| HOMENET | D. Migault (Ed) |
| Internet-Draft | Ericsson |
| Intended status: Standards Track | W. Cloetens |
| Expires: August 21, 2015 | SoftAtHome |
| C. Griffiths | |
| Dyn | |
| R. Weber | |
| Nominum | |
| February 17, 2015 |
DHCP Options for Homenet Naming Architecture
draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options-01.txt
CPEs are usually constraint devices with reduced network and CPU capacities. As such, a CPE hosting on the Internet the authoritative naming service for its home network may become vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks. One way to avoid exposing CPE is to outsource the authoritative service to a third party. This third party can be the ISP or any other independent third party.
Outsourcing the authoritative naming service to a third party requires setting up an architecture which may be unappropriated for most end users. To leverage this issue, this document proposes DHCP Options so any agnostic CPE can automatically proceed to the appropriated configuration and outsource the authoritative naming service for the home network. This document shows that in most cases, these DHCP Options make outsourcing to a third party (be it the ISP or any ISP independent service provider) transparent for the end user.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 21, 2015.
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
CPEs are usually constraint devices with reduced network and CPU capacities. As such, a CPE hosting on the Internet the authoritative naming service for its home network may become vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks. One way to avoid exposing CPE is to outsource the authoritative service to a third party. This third party can be the ISP or any other independent third party.
Outsourcing the authoritative naming service to a third party requires setting up an architecture which may be unappropriated for most end users. To leverage this issue, this document proposes DHCP Options so any agnostic CPE can automatically proceed to the appropriated configuration and outsource the authoritative naming service for the home network. This document shows that in most cases, these DHCP Options make outsourcing to a third party (be it the ISP or any ISP independent service provider) transparent for the end user.
When the CPE is plugged, the DHCP Options described in the document enable the CPE:
As a result, the DHCP Options described in this document enable an agnostic CPE to outsource its naming infrastructure without any configuration from the end user. The main reason no configuration is required by the end user is that there are privileged links: first between the CPE and the DHCP Server and then between the DHCP Server and the various DNS servers (DNS Homenet Zone Server, the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set, Public Authoritative Name Server Set). This enables the CPE to send its authentication credentials (a Public Key) to the DHCP Server that in turn forward it to the various DNS servers. With the authentication credential on the DNS servers set, the CPE is able to update the various zones in a secure way.
If the DHCP Server cannot provide the public key to one of these servers (most likely the Public Authoritative Name Server Set) and the CPE needs to interact with the server, then, the end user is expected to provide the CPE's public key to these servers (the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set or the Public Authoritative Name Server Set) either manually or using other mechanisms. Such mechanisms are outside the scope of this document. In that case, the authentication credentials need to be provided every time the key is modified. Appendix A provides more details on how different scenarios impact the end users.
The remaining of this document is as follows. Section 4 provides an overview of the DHCP Options as well as the expected interactions between the CPE and the various involved entities. This section also provides an overview of available mechanisms to secure DNS transactions and update DNS Data. Section 5 describes how the CPE may securely synchronize and update DNS data. Section 6 describes the payload of the DHCP Options and Section 7 details how DHCP Client DHCP Server and DHCP Relay behave. Section 8 lists the new parameters to be registered at the IANA, Section 9 provides security considerations. Finally, Appendix A describes how the CPE may behave and be configured regarding various scenarios.
This section provides an overview of the how the CPE is expect to interact with various entities, as well as how the CPE is expected to be configured via DHCP Options. Section 4.1 describes the entities the CPE is expected to interact with. Interaction with each entities is defined via DHCP Options that are expected to configure the CPE. Once configured, the CPE is expected to be able to update some DNS Data hosted by the different entities. As a result security and updating mechanisms play an important role in the specification. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the different security mechanisms considered for securing the CPE transactions and Section 4.3 considers the different update mechanisms considered for the CPE to update the DNS Data.
This section illustrates how a CPE configures its naming infrastructure to outsource its authoritative naming service. All configurations and settings are performed using DHCP Options. This section, for the sake of simplicity, assumes that the DHCP Server is able to communicate to the various DNS servers and to provide them the public key associated to the CPE. Once each server got the public key, the CPE can proceed to updates in a authenticated and secure way.
This scenario has been chosen as it is believed to be the most popular scenario. This document does not ignore that scenarios where the DHCP Server does not have privileged relations with the Public Authoritative Name Server Set must be considered. These cases are discussed latter in Appendix A. Such scenario does not necessarily require configuration for the end user and can also be Zero Config.
The scenario is represented in Figure 1.
+----------------------+
| DHCP Server |
+----------------------+
^ ^ ^
| | |2.
1.| |3. |
v v |
+------+ | +--------------------------------+
| | 4. +--->| DNS Template Server |
| |<---------->| |
| | | +--------------------------------+
| CPE | |
| | | +--------------------------------+
| | 5./6. +--->| Reverse Public Authoritative |
| |<---------->| Name Server Set |
| | | +--------------------------------+
-------| |-------|--------------------------------------
| | | +--------------------------------+
+------+ +--->| Public Authoritative |
| Name Server Set |
+--------------------------------+
Figure 1: Protocol Overview
As described above, the CPE is likely to interact with various DNS content. This section is focused on DNS Data the CPE is likely to update. More specifically, the CPE is likely to update the:
In fact, the CPE must be able to perform these updates in a secure manner. There are multiple ways to secure a DNS transaction and this document considers two mechanisms to update a DNS Data (nsupdate and master/slave synchronization). Which security mechanism to use to secure a DNS transaction depends on the expected security (authentication of the authoritative server, mutual authentication, confidentiality...). The expected security may also depends on the kind of transaction performed by the CPE. Section 4.2 describes the different security mechanisms considered in the document as well as their respective goals. Which mechanism to use to update the DNS Data depends on the kind of update. Frequency of the update, size of the DNS Data to update may be some useful criteria. Section 4.3 positions the nsupdate and master/slave synchronization mechanisms.
Multiple protocols like IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS / DTLS [RFC5246] / [RFC6347] may be used to secure DNS transactions between the CPE and the DNS servers. This document restricts the scope of security protocols to those that have been designed specifically for DNS. This includes DNSSEC [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035] that authenticates and provides integrity protection of DNS data, TSIG [RFC2845], [RFC2930] that use a shared secret to secure a transaction between two end points and SIG(0) [RFC2931] authenticates the DNS packet exchanged.
The key issue with TSIG is that a shared secret must be negotiated between the CPE and the server. On the other hand, TSIG performs symmetric cryptography which is light in comparison with asymmetric cryptography used by SIG(0). As a result, over large zone transfer, TSIG may be preferred to SIG(0).
This document does not provides means to distribute shared secret for example using a specific DHCP Option. The only assumption made is that the CPE generates or is assigned a public key.
As a result, when the document specifies the transaction is secured with TSIG, it means that either the CPE and the DNS Server have been manually configured with a shared secret, or the shared secret has been negotiated using TKEY [RFC2930], and the TKEY exchanged are secured with SIG(0).
Exchange with the DNS Template Server to retrieve the DNS Homenet Zone Template may be protected by SIG(0), TSIG or DNSSEC. When DNSSEC is used, it means the DNS Template Server only provides integrity protection, and does not necessarily prevents someone else to query the DNS Homenet Zone Template. In addition, DNSSEC is only a way to protect the AXFR queries transaction, in other words, DNSSEC cannot be used to secure updates. If DNSSEC is used to provide integrity protection for the AXFR response, the CPE should proceed to the DNSSEC signature checks. If signature check fails, it MUST reject the response. If the signature check succeeds, the CPE removes all DNSSEC related RRsets (DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC* ...) before building the DNS Homenet Zone. In fact, these DNSSEC related fields are associated to the DNS Homenet Zone Template and not the DNS Homenet Zone.
Any update exchange should use SIG(0) or TSIG to authenticate the exchange.
As updates only concern DNS zones, this document only considers DNS update mechanisms such as DNS update [RFC2136] [RFC3007] or a master / slave synchronization.
The DNS Homenet Zone Template can only be updated with DNS update. The reason is that the DNS Homenet Zone Template contains static configuration data that is not expected to evolve over time.
The DNS Homenet Reverse Zone and the DNS Homenet Zone can be updated either with DNS update or using a master / slave synchronization. As these zones may be large, with frequent updates, we recommend to use the master / slave architecture as described in [I-D.ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation]. The master / slave mechanism is preferred as it better scales and avoids DoS attacks: First the master notifies the slave the zone must be updated, and leaves the slave to proceed to the update when possible. Then, the NOTIFY message sent by the master is a small packet that is less likely to load the slave. At last, the AXFR query performed by the slave is a small packet sent over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]) which makes unlikely the slave to perform reflection attacks with a forged NOTIFY. On the other hand, DNS updates can use UDP, packets require more processing then a NOTIFY, and they do not provide the server the opportunity to post-pone the update.
The master / slave architecture is described in [I-D.ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation]. The CPE is configured as a master whereas the DNS Server is configured as a slave. The DNS Server represents the Public Authoritative Name Server Set or the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set.
When the CPE is plugged its IP address may be unknown to the slave. The section details how the CPE or master communicate the necessary information to set up the slave.
In order to set the master / slave configuration, both master and slaves must agree on 1) the zone to be synchronized, 2) the IP address and ports used by both master and slave.
The CPE knows the zone to be synchronized by reading the Registered Homenet Domain in the DNS Homenet Zone Template provided by the DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION_DNS_ZONE_TEMPLATE). The IP address of the slave is provided by the DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION_NAME_SERVER_SET).
The Public Authoritative Name Server Set has been configured with the Registered Homenet Domain and the Public Key that identifies the CPE. The only thing missing is the IP address of the CPE. This IP address is provided by the CPE by sending a NOTIFY [RFC1996].
When the CPE has built its DNS Homenet Zone, it sends a NOTIFY message to the Public Authoritative Name Server Sets. Upon receiving the NOTIFY message, the slave reads the Registered Homenet Domain and checks the NOTIFY is sent by the authorized master. This can be done using the shared secret (TSIG) or the public key (SIG(0)). Once the NOTIFY has been authenticated, the Public Authoritative Name Server Sets might consider the source IP address of the NOTIFY query to configure the masters attributes.
The CPE knows the zone to be synchronized by looking at its assigned prefix. The IP address of the slave is provided by the DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION_REVERSE_NAME_SERVER_SET).
Configuration of the slave is performed as illustrated in Section 5.1.1.
The DNS Homenet Zone Template contains at least the related fields of the Public Authoritative Master(s) as well as the Homenet Registered Domain, that is SOA, and NS fields. This template might be generated automatically by the owner of the DHCP Server. For example, an ISP might provide a default Homenet Registered Domain as well as default Public Authoritative Master(s). This default settings should provide the CPE the necessary pieces of information to set the homenet naming architecture.
If the DNS Homenet Zone Template is not subject to modifications or updates, the owner of the template might only use DNSSEC to enable integrity check.
The DNS Homenet Zone Template might be subject to modification by the CPE. The advantage of using the standard DNS zone format is that standard DNS update mechanism can be used to perform updates. These updates might be accepted or rejected by the owner of the DNS Homenet Zone Template. Policies that defines what is accepted or rejected is out of scope of this document. However, in this document we assume the Registered Homenet Domain is used as an index by the Public Authoritative Name Server Set, and SIG(0), TSIG are used to authenticate the CPE. As a result, the Registered Homenet Domain should not be modified unless the Public Authoritative Name Server Set can handle with it.
The DNS Homenet Zone might be generated from the DNS Homenet Zone Template. How the DNS Homenet Zone is generated is out of scope of this document. In some cases, the DNS Homenet Zone might be the exact copy of the DNS Homenet Zone Template. In other cases, it might be generated from the DNS Homenet Zone Template with additional RRsets. In some other cases, the DNS Homenet Zone might be generated without considering the DNS Homenet Zone Template, but only considering specific configuration rules.
In the current document the CPE only sets a single zone that is associated with one single Homenet Registered Domain. The domain might be assigned by the owner of the DNS Homenet Zone Template. This constrain does not prevent the CPE to use multiple domain names. How additional domains are considered is out of scope of this document. One way to handle these additional zones is to configure static redirections to the DNS Homenet Zone using CNAME [RFC2181], [RFC1034], DNAME [RFC6672] or CNAME+DNAME [I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname].
This section details the payload of the DHCP Options. A few DHCP Options are used to advertise a server the CPE may be expect to interact with. Interaction may require to define how the update is expected to be performed as well as how the communication is secured. Security and Update are shared by multiple DHCP Options and are described in separate sections. Section 6.1 describes the security field, Section 6.2 describes the update fields, the remaining sections Section 6.3, Section 6.4, Section 6.5, Section 6.6 describe the DHCP Options.
The Security Field of the DHCP Option is represented in Figure 2. It indicates the security mechanism supported by the DNS Server. One of these mechanism MUST be chosen by the CPE in order to perform a transaction with the DNS server. See Section 4.2 for more details.
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Security Field
A Security field with all bits set to zero indicates the operation is not permitted. The Security field may be set to zero when updates operations are not permitted for the DNS Homenet Template. In any other case this is an error.
The Update Field of the DHCP Option is represented in Figure 3. It indicates the update mechanism supported by the DNS server. See Section 4.3 for more details.
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Update |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Update Field
The DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION_PUBLIC_KEY) indicates the Public Key that is used to authenticate the CPE.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_PUBLIC_KEY | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Public Key Data /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: DHCP Public Key Option
The DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION_DNS_ZONE_TEMPLATE) Option indicates the CPE how to retrieve the DNS Homenet Zone Template. It provides a FQDN the CPE SHOULD query with a DNS query of type AXFR. The option also specifies which security protocols are available on the authoritative server. DNS Homenet Zone Template update, if permitted MUST use the DNS Update mechanism.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_DNS_ZONE_TEMPLATE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security (axfr) | Security |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Zone Template FQDN /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: DHCP Zone Template Option
The DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION_NAME_SERVER_SET) provides information so the CPE can upload the DNS Homenet Zone to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. Finally, the option provides the security mechanisms that are available to perform the upload. The upload is performed via a DNS master / slave architecture or DNS updates.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_NAME_SERVER_SET | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security | Update | Server /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
/ Public Authoritative Name Server Set FQDN /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option
The DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION_REVERSE_NAME_SERVER_SET) provides information so the CPE can upload the DNS Homenet Zone to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. The option provides the security mechanisms that are available to perform the upload. The upload is performed via a DNS master / slave architecture or DNS updates.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_REVERSE_NAME_SERVER_SET| option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security | Update | Server /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
/ Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set FQDN /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option
The DHCP Server sends the DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION_DNS_ZONE_TEMPLATE), DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION_NAME_SERVER_SET), DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION_REVERSE_NAME_SERVER_SET) upon request by the DHCP Client.
The DHCP Server MAY receive a DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION_PUBLIC_KEY) from the CPE. Upon receipt of this DHCP Option, the DHCP Sever is expect to communicate this credential to the available DNS Servers like the DNS Template Server, the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set.
The DHCP Client MAY send a DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION_PUBLIC_KEY) to the DHCP Server. This Public Key authenticates the CPE.
The DHCP Client sends a DHCP Option Request Option (ORO) with the necessary DHCP options.
A CPE SHOULD only send the an ORO request for DHCP Options it needs or for information that needs to be up-to-date.
Upon receiving a DHCP option described in this document, the CPE SHOULD retrieve or update DNS zones using the associated security and update protocols.
DHCP Relay behavior are not modified by this document.
The DHCP options detailed in this document is:
It is recommended that the (Reverse) DNS Homenet Zone is signed with DNSSEC. The zone may be signed by the CPE or by a third party. We recommend the zone to be signed by the CPE, and that the signed zone is uploaded.
The document considers that the channel between the CPE and the ISP DHCP Server is trusted. More specifically, the CPE is authenticated and the exchanged messages are protected. The current document does not specify how to secure the channel. [RFC3315] proposes a DHCP authentication and message exchange protection, [RFC4301], [RFC7296] propose to secure the channel at the IP layer.
In fact, the channel MUST be secured because the CPE provides authentication credentials. Unsecured channel may result in CPE impersonation attacks.
CPE have not been designed for handling heavy load. The CPE are exposed on the Internet, and their IP address is publicly published on the Internet via the DNS. This makes the Home Network sensitive to Deny of Service Attacks. The resulting outsourcing architecture is described in [I-D.ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation]. This document shows how the outsourcing architecture can be automatically set.
We would like to thank Tomasz Mrugalski, Marcin Siodelski and Bernie Volz for their comments on the design of the DHCP Options. We would also like to thank Mark Andrews, Andrew Sullivan and Lorenzo Colliti for their remarks on the architecture design. The designed solution has been largely been inspired by Mark Andrews's document [I-D.andrews-dnsop-pd-reverse] as well as discussions with Mark.
| [I-D.andrews-dnsop-pd-reverse] | Andrews, M., "Automated Delegation of IP6.ARPA reverse zones with Prefix Delegation", Internet-Draft draft-andrews-dnsop-pd-reverse-02, November 2013. |
| [I-D.ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation] | Migault, D., Cloetens, W., Griffiths, C. and R. Weber, "Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-00, September 2014. |
| [I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname] | Sury, O., "CNAME+DNAME Name Redirection", Internet-Draft draft-sury-dnsext-cname-dname-00, April 2010. |
This section details various scenarios and discuss their impact on the end user.
The base scenario is the one described in Section 4. It is typically the one of an ISP that manages the DHCP Server, and all DNS servers.
The end user subscribes to the ISP (foo), and at subscription time registers for example.foo as its Registered Homenet Domain example.foo. Since the ISP knows the Registered Homenet Domain and the Public Authoritative Master(s) the ISP is able to build the DNS Homenet Zone Template.
The ISP manages the DNS Template Server, so it is able to load the DNS Homenet Zone Template on the DNS Template Server.
When the CPE is plugged (at least the first time), it provides its Public Key to the DHCP Server. In this scenario, the DHCP Server and the DNS Servers are managed by the ISP so the DHCP Server can provide authentication credentials of the CPE to enable secure authenticated transaction between the CPE and these DNS servers. More specifically, credentials are provided to:
The CPE can update the zone using DNS update or a master / slave configuration in a secure way.
The main advantage of this scenario is that the naming architecture is configured automatically and transparently for the end user.
The drawbacks are that the end user uses a Registered Homenet Domain managed by the ISP and that it relies on the ISP naming infrastructure.
This section considers the case when the end user wants its home network to use example.com as a Registered Homenet Domain instead of example.foo that has been assigned by the ISP. We also suppose that example.com is not managed by the ISP.
This can also be achieved without any configuration. When the end user buys the domain name example.com, it may request to redirect the name example.com to example.foo using static redirection with CNAME [RFC2181], [RFC1034], DNAME [RFC6672] or CNAME+DNAME [I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname].
This configuration is performed once when the domain name example.com is registered. The only information the end user needs to know is the domain name assigned by the ISP. Once this configuration is done no additional configuration is needed anymore. More specifically, the CPE may be changed, the zone can be updated as in Appendix A.1 without any additional configuration from the end user.
The main advantage of this scenario is that the end user benefits from the Zero Configuration of the Base Scenario Appendix A.1. Then, the end user is able to register for its home network an unlimited number of domain names provided by an unlimited number of different third party providers.
The drawback of this scenario may be that the end user still rely on the ISP naming infrastructure. Note that the only case this may be inconvenient is when the DNS Servers provided by the ISPs results in high latency.
This scenario considers that the end user uses example.com as a Registered Homenet Domain, and does not want to rely on the authoritative servers provided by the ISP.
In this section we limit the outsourcing to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Authoritative Master(s) to a third party. All other DNS Servers DNS Template Server, Reverse Public Authoritative Master(s) and Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set remain managed by the ISP. The reason we consider that Reverse Public Authoritative Masters(s) and Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set remains managed by the ISP are that the prefix is managed by the ISP, so outsourcing these resources requires some redirection agreement with the ISP. More specifically the ISP will need to configure the redirection on one of its Reverse DNS Servers. That said, outsourcing these resources is similar as outsourcing Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Authoritative Master(s) to a third party. Similarly, the DNS Template Server can be easily outsourced as detailed in this section
Outsourcing Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Authoritative Master(s) requires:
The main advantage of this scenario is that the DNS infrastructure is completely outsourced to the third party. Most likely the Public Key that authenticate the CPE need to be configured for every CPE. Configuration is expected to be CPE live-long.
This scenario considers a CPE connected to multiple ISPs.
Firstly, suppose the CPE has been configured with the based scenarios exposed in Appendix A.1. The CPE has multiple interfaces, one for each ISP, and each of these interface is configured using DHCP. The CPE sends to each ISP its DHCP Public Key Option as well as a request for a DHCP Zone Template Option, a DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option and a DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option. Each ISP provides the requested DHCP options, with different values. Note that this scenario assumes, the home network has a different Registered Homenet Domain for each ISP as it is managed by the ISP. On the other hand, the CPE Public Key may be shared between the CPE and the multiple ISPs. The CPE builds the associate DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone, and proceeds to the various settings as described in Appendix A.1.
The protocol and DHCP Options described in this document are fully compatible with a CPE connected to multiple ISPs with multiple Registered Homenet Domains. However, the CPE should be able to handle different Registered Homenet Domains. This is an implementation issue which is outside the scope of the current document. More specifically, multiple Registered Homenet Domains leads to multiple DNS(SEC) Homenet Zones. A basic implementation may erase the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone that exists when it receives DHCP Options, and rebuild everything from scratch. This will work for an initial configuration but comes with a few drawbacks. First, updates to the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone may only push to one of the multiple Registered Homenet Domain, the latest Registered Homenet Domain that has been set, and this is most likely expected to be almost randomly chosen as it may depend on the latency on each ISP network at the boot time. As a results, this leads to unsynchronized Registered Homenet Domains. Secondly, if the CPE handles in some ways resolution, only the latest Registered Homenet Domain set may be able to provide naming resolution in case of network disruption.
Secondly, suppose the CPE is connected to multiple ISP with a single Registered Homenet Domain. In this case, the one party is chosen to host the Registered Homenet Domain. This entity may be one of the ISP or a third party. Note that having multiple ISPs can be motivated for bandwidth aggregation, or connectivity fail-over. In the case of connectivity fail-over, the fail-over concerns the access network and a failure of the access network may not impact the core network where the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Masters are hosted. In that sense, choosing one of the ISP even in a scenario of multiple ISPs may make sense. However, for sake of simplicity, this scenario assumes that a third party has be chosen to host the Registered Homenet Domain. The DNS settings for each ISP is described in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3. With the configuration described in Appendix A.2, the CPE is expect to be able to handle multiple Homenet Registered Domain, as the third party redirect to one of the ISPs Servers. With the configuration described in Appendix A.3, DNS zone are hosted and maintained by the third party. A single DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone is built and maintained by the CPE. This latter configuration is likely to match most CPE implementations.
The protocol and DHCP Options described in this document are fully compatible with a CPE connected to multiple ISPs. To configure or not and how to configure the CPE depends on the CPE facilities. Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 require the CPE to handle multiple Registered Homenet Domain, whereas Appendix A.3 does not have such requirement.
[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]
-04: Working Version Major modifications are:
-03: Working Version Major modifications are:
-02: Working Version Major modifications are:
-01: Working Version Major modifications are:
-00: version published in the homenet WG. Major modifications are:
-00: First version published in dhc WG.