DRINKS K. Cartwright
Internet-Draft V. Bhatia
Intended status: Standards Track TNS
Expires: April 25, 2015 S. Ali
NeuStar
D. Schwartz
XConnect
October 22, 2014
Session Peering Provisioning Framework (SPPF)
draft-ietf-drinks-spp-framework-08
Abstract
This document specifies the data model and the overall structure for
a framework to provision session establishment data into Session Data
Registries and SIP Service Provider data stores. The framework is
called the Session Peering Provisioning Framework (SPPF). The
provisioned data is typically used by network elements for session
establishment.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2015.
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Framework High Level Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Framework Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Time Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Transport Protocol Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Connection Oriented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Request and Response Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Connection Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.5. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.6. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.7. Near Real Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8. Request and Response Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.9. Request and Response Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.10. Request Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.11. Mandatory Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Base Framework Data Structures and Response Codes . . . . . . 13
5.1. Basic Object Type and Organization Identifiers . . . . . 13
5.2. Various Object Key Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.1. Generic Object Key Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. Derived Object Key Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Response Message Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Framework Data Model Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1. Destination Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2. Public Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3. SED Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.4. SED Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.5. SED Group Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.6. Egress Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7. Framework Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1. Add Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.2. Delete Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3. Get Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.4. Accept Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.5. Reject Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.6. Get Server Details Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. XML Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1. Namespaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
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8.2. Versioning and Character Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.1. Confidentiality and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.3.1. DoS Issues Inherited from Transport Mechanism . . . . 41
9.3.2. DoS Issues Specific to SPPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
9.4. Information Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.5. Non Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.6. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.7. Man in the Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11.1. URN Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11.2. Organization Identifier Namespace Registry . . . . . . . 44
12. Formal Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Introduction
Service providers and enterprises use routing databases known as
registries to make session routing decisions for Voice over IP, SMS
and MMS traffic exchanges. This document is narrowly focused on the
provisioning framework for these registries. This framework
prescribes a way for an entity to provision session-related data into
a Registry. The data being provisioned can be optionally shared with
other participating peering entities. The requirements and use cases
driving this framework have been documented in [RFC6461].
Three types of provisioning flows have been described in the use case
document: client to Registry, Registry to local data repository and
Registry to Registry. This document addresses client to Registry
flow enabling the need to provision Session Establishment Data (SED).
The framework that supports flow of messages to facilitate client to
Registry provisioning is referred to as Session Peering Provisioning
Framework (SPPF).
The role of the "client" and the "server" only applies to the
connection, and those roles are not related in any way to the type of
entity that participates in a protocol exchange. For example, a
Registry might also include a "client" when such a Registry initiates
a connection (for example, for data distribution to SSP).
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*--------* *------------* *------------*
| | (1). Client | | (3).Registry | |
| Client | ------------> | Registry |<------------->| Registry |
| | to Registry | | to Registry | |
*--------* *------------* *------------*
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ \ v
/ \ ...
/ \
/ (2). Distrib \
/ Registry data \
/ to local data \
V store V
+----------+ +----------+
|Local Data| |Local Data|
|Repository| |Repository|
+----------+ +----------+
Three Registry Provisioning Flows
Figure 1
A "terminating" SIP Service Provider (SSP) provisions Session
Establishment Data or SED into the Registry to be selectively shared
with other peer SSPs.
SED is typically used by various downstream SIP signaling systems to
route a call to the next hop associated with the called domain.
These systems typically use a local data store ("Local Data
Repository") as their source of session routing information. More
specifically, the SED data is the set of parameters that the outgoing
signaling path border elements (SBEs) need to initiate the session.
See [RFC5486] for more details.
A Registry may distribute the provisioned data into local data
repositories or may additionally offer a central query resolution
service (not shown in the above figure) for query purposes.
A key requirement for the SPPF is to be able to accommodate two basic
deployment scenarios:
1. A resolution system returns a Look-Up Function (LUF) that
comprises the target domain to assist in call routing (as
described in [RFC5486]). In this case, the querying entity may
use other means to perform the Location Routing Function (LRF)
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which in turn helps determine the actual location of the
Signaling Function in that domain.
2. A resolution system returns a Location Routing Function (LRF)
that comprises the location (address) of the signaling function
in the target domain (as described in [RFC5486]).
In terms of framework design, SPPF is agnostic to the transport
protocol. This document includes the specification of the data model
and identifies, but does not specify, the means to enable protocol
operations within a request and response structure. That aspect of
the specification has been delegated to the "protocol" specification
for the framework. To encourage interoperability, the framework
supports extensibility aspects.
In this document, XML schema is used to describe the building blocks
of the SPPF and to express the data types, the semantic relationships
between the various data types, and the various constraints as a
binding construct. However, the "protocol" specification is free to
choose any data representation format as long as it meets the
requirements laid out in the SPPF XML schema definition. As an
example, XML and JSON are two widely used data representation
formats.
This document is organized as follows:
o Section 2 provides the terminology
o Section 3 provides an overview of SPPF, including functional
entities and data model
o Section 4 specifies requirements for SPPF transport protocols
o Section 5 describes the base framework data structures, the
generic response types that MUST be supported by a conforming
transport "protocol" specification, and the basic object type most
first class objects extend from
o Section 6 provides a detailed description of the data model object
specifications
o Section 7 describes the operations that are supported by the data
model
o Section 8 defines XML considerations XML parsers must meet to
conform to this specification
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o Sections 9 - 11 discuss security, internationalization and IANA
considerations
o Section 12 normatively defines the SPPF using its XML Schema
Definition.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document reuses terms from [RFC3261], [RFC5486], use cases and
requirements documented in [RFC6461] and the ENUM Validation
Architecture [RFC4725].
In addition, this document specifies the following additional terms:
SPPF: Session Peering Provisioning Framework, the framework used by
a transport protocol to provision data into a Registry (see arrow
labeled "1." in Figure 1 of [RFC6461]). It is the primary scope
of this document.
Client: In the context of SPPF, this is an application that
initiates a provisioning request. It is sometimes referred to as
a "Registry client".
Server: In the context of SPPF, this is an application that
receives a provisioning request and responds accordingly. It is
sometimes referred to as a Registry.
Registry: The Registry operates a master database of Session
Establishment Data for one or more Registrants.
Registrant: The definition of a Registrant is based on [RFC4725].
It is the end-user, the person or organization that is the
"holder" of the Session Establishment Data being provisioned into
the Registry by a Registrar. For example, in [RFC6461], a
Registrant is pictured as a SIP Service Provider in Figure 2.
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Within the confines of a Registry, a Registrant is uniquely
identified by a well-known ID.
Registrar: The definition of a Registrar is based on [RFC4725]. It
is an entity that performs provisioning operations on behalf of a
Registrant by interacting with the Registry via SPPF operations.
In other words the Registrar is the SPPF Client. The Registrar
and Registrant roles are logically separate to allow, but not
require, a single Registrar to perform provisioning operations on
behalf of more than one Registrant.
Peering Organization: A Peering Organization is an entity to which
a Registrant's SED Groups are made visible using the operations of
SPPF.
3. Framework High Level Design
This section introduces the structure of the data model and provides
the information framework for the SPPF. The data model is defined
along with all the objects manipulated by a conforming transport
protocol and their relationships.
3.1. Framework Data Model
The data model illustrated and described in Figure 2 defines the
logical objects and the relationships between these objects supported
by SPPF. SPPF defines protocol operations through which an SPPF
client populates a Registry with these logical objects. SPPF clients
belonging to different Registrars may provision data into the
Registry using a conforming transport protocol that implements these
operations
The logical structure presented below is consistent with the
terminology and requirements defined in [RFC6461].
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+-------------+ +-----------------+
| all object | |Egress Route: |
| types | 0..n | rant, |
+-------------+ +--| egrRteName, |
|0..n / | pref, |
| / | regxRewriteRule,|
|2 / | ingrSedGrp, |
+----------------------+ / | svcs |
|Organization: | / +-----------------+
| orgId | /
+----------------------+ /
|0..n /
| /
|A SED Group is /
|associated with /
|zero or more / +---[abstract]----+
|Peering / | SED Record: |
|Organizations / | rant, |
| / | sedName, |0..n
|0..n / | sedFunction, |------|
+--------+--------------+0..n 0..n| isInSvc, | |
|SED Group: |------------------| ttl | |
| rant, | +-----------------+ |
| sedGrpName, | ^ Various types |
| isInSvc, | | of SED Records |
| sedRecRef, | | |
| peeringOrg, | +-----+------------+ |
| sourceIdent, | | | | |
| priority, | +----+ +-------+ +----+ |
| dgName | | URI| | NAPTR | | NS | |
+-----------------------+ +----+ +-------+ +----+ |
|0..n |
| +-----[abstract]------+ |
|0..n |Public Identifier: | |
+----------------------+0..n 0..n| rant, | |
| Dest Group: |--------------| publicIdentifier, | |
| rant, | | dgName | |
| dgName | | | |
+----------------------+ +---------------------+ |
^ Various types |
+---------+-------+------+----------+ of Public |
| | | | | Identifiers |
+------+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ |
| URI | | TNP | | TNR | | RN | | TN |-------------|
+------+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +------+ 0..n
Figure 2
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The objects and attributes that comprise the data model can be
described as follows (objects listed from the bottom up):
o Public Identifier:
From a broad perspective a public identifier is a well-known
attribute that is used as the key to perform resolution lookups.
Within the context of SPPF, a public identifier object can be a
Telephone Number (TN), a range of Telephone Numbers, a PSTN
Routing Number (RN), a TN prefix, or a URI.
An SPPF Public Identifier may be a member of zero or more
Destination Groups to create logical groupings of Public
Identifiers that share a common set of Session Establishment Data
(e.g. routes).
A TN Public Identifier may optionally be associated with zero or
more individual SED Records. This ability for a Public Identifier
to be directly associated with a SED Record, as opposed to forcing
membership in one or more Destination Groups, supports use cases
where the SED Record contains data specifically tailored to an
individual TN Public Identifier.
o Destination Group:
A named logical grouping of zero or more Public Identifiers that
can be associated with one or more SED Groups for the purpose of
facilitating the management of their common session establishment
information.
o SED Group:
A SED Group contains a set of SED Record references, a set of
Destination Group references, and a set of peering organization
identifiers. This is used to establish a three part relationships
between a set of Public Identifiers, the session establishment
information (SED) shared across these Public Identifiers, and the
list of peering organizations whose query responses from the
resolution system may include the session establishment
information contained in a given SED group. In addition, the
sourceIdent element within a SED Group, in concert with the set of
peering organization identifiers, enables fine-grained source
based routing. For further details about the SED Group and source
based routing, refer to the definitions and descriptions in
Section 6.1.
o SED Record:
A SED Record contains the data that a resolution system returns in
response to a successful query for a Public Identifier. SED
Records are generally associated with a SED Group when the SED
within is not specific to a Public Identifier.
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To support the use cases defined in [RFC6461], SPPF framework
defines three type of SED Records: URIType, NAPTRType, and NSType.
These SED Records extend the abstract type SedRecType and inherit
the common attribute 'priority' that is meant for setting
precedence across the SED records defined within a SED Group in a
protocol agnostic fashion.
o Egress Route:
In a high-availability environment, the originating SSP likely has
more than one egress paths to the ingress SBE of the target SSP.
The Egress Route allows the originating SSP to choose a specific
egress SBE to be associated with the target ingress SBE. the
'svcs' element specifies ENUM services ((e.g.,E2U+pstn:sip+sip)
that are used to identify the SED records associated with the SED
Group that will be modified by the originating SSP.
o Organization:
An Organization is an entity that may fulfill any combination of
three roles: Registrant, Registrar, and Peering Organization. All
objects in SPPF are associated with two organization identifiers
to identify each object's Registrant and Registrar. A SED Group
object is also associated with a set of zero or more organization
identifiers that identify the peering organization(s) whose
resolution query responses may include the session establishment
information (SED) defined in the SED Records within that SED
Group. A peering organization is an entity that the Registrant
intends to share the SED data with.
3.2. Time Value
Some request and response messages in SPPF include time value(s)
defined as type xs:dateTime, a built-in W3C XML Schema Datatype. Use
of unqualified local time value is disallowed as it can lead to
interoperability issues. The value of time attribute MUST be
expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) format without the
timezone digits.
"2010-05-30T09:30:10Z" is an example of an acceptable time value for
use in SPPF messages. "2010-05-30T06:30:10+3:00" is a valid UTC
time, but it is not approved for use in SPPF messages.
3.3. Extensibility
The framework contains various points of extensibility in form of the
"ext" elements. Extensions used beyond the scope of private SPPF
installations MUST be documented in an RFC level document, and the
first such extension SHOULD define an IANA registry, holding a list
of documented extensions.
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4. Transport Protocol Requirements
This section provides requirements for transport protocols suitable
for SPPF. More specifically, this section specifies the services,
features, and assumptions that SPPF framework delegates to the chosen
transport and envelope technologies.
4.1. Connection Oriented
The SPPF follows a model where a client establishes a connection to a
server in order to further exchange SPPF messages over such point-to-
point connection. A transport protocol for SPPF MUST therefore be
connection oriented.
4.2. Request and Response Model
Provisioning operations in SPPF follow the request-response model,
where a client sends a request message to initiate a transaction and
the server responds with a response. Multiple subsequent request-
response exchanges MAY be performed over a single persistent
connection.
Therefore, a transport protocol for SPPF MUST follow the request-
response model by allowing a response to be sent to the request
initiator.
4.3. Connection Lifetime
Some use cases involve provisioning a single request to a network
element. Connections supporting such provisioning requests might be
short-lived, and may be established only on demand. Other use cases
involve either provisioning a large dataset, or a constant stream of
small updates, either of which would likely require long-lived
connections.
Therefore, a protocol suitable for SPPF SHOULD be able to support
both short-lived as well as long-lived connections.
4.4. Authentication
All SPPF objects are associated with a Registrant identifier. An
SPPF Client provisions SPPF objects on behalf of Registrants. An
authenticated SPP Client is a Registrar. Therefore, the SPPF
transport protocol MUST provide means for an SPPF server to
authenticate an SPPF Client.
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4.5. Authorization
After successful authentication of the SPPF client as a Registrar the
Registry performs authorization checks to determine if the Registrar
is authorized to act on behalf of the Registrant whose identifier is
included in the SPPF request. Refer to the Security Considerations
section for further guidance.
4.6. Confidentiality and Integrity
SPPF objects that the Registry manages can be private in nature.
Therefore, the transport protocol MUST provide means for end-to-end
encryption between the SPPF client and Registry.
If the data is compromised in-flight between the SPPF client and
Registry, it will seriously affect the stability and integrity of the
system. Therefore, the transport protocol MUST provide means for
data integrity protection.
4.7. Near Real Time
Many use cases require near real-time responses from the server.
Therefore, a DRINKS transport protocol MUST support near real-time
response to requests submitted by the client.
4.8. Request and Response Sizes
Use of SPPF may involve simple updates that may consist of small
number of bytes, such as, update of a single public identifier.
Other provisioning operations may constitute large number of dataset
as in adding millions records to a Registry. As a result, a suitable
transport protocol for SPPF SHOULD accommodate dataset of various
sizes.
4.9. Request and Response Correlation
A transport protocol suitable for SPPF MUST allow responses to be
correlated with requests.
4.10. Request Acknowledgement
Data transported in the SPPF is likely crucial for the operation of
the communication network that is being provisioned. A SPPF client
responsible for provisioning SED to the Registry has a need to know
if the submitted requests have been processed correctly.
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Failed transactions can lead to situations where a subset of public
identifiers or even SSPs might not be reachable, or the provisioning
state of the network is inconsistent.
Therefore, a transport protocol for SPPF MUST provide a response for
each request, so that a client can identify whether a request
succeeded or failed.
4.11. Mandatory Transport
At the time of this writing, a choice of transport protocol has been
provided in SPP Protocol over SOAP document. To encourage
interoperability, the SPPF server MUST provide support for this
transport protocol. With time, it is possible that other transport
layer choices may surface that agree with the requirements discussed
above.
5. Base Framework Data Structures and Response Codes
SPPF contains some common data structures for most of the supported
object types. This section describes these common data structures.
5.1. Basic Object Type and Organization Identifiers
All first class objects extend the type BasicObjType. It consists of
the Registrant organization, the Registrar organization, the date and
time of object creation, and the last date and time the object was
updated. The Registry MUST store the date and time of the object
creation and update, if applicable, for all Get operations (see
Section 7). If the client passed in either date and time values, the
Registry MUST ignore it. The Registrar performs the SPPF operations
on behalf of the Registrant, the organization that owns the object.
The identifiers used for Registrants (rant) and Registrars (rar) are
instances of OrgIdType. The OrgIdType is defined as a string and all
OrgIdType instances MUST follow the textual convention:
"namespace:value" (for example "iana-en:32473"). See the IANA
Consideration section for more details.
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5.2. Various Object Key Types
The SPPF data model contains various object relationships. In some
cases, these object relationships are established by embedding the
unique identity of the related object inside the relating object.
Note that an object's unique identity is required to Delete or Get
the details of an object. The following sub-sections normatively
define the various object keys in SPPF and the attributes of those
keys.
"Name" attributes that are used as components of object key types
MUST be treated case insensitive, more specifically, comparison
operations MUST use the toCasefold() function, as specified in
Section 3.13 of [Unicode6.1].
5.2.1. Generic Object Key Type
Most objects in SPPF are uniquely identified by an object key that
has the object's name, object's type and its Registrant's
organization ID as its attributes. The abstract type called
ObjKeyType is where this unique identity is housed. Any concrete
representation of the ObjKeyType MUST contain the following:
Object Name: The name of the object.
Registrant Id: The unique organization ID that identifies the
Registrant.
Type: The value that represents the type of SPPF object that.
This is required as different types of objects in SPPF, that
belong to the same Registrant, can have the same name.
The structure of abstract ObjKeyType is as follows:
---- Generic type that represents the
key for various objects in SPPF. ----
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5.2.2. Derived Object Key Types
The SPPF data model contains certain objects that are uniquely
identified by attributes, different from or in addition to, the
attributes in the generic object key described in previous section.
These kind of object keys are derived from the abstract ObjKeyType
and defined in their own abstract key types. Because these object
key types are abstract, they MUST be specified in a concrete form in
any SPPF conforming transport protocol specification. These are used
in Delete and Get operations, and may also be used in Accept and
Reject operations.
Following are the derived object keys in SPPF data model:
o SedGrpOfferKeyType: This uniquely identifies a SED Group object
offer. This key type extends from ObjKeyType and MUST also have
the organization ID of the Registrant to whom the object is being
offered, as one of its attributes. In addition to the Delete and
Get operations, these key types are used in Accept and Reject
operations on a SED Group Offer object. The structure of abstract
SedGrpOfferKeyType is as follows:
---- Generic type that represents
the key for a object offer. ----
A SED Group Offer object MUST use SedGrpOfferKeyType. Refer the
"Framework Data Model Objects" section of this document for
description of SED Group Offer object.
o PubIdKeyType: This uniquely identifies a Public Identity object.
This key type extends from abstract ObjKeyType. Any concrete
definition of PubIdKeyType MUST contain the elements that identify
the value and type of Public Identity and also contain the
organization ID of the Registrant that is the owner of the Public
Identity object. A Public Identity object in SPPF is uniquely
identified by the Registrant's organization ID, the value of the
public identity, and the type of the public identity object.
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Consequently, any concrete representation of the PubIdKeyType MUST
contain the following attributes:
* Registrant Id: The unique organization ID that identifies the
Registrant.
* Value: The value of the Public Identity.
* Type: The type of the Public Identity Object.
The PubIdKeyType is used in Delete and Get operations on a Public
Identifier object.
o The structure of abstract PubIdKeyType is as follows:
---- Generic type that represents the key for a Pub Id. ----
A Public Identity object MUST use attributes of PubIdKeyType for its
unique identification . Refer to Section 6 for a description of
Public Identity object.
5.3. Response Message Types
This section contains the listing of response types that MUST be
defined by the SPPF conforming transport protocol specification and
implemented by a conforming SPPF server.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Response Type | Description |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Request Succeeded | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| | response to indicate that a given request |
| | succeeded. |
| | |
| Request syntax | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| invalid | response to indicate that a syntax of a |
| | given request was found invalid. |
| | |
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| Request too large | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| | response to indicate that the count of |
| | entities in the request is larger than the |
| | server is willing or able to process. |
| | |
| Version not | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| supported | response to indicate that the server does |
| | not support the version of the SPPF |
| | protocol specified in the request. |
| | |
| Command invalid | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| | response to indicate that the operation |
| | and/or command being requested by the |
| | client is invalid and/or not supported by |
| | the server. |
| | |
| System temporarily | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| unavailable | response to indicate that the SPPF server |
| | is temporarily not available to serve |
| | client request. |
| | |
| Unexpected internal | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| system or server | response to indicate that the SPPF server |
| error. | encountered an unexpected error that |
| | prevented the server from fulfilling the |
| | request. |
| | |
| Attribute value | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| invalid | response to indicate that the SPPF server |
| | encountered an attribute or property in the |
| | request that had an invalid/bad value. |
| | Optionally, the specification MAY provide a |
| | way to indicate the Attribute Name and the |
| | Attribute Value to identify the object that |
| | was found to be invalid. |
| | |
| Object does not | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| exist | response to indicate that an object present |
| | in the request does not exist on the SPPF |
| | server. Optionally, the specification MAY |
| | provide a way to indicate the Attribute |
| | Name and the Attribute Value that |
| | identifies the non-existent object. |
| | |
| Object status or | Any conforming specification MUST define a |
| ownership does not | response to indicate that the operation |
| allow for | requested on an object present in the |
| operation. | request cannot be performed because the |
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| | object is in a status that does not allow |
| | the said operation or the user requesting |
| | the operation is not authorized to perform |
| | the said operation on the object. |
| | Optionally, the specification MAY provide a |
| | way to indicate the Attribute Name and the |
| | Attribute Value that identifies the object. |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Response Types
When the response messages are "parameterized" with the Attribute
Name and Attribute Value, then the use of these parameters MUST
adhere to the following rules:
o Any value provided for the Attribute Name parameter MUST be an
exact XSD element name of the protocol data element that the
response message is referring to. For example, valid values for
"attribute name" are "dgName", "sedGrpName", "sedRec", etc.
o The value for Attribute Value MUST be the value of the data
element to which the preceding Attribute Name refers.
o Response type "Attribute value invalid" MUST be used whenever an
element value does not adhere to data validation rules.
o Response types "Attribute value invalid" and "Object does not
exist" MUST not be used interchangeably. Response type "Object
does not exist" MUST be returned by an Update/Del/Accept/Reject
operation when the data element(s) used to uniquely identify a
pre-existing object do not exist. If the data elements used to
uniquely identify an object are malformed, then response type
"Attribute value invalid" MUST be returned.
6. Framework Data Model Objects
This section provides a description of the specification of each
supported data model object (the nouns) and identifies the commands
(the verbs) that MUST be supported for each data model object.
However, the specification of the data structures necessary to
support each command is delegated to an SPPF conforming transport
protocol specification.
6.1. Destination Group
Destination Group represents a logical grouping of Public Identifiers
with common session establishment information. The transport
protocol MUST support the ability to Create, Modify, Get, and Delete
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Destination Groups (refer the "Framework Operations" section of this
document for a generic description of various operations).
A Destination Group object MUST be uniquely identified by attributes
as defined in the description of "ObjKeyType" in the section "Generic
Object Key Type" of this document.
The DestGrpType object structure is defined as follows:
The DestGrpType object is composed of the following elements:
o base: All first class objects extend BasicObjType (see
Section 5.1).
o dgName: The character string that contains the name of the
Destination Group.
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
6.2. Public Identifier
A Public Identifier is the search key used for locating the session
establishment data (SED). In many cases, a Public Identifier is
attributed to the end user who has a retail relationship with the
service provider or Registrant organization. SPPF supports the
notion of the carrier-of-record as defined in [RFC5067]. Therefore,
the Registrant under whom the Public Identity is being created can
optionally claim to be a carrier-of-record.
SPPF identifies three types of Public Identifiers: telephone numbers
(TN), routing numbers (RN), and URI. SPPF provides structures to
manage a single TN, a contiguous range of TNs, and a TN prefix. The
transport protocol MUST support the ability to Create, Modify, Get,
and Delete Public Identifiers (refer the "Framework Operations"
section of this document for a generic description of various
operations).
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A Public Identity object MUST be uniquely identified by attributes as
defined in the description of "PubIdKeyType" in the section
Section 5.2.2.
The abstract XML schema type definition PubIdType is a generalization
for the concrete Public Identifier schema types. PubIdType element
'dgName' represents the name of a destination group that a given
Public Identifier may be a member of. Note that this element may be
present multiple times so that a given Public Identifier may be a
member of multiple destination groups. The PubIdType object
structure is defined as follows:
A Public Identifier may be a member of zero or more Destination
Groups. When a Public Identifier is member of a Destination Group,
it is intended to be associated with SED(s) through the SED Group(s)
that are associated with the Destination Group. When a Public
Identifier is not member of any Destination Group, it is intended to
be associated with SED through the SED Records that are directly
associated with the Public Identifier.
A telephone number is provisioned using the TNType, an extension of
PubIdType. Each TNType object is uniquely identified by the
combination of its value contained within element, and its
Registrant ID. TNType is defined as follows:
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TNType consists of the following attributes:
o tn: Telephone number to be added to the Registry.
o sedRecRef: Optional reference to SED records that are directly
associated with the TN Public Identifier. Following the SPPF data
model, the SED record could be a protocol agnostic URIType or
another type.
o corInfo: corInfo is an optional parameter of type CORInfoType that
allows the Registrant organization to set forth a claim to be the
carrier-of-record (see [RFC5067]). This is done by setting the
value of element of the CORInfoType object structure to
"true". The other two parameters of the CORInfoType, and
are set by the Registry to describe the outcome of the
carrier-of-record claim by the Registrant. In general, inclusion
of parameter is useful if the Registry has the authority
information, such as, the number portability data, etc., in order
to qualify whether the Registrant claim can be satisfied. If the
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carrier-of-record claim disagrees with the authority data in the
Registry, whether the TN add operation fails or not is a matter of
policy and it is beyond the scope of this document.
A routing number is provisioned using the RNType, an extension of
PubIDType. The Registrant organization can add the RN and associate
it with the appropriate destination group(s) to share the route
information. This allows SSPs to use the RN search key to derive the
ingress routes for session establishment at the runtime resolution
process (see [RFC3761]. Each RNType object is uniquely identified by
the combination of its value inside the element, and its
Registrant ID. RNType is defined as follows:
RNType has the following attributes:
o rn: Routing Number used as the search key.
o corInfo: corInfo is an optional parameter of type CORInfoType that
allows the Registrant organization to set forth a claim to be the
carrier-of-record (see [RFC5067])
TNRType structure is used to provision a contiguous range of
telephone numbers. The object definition requires a starting TN and
an ending TN that together define the span of the TN range. Use of
TNRType is particularly useful when expressing a TN range that does
not include all the TNs within a TN block or prefix. The TNRType
definition accommodates the open number plan as well such that the
TNs that fall between the start and end TN range may include TNs with
different length variance. Whether the Registry can accommodate the
open number plan semantics is a matter of policy and is beyond the
scope of this document. Each TNRType object is uniquely identified
by the combination of its value that in turn is a combination of the
and elements, and its Registrant ID. TNRType
object structure definition is as follows:
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TNRType has the following attributes:
o startTn: Starting TN in the TN range
o endTn: The last TN in the TN range
o corInfo: corInfo is an optional parameter of type CORInfoType that
allows the Registrant organization to set forth a claim to be the
carrier-of-record (see [RFC5067])
In some cases, it is useful to describe a set of TNs with the help of
the first few digits of the telephone number, also referred to as the
telephone number prefix or a block. A given TN prefix may include
TNs with different length variance in support of open number plan.
Once again, whether the Registry supports the open number plan
semantics is a matter of policy and it is beyond the scope of this
document. The TNPType data structure is used to provision a TN
prefix. Each TNPType object is uniquely identified by the
combination of its value in the element, and its
Registrant ID. TNPType is defined as follows:
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TNPType consists of the following attributes:
o tnPrefix: The telephone number prefix
o corInfo: corInfo is an optional parameter of type CORInfoType that
allows the Registrant organization to set forth a claim to be the
carrier-of-record (see [RFC5067])
In some cases, a Public Identifier may be a URI, such as an email
address. The URIPubIdType object is comprised of the data element
necessary to house such Public Identifiers. Each URIPubIdType object
is uniquely identified by the combination of its value in the
element, and its Registrant ID. URIPubIdType is defined as follows:
URIPubIdType consists of the following attributes:
o uri: The value that acts a Public Identifier.
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
6.3. SED Group
SED Group is a grouping of one or more Destination Group, the common
SED Records, and the list of peer organizations with access to the
SED Records associated with a given SED Group. It is this indirect
linking of public identifiers to their Session Establishment Data
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that significantly improves the scalability and manageability of the
peering data. Additions and changes to SED information are reduced
to a single operation on a SED Group or SED Record , rather than
millions of data updates to individual public identifier records that
individually contain their peering data. The transport protocol MUST
support the ability to Create, Modify, Get, and Delete SED Groups
(refer the "Framework Operations" section of this document for a
generic description of various operations).
A SED Group object MUST be uniquely identified by attributes as
defined in the description of "ObjKeyType" in the section "Generic
Object Key Type" of this document.
The SedGrpType object structure is defined as follows:
The SedGrpType object is composed of the following elements:
o base: All first class objects extend BasicObjType (see
Section 5.1).
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o sedGrpName: The character string that contains the name of the SED
Group. It uniquely identifies this object within the context of
the Registrant ID (a child element of the base element as
described above).
o sedRecRef: Set of zero or more objects of type SedRecRefType that
house the unique keys of the SED Records (containing the session
establishment data) that the SedGrpType object refers to and their
relative priority within the context of this SED Group.
o dgName: Set of zero or more names of DestGrpType object instances.
Each dgName name, in association with this SED Group's Registrant
ID, uniquely identifies a DestGrpType object instance whose
associated public identifiers are reachable using the session
establishment information housed in this SED Group. An intended
side affect of this is that a SED Group cannot provide session
establishment information for a Destination Group belonging to
another Registrant.
o peeringOrg: Set of zero or more peering organization IDs that have
accepted an offer to receive this SED Group's information. Note
that this identifier "peeringOrg" is an instance of OrgIdType.
The set of peering organizations in this list is not directly
settable or modifiable using the addSedGrpsRqst operation. This
set is instead controlled using the SED offer and accept
operations.
o sourceIdent: Set of zero or more SourceIdentType object instances.
These objects, described further below, house the source
identification schemes and identifiers that are applied at
resolution time as part of source based routing algorithms for the
SED Group.
o isInSvc: A boolean element that defines whether this SED Group is
in service. The session establishment information contained in a
SED Group that is in service is a candidate for inclusion in
resolution responses for public identities residing in the
Destination Group associated with this SED Group. The session
establishment information contained in a SED Group that is not in
service is not a candidate for inclusion in resolution responses.
o priority: Priority value that can be used to provide a relative
value weighting of one SED Group over another. The manner in
which this value is used, perhaps in conjunction with other
factors, is a matter of policy.
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
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As described above, the SED Group contains a set of references to SED
record objects. A SED record object is based on an abstract type:
SedRecType. The concrete types that use SedRecType as an extension
base are NAPTRType, NSType, and URIType. The definitions of these
types are included the SED Record section of this document.
The SedGrpType object provides support for source-based routing via
the peeringOrg data element and more granular source base routing via
the source identity element. The source identity element provides
the ability to specify zero or more of the following in association
with a given SED Group: a regular expression that is matched against
the resolution client IP address, a regular expression that is
matched against the root domain name(s), and/or a regular expression
that is matched against the calling party URI(s). The result will be
that, after identifying the visible SED Groups whose associated
Destination Group(s) contain the lookup key being queried and whose
peeringOrg list contains the querying organizations organization ID,
the resolution server will evaluate the characteristics of the Source
URI, and Source IP address, and root domain of the lookup key being
queried. The resolution server then compares these criteria against
the source identity criteria associated with the SED Groups. The
session establishment information contained in SED Groups that have
source based routing criteria will only be included in the resolution
response if one or more of the criteria matches the source criteria
from the resolution request. The Source Identity data element is of
type SourceIdentType, whose structure is defined as follows:
The SourceIdentType object is composed of the following data
elements:
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o sourceIdentScheme: The source identification scheme that this
source identification criteria applies to and that the associated
sourceIdentRegex should be matched against.
o sourceIdentRegex: The regular expression that should be used to
test for a match against the portion of the resolution request
that is dictated by the associated sourceIdentScheme.
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
6.4. SED Record
SED Group represents a combined grouping of SED Records that define
session establishment information. However, SED Records need not be
created to just serve a single SED Group. SED Records can be created
and managed to serve multiple SED Groups. As a result, a change for
example to the properties of a network node used for multiple routes,
would necessitate just a single update operation to change the
properties of that node. The change would then be reflected in all
the SED Groups whose SED record set contains a reference to that
node. The transport protocol MUST support the ability to Create,
Modify, Get, and Delete SED Records (refer the "Framework Operations"
section of this document for a generic description of various
operations).
A SED Record object MUST be uniquely identified by attributes as
defined in the description of "ObjKeyType" in the section "Generic
Object Key Type" of this document.
The SedRecType object structure is defined as follows:
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The SedRecType object is composed of the following elements:
o base: All first class objects extend BasicObjType (see
Section 5.1).
o sedName: The character string that contains the name of the SED
Record. It uniquely identifies this object within the context of
the Registrant ID (a child element of the base element as
described above).
o sedFunction: As described in [RFC6461], SED or Session
Establishment Data falls primarily into one of two categories or
functions, LUF and LRF. To remove any ambiguity as to the
function a SED record is intended to provide, this optional
element allows the provisioning party to make his or her
intentions explicit.
o isInSvc: A boolean element that defines whether this SED Record is
in service or not. The session establishment information
contained in a SED Record which is in service is a candidate for
inclusion in resolution responses for Telephone Numbers that are
either directly associated to this SED Record, or for Public
Identities residing in a Destination Group that is associated to a
SED Group which in turn has an association to this SED Record.
o ttl: Number of seconds that an addressing server may cache a
particular SED Record.
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As described above, SED records are based on an abstract type:
SedRecType. The concrete types that use SedRecType as an extension
base are NAPTRType, NSType, and URIType. The definitions of these
types are included below. The NAPTRType object is comprised of the
data elements necessary for a NAPTR (see [RFC3403]that contains
routing information for a SED Group. The NSType object is comprised
of the data elements necessary for a DNS name server that points to
another DNS server that contains the desired routing information.
The NSType is relevant only when the resolution protocol is ENUM (see
[RFC3761]). The URIType object is comprised of the data elements
necessary to house a URI.
The data provisioned in a Registry can be leveraged for many purposes
and queried using various protocols including SIP, ENUM and others.
As such, the resolution data represented by the SED records must be
in a form suitable for transport using one of these protocols. In
the NAPTRType for example, if the URI is associated with a
destination group, the user part of the replacement string that
may require the Public Identifier cannot be preset. As a SIP
Redirect, the resolution server will apply pattern on the input
Public Identifier in the query and process the replacement string by
substituting any back reference(s) in the to arrive at the
final URI that is returned in the SIP Contact header. For an ENUM
query, the resolution server will simply return the values of the
and members of the URI.
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The NAPTRType object is composed of the following elements:
o order: Order value in an ENUM NAPTR, relative to other NAPTRType
objects in the same SED Group.
o svcs: ENUM service(s) that are served by the SBE. This field's
value must be of the form specified in [RFC6116] (e.g.,
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E2U+pstn:sip+sip). The allowable values are a matter of policy
and not limited by this protocol.
o regx: NAPTR's regular expression field. If this is not included
then the Repl field must be included.
o repl: NAPTR replacement field, should only be provided if the
Regex field is not provided, otherwise the server will ignore it
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
The NSType object is composed of the following elements:
o hostName: Root-relative host name of the name server.
o ipAddr: Zero or more objects of type IpAddrType. Each object
holds an IP Address and the IP Address type, IPv4 or IP v6.
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
The URIType object is composed of the following elements:
o ere: The POSIX Extended Regular Expression (ere) as defined in
[RFC3986].
o uri: the URI as defined in [RFC3986]. In some cases, this will
serve as the replacement string and it will be left to the
resolution server to arrive at the final usable URI.
6.5. SED Group Offer
The list of peer organizations whose resolution responses can include
the session establishment information contained in a given SED Group
is controlled by the organization to which a SED Group object belongs
(its Registrant), and the peer organization that submits resolution
requests (a data recipient, also know as a peering organization).
The Registrant offers access to a SED Group by submitting a SED Group
Offer. The data recipient can then accept or reject that offer. Not
until access to a SED Group has been offered and accepted will the
data recipient's organization ID be included in the peeringOrg list
in a SED Group object, and that SED Group's peering information
become a candidate for inclusion in the responses to the resolution
requests submitted by that data recipient. The transport protocol
MUST support the ability to Create, Modify, Get, Delete, Accept and
Reject SED Group Offers (refer the "Framework Operations" section of
this document for a generic description of various operations).
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A SED Group Offer object MUST be uniquely identified by attributes as
defined in the description of "SedGrpOfferKeyType" in the section
"Derived Object Key Types" of this document.
The SedGrpOfferType object structure is defined as follows:
-- Generic type that represents the key for a SED group offer. Must
be defined in concrete form in the transport specification. --
The SedGrpOfferType object is composed of the following elements:
o base: All first class objects extend BasicObjType (see
Section 5.1).
o sedGrpOfferKey: The object that identifies the SED that is or has
been offered and the organization that it is or has been offered
to.
o status: The status of the offer, offered or accepted. The server
controls the status. It is automatically set to "offered" when
ever a new SED Group Offer is added, and is automatically set to
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"accepted" if and when that offer is accepted. The value of the
element is ignored when passed in by the client.
o offerDateTime: Date and time in UTC when the SED Group Offer was
added.
o acceptDateTime: Date and time in UTC when the SED Group Offer was
accepted.
6.6. Egress Route
In a high-availability environment, the originating SSP likely has
more than one egress path to the ingress SBE of the target SSP. If
the originating SSP wants to exercise greater control and choose a
specific egress SBE to be associated to the target ingress SBE, it
can do so using the EgrRteType object.
An Egress Route object MUST be uniquely identified by attributes as
defined in the description of "ObjKeyType" in the section "Generic
Object Key Type" of this document.
Lets assume that the target SSP has offered as part of his session
establishment data, to share one or more ingress routes and that the
originating SSP has accepted the offer. In order to add the egress
route to the Registry, the originating SSP uses a valid regular
expression to rewrite ingress route in order to include the egress
SBE information. Also, more than one egress route can be associated
with a given ingress route in support of fault-tolerant
configurations. The supporting SPPF structure provides a way to
include route precedence information to help manage traffic to more
than one outbound egress SBE.
The transport protocol MUST support the ability to Add, Modify, Get,
and Delete Egress Routes (refer the "Framework Operations" section of
this document for a generic description of various operations). The
EgrRteType object structure is defined as follows:
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The EgrRteType object is composed of the following elements:
o base: All first class objects extend BasicObjType (see
Section 5.1).
o egrRteName: The name of the egress route.
o pref: The preference of this egress route relative to other egress
routes that may get selected when responding to a resolution
request.
o regxRewriteRule: The regular expression re-write rule that should
be applied to the regular expression of the ingress NAPTR(s) that
belong to the ingress route.
o ingrSedGrp: The ingress SED group that the egress route should be
used for.
o svcs: ENUM service(s) that are served by an Egress Route. This
element is used to identify the ingress NAPTRs associated with the
SED Group to which an Egress Route's regxRewriteRule should be
applied. If no ENUM service(s) are associated with an Egress
Route, then the Egress Route's regxRewriteRule should be applied
to all the NAPTRs associated with the SED Group. This field's
value must be of the form specified in [RFC6116] (e.g.,
E2U+pstn:sip+sip). The allowable values are a matter of policy
and not limited by this protocol.
o ext: Point of extensibility described in Section 3.3.
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7. Framework Operations
In addition to the operation specific object types, all operations
MAY specify the minor version of the protocol that when used in
conjunction with the major version (that can be for instance
specified in the protocol namespace) can serve to identify the
version of the SPPF protocol that the client is using. If the minor
version is not specified, the latest minor version supported by the
SPPF server for the given major version will be used. Additionally,
operations that may potentially modify persistent protocol objects
SHOULD include a transaction ID as well.
7.1. Add Operation
Any conforming transport protocol specification MUST provide a
definition for the operation that adds one or more SPPF objects into
the Registry. If the object, as identified by the request attributes
that form part of the object's key, does not exist, then the Registry
MUST create the object. If the object does exist, then the Registry
MUST replace the current properties of the object with the properties
passed in as part of the Add operation.
If the entity that issued the command is not authorized to perform
this operation an appropriate error message MUST be returned from
amongst the response messages defined in "Response Message Types"
section of the document.
7.2. Delete Operation
Any conforming transport protocol specification MUST provide a
definition for the operation that deletes one or more SPPF objects
from the Registry using the object's key.
If the entity that issued the command is not authorized to perform
this operation an appropriate error message MUST be returned from
amongst the response messages defined in "Response Message Types"
section of the document.
When an object is deleted, any references to that object must of
course also be removed as the SPPF server implementation fulfills the
deletion request. Furthermore, the deletion of a composite object
must also result in the deletion of the objects it contains. As a
result, the following rules apply to the deletion of SPPF object
types:
o Destination Groups: When a destination group is deleted any
references between that destination group and any SED group must
be automatically removed by the SPPF implementation as part of
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fulfilling the deletion request. Similarly, any references
between that destination group and any Public Identifier must be
removed by the SPPF implementation as part of fulfilling the
deletion request.
o SED Groups: When a SED group is deleted any references between
that SED group and any destination group must be automatically
removed by the SPPF implementation as part of fulfilling the
deletion request. Similarly any references between that SED group
and any SED records must be removed by the SPPF implementation as
part of fulfilling the deletion request. Furthermore, SED group
offers relating that SED group must also be deleted as part of
fulfilling the deletion request.
o SED Records: When a SED record is deleted any references between
that SED record and any SED group must be removed by the SPPF
implementation as part of fulfilling the deletion request.
Similarly, any reference between that SED record and any Public
Identifier must be removed by the SPPF implementation as part of
fulfilling the deletion request.
o Public Identifiers: When a public identifier is deleted any
references between that public identifier and any referenced
destination group must be removed by the SPPF implementation as
part of fulfilling the deletion request. Any references to SED
records associated directly to that Public Identifier must also be
deleted by the SPPF implementation as part of fulfilling the
deletion request.
7.3. Get Operations
At times, on behalf of the Registrant, the Registrar may need to get
information about SPPF objects that were previously provisioned in
the Registry. A few examples include logging, auditing, and pre-
provisioning dependency checking. This query mechanism is limited to
aid provisioning scenarios and should not be confused with query
protocols provided as part of the resolution system (e.g. ENUM and
SIP).
Any conforming "protocol" specification MUST provide a definition for
the operation that queries the details of one or more SPPF objects
from the Registry using the object's key. If the entity that issued
the command is not authorized to perform this operation an
appropriate error message MUST be returned from amongst the response
messages defined in Section 5.3.
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If the response to the Get operation includes object(s) that extend
the BasicObjType, the Registry MUST include the 'cDate' and 'mDate',
if applicable.
7.4. Accept Operations
In SPPF, a SED Group Offer can be accepted or rejected by, or on
behalf of, the Registrant to whom the SED Group has been offered
(refer "Framework Data Model Objects" section of this document for a
description of the SED Group Offer object). The Accept operation is
used to accept the SED Group Offers. Any conforming transport
protocol specification MUST provide a definition for the operation to
accept SED Group Offers by, or on behalf of the Registrant, using the
SED Group Offer object key.
Not until access to a SED Group has been offered and accepted will
the Registrant's organization ID be included in the peeringOrg list
in that SED Group object, and that SED Group's peering information
become a candidate for inclusion in the responses to the resolution
requests submitted by that Registrant. A SED Group Offer that is in
the "offered" status is accepted by, or on behalf of, the Registrant
to which it has been offered. When the SED Group Offer is accepted
the the SED Group Offer is moved to the "accepted" status and adds
that data recipient's organization ID into the list of peerOrgIds for
that SED Group.
If the entity that issued the command is not authorized to perform
this operation an appropriate error message MUST be returned from
amongst the response messages defined in "Response Message Types"
section of the document.
7.5. Reject Operations
In SPPF, a SED Group Offer object can be accepted or rejected by, or
on behalf of, the Registrant to whom the SED Group has been offered
(refer "Framework Data Model Objects" section of this document for a
description of the SED Group Offer object). Furthermore, that offer
may be rejected, regardless of whether or not it has been previously
accepted. The Reject operation is used to reject the SED Group
Offers. When the SED Group Offer is rejected that SED Group Offer is
deleted, and, if appropriate, the data recipient's organization ID is
removed from the list of peeringOrg IDs for that SED Group. Any
conforming transport protocol specification MUST provide a definition
for the operation to reject SED Group Offers by, or on behalf of the
Registrant, using the SED Group Offer object key.
If the entity that issued the command is not authorized to perform
this operation an appropriate error message MUST be returned from
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amongst the response messages defined in "Response Message Types"
section of the document.
7.6. Get Server Details Operation
In SPPF, Get Server Details operation can be used to request certain
details about the SPPF server that include the SPPF server's current
status, the major/minor version of the SPPF protocol supported by the
SPPF server.
Any conforming transport protocol specification MUST provide a
definition for the operation to request such details from the SPPF
server. If the entity that issued the command is not authorized to
perform this operation an appropriate error message MUST be returned
from amongst the response messages defined in "Response Message
Types" section of the document.
8. XML Considerations
XML serves as the encoding format for SPPF, allowing complex
hierarchical data to be expressed in a text format that can be read,
saved, and manipulated with both traditional text tools and tools
specific to XML.
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
character case presented to develop a conforming implementation.
This section discusses a small number of XML-related considerations
pertaining to SPPF.
8.1. Namespaces
All SPPF elements are defined in the namespaces in the IANA
Considerations section and in the Formal Framework Specification
section of this document.
8.2. Versioning and Character Encoding
All XML instances SHOULD begin with an declaration to
identify the version of XML that is being used, optionally identify
use of the character encoding used, and optionally provide a hint to
an XML parser that an external schema file is needed to validate the
XML instance.
Conformant XML parsers recognize both UTF-8 (defined in [RFC3629])
and UTF-16 (defined in [RFC2781]); per [RFC2277] UTF-8 is the
RECOMMENDED character encoding for use with SPPF.
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Character encodings other than UTF-8 and UTF-16 are allowed by XML.
UTF-8 is the default encoding assumed by XML in the absence of an
"encoding" attribute or a byte order mark (BOM); thus, the "encoding"
attribute in the XML declaration is OPTIONAL if UTF-8 encoding is
used. SPPF clients and servers MUST accept a UTF-8 BOM if present,
though emitting a UTF-8 BOM is NOT RECOMMENDED.
Example XML declarations:
9. Security Considerations
Many SPPF implementations manage data that is considered confidential
and critical. Furthermore, SPPF implementations can support
provisioning activities for multiple Registrars and Registrants. As
a result any SPPF implementation must address the requirements for
confidentiality, authentication, and authorization.
9.1. Confidentiality and Authentication
With respect to confidentiality and authentication, the transport
protocol requirements section of this document contains security
properties that the transport protocol must provide so that
authenticated endpoints can exchange data confidentially and with
integrity protection. Refer to that section and the resulting
transport protocol specification document for the specific solutions
to authentication and confidentiality.
9.2. Authorization
With respect to authorization, the SPPF server implementation must
define and implement a set of authorization rules that precisely
address (1) which Registrars will be authorized to create/modify/
delete each SPPF object type for given Registrant(s) and (2) which
Registrars will be authorized to view/get each SPPF object type for
given Registrant(s). These authorization rules are a matter of
policy and are not specified within the context of SPPF. However,
any SPPF implementation must specify these authorization rules in
order to function in a reliable and safe manner.
9.3. Denial of Service
Guidance on Denial-of-Service (DoS) issues in general is given in
[RFC4732], "Internet Denial of Service Considerations", which also
gives a general vocabulary for describing the DoS issue.
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SPPF is a high-level client-server protocol that can be implemented
on lower-level mechanisms such as remote procedure call and web-
service API protocols. As such, it inherits any Denial-of-Service
issues inherent to the specific lower-level mechanism used for any
implementation of SPPF. SPPF also has its own set of higher-level
exposures that are likely to be independent of lower-layer mechanism
choices.
9.3.1. DoS Issues Inherited from Transport Mechanism
SPPF implementation is in general dependent on the selection and
implementation of a lower-level transport protocol and a binding
between that protocol and SPPF. The archetypal SPPF implementation
uses XML (http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/) representation in a SOAP
(http://www.w3.org/TR/soap/) request/response framework over HTTP
([RFC2616]), and probably also uses TLS ([RFC5246]) for on-the wire
data integrity and participant authentication, and might use HTTP
Digest authentication ([RFC2609]).
The typical deployment scenario for SPPF is to have servers in a
managed facility, and therefore techniques such as Network Ingress
Filtering ([RFC2609]) are generally applicable. In short, any DoS
mechanism affecting a typical HTTP implementation would affect such
an SPPF implementation, and the mitigation tools for HTTP in general
also therefore apply to SPPF.
SPPF does not directly specify an authentication mechanism, instead
relying on the lower-level transport protocol to provide for
authentication. In general, authentication is an expensive
operation, and one apparent attack vector is to flood an SPPF server
with repeated requests for authentication, thereby exhausting its
resources. SPPF implementations SHOULD therefore be prepared to
handle authentication floods, perhaps by noting repeated failed login
requests from a given source address and blocking that source
address.
9.3.2. DoS Issues Specific to SPPF
The primary defense mechanism against DoS within SPPF is
authentication. Implementations MUST tightly control access to the
SPPF service, SHOULD implement DoS and other policy control
screening, and MAY employ a variety of policy violation reporting and
response measures such as automatic blocking of specific users and
alerting of operations personnel. In short, the primary SPPF
response to DoS-like activity by a user is to block that user or
subject their actions to additional review.
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SPPF allows a client to submit multiple-element or "batch" requests
that may insert or otherwise affect a large amount of data with a
single request. In the simplest case, the server progresses
sequentially through each element in a batch, completing one and
before starting the next. Mid-batch failures are handled by stopping
the batch and rolling-back the data store to its pre-request state.
This "stop and roll-back" design provides a DoS opportunity. A
hostile client could repeatedly issue large batch requests with one
or more failing elements, causing the server to repeatedly stop and
roll-back large transactions. The suggested response is to monitor
clients for such failures, and take administrative action (such as
blocking the user) when an excessive number of roll-backs is
reported.
An additional suggested response is for an implementer to set their
maximum allowable XML message size, and their maximum allowable batch
size at a level that they feel protects their operational instance,
given the hardware sizing they have in place and the expected load
and size needs that their users expect.
9.4. Information Disclosure
It is not uncommon for the logging systems to document on-the-wire
messages for various purposes, such as, debug, audit, and tracking.
At the minimum, the various support and administration staff will
have access to these logs. Also, if an unprivileged user gains
access to the SPPF deployments and/or support systems, it will have
access to the information that is potentially deemed confidential.
To manage information disclosure concerns beyond the transport level,
SPPF implementations MAY provide support for encryption at the SPPF
object level.
9.5. Non Repudiation
In some situations, it may be required to protect against denial of
involvement (see [RFC4949]) and tackle non-repudiation concerns in
regards to SPPF messages. This type of protection is useful to
satisfy authenticity concerns related to SPPF messages beyond the
end-to-end connection integrity, confidentiality, and authentication
protection that the transport layer provides. This is an optional
feature and some SPPF implementations MAY provide support for it.
9.6. Replay Attacks
Anti-replay protection ensures that a given SPPF object replayed at a
later time doesn't affect the integrity of the system. SPPF provides
at least one mechanism to fight against replay attacks. Use of the
optional client transaction identifier allows the SPPF client to
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correlate the request message with the response and to be sure that
it is not a replay of a server response from earlier exchanges. Use
of unique values for the client transaction identifier is highly
encouraged to avoid chance matches to a potential replay message.
9.7. Man in the Middle
The SPPF client or Registrar can be a separate entity acting on
behalf of the Registrant in facilitating provisioning transactions to
the Registry. Further, the transport layer provides end-to-end
connection protection between SPPF client and the SPPF server.
Therefore, man-in-the-middle attack is a possibility that may affect
the integrity of the data that belongs to the Registrant and/or
expose peer data to unintended actors in case well-established
peering relationships already exist.
10. Internationalization Considerations
Character encodings to be used for SPPF elements are described in
Section 8.2. The use of time elements in the protocol is specified
in Section 3.2. Where human-readable languages are used in the
protocol, those messages SHOULD be tagged according to [RFC5646], and
the transport protocol MUST support a respective mechanism to
transmit such tags together with those human-readable messages. If
tags are absent, the language of the message defaults to "en"
(English).
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. URN Assignments
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
conforming to a Registry mechanism described in [RFC3688].
Two URI assignments are requested.
Registration request for the SPPF XML namespace:
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:sppf:base:1
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:sppf:1
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: See the "Formal Specification" section of this document
(Section 12).
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11.2. Organization Identifier Namespace Registry
IANA is requested to create and maintain a Registry entitled "SPPF
OrgIdType Namespaces". Strings used as OrgIdType Namespace
identifiers MUST conform to the following syntax in the Augmented
Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC5234]
namespace = ALPHA * (ALPHA/DIGIT/"-")
Assignments consist of the OrgIdType namespace string, and the
definition of the associated namespace. This document makes the
following initial assignment for the OrgIdType Namespaces:
OrgIdType namespace string Namespace
-------------------------- ---------
IANA Enterprise Numbers iana-en
Future assignments are to be made through the well known IANA Policy
"RFC Required" (see section 4.1 of [RFC5226])
12. Formal Specification
This section provides the draft XML Schema Definition for SPPF
Protocol.
---- Generic Object key types to be defined by specific
Transport/Architecture. The types defined here can
be extended by the specific architecture to
define the Object Identifiers ----
---- Generic type that represents the
key for various objects in SPPF. ----
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---- Generic type that represents
the key for a SED group offer. ----
----Generic type that
represents the key
for a Pub Id. ----
---- Object Type Definitions ----
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---- Abstract Object and Element Type Definitions ----
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13. Acknowledgments
This document is a result of various discussions held in the DRINKS
working group and within the DRINKS protocol design team, with
contributions from the following individuals, in alphabetical order:
Alexander Mayrhofer, David Schwartz, Deborah A Guyton, Lisa
Dusseault, Manjul Maharishi, Mickael Marrache, Otmar Lendl, Richard
Shockey, Samuel Melloul, Sumanth Channabasappa, Syed Ali, Vikas
Bhatia, and Jeremy Barkan
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14. References
14.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
3986, January 2005.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC5067] Lind, S. and P. Pfautz, "Infrastructure ENUM
Requirements", RFC 5067, November 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
14.2. Informative References
[RFC2609] Guttman, E., Perkins, C., and J. Kempf, "Service Templates
and Service: Schemes", RFC 2609, June 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2781] Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO
10646", RFC 2781, February 2000.
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[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3403] Mealling, M., "Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS)
Part Three: The Domain Name System (DNS) Database", RFC
3403, October 2002.
[RFC3761] Faltstrom, P. and M. Mealling, "The E.164 to Uniform
Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation Discovery
System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)", RFC 3761, April 2004.
[RFC4725] Mayrhofer, A. and B. Hoeneisen, "ENUM Validation
Architecture", RFC 4725, November 2006.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[RFC5486] Malas, D. and D. Meyer, "Session Peering for Multimedia
Interconnect (SPEERMINT) Terminology", RFC 5486, March
2009.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
[RFC6116] Bradner, S., Conroy, L., and K. Fujiwara, "The E.164 to
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation
Discovery System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)", RFC 6116,
March 2011.
[RFC6461] Channabasappa, S., "Data for Reachability of Inter-/Intra-
NetworK SIP (DRINKS) Use Cases and Protocol Requirements",
RFC 6461, January 2012.
[Unicode6.1]
The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard - Version
6.1", Unicode 6.1, January 2012.
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Authors' Addresses
Kenneth Cartwright
TNS
1939 Roland Clarke Place
Reston, VA 20191
USA
Email: kcartwright@tnsi.com
Vikas Bhatia
TNS
1939 Roland Clarke Place
Reston, VA 20191
USA
Email: vbhatia@tnsi.com
Syed Wasim Ali
NeuStar
46000 Center Oak Plaza
Sterling, VA 20166
USA
Email: syed.ali@neustar.biz
David Schwartz
XConnect
316 Regents Park Road
London N3 2XJ
United Kingdom
Email: dschwartz@xconnect.net
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