| eppext | H. Ribbers |
| Internet-Draft | M. Groeneweg |
| Intended status: Standards Track | SIDN |
| Expires: December 31, 2015 | R. Gieben |
| A. Verschuren | |
| June 29, 2015 |
Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in [RFC5730].
This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2015.
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS-operator, which require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS-operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties or it is non-scalable and insecure.
One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC signed zones. We suggest that DNS-operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.
In this document we define an EPP extension to support and automate this transaction.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a conforming implementation.
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol.
Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name transfer is one of the phases in the lifecycle of a domain name [I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change].
DNS-operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining registrar.
The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each other (the ~ arrow in Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no trusted path between the two. As both can securely interact with the registry over the administrative channel through the registrar, the registry can act as a relay for the key material exchange.
The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore it is up to the losing DNS-operator to complete the intended transaction. The registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction, however this is beyond this I-D. This I-D focusses on the EPP protocol syntax.
+--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+
|gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^
| |
V |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| gaining registrar | | registrar of record |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^
EPP keyrelay | | EPP poll
V |
+-----------------------------+
| registry |
+-----------------------------+
Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC key material.
There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and DNS-operators, there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP server. Therefore the term EPP client will be used for the interaction with the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.
The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData> element.
The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:
The <expiry> element MUST contain one of the following child elements:
* <absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date and
time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a date
in the past is provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a
previously send key relay object.
* <relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date and
time until the end of the specified duration. If a negative period is
provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a previously send key
relay object.
A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay mapping.
EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check> to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to retrieve object transfer status information.
Check semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check> response.
Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> Command.
The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll response, as described in [RFC5730]. The key relay object created with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted into the receiving client’s poll queue. The receiving client will receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as described in [RFC5730].
When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child <keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following child elements:
o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731], Section 3.2.1).
o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1. A server MAY apply a server policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that can be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server MUST respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy violation".
o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of the submitted <create> command.
o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the client that requested the key relay.
o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.
Example <poll> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0" S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0" S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"> S: <response> S: <result code="1301"> S: <msg>Command completed successfully; ack to dequeue</msg> S: </result> S: <msgQ count="5" id="12345"> S: <qDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z</qDate> S: <msg>Keyrelay action completed successfully.</msg> S: </msgQ> S: <resData> S: <keyrelay:infData> S: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name> S: <keyrelay:authInfo> S: <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw> S: </keyrelay:authInfo> S: <keyrelay:keyRelayData> S: <keyrelay:keyData> S: <s:flags>256</s:flags> S: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol> S: <s:alg>8</s:alg> S: <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey> S: </keyrelay:keyData> S: <keyrelay:expiry> S: <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative> S: </keyrelay:expiry> S: </keyrelay:keyRelayData> S: <keyrelay:crDate> S: 1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z S: </keyrelay:crDate> S: <keyrelay:reID> S: ClientX S: </keyrelay:reID> S: <keyrelay:acID> S: ClientY S: </keyrelay:acID> S: </keyrelay:infData> S: </resData> S: <trID> S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID> S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID> S: </trID> S: </response> S:</epp>
Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command.
EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object, <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to change information associated with an object.
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the key relay info response (See Section 3.1.2), in the receiving client’s poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the provided domain name.
In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create> command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains the following child elements:
o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> element containing data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1
Example <create> commands:
Note that in the provided example the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData> element had a negative period and thus represents the revocation of a previouly send key relay object (see Section 2.1.1).
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0" C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0" C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"> C: <command> C: <create> C: <keyrelay:create> C: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name> C: <keyrelay:authInfo> C: <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw> C: </keyrelay:authInfo> C: <keyrelay:keyRelayData> C: <keyrelay:keyData> C: <s:flags>256</s:flags> C: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol> C: <s:alg>8</s:alg> C: <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey> C: </keyrelay:keyData> C: <keyrelay:expiry> C: <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative> C: </keyrelay:expiry> C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData> C: <keyrelay:keyRelayData> C: <keyrelay:keyData> C: <s:flags>256</s:flags> C: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol> C: <s:alg>8</s:alg> C: <s:pubKey>bWFyY2lzdGhlYmVzdA==</s:pubKey> C: </keyrelay:keyData> C: <keyrelay:expiry> C: <keyrelay:relative>-P1D</keyrelay:relative> C: </keyrelay:expiry> C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData> C: </keyrelay:create> C: </create> C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID> C: </command> C:</epp>
When a server has succesfully processed the <create> command it MUST respond with a standard EPP response. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"> S: <response> S: <result code="1000"> S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg> S: </result> S: <trID> S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID> S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID> S: </trID> S: </response> S:</epp>
When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server policy it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support keyrelay transactions. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"> S: <response> S: <result code="2308"> S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg> S: </result> S: <trID> S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID> S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID> S: </trID> S: </response> S:</epp>
Delete semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <delete> command and the EPP <delete> response.
Renew semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <renew> command and the EPP <renew> response.
Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command and the EPP <transfer> response.
Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update> response.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:epp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol
extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
schemaLocation="epp-1.0.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
schemaLocation="eppcom-1.0.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
schemaLocation="secdns-1.1.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
schemaLocation="domain-1.0.xsd" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
<element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" />
<element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" />
<complexType name="createType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="infDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="crDate" type="dateTime"/>
<element name="reID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
<element name="acID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType" />
<element name="expiry" type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType" minOccurs="0" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayExpiryType">
<choice>
<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
<element name="relative" type="duration" />
</choice>
</complexType>
</schema>
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI assignment is requested of IANA:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document.
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
The EPP extension described in this document should be registered by the IANA in the EPP Extension Registry described in [RFC7451]. The details of the registration are as follows:
Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol"
Document status: Standards Track
Reference: (insert reference to RFC version of this document)
Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org
TLDs: Any
IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2393/
Status: Active
Notes: None
A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command.
Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial of service attack. However this can, and SHOULD be detected by the server. A server MAY set a server policy which limits or rejects a <keyrelay:create> command if it detects the mechanism is being abused.
For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data a correct <domain:authInfo> element SHOULD be used as an indication that putting the key material on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the registrant of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients to perform DNS changes is not covered in this I-D as it depends on registry specific policy.
We like to thank the following individuals for their valuable input, review, constructive criticism in earlier revisions or support for the concepts described in this document:
Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal, Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser and Kees Monshouwer.
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC3688] | Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, January 2004. |
| [RFC5730] | Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009. |
| [RFC5731] | Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009. |
| [RFC5910] | Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910, May 2010. |
| [RFC7451] | Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, February 2015. |
| [I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change] | Koch, P., Sanz, M. and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", Internet-Draft draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-06, February 2014. |
[This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publishing]