| JOSE Working Group | M.B. Jones |
| Internet-Draft | Microsoft |
| Intended status: Standards Track | J. Bradley |
| Expires: October 28, 2013 | Ping Identity |
| N. Sakimura | |
| NRI | |
| April 26, 2013 |
JSON Web Signature (JWS)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-10
JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a means of representing content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.
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JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a compact format for representing content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and URI query parameters. It represents this content using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data structures. The JWS cryptographic mechanisms provide integrity protection for arbitrary sequences of octets.
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].
JWS represents digitally signed or MACed content using JSON data structures and base64url encoding. Three values are represented in a JWS: the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature. In the Compact Serialization, the three values are base64url-encoded for transmission, and represented as the concatenation of the encoded strings in that order, with the three strings being separated by two period ('.') characters. A JSON Serialization for this information is also defined in Section 7.
The JWS Header describes the signature or MAC method and parameters employed. The JWS Payload is the message content to be secured. The JWS Signature ensures the integrity of both the JWS Header and the JWS Payload.
The following example JWS Header declares that the encoded object is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Header and the JWS Payload are secured using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm:
{"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"}
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The following is an example of a JSON object that can be used as a JWS Payload. (Note that the payload can be any content, and need not be a representation of a JSON object.)
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object yields the following Encoded JWS Payload (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Computing the HMAC of the octets of the ASCII [USASCII] representation of the JWS Signing Input (the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload) with the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm using the key specified in Appendix A.1 and base64url encoding the result yields this Encoded JWS Signature value:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
This computation is illustrated in more detail in Appendix A.1.
The members of the JSON object represented by the JWS Header describe the digital signature or MAC applied to the Encoded JWS Header and the Encoded JWS Payload and optionally additional properties of the JWS. The Header Parameter Names within this object MUST be unique; JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be rejected.
Implementations are required to understand the specific header parameters defined by this specification that are designated as "MUST be understood" and process them in the manner defined in this specification. All other header parameters defined by this specification that are not so designated MUST be ignored when not understood. Unless listed as a critical header parameter, per Section 4.1.10, all other header parameters MUST be ignored when not understood.
There are three classes of Header Parameter Names: Reserved Header Parameter Names, Public Header Parameter Names, and Private Header Parameter Names.
The following Header Parameter Names are reserved with meanings as defined below. All the names are short because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations using the JWS Compact Serialization to be compact.
Additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry Section 9.1. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.
The alg (algorithm) header parameter identifies the cryptographic algorithm used to secure the JWS. The algorithm specified by the alg value MUST be supported by the implementation and there MUST be a key for use with that algorithm associated with the party that digitally signed or MACed the content or the JWS MUST be rejected. alg values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA] or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. The alg value is a case sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value. Use of this header parameter is REQUIRED. This header parameter MUST be understood by implementations.
A list of defined alg values can be found in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values defined in Section 3.1 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
The jku (JWK Set URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers to a resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of which corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The keys MUST be encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) [JWK]. The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
The jwk (JSON Web Key) header parameter is the public key that corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. This key is represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK]. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
The x5u (X.509 URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers to a resource for the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280] in PEM encoded form [RFC1421]. The certificate containing the public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the previous one. The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
The x5t (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) header parameter provides a base64url encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example, it is suggested that a new x5t#S256 (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined by registering it in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry Section 9.1.
The x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter contains the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The certificate or certificate chain is represented as an array of certificate value strings. Each string is a base64 encoded ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER [ITU.X690.1994] PKIX certificate value. The certificate containing the public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the previous one. The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] and reject the JWS if any validation failure occurs. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
See Appendix B for an example x5c value.
The kid (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key was used to secure the JWS. This parameter allows originators to explicitly signal a change of key to recipients. Should the recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the kid value, they SHOULD treat that condition as an error. The interpretation of the kid value is unspecified. Its value MUST be a string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
When used with a JWK, the kid value can be used to match a JWK kid parameter value.
The typ (type) header parameter is used to declare the type of this object. The type value JWS is used to indicate that this object is a JWS using the JWS Compact Serialization. The type value JWS-JS is used to indicate that this object is a JWS using the JWS JSON Serialization. The typ value is a case sensitive string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MAY be used as typ values.
typ values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry Section 9.2 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
The cty (content type) header parameter is used to declare the type of the secured content (the Payload). For example, the JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] specification uses the cty value JWT to indicate that the Payload is a JSON Web Token (JWT). The cty value is a case sensitive string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
The values used for the cty header parameter come from the same value space as the typ header parameter, with the same rules applying.
The crit (critical) header parameter is array listing the names of header parameters that are present in the JWS Header that MUST be understood and processed by the implementation or if not understood, MUST cause the JWS to be rejected. This list MUST NOT include header parameters defined by this specification, duplicate names, or names that do not occur as header parameters within the JWS. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL. This header parameter MUST be understood by implementations.
An example use, along with a hypothetical exp (expiration-time) field is:
{"alg":"ES256",
"crit":["exp"],
"exp":1363284000
}
Additional Header Parameter Names can be defined by those using JWSs. However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter Name SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry Section 9.1 or be a Public Name: a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In each case, the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable precautions to make sure they are in control of the part of the namespace they use to define the Header Parameter Name.
New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can result in non-interoperable JWSs.
A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to use Header Parameter Names that are Private Names: names that are not Reserved Names Section 4.1 or Public Names Section 4.2. Unlike Public Names, Private Names are subject to collision and should be used with caution.
To create a JWS, one MUST perform these steps. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps.
When validating a JWS, the following steps MUST be taken. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps. If any of the listed steps fails, then the JWS MUST be rejected.
Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings to values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the algorithm is, the Unicode string encoding alg will be checked against the member names in the JWS Header to see if there is a matching Header Parameter Name. A similar process occurs when determining if the value of the alg header parameter represents a supported algorithm.
Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below:
Also, see the JSON security considerations in Section 10.2 and the Unicode security considerations in Section 10.3.
JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or MAC the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification describes a set of cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with this specification. Specifically, Section 3.1 specifies a set of alg (algorithm) header parameter values intended for use this specification. It also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms.
Public keys employed for digital signing can be identified using the Header Parameter methods described in Section 4.1 or can be distributed using methods that are outside the scope of this specification.
The JWS JSON Serialization represents digitally signed or MACed content as a JSON object with a signatures member containing an array of per-signature information and a payload member containing a shared Encoded JWS Payload value. Each member of the signatures array is a JSON object with a header member containing an Encoded JWS Header value and a signature member containing an Encoded JWS Signature value.
Unlike the JWS Compact Serialization, content using the JWS JSON Serialization MAY be secured with more than one digital signature and/or MAC value. Each is represented as an Encoded JWS Signature value in the signature member of an object in the signatures array. For each signature, there is an Encoded JWS Encoded Header value in the header member of the same object in the signatures array. This specifies the digital signature or MAC applied to the Encoded JWS Header value and the shared Encoded JWS Payload value to create the JWS Signature value. Therefore, the syntax is:
{"signatures":[
{"header":"<header 1 contents>",
"signature":"<signature 1 contents>"},
...
{"header":"<header N contents>",
"signature":"<signature N contents>"}],
"payload":"<payload contents>"
}
The contents of the Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature values are exactly as specified in the rest of this specification. They are interpreted and validated in the same manner, with each corresponding header and signature value being created and validated together.
Each JWS Signature value is computed on the JWS Signing Input corresponding to the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload in the same manner as for the JWS Compact Serialization. This has the desirable result that each Encoded JWS Signature value in the signatures array is identical to the value that would be used for the same parameter in the JWS Compact Serialization, as is the shared JWS Payload value.
This section contains an example using the JWS JSON Serialization. This example demonstrates the capability for conveying multiple digital signatures and/or MACs for the same payload.
The Encoded JWS Payload used in this example is the same as used in the examples in Appendix A (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Two digital signatures are used in this example: an RSA SHA-256 signature, for which the header and signature values are the same as in Appendix A.2, and an ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 signature, for which the header and signature values are the same as in Appendix A.3. The two Decoded JWS Header Segments used are:
{"alg":"RS256"}
and:
{"alg":"ES256"}
Since the computations of the JWS Header and JWS Signature values are the same as in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3, they are not repeated here.
The complete JSON Web Signature JSON Serialization (JWS-JS) for these values is as follows (with line breaks for display purposes only):
{"signatures":[
{"header":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"signature":
"cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZ
mh7AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjb
KBYNX4BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHl
b1L07Qe7K0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZES
c6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AX
LIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw"},
{"header":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
"signature":
"DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS
lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"}],
"payload":
"eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGF
tcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ"
}
The JWS Compact Serialization is mandatory to implement. Implementation of the JWS JSON Serialization is OPTIONAL.
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example"). [[ Note to RFC-EDITOR: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jose-reg-review. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry for reserved JWS and JWE Header Parameter Names. The registry records the reserved Header Parameter Name and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same Header Parameter Name MAY be registered multiple times, provided that the parameter usage is compatible between the specifications. Different registrations of the same Header Parameter Name will typically use different Header Parameter Usage Location(s) values.
This specification registers the Header Parameter Names defined in Section 4.1 in this registry.
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry for values of the JWS and JWE typ (type) header parameter. It is RECOMMENDED that all registered typ values also include a MIME Media Type [RFC2046] value that the registered value is a short name for. The registry records the typ value, the MIME type value that it is an abbreviation for (if any), and a reference to the specification that defines it.
MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MUST NOT be directly registered as new typ values; rather, new typ values MAY be registered as short names for MIME types.
This specification registers the JWS and JWS-JS type values in this registry:
This specification registers the application/jws and application/jws-js Media Types [RFC2046] in the MIME Media Type registry [RFC4288] to indicate, respectively, that the content is a JWS using the JWS Compact Serialization or a JWS using the JWS JSON Serialization.
All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but some significant concerns are listed here.
All the security considerations in XML DSIG 2.0 [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124], also apply to this specification, other than those that are XML specific. Likewise, many of the best practices documented in XML Signature Best Practices [W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809] also apply to this specification, other than those that are XML specific.
Keys are only as strong as the amount of entropy used to generate them. A minimum of 128 bits of entropy should be used for all keys, and depending upon the application context, more may be required. In particular, it may be difficult to generate sufficiently random values in some browsers and application environments.
Creators of JWSs should not allow third parties to insert arbitrary content into the message without adding entropy not controlled by the third party.
When utilizing TLS to retrieve information, the authority providing the resource MUST be authenticated and the information retrieved MUST be free from modification.
When cryptographic algorithms are implemented in such a way that successful operations take a different amount of time than unsuccessful operations, attackers may be able to use the time difference to obtain information about the keys employed. Therefore, such timing differences must be avoided.
A SHA-1 hash is used when computing x5t (x.509 certificate thumbprint) values, for compatibility reasons. Should an effective means of producing SHA-1 hash collisions be developed, and should an attacker wish to interfere with the use of a known certificate on a given system, this could be accomplished by creating another certificate whose SHA-1 hash value is the same and adding it to the certificate store used by the intended victim. A prerequisite to this attack succeeding is the attacker having write access to the intended victim's certificate store.
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example, it is suggested that a new x5t#S256 (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined and used.
Strict JSON validation is a security requirement. If malformed JSON is received, then the intent of the sender is impossible to reliably discern. Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser used does not reject malformed JSON syntax.
Section 2.2 of the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) specification [RFC4627] states "The names within an object SHOULD be unique", whereas this specification states that "Header Parameter Names within this object MUST be unique; JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be rejected". Thus, this specification requires that the Section 2.2 "SHOULD" be treated as a "MUST". Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser used does not enforce the uniqueness of member names.
Some JSON parsers might not reject input that contains extra significant characters after a valid input. For instance, the input {"tag":"value"}ABCD contains a valid JSON object followed by the extra characters ABCD. Such input MUST be rejected in its entirety.
Header Parameter Names and algorithm names are Unicode strings. For security reasons, the representations of these names must be compared verbatim after performing any escape processing (as per RFC 4627 [RFC4627], Section 2.5). This means, for instance, that these JSON strings must compare as being equal ("sig", "\u0073ig"), whereas these must all compare as being not equal to the first set or to each other ("SIG", "Sig", "si\u0047").
JSON strings can contain characters outside the Unicode Basic Multilingual Plane. For instance, the G clef character (U+1D11E) may be represented in a JSON string as "\uD834\uDD1E". Ideally, JWS implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly; alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation, then input containing them MUST be rejected.
| [RFC4122] | Leach, P., Mealling, M. and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005. |
| [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124] | Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Yiu, K., Solo, D., Datta, P., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S. and T. Roessler, "XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web Consortium CR CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124, January 2012. |
| [JWT] | Jones, M.B., Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token, April 2013. |
| [MagicSignatures] | Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B. and D. Balfanz, "Magic Signatures", January 2011. |
| [JSS] | Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", September 2010. |
| [CanvasApp] | Facebook, , "Canvas Applications", 2010. |
| [JWE] | Jones, M.B., Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption, April 2013. |
This section provides several examples of JWSs. While these examples all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT], the payload can be any base64url encoded content.
The following example JWS Header declares that the data structure is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Signing Input is secured using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm.
{"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"}
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header:
[123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example is the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object below. (Note that the payload can be any base64url encoded octet sequence, and need not be a base64url encoded JSON object.)
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
The following octet sequence, which is the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object above, is the JWS Payload:
[123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56, 48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111, 111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125]
Base64url encoding the above yields the Encoded JWS Payload value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 48, 101, 88, 65, 105, 79, 105, 74, 75, 86, 49, 81, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 73, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
HMACs are generated using keys. This example uses the key represented by the following octet sequence:
[3, 35, 53, 75, 43, 15, 165, 188, 131, 126, 6, 101, 119, 123, 166, 143, 90, 179, 40, 230, 240, 84, 201, 40, 169, 15, 132, 178, 210, 80, 46, 191, 211, 251, 90, 146, 210, 6, 71, 239, 150, 138, 180, 195, 119, 98, 61, 34, 61, 46, 33, 114, 5, 46, 79, 8, 192, 205, 154, 245, 103, 208, 128, 163]
Running the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm on the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input with this key yields the following octet sequence:
[116, 24, 223, 180, 151, 153, 224, 37, 79, 250, 96, 125, 216, 173, 187, 186, 22, 212, 37, 77, 105, 214, 191, 240, 91, 88, 5, 88, 83, 132, 141, 121]
Base64url encoding the above HMAC output yields the Encoded JWS Signature value:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
Next we validate the decoded results. Since the alg parameter in the header is "HS256", we validate the HMAC SHA-256 value contained in the JWS Signature. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
To validate the HMAC value, we repeat the previous process of using the correct key and the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as input to the HMAC SHA-256 function and then taking the output and determining if it matches the JWS Signature. If it matches exactly, the HMAC has been validated.
The JWS Header in this example is different from the previous example in two ways: First, because a different algorithm is being used, the alg value is different. Second, for illustration purposes only, the optional "typ" parameter is not used. (This difference is not related to the algorithm employed.) The JWS Header used is:
{"alg":"RS256"}
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as in the previous example. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
The RSA key consists of a public part (Modulus, Exponent), and a Private Exponent. The values of the RSA key used in this example, presented as the octet sequences representing big endian integers are:
| Parameter Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Modulus | [161, 248, 22, 10, 226, 227, 201, 180, 101, 206, 141, 45, 101, 98, 99, 54, 43, 146, 125, 190, 41, 225, 240, 36, 119, 252, 22, 37, 204, 144, 161, 54, 227, 139, 217, 52, 151, 197, 182, 234, 99, 221, 119, 17, 230, 124, 116, 41, 249, 86, 176, 251, 138, 143, 8, 154, 220, 75, 105, 137, 60, 193, 51, 63, 83, 237, 208, 25, 184, 119, 132, 37, 47, 236, 145, 79, 228, 133, 119, 105, 89, 75, 234, 66, 128, 211, 44, 15, 85, 191, 98, 148, 79, 19, 3, 150, 188, 110, 155, 223, 110, 189, 210, 189, 163, 103, 142, 236, 160, 198, 104, 247, 1, 179, 141, 191, 251, 56, 200, 52, 44, 226, 254, 109, 39, 250, 222, 74, 90, 72, 116, 151, 157, 212, 185, 207, 154, 222, 196, 199, 91, 5, 133, 44, 44, 15, 94, 248, 165, 193, 117, 3, 146, 249, 68, 232, 237, 100, 193, 16, 198, 182, 71, 96, 154, 164, 120, 58, 235, 156, 108, 154, 215, 85, 49, 48, 80, 99, 139, 131, 102, 92, 111, 111, 122, 130, 163, 150, 112, 42, 31, 100, 27, 130, 211, 235, 242, 57, 34, 25, 73, 31, 182, 134, 135, 44, 87, 22, 245, 10, 248, 53, 141, 154, 139, 157, 23, 195, 64, 114, 143, 127, 135, 216, 154, 24, 216, 252, 171, 103, 173, 132, 89, 12, 46, 207, 117, 147, 57, 54, 60, 7, 3, 77, 111, 96, 111, 158, 33, 224, 84, 86, 202, 229, 233, 161] |
| Exponent | [1, 0, 1] |
| Private Exponent | [18, 174, 113, 164, 105, 205, 10, 43, 195, 126, 82, 108, 69, 0, 87, 31, 29, 97, 117, 29, 100, 233, 73, 112, 123, 98, 89, 15, 157, 11, 165, 124, 150, 60, 64, 30, 63, 207, 47, 44, 211, 189, 236, 136, 229, 3, 191, 198, 67, 155, 11, 40, 200, 47, 125, 55, 151, 103, 31, 82, 19, 238, 216, 193, 90, 37, 216, 213, 206, 160, 2, 94, 227, 171, 46, 139, 127, 121, 33, 111, 198, 59, 234, 86, 39, 83, 180, 6, 68, 198, 161, 81, 39, 217, 178, 149, 69, 64, 160, 187, 225, 163, 5, 86, 152, 45, 78, 159, 222, 95, 100, 37, 241, 77, 75, 113, 52, 65, 181, 93, 199, 59, 155, 74, 237, 204, 146, 172, 227, 146, 126, 55, 245, 125, 12, 253, 94, 117, 129, 250, 81, 44, 143, 73, 97, 169, 235, 11, 128, 248, 168, 7, 70, 114, 138, 85, 255, 70, 71, 31, 52, 37, 6, 59, 157, 83, 100, 47, 94, 222, 30, 132, 214, 19, 8, 26, 250, 92, 34, 208, 81, 40, 91, 214, 59, 148, 59, 86, 93, 137, 138, 5, 104, 84, 19, 229, 60, 60, 108, 101, 37, 255, 31, 227, 78, 61, 220, 112, 240, 213, 100, 80, 253, 164, 139, 161, 46, 16, 78, 157, 235, 159, 184, 24, 129, 225, 196, 189, 242, 93, 146, 71, 244, 80, 200, 101, 146, 121, 104, 231, 115, 52, 244, 65, 79, 117, 167, 80, 225, 57, 84, 110, 58, 138, 115, 157] |
The RSA private key (Modulus, Private Exponent) is then passed to the RSA signing function, which also takes the hash type, SHA-256, and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as inputs. The result of the digital signature is an octet sequence, which represents a big endian integer. In this example, it is:
[112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45, 191, 120, 69, 243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115, 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125, 131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253, 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81, 102, 104, 123, 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69, 229, 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198, 109, 219, 61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237, 213, 217, 217, 112, 7, 16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248, 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31, 190, 127, 249, 217, 46, 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244, 74, 230, 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212, 1, 48, 121, 91, 212, 189, 59, 65, 238, 202, 208, 102, 171, 101, 25, 129, 253, 228, 141, 247, 127, 55, 45, 195, 139, 159, 175, 221, 59, 239, 177, 139, 93, 163, 204, 60, 46, 176, 47, 158, 58, 65, 214, 18, 202, 173, 21, 145, 18, 115, 160, 95, 35, 185, 232, 56, 250, 175, 132, 157, 105, 132, 41, 239, 90, 30, 136, 121, 130, 54, 195, 212, 14, 96, 69, 34, 165, 68, 200, 242, 122, 122, 45, 184, 6, 99, 209, 108, 247, 202, 234, 86, 222, 64, 92, 178, 33, 90, 69, 178, 194, 85, 102, 181, 90, 193, 167, 72, 160, 112, 223, 200, 163, 42, 70, 149, 67, 208, 25, 238, 251, 71]
Base64url encoding the digital signature produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature (with line breaks for display purposes only):
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7 AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4 BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K 0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7 AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4 BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K 0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
Since the alg parameter in the header is "RS256", we validate the RSA SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
Validating the JWS Signature is a little different from the previous example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature to produce a digital signature S to check. We then pass (n, e), S and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input to an RSA signature verifier that has been configured to use the SHA-256 hash function.
The JWS Header for this example differs from the previous example because a different algorithm is being used. The JWS Header used is:
{"alg":"ES256"}
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as in the previous examples. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a private part d. The values of the ECDSA key used in this example, presented as the octet sequences representing three 256 bit big endian integers are:
| Parameter Name | Value |
|---|---|
| x | [127, 205, 206, 39, 112, 246, 196, 93, 65, 131, 203, 238, 111, 219, 75, 123, 88, 7, 51, 53, 123, 233, 239, 19, 186, 207, 110, 60, 123, 209, 84, 69] |
| y | [199, 241, 68, 205, 27, 189, 155, 126, 135, 44, 223, 237, 185, 238, 185, 244, 179, 105, 93, 110, 169, 11, 36, 173, 138, 70, 35, 40, 133, 136, 229, 173] |
| d | [142, 155, 16, 158, 113, 144, 152, 191, 152, 4, 135, 223, 31, 93, 119, 233, 203, 41, 96, 110, 190, 210, 38, 59, 95, 87, 194, 19, 223, 132, 244, 178] |
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, which also takes the curve type, P-256, the hash type, SHA-256, and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as inputs. The result of the digital signature is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S values, given as octet sequences representing big endian integers are:
| Result Name | Value |
|---|---|
| R | [14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129, 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101] |
| S | [197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175, 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154, 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213] |
Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url encoding the result produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature (with line breaks for display purposes only):
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
Since the alg parameter in the header is "ES256", we validate the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
Validating the JWS Signature is a little different from the first example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in the previous examples but we then need to split the 64 member octet sequence that must result into two 32 octet sequences, the first R and the second S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature verifier that has been configured to use the P-256 curve with the SHA-256 hash function.
As explained in Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification, the use of the K value in ECDSA means that we cannot validate the correctness of the digital signature in the same way we validated the correctness of the HMAC. Instead, implementations MUST use an ECDSA validator to validate the digital signature.
The JWS Header for this example differs from the previous example because a different ECDSA curve and hash function are used. The JWS Header used is:
{"alg":"ES512"}
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 53, 49, 50, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, is the ASCII string "Payload". The representation of this string is the octet sequence:
[80, 97, 121, 108, 111, 97, 100]
Base64url encoding these octets yields the Encoded JWS Payload value:
UGF5bG9hZA
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 85, 120, 77, 105, 74, 57, 46, 85, 71, 70, 53, 98, 71, 57, 104, 90, 65]
The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a private part d. The values of the ECDSA key used in this example, presented as the octet sequences representing three 521 bit big endian integers are:
| Parameter Name | Value |
|---|---|
| x | [1, 233, 41, 5, 15, 18, 79, 198, 188, 85, 199, 213, 57, 51, 101, 223, 157, 239, 74, 176, 194, 44, 178, 87, 152, 249, 52, 235, 4, 227, 198, 186, 227, 112, 26, 87, 167, 145, 14, 157, 129, 191, 54, 49, 89, 232, 235, 203, 21, 93, 99, 73, 244, 189, 182, 204, 248, 169, 76, 92, 89, 199, 170, 193, 1, 164] |
| y | [0, 52, 166, 68, 14, 55, 103, 80, 210, 55, 31, 209, 189, 194, 200, 243, 183, 29, 47, 78, 229, 234, 52, 50, 200, 21, 204, 163, 21, 96, 254, 93, 147, 135, 236, 119, 75, 85, 131, 134, 48, 229, 203, 191, 90, 140, 190, 10, 145, 221, 0, 100, 198, 153, 154, 31, 110, 110, 103, 250, 221, 237, 228, 200, 200, 246] |
| d | [1, 142, 105, 111, 176, 52, 80, 88, 129, 221, 17, 11, 72, 62, 184, 125, 50, 206, 73, 95, 227, 107, 55, 69, 237, 242, 216, 202, 228, 240, 242, 83, 159, 70, 21, 160, 233, 142, 171, 82, 179, 192, 197, 234, 196, 206, 7, 81, 133, 168, 231, 187, 71, 222, 172, 29, 29, 231, 123, 204, 246, 97, 53, 230, 61, 130] |
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, which also takes the curve type, P-521, the hash type, SHA-512, and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as inputs. The result of the digital signature is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S values, given as octet sequences representing big endian integers are:
| Result Name | Value |
|---|---|
| R | [1, 220, 12, 129, 231, 171, 194, 209, 232, 135, 233, 117, 247, 105, 122, 210, 26, 125, 192, 1, 217, 21, 82, 91, 45, 240, 255, 83, 19, 34, 239, 71, 48, 157, 147, 152, 105, 18, 53, 108, 163, 214, 68, 231, 62, 153, 150, 106, 194, 164, 246, 72, 143, 138, 24, 50, 129, 223, 133, 206, 209, 172, 63, 237, 119, 109] |
| S | [0, 111, 6, 105, 44, 5, 41, 208, 128, 61, 152, 40, 92, 61, 152, 4, 150, 66, 60, 69, 247, 196, 170, 81, 193, 199, 78, 59, 194, 169, 16, 124, 9, 143, 42, 142, 131, 48, 206, 238, 34, 175, 83, 203, 220, 159, 3, 107, 155, 22, 27, 73, 111, 68, 68, 21, 238, 144, 229, 232, 148, 188, 222, 59, 242, 103] |
Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url encoding the result produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature (with line breaks for display purposes only):
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
Since the alg parameter in the header is "ES512", we validate the ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
Validating the JWS Signature is similar to the previous example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in the previous examples but we then need to split the 132 member octet sequence that must result into two 66 octet sequences, the first R and the second S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature verifier that has been configured to use the P-521 curve with the SHA-512 hash function.
As explained in Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification, the use of the K value in ECDSA means that we cannot validate the correctness of the digital signature in the same way we validated the correctness of the HMAC. Instead, implementations MUST use an ECDSA validator to validate the digital signature.
The following example JWS Header declares that the encoded object is a Plaintext JWS:
{"alg":"none"}
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header yields this Encoded JWS Header:
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as in the previous examples. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
The Encoded JWS Signature is the empty string.
Concatenating these parts in the order Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ .
The JSON array below is an example of a certificate chain that could be used as the value of an x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter, per Section 4.1.6. Note that since these strings contain base64 encoded (not base64url encoded) values, they are allowed to contain white space and line breaks.
["MIIE3jCCA8agAwIBAgICAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVM
xITAfBgNVBAoTGFRoZSBHbyBEYWRkeSBHcm91cCwgSW5jLjExMC8GA1UECxMoR2
8gRGFkZHkgQ2xhc3MgMiBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw0wNjExM
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This appendix describes how to implement base64url encoding and decoding functions without padding based upon standard base64 encoding and decoding functions that do use padding.
To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown below. Similar code could be used in other languages.
static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
{
string s = Convert.ToBase64String(arg); // Regular base64 encoder
s = s.Split('=')[0]; // Remove any trailing '='s
s = s.Replace('+', '-'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('/', '_'); // 63rd char of encoding
return s;
}
static byte [] base64urldecode(string arg)
{
string s = arg;
s = s.Replace('-', '+'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('_', '/'); // 63rd char of encoding
switch (s.Length % 4) // Pad with trailing '='s
{
case 0: break; // No pad chars in this case
case 2: s += "=="; break; // Two pad chars
case 3: s += "="; break; // One pad char
default: throw new System.Exception(
"Illegal base64url string!");
}
return Convert.FromBase64String(s); // Standard base64 decoder
}
As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters that needs to be added to the end of a base64url encoded string without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two '=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '=' padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is malformed.
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below, which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
3 236 255 224 193
A-z_4ME
Appendix C of [JWE] suggests a possible compact serialization for JWEs with multiple recipients. This suggests a corresponding compact serialization for JWSs with multiple digital signatures and/or MACs. This possible compact serialization concatenates instances of the per-signature/MAC fields, separating them with tilde ('~') characters, which are URL-safe.
The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header values goes before the first period ('.') character in the compact serialization. The concatenation of the corresponding Encoded JWS Signature values goes after the second period ('.') character in the compact serialization.
A complete compact serialization of the multi-signature/MAC JWS in Section 7.1 (with line breaks for display purposes only) would be:
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 ~ eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGF tcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ . cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZ mh7AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjb KBYNX4BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHl b1L07Qe7K0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZES c6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AX LIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw ~ DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
This representation is suggested for those who may desire or require a compact, URL-safe serialization of JWSs with multiple digital signatures and/or MACs. It is a suggestion to implementers for whom this functionality would be valuable, and not a normative part of this specification.
Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft.
Thanks to Axel Nennker for his early implementation and feedback on the JWS and JWE specifications.
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification:
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Yaron Y. Goland, Ben Laurie, James Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors during the creation of this specification.
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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