MARF Working Group S. Kitterman
Internet-Draft Agari
Updates: 4408 (if approved) March 12, 2012
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: September 11, 2012

SPF Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format
draft-ietf-marf-spf-reporting-09

Abstract

This memo presents extensions to the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF), and Sender Policy Framework (SPF) specifications to allow for detailed reporting of message authentication failures in an on-demand fashion.

This memo updates RFC4408 by providing an IANA registry for SPF modifiers.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2012.

Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

[ARF] defines a message format for sending reports of abuse in the messaging infrastructure, with an eye toward automating both the generating and consumption of those reports.

[SPF] is one mechanism for message sender authentication; it is "path-based" meaning it authenticates the route that a message took from origin to destination. The output is a verified domain name that can then be subjected to some sort of evaluation process (e.g., comparison to a known-good list, submission to a reputation service, etc.).

This document extends [SPF] to add an optional reporting address and other parameters. Extension of [ARF] to add features required for the reporting of these incidents is covered in [I-D.IETF-MARF-AUTHFAILURE-REPORT] and [I-D.IETF-MARF-AS].

This document additionally creates a an IANA registry of [SPF] record modifiers to avoid modifier namespace collisions.

2. Definitions

2.1. Keywords

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].

2.2. Imported Definitions

The ABNF token "qp-section" is defined in [MIME].

"local-part" is defined in [MAIL].

"addr-spec" is defined in [MAIL].

3. Optional Reporting Address for SPF

There exist cases in which an ADministrative Management Domain (ADMD) (see [EMAIL-ARCH]) employing [SPF] for announcing sending practices may want to know when messages are received via unauthorized routing. Currently there is no such method defined in conjunction with standardized approaches such as [ARF]. Similar information can be gathered using a specially crafted [SPF] record and a special DNS server to track [SPF] record lookups.

This document defines the following optional "modifier" (as defined in Section 4.6.1 of [SPF]) to SPF records, using the form defined in that specification:

ra=
Reporting Address (plain-text; OPTIONAL; no default). MUST be a local-part (see Section 3.4.1 of [MAIL]) specifying an e-mail address to which a report SHOULD be sent when mail claiming to be from this domain (see Section 2.4 of [SPF] for a description of how domains are identified for SPF checks) has failed the evaluation algorithm described in [SPF], in particular because a message arrived via an unauthorized route. To generate a complete address to which the report is sent, the verifier simply appends to this value an "@" followed by the SPF-compliant domain per paragraph 4.1 of [SPF]. ra= modifiers in a record that was reached by following an include: mechanism MUST be ignored.
ABNF:
spf-report-tag = %x72.61 "=" qp-section
rp=
Requested Report Percentage (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "100"). The value is an integer from 0 to 100 inclusive that indicates what percentage of incidents of SPF failures, selected at random, are to cause reports to be generated. The report generator SHOULD NOT issue reports for more than the requested percentage of incidents. An exception to this might be some out-of-band arrangement between two parties to override it with some mutually agreed value. Report generators MAY make use of the "Incidents:" field in [ARF] to indicate that there are more reportable incidents than there are reports.
ABNF:
spf-rp-tag = %x72.69 *WSP "=" *WSP 1*12DIGIT "/" 1*12DIGIT
rr=
Requested Reports (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "all"). The value MUST be a colon-separated list of tokens representing those conditions under which a report is desired. See Section 4.1 for a list of valid tags.
ABNF:
spf-rr-type = ( "all" / "e" / "f" / "s" / "n" )
spf-rr-tag = %x72.72 "=" spf-rr-type 0* ( ":" spf-rr-type )

In the absence of an "ra=" tag in the SPF record, the "rp=" and "rr=" tags MUST be ignored, and the report generator MUST NOT issue a report.

4. Requested Reports

This memo also includes, as the "rr" tokens defined above, the means by which the sender can request reports for specific circumstances of interest. Verifiers MUST NOT generate reports for incidents that do not match a requested report, and MUST ignore requests for reports not included in this list.

4.1. Requested Reports for SPF Failures

The following report requests are defined for SPF results:

all
All reports are requested.
e
Reports are requested for messages that produced an SPF result of "TempError" or "PermError".
f
Reports are requested for messages that produced an SPF result of "Fail".
s
Reports are requested for messages that produced an SPF result of "SoftFail".
n
Reports are requested for messages that produced an SPF result of "Neutral" or "None".

5. IANA Considerations

As required by [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], this section contains registry information for the new [SPF] modifiers.

5.1. SPF Modifier Registration

IANA is requested to create the Sender Policy Framework Modifier Registry, to include a list of all registered SPF modifier names and their defining documents.

New registrations or updates are to be published in accordance with the "Specification Required" guidelines as described in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]. New registrations and updates MUST contain the following information:

  1. Name of the modifier being registered or updated
  2. The document in which the specification of the modifier is published
  3. New or updated status, which MUST be one of:
    current:
    The field is in current use
    deprecated:
    The field might be in current use but its use is discouraged
    historic:
    The field is no longer in current use

An update may make a notation on an existing registration indicating that a registered field is historic or deprecated if appropriate.

              +------------+-----------------+---------+
              | MODIFIER   | REFERENCE       | STATUS  |
              +------------+-----------------+---------+
              | exp        | RFC4408         | current |
              | redirect   | RFC4408         | current |
              | ra         | (this document) | current |
              | rp         | (this document) | current |
              | rr         | (this document) | current |
              +------------+-----------------+---------+
			

6. Security Considerations

Inherited considerations: implementors are advised to consider the Security Considerations sections of [SPF], [ARF], [I-D.IETF-MARF-AS], and [I-D.IETF-MARF-AUTHFAILURE-REPORT].

In addition to the advice in the Security Considerations section of [I-D.IETF-MARF-AS], these additional considerations apply to generation of [SPF] authentication failure reports:

6.1. Identity Selection

Preventing an [SPF] failure for SPF SPF authentication failure reports is essential to mitigate the risk of data loops.

If the [SMTP] return address to be used will not be the NULL return address, i.e., "MAIL FROM:<>", then the selected return address MUST be selected such that it will pass [SPF] MAIL FROM checks upon initial receipt.
If the report is passed to the Mail Submission Agent (MSA) (MSA is described in [EMAIL-ARCH] using [SMTP], the HELO/EHLO command parameter SHOULD also be selected so that it will pass [SPF] HELO checks.

6.2. Report Volume

It is impossible to predict the volume of reports this facility will generate when enabled by a report receiver. An implementer ought to anticipate substantial volume, since the amount of abuse occurring at receivers cannot be known ahead of time, and may vary rapidly and unpredictably.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.IETF-MARF-AUTHFAILURE-REPORT] Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format ", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report, January 2012.
[I-D.IETF-MARF-AS] Falk, J. and M. Kucherawy, Ed., "Creation and Use of Email Feedback Reports: An Applicability Statement for the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) ", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-marf-as, February 2012.
[ARF] Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J. and M. Kucherawy, "An Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports ", RFC 5965, August 2010.
[IANA-CONSIDERATIONS] Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs ", RFC 5226, May 2008.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels ", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MAIL] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format ", RFC 5322, October 2008.
[MIME] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies ", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[SPF] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1 ", RFC 4408, April 2006.
[SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, October 2008.

7.2. Informative References

[EMAIL-ARCH] Crocker, D, "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598, October 2008.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the following for their review and constructive criticism of this proposal: Murray Kucherawy, Tim Draegen, Julian Mehnle, and John Levine.

Appendix B. Examples

Appendix B.1. SPF DNS record for domain that sends no mail, but requests reports

v=spf1 ra=postmaster -all
				

Appendix B.2. Minimal SPF DNS record change to add a reporting address

v=spf1 mx:example.org ra=postmaster -all
				

Appendix B.3. SPF DNS record with reporting address, report percentage, and requested report type

v=spf1 mx:example.org -all ra=postmaster rp=10 rr=e
				

Author's Address

Scott Kitterman Agari 3611 Scheel Dr Ellicott City, MD 21042 US Phone: +1 301 325 5475 EMail: skitterman@agari.com