mitigation Telemetry from the DOTS server
A DOTS client may issue a GET message with 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the current DOTS telemetry configuration. An example of such request is depicted in Figure 7.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Uri-Path: ".well-known" Uri-Path: "dots" Uri-Path: "tm-setup" Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw" Uri-Path: "tsid=123"
Figure 7: GET to Retrieve Current DOTS Telemetry Configuration
If the DOTS server does not find the 'tsid' Uri-Path value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS client, it MUST respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code.
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS telemetry configuration data (Figure 8). 'cuid' and 'tsid' are mandatory Uri-Path parameters for such DELETE requests.
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Uri-Path: ".well-known" Uri-Path: "dots" Uri-Path: "tm-setup" Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw" Uri-Path: "tsid=123"
Figure 8: Delete Telemetry Configuration
If the DELETE request does not include 'cuid' and 'tsid' parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
The DOTS server resets the DOTS telemetry configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the DOTS telemetry configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.
A DOTS client can communicate to its server(s) its DOTS client domain pipe information. The tree structure of the pipe information is shown in Figure 9.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| +--rw cuid string
| +--rw cdid? string
| +--rw tsid uint32
| +--rw (setup-type)?
| +--:(telemetry-config)
| | ...
| +--:(pipe)
| | +--rw total-pipe-capacity* [link-id unit]
| | +--rw link-id nt:link-id
| | +--rw capacity uint64
| | +--rw unit unit
| +--:(baseline)
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
...
Figure 9: Pipe Tree Structure
A DOTS client domain pipe is defined as a list of limits of (incoming) traffic volume (total-pipe-capacity") that can be forwarded over ingress interconnection links fo a DOTS client domain. Each of these links is identified with a "link-id" [RFC8345].
This limit can be expressed in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and in kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second. The unit used by a DOTS client when conveying pipe information is captured in "unit" attribute.
Similar considerations to those specified in Section 6.1.2 are followed with one exception:
DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of active "tsids" used for pipe information. Typically, in order to avoid maintaining a long list of "tsids" for pipe information, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients include in a request to update information related to a given link, the information of other links (already communicated using a lower 'tsid' value). Doing so, this update request will override these existing requests and hence optimize the number of 'tsid" request per DOTS client.
For example, a DOTS client managing a single homed domain (Figure 10) can send a PUT request (shown in Figure 11) to communicate the capacity of "link1" used to connected its ISP.
,--,--,--. ,--,--,--.
,-' `-. ,-' `-.
( DOTS Client )=====( ISP#A )
`-. Domain ,-' link1 `-. ,-'
`--'--'--' `--'--'--'
Figure 10: Single Homed DOTS Client Domain
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=457"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry-setup": {
"telemetry": [
{
"total-pipe-capacity": [
{
"link-id": "link1",
"capacity": 500,
"unit": "megabytes-ps"
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 11: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Single Homed)
Now consider that the DOTS client domain was upgraded to connect to an additional ISP (ISP#B of Figure 12), the DOTS client can inform the DOTS server about this update by sending the PUT request depicted in Figure 13. This request includes also information related to "link1" even if that link is not upgraded. Upon receipt of this request, the DOTS server removes the request with "tsid=457" and updates its configuration base to maintain two links (link#1 and link#2).
,--,--,--.
,-' `-.
( ISP#B )
`-. ,-'
`--'--'--'
||
|| link2
,--,--,--. ,--,--,--.
,-' `-. ,-' `-.
( DOTS Client )=====( ISP#A )
`-. Domain ,-' link1 `-. ,-'
`--'--'--' `--'--'--'
Figure 12: Multi-Homed DOTS Client Domain
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=458"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry-setup": {
"telemetry": [
{
"total-pipe-capacity": [
{
"link-id": "link1",
"capacity": 500,
"unit": "megabytes-ps"
},
{
"link-id": "link2",
"capacity": 500,
"unit": "megabytes-ps"
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 13: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Multi-Homed)
A DOTS client can delete a link by sending a PUT request with the capacity" attribute set to "0" if other links are still active for the same DOTS client domain (see Section 6.2.3 for other delete cases). For example, if a DOTS client domain re-homes (that is, it changes it ISP), the DOTS client can inform the DOTS server about this update (e.g., from the network configuration in Figure 10 to the one shown in Figure 14) by sending the PUT request depicted in Figure 15. Upon receipt of this request, the DOTS server removes "link1" from its configuration bases for this DOTS client domain.
,--,--,--.
,-' `-.
( ISP#B )
`-. ,-'
`--'--'--'
||
|| link2
,--,--,--.
,-' `-.
( DOTS Client )
`-. Domain ,-'
`--'--'--'
Figure 14: Multi-Homed DOTS Client Domain
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=459"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry-setup": {
"telemetry": [
{
"total-pipe-capacity": [
{
"link-id": "link1",
"capacity": 0,
"unit": "megabytes-ps"
},
{
"link-id": "link2",
"capacity": 500,
"unit": "megabytes-ps"
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 15: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Multi-Homed)
A GET request with 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter is used to retrieve a specific installed DOTS client domain pipe related information. The that aim, the same procedure defined in (Section 6.1.3) is followed.
To retrieve all pipe information bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS client proceeds as specified in Section 6.1.1.
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS client domain pipe related information. The that aim, the same procedure defined in (Section 6.1.4) is followed.
A DOTS client can communicate to its server(s) its normal traffic baseline and total connections capacity:
The tree structure of the baseline is shown in Figure 16.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| +--rw cuid string
| +--rw cdid? string
| +--rw tsid uint32
| +--rw (setup-type)?
| +--:(telemetry-config)
| | ...
| +--:(pipe)
| | ...
| +--:(baseline)
| +--rw baseline* [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
| +--rw total-traffic-normal-baseline* [unit protocol]
| | +--rw unit unit
| | +--rw protocol uint8
| | +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw total-connection-capacity* [protocol]
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? uint64
| +--rw connection-client? uint64
| +--rw embryonic? uint64
| +--rw embryonic-client? uint64
| +--rw connection-ps? uint64
| +--rw connection-client-ps? uint64
| +--rw request-ps? uint64
| +--rw request-client-ps? uint64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? uint64
| +--rw partial-request-client-ps? uint6
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
...
Figure 16: Telemetry Baseline Tree Structure
Similar considerations to those specified in Section 6.1.2 are followed with one exception:
Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if there is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, or URI.
DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of active "tsids" used for baseline information. Typically, in order to avoid maintaining a long list of "tsids" for baseline information, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients include in a request to update information related to a given target, the information of other targets (already communicated using a lower 'tsid' value) (assuming this fits within one single datagram). This update request will override these existing requests and hence optimize the number of 'tsid" request per DOTS client.
If no target clause in included in the request, this is an indication that the baseline information applies for the DOTS client domain as a whole.
An example of a PUT request to convey the baseline information is shown in Figure 17.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=126"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:telemetry": {
"baseline": {
"id": 1,
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:6401::1/128",
"2001:db8:6401::2/128"
],
"total-traffic-normal-baseline": {
"unit": "megabytes-ps",
"protocol": 6,
"peak-g": "50"
}
}
}
}
Figure 17: PUT to Convey the DOTS Traffic Baseline
A GET request with 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter is used to retrieve a specific installed DOTS client domain baseline traffic information. The that aim, the same procedure defined in (Section 6.1.3) is followed.
To retrieve all baseline information bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS client proceeds as specified in Section 6.1.1.
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS client domain normal traffic baseline. The that aim, the same procedure defined in (Section 6.1.4) is followed.
Upon bootstrapping (or reboot or any other event that may alter the , a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request to set the telemetry parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any 'tsid'. An example of such request is depicted in Figure 18.
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Uri-Path: ".well-known" Uri-Path: "dots" Uri-Path: "tm-setup" Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Figure 18: Delete Telemetry Configuration
A DOTS server may detect conflicts between requests to convey pipe and baseline information received from DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. 'conflict-information' is used to report the conflict to the DOTS client following similar conflict handling discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. The confict cause can be set to one of these values:
There are two broad types of DDoS attacks, one is bandwidth consuming attack, the other is target resource consuming attack. This section outlines the set of DOTS telemetry attributes (Section 7.1) that covers both the types of attacks. The ultimate objective of these attributes is to allow for the complete knowledge of attacks and the various particulars that can best characterize attacks.
The description and motivation behind each attribute are presented in Section 3. DOTS telemetry attributes are optionally signaled and therefore MUST NOT be treated as mandatory fields in the DOTS signal channel protocol.
The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module (Section 9) augments the "ietf-dots-signal" with a new message type called "telemetry". The tree structure of the "telemetry" message type is shown Figure 19.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw id uint32
+--rw target
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
+--rw total-traffic* [unit protocol]
| ...
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit protocol]
| ...
+--rw total-attack-connection
| ...
+--rw attack-detail
...
Figure 19: Telemetry Message Type Tree Structure
The pre-mitigation telemetry attributes are indicated by the path-suffix '/tm'. The '/tm' is appended to the path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to signal the DOTS telemetry. The following pre-mitigation telemetry attributes can be signaled from DOTS clients to DOTS servers.
By default, this attribute conveys the low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of total traffic during a DDoS attack measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second gigabytes per second.
The total traffic is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw id uint32
+--rw target
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
+--rw total-traffic* [unit protocol]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit protocol]
| ...
+--rw total-attack-connection
| ...
+--rw attack-detail
...
Figure 20: Total Traffic Tree Structure
By default, this attribute conveys the total attack traffic can be identified by the DOTS client domain's DMS or DDoS Detector. The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of total attack traffic measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second.
The total attack traffic is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw id uint32
+--rw target
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
+--rw total-traffic* [unit protocol]
| ...
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit protocol]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection
| ...
+--rw attack-detail
...
Figure 21: Total Attack Traffic Tree Structure
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw id uint32
+--rw target
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
+--rw total-traffic* [unit protocol]
| ...
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit protocol]
| ...
+--rw total-attack-connection
| +--rw low-percentile-l* [protocol]
| | +--rw protocol uint8
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-l* [protocol]
| | +--rw protocol uint8
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-l* [protocol]
| | +--rw protocol uint8
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-l* [protocol]
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw attack-detail
...
Figure 22: Total Attack Connections Tree Structure
If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attack, the low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of following optional attributes for the target per transport-protocol are included to represent the attack characteristics:
The attack details need to cover well-known and common attacks (such as a SYN Flood) along with new emerging or vendor-specific attacks.
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry-setup) {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw telemetry* [cuid tsid]
| ...
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw pre-mitigation* [cuid id]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw id uint32
...
+--rw attack-detail
+--rw id? uint32
+--rw attack-id? string
+--rw attack-name? string
+--rw attack-severity? attack-severity
+--rw start-time? uint64
+--rw end-time? uint64
+--rw source-count
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw top-talker
+--rw source-prefix* [source-prefix]
+--rw spoofed-status? boolean
+--rw source-prefix inet:ip-prefix
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection
+--rw low-percentile-l* [protocol]
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw mid-percentile-l* [protocol]
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw high-percentile-l* [protocol]
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw peak-l* [protocol]
+--rw protocol uint8
+--rw connection? yang:gauge64
+--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
+--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
Attack Detail Tree Structure
The following new fields describing the on-going attack are discussed:
The following existing fields are re-defined describing the on-going attack are discussed:
This is an optional sub-attribute.
The mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS client to the DOTS server as part of the periodic mitigation efficacy updates to the server (Section 5.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]).
<<>>
<<multiple mitigation-ids are used >>
<<A server can aggregate top-talkers for all targets of a domain, or when justified, send specific information (including top-talkers) per individual targets. >>
<<several target victim (target) addresses should be included in the target-prefix*.>>
<<Each target victim (target) address should be included in the list of target-prefix* in each pre-mitigation, and several pre-mitigations should be included in the pre-mitigation*.>>
The mitigation status telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS server to the DOTS client as part of the periodic mitigation status update (Section 5.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]). In particular, DOTS clients can receive asynchronous notifications of the attack details from DOTS servers using the Observe option defined in [RFC7641].
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type
/ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope:
+--rw total-traffic* [unit protocol] {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit] {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw low-percentile-c
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-c
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-c
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw attack-detail {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw id? uint32
+--rw attack-id? string
+--rw attack-name? string
+--rw attack-severity? attack-severity
+--rw start-time? uint64
+--rw end-time? uint64
+--rw source-count
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw top-talker
+--rw source-prefix* [source-prefix]
+--rw spoofed-status? boolean
+--rw source-prefix inet:ip-prefix
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak-g? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection
+--rw low-percentile-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw mid-percentile-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw high-percentile-c
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw peak-c
+--rw connection? yang:gauge64
+--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
+--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module augments the "mitigation-scope" type message defined in "ietf-dots-signal" with telemetry data as depicted in following tree structure:
As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include several countermeasure mechanisms. The DOTS server SHOULD signal the current operational status to each relevant countermeasure. A list of attacks detected by each countermeasure.
The same attributes defined for Section 7.1.4 are applicable for describing the attacks detected and mitigated.
The attack details can also be signaled from DOTS servers to DOTS clients. For example, the DOTS server co-located with a DDoS detector collects monitoring information from the target network, identifies DDoS attack using statistical analysis or deep learning techniques, and signals the attack details to the DOTS client.
The DOTS client can use the attack details to decide whether to trigger a DOTS mitigation request or not. Furthermore, the security operation personnel at the DOTS client domain can use the attack details to determine the protection strategy and select the appropriate DOTS server for mitigating the attack.
<<to be further discussed>>
This module uses types defined in [RFC6991].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-telemetry@2020-01-23.yang"
module ietf-dots-telemetry {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry";
prefix dots-telemetry;
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
prefix ietf-signal;
reference
"RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
prefix ietf-data;
reference
"RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"Section 3 of RFC 6991";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"Section 4 of RFC 6991";
}
import ietf-network-topology {
prefix nt;
reference
"Section 6.2 of RFC 8345: A YANG Data Model for Network
Topologies";
}
organization
"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
Author: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
<mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";
description
"This module contains YANG definitions for the signaling
of DOTS telemetry exchanged between a DOTS client and
a DOTS server, by means of the DOTS signal channel.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2020-01-23 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}
feature dots-telemetry {
description
"This feature means that the DOTS signal channel is able
to convey DOTS telemetry data between DOTS clients and
servers.";
}
typedef attack-severity {
type enumeration {
enum emergency {
value 1;
description
"The attack is severe: emergency.";
}
enum critical {
value 2;
description
"The attack is critical.";
}
enum alert {
value 3;
description
"This is an alert.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration for attack severity.";
}
typedef unit {
type enumeration {
enum pps {
value 1;
description
"Packets per second (PPS).";
}
enum kilo-pps {
value 2;
description
"Kilo packets per second (Kpps).";
}
enum bps {
value 3;
description
"Bits per Second (BPS).";
}
enum kilobytes-ps {
value 4;
description
"Kilobytes per second.";
}
enum megabytes-ps {
value 5;
description
"Megabytes per second.";
}
enum gigabytes-ps {
value 6;
description
"Gigabytes per second.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate which unit is used.";
}
typedef interval {
type enumeration {
enum hour {
value 1;
description
"Hour.";
}
enum day {
value 2;
description
"Day.";
}
enum week {
value 3;
description
"Week.";
}
enum month {
value 4;
description
"Month.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate the overall measurement period.";
}
typedef sample {
type enumeration {
enum second {
value 1;
description
"Second.";
}
enum 5-seconds {
value 2;
description
"5 seconds.";
}
enum 30-seconds {
value 3;
description
"30 seconds.";
}
enum minute {
value 4;
description
"One minute.";
}
enum 5-minutes {
value 5;
description
"5 minutes.";
}
enum 10-minutes {
value 6;
description
"10 minutes.";
}
enum 30-minutes {
value 7;
description
"30 minutes.";
}
enum hour {
value 8;
description
"One hour.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate the measurement perdiod.";
}
typedef percentile {
type decimal64 {
fraction-digits 2;
}
description
"The nth percentile of a set of data is the
value at which n percent of the data is below it.";
}
grouping percentile-config {
description
"Configuration of low, mid, and high percentile values.";
leaf measurement-interval {
type interval;
description
"Defines the period on which percentiles are computed.";
}
leaf measurement-sample {
type sample;
description
"Defines the time distribution for measuring
values that are used to compute percentiles..";
}
leaf low-percentile {
type percentile;
default "10.00";
description
"Low percentile. If set to '0', this means low-percentiles
are disabled.";
}
leaf mid-percentile {
type percentile;
must '. >= ../low-percentile' {
error-message
"The mid-percentile must be greater than
or equal to the low-percentile.";
}
default "50.00";
description
"Mid percentile. If set to the same value as low-percentiles,
this means mid-percentiles are disabled.";
}
leaf high-percentile {
type percentile;
must '. >= ../mid-percentile' {
error-message
"The high-percentile must be greater than
or equal to the mid-percentile.";
}
default "90.00";
description
"High percentile. If set to the same value as mid-percentiles,
this means high-percentiles are disabled.";
}
}
grouping percentile {
description
"Generic grouping for percentile.";
leaf low-percentile-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Low traffic.";
}
leaf mid-percentile-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Mid percentile.";
}
leaf high-percentile-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"High percentile.";
}
leaf peak-g {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Peak";
}
}
grouping unit-config {
description
"Generic grouping for unit configuration.";
list unit-config {
key "unit";
description
"Controls which units are allowed when sharing telemetry
data.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf unit-status {
type boolean;
description
"Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit.";
}
}
}
grouping traffic-unit {
description
"Grouping of traffic as a function of measurement unit.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
uses percentile;
}
grouping traffic-unit-protocol {
description
"Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as
a function of measurement unit.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.
For example, this field contains 6 for TCP,
17 for UDP, 33 for DCCP, or 132 for SCTP.";
}
uses percentile;
}
grouping total-connection-capacity {
description
"Total Connections Capacity. If the target is subjected
to resource consuming DDoS attack, these attributes are
useful to detect resource consuming DDoS attacks";
leaf connection {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
are allowed to the target server. The threshold is
transport-protocol specific because the target server
could support multiple protocols.";
}
leaf connection-client {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
are allowed to the target server per client.";
}
leaf embryonic {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
that are allowed to the target server. The term 'embryonic
connection' refers to a connection whose connection handshake
is not finished and embryonic connection is only possible in
connection-oriented transport protocols like TCP or SCTP.";
}
leaf embryonic-client {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
that are allowed to the target server per client.";
}
leaf connection-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of connections allowed per second
to the target server.";
}
leaf connection-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of connections allowed per second
to the target server per client.";
}
leaf request-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of requests allowed per second
to the target server.";
}
leaf request-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of requests allowed per second
to the target server per client.";
}
leaf partial-request-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of partial requests allowed per
second to the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of partial requests allowed per
second to the target server per client.";
}
}
grouping connection {
description
"A set of attributes which represent the attack
characteristics";
leaf connection {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of simultaneous attack connections to
the target server.";
}
leaf embryonic {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
the target server.";
}
leaf connection-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack connections per second to
the target server.";
}
leaf request-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack requests per second to
the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack partial requests to
the target server.";
}
}
grouping connection-percentile {
description
"Total attack connections.";
container low-percentile-c {
description
"Low percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container mid-percentile-c {
description
"Mid percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container high-percentile-c {
description
"High percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container peak-c {
description
"Peak attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
}
grouping connection-protocol-percentile {
description
"Total attack connections.";
list low-percentile-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Low percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list mid-percentile-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Mid percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list high-percentile-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Highg percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list peak-l {
key "protocol";
description
"Peak attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
}
grouping attack-detail {
description
"Various information and details that describe the on-going
attacks that needs to be mitigated by the DOTS server.
The attack details need to cover well-known and common attacks
(such as a SYN Flood) along with new emerging or vendor-specific
attacks.";
leaf id {
type uint32;
description
"Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
}
leaf attack-id {
type string;
description
"Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.";
}
leaf attack-name {
type string;
description
"Textual representation of attack description. Natural Language
Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) can possibly be used
to map the attack description to an attack type.";
}
leaf attack-severity {
type attack-severity;
description
"Severity level of an attack";
}
leaf start-time {
type uint64;
description
"The time the attack started. Start time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
leaf end-time {
type uint64;
description
"The time the attack ended. End time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
container source-count {
description
"Indicates the count of unique sources involved
in the attack.";
uses percentile;
}
}
grouping top-talker-aggregate {
description
"Top attack sources.";
list source-prefix {
key "source-prefix";
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
leaf spoofed-status {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether this address is spoofed.";
}
leaf source-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections issued from this source.";
uses connection-percentile;
}
}
}
grouping top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
list source-prefix {
key "source-prefix";
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
leaf spoofed-status {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether this address is spoofed.";
}
leaf source-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections issued from this source.";
uses connection-protocol-percentile;
}
}
}
grouping baseline {
description
"Grouping for the telemetry baseline.";
uses ietf-data:target;
list total-traffic-normal-baseline {
key "unit protocol";
description
"Total traffic normal baselines.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-connection-capacity {
key "protocol";
description
"Total connection capacity.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses total-connection-capacity;
}
}
grouping pre-mitigation {
description
"Grouping for the telemetry data.";
list total-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
description
"Total traffic.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
description
"Total attack traffic per protocol.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections.";
uses connection-protocol-percentile;
}
container attack-detail {
description
"Attack details.";
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
uses top-talker;
}
}
}
augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type/"
+ "ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope" {
if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Extends mitigation scope with telemetry update data.";
list total-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
description
"Total traffic.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections.";
uses connection-percentile;
}
container attack-detail {
description
"Atatck details";
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
uses top-talker-aggregate;
}
}
}
augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type" {
if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Add a new choice to enclose telemetry data in DOTS
signal channel.";
case telemetry-setup {
description
"Indicates the message is about telemetry.";
list telemetry {
key "cuid tsid";
description
"The telemetry data per DOTS client.";
leaf cuid {
type string;
description
"A unique identifier that is
generated by a DOTS client to prevent
request collisions. It is expected that the
cuid will remain consistent throughout the
lifetime of the DOTS client.";
}
leaf cdid {
type string;
description
"The cdid should be included by a server-domain
DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
identification information from the
gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
server-facing-side, and from the gateway's
server-facing-side to the DOTS server.
It may be used by the final DOTS server
for policy enforcement purposes.";
}
leaf tsid {
type uint32;
description
"An identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup
data.";
}
choice setup-type {
description
"Can be a mitigation configuration, a pipe capacity,
or baseline message.";
case telemetry-config {
description
"Uses to set low, mid, and high percentile values.";
container current-config {
description
"Current configuration values.";
uses percentile-config;
uses unit-config;
leaf server-initiated-telemetry {
type boolean;
description
"Used by a DOTS client to enable/disable whether it
accepts pre-mitigation telemetry from the DOTS
server.";
}
leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
type uint32 {
range "1 .. 3600";
}
units "seconds";
description
"Minimum number of seconds between successive
telemetry notifications.";
}
}
container max-config-values {
description
"Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
config false;
uses percentile-config;
// Check if this is right place for indciating this capability
leaf server-initiated-telemetry {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether the DOTS server can be instructed
to send pre-mitigation telemetry. If set to FALSE
or the attribute is not present, this is an indication
that the server does not support this capability.";
}
leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
type uint32 {
range "1 .. 3600";
}
units "seconds";
description
"Minimum number of seconds between successive
telemetry notifications.";
}
}
container min-config-values {
description
"Minimum acceptable configuration values.";
config false;
uses percentile-config;
leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
type uint32 {
range "1 .. 3600";
}
units "seconds";
description
"Minimum number of seconds between successive
telemetry notifications.";
}
}
container supported-units {
description
"Supported units and default activation status.";
config false;
uses unit-config;
}
}
case pipe {
description
"Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain";
list total-pipe-capacity {
key "link-id unit";
description
"Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain.";
leaf link-id {
type nt:link-id;
description
"Identifier of an interconnection link.";
}
leaf capacity {
type uint64;
mandatory true;
description
"Pipe capacity.";
}
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
}
}
case baseline {
description
"Traffic baseline information";
list baseline {
key "id";
description
"Traffic baseline information";
leaf id {
type uint32;
must '. >= 1';
description
"A baseline entry identifier.";
}
uses baseline;
}
}
}
}
}
case telemetry {
description
"Indicates the message is about telemetry.";
list pre-mitigation {
key "cuid id";
description
"Pre-mitigation telemetry per DOTS client.";
leaf cuid {
type string;
description
"A unique identifier that is
generated by a DOTS client to prevent
request collisions. It is expected that the
cuid will remain consistent throughout the
lifetime of the DOTS client.";
}
leaf cdid {
type string;
description
"The cdid should be included by a server-domain
DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
identification information from the
gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
server-facing-side, and from the gateway's
server-facing-side to the DOTS server.
It may be used by the final DOTS server
for policy enforcement purposes.";
}
leaf id {
type uint32;
description
"An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data send using
the same message.";
}
container target {
description
"Indicates the target.";
uses ietf-data:target;
}
uses pre-mitigation;
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
All DOTS telemetry parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel MUST be mapped to CBOR types as shown in the following table:
+----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+ | Parameter Name | YANG | CBOR | CBOR Major | JSON | | | Type | Key | Type & | Type | | | | | Information | | +----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+ | ietf-dots-signal-cha | | | | | | nnel:telemetry | container |32776 | 5 map | Object | | tsid | uint32 |32777 | 0 unsigned | Number | | telemetry-config | container |32778 | 5 map | Object | | low-percentile | decimal64 |32779 | 6 tag 4 | | | | | | [-2, integer]| String | | mid-percentile | decimal64 |32780 | 6 tag 4 | | | | | | [-2, integer]| String | | high-percentile | decimal64 |32781 | 6 tag 4 | | | | | | [-2, integer]| String | | unit-config | list |32782 | 4 array | Array | | unit | enumeration |32783 | 0 unsigned | String | | unit-status | boolean |32784 | 7 bits 20 | False | | | | | 7 bits 21 | True | | total-pipe-capability| list |32785 | 4 array | Array | | pipe | uint64 |32786 | 0 unsigned | String | | pre-mitigation | list |32787 | 4 array | Array | | ietf-dots-signal-cha | | | | | | nnel:telemetry-setup | container |32888 | 5 map | Object | | total-traffic- | | | | | | normal-baseline | list |32789 | 4 array | Array | | low-percentile-g | yang:gauge64|32790 | 0 unsigned | String | | mid-percentile-g | yang:gauge64|32791 | 0 unsigned | String | | high-percentile-g | yang:gauge64|32792 | 0 unsigned | String | | peak-g | yang:gauge64|32793 | 0 unsigned | String | | total-attack-traffic | list |32794 | 4 array | Array | | total-traffic | list |32795 | 4 array | Array | | total-connection- | | | | | | capacity | list |32796 | 4 array | Array | | connection | uint64 |32797 | 0 unsigned | String | | connection-client | uint64 |32798 | 0 unsigned | String | | embryonic | uint64 |32799 | 0 unsigned | String | | embryonic-client | uint64 |32800 | 0 unsigned | String | | connection-ps | uint64 |32801 | 0 unsigned | String | | connection-client-ps | uint64 |32802 | 0 unsigned | String | | request-ps | uint64 |32803 | 0 unsigned | String | | request-client-ps | uint64 |32804 | 0 unsigned | String | | partial-request-ps | uint64 |32805 | 0 unsigned | String | | partial-request- | | | | | | client-ps | uint64 |32806 | 0 unsigned | String | | total-attack- | | | | | | connection | container |32807 | 5 map | Object | | low-percentile-l | list |32808 | 4 array | Array | | mid-percentile-l | list |32809 | 4 array | Array | | high-percentile-l | list |32810 | 4 array | Array | | peak-l | list |32811 | 4 array | Array | | attack-detail | container |32812 | 5 map | Object | | id | uint32 |32813 | 0 unsigned | Number | | attack-id | string |32814 | 3 text string | String | | attack-name | string |32815 | 3 text string | String | | attack-severity | enumeration |32816 | 0 unsigned | String | | start-time | uint64 |32817 | 0 unsigned | String | | end-time | uint64 |32819 | 0 unsigned | String | | source-count | container |32820 | 5 map | Object | | top-talker | container |32821 | 5 map | Object | | spoofed-status | boolean |32822 | 7 bits 20 | False | | | | | 7 bits 21 | True | | low-percentile-c | container |32823 | 5 map | Object | | mid-percentile-c | container |32824 | 5 map | Object | | high-percentile-c | container |32825 | 5 map | Object | | peak-c | container |32826 | 5 map | Object | | baseline | container |32827 | 5 map | Object | | current-config | container |32828 | 5 map | Object | | max-config-values | container |32829 | 5 map | Object | | min-config-values | container |32830 | 5 map | Object | | supported-units | container |32831 | 5 map | Object | | server-initiated- | boolean |32832 | 7 bits 20 | False | | telemetry | | | 7 bits 21 | True | | telemetry-notify- | uint32 |32833 | 0 unsigned | Number | | interval | | | | | +----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+
This specification registers the DOTS telemetry attributes in the IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/dots/dots.xhtml#dots-signal-channel-cbor-key-values.
The DOTS telemetry attributes defined in this specification are comprehension-optional parameters.
+----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+ | Parameter Name | CBOR | CBOR | Change | Specification | | | Key | Major | Controller | Document(s) | | | Value | Type | | | +----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+ | ietf-dots-signal-cha | 32776 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | nnel:telemetry | | | | | | tsid | 32777 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | telemetry-config | 32778 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | low-percentile | 32779 | 6tag4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | mid-percentile | 32780 | 6tag4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | high-percentile | 32781 | 6tag4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | unit-config | 32782 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | unit | 32783 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | unit-status | 32784 | 7 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | total-pipe-capability| 32785 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | pipe | 32786 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | pre-mitigation | 32787 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | ietf-dots-signal-cha | 32788 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | nnel:telemetry | | | | | | total-traffic- | 32789 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | normal-baseline | | | | | | low-percentile-g | 32790 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | mid-percentile-g | 32791 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | high-percentile-g | 32792 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | peak-g | 32793 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | total-attack-traffic | 32794 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | total-traffic | 32795 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | total-connection- | 32796 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | capacity | | | | | | connection | 32797 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | connection-client | 32798 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | embryonic | 32799 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | embryonic-client | 32800 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | connection-ps | 32801 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | connection-client-ps | 32802 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | request-ps | 32803 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | request-client-ps | 32804 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | partial-request-ps | 32805 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | partial-request- | 32806 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | client-ps | | | | | | total-attack- | 32807 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | connection | | | | | | low-percentile-l | 32808 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | mid-percentile-l | 32809 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | high-percentile-l | 32810 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | peak-l | 32811 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | attack-detail | 32812 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | id | 32813 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | attack-id | 32814 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | attack-name | 32815 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | attack-severity | 32816 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | start-time | 32817 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | end-time | 32819 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | source-count | 32820 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | top-talker | 32821 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | spoofed-status | 32822 | 7 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | low-percentile-c | 32823 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | mid-percentile-c | 32824 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | high-percentile-c | 32825 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | peak-c | 32826 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | ietf-dots-signal-cha | 32827 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | current-config | 32828 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | max-config-value | 32829 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | min-config-values | 32830 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | supported-units | 32831 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | server-initiated- | 32832 | 7 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | telemetry | | | | | | telemetry-notify- | 32833 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | interval | | | | | +----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+
This specification requests IANA to assign a new code from the "DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes" registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/dots/dots.xhtml#dots-signal-channel-conflict-cause-codes.
Code Label Description Reference TBA overlapping-pipes Overlapping pipe scope [RFCXXXX]
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
name: ietf-dots-telemetry
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry
maintained by IANA: N
prefix: dots-telemetry
reference: RFC XXXX
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: [RFC7950] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.
Security considerations in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] need to be taken into consideration.
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
The authors would like to thank Flemming Andreasen, Liang Xia, and Kaname Nishizuka co-authors of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-doron-dots-telemetry-00 draft and everyone who had contributed to that document.
Authors would like to thank Kaname Nishizuka, Jon Shallow, Wei Pan and Yuuhei Hayashi for comments and review.
| [Enterprise-Numbers] | "Private Enterprise Numbers", 2005. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] | Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-31, July 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] | Reddy.K, T., Boucadair, M. and J. Shallow, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Call Home", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home-07, November 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] | Reddy.K, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A. and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-41, January 2020. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC3688] | Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004. |
| [RFC6991] | Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013. |
| [RFC7049] | Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, October 2013. |
| [RFC7641] | Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641, DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015. |
| [RFC7950] | Bjorklund, M., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016. |
| [RFC7959] | Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, "Block-Wise Transfers in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959, DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |