| DHC Working Group | S. Krishnan |
| Internet-Draft | Ericsson |
| Intended status: Standards Track | J. Korhonen |
| Expires: September 5, 2015 | Broadcom Corporation |
| S. Bhandari | |
| Cisco Systems | |
| March 4, 2015 |
Support for multiple provisioning domains in DHCPv6
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-dhcp-support-01
The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document details how configuration information provided through DHCPv6 can be associated with provisioning domains.
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The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture work [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-arch]. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document describes a DHCPv6 mechanism for explicitly indicating provisioning domain information along with any configuration that will be provided. The proposed mechanism uses a DHCPv6 option that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and encapsulates the options that contain the configuration information as well as any accompanying authentication/authorization information.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The PVD container option is used to encapsulate and group together all the configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified provisioning domain. The PVD container option MUST encapsulate exactly one OPTION_PVD_ID. The PVD container option MAY occur multiple times in the same message, but each of these PVD container options MUST have a different PVD identity specified under its PVD identity option. The PVD container option SHOULD contain exactly one OPTION_PVD_AUTH.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OPTION_PVD | option-length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | + encapsulated-options (variable length) . . . +---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: PVD Container Option
o option-code: OPTION_PVD (TBA1)
o option-length: Length of encapsulated options
o encapsulated-options: options associated with this provisioning
domain.
The PVD identity option is used to explicitly indicate the identity of the provisioning domain that is associated with the configuration information encapsulated by the PVD container option.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OPTION_PVD_ID | option-length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | PVD identity information | + (variable length) + + + . . +---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: PVD ID Option
o option-code: OPTION_PVD_ID (TBA2)
o option-length: Length of PVD identity information
o PVD identity information: The provisioning domain identity.
The contents of this field is defined in
a separate document [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-id].
The PVD authentication and authorization option contains information that could be used by the DHCPv6 client to verify whether the configuration information provided was not tampered with by the DHCPv6 server as well as establishing that the DHCPv6 server was authorized to advertise the information on behalf of the PVD per OPTION_PVD basis. The contents of the authentication/authorization information is provided by the owner of the provisioning domain and is completely opaque to the DHCPv6 server that passes along the information unmodified. Every OPTION_PVD option SHOULD contain at most one OPTION_PVD_AUTH option. The OPTION_PVD_AUTH option MUST be the last option inside the OPTION_PVD option.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OPTION_PVD_AUTH | option-length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+ | name-type | key-hash : | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ : | : : +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Auth : : info : digital-signature : | : : | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
Figure 3: PVD Auth Option
o option-code: OPTION_PVD_AUTH (TBA3)
o option-length: Length of the Auth info
o name-type: Names the algorithm used to identify a specific
X.509 certificate using the method defined for the Subject Key
Identifier (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates. The
usage and the Name Type registry aligns with the mechanism
defined for SeND [RFC6494][RFC6495].
Name Type values starting
from 3 are supported and an implementation MUST at least support
SHA-1 (value 3).
o key-hash: A hash of the public key using the algorithm
identified by the Name Type. The procedure how the Key Hash is
calculated is defined in [RFC3971] and [RFC6495].
o digital-signature: A signature calculated over the encapsulating
OPTION_PVD including all option data from the beginning of the
option while setting the digital-signature field to zero. The
procedure of calculating the signature is identical to the one
defined for SeND [RFC3971].
The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated DHCPv6 options but MUST NOT be used to encapsulate another OPTION_PVD option. [TODO: Should we add any other exclusions?]
This section describes role of DHCPv6 entities involved in requesting and receiving DHCPv6 configuration or prefix and address allocation.
DHCPv6 client or requesting router can request for configuration from provisioning domain in the following ways:
The client or requesting router parses OPTION_PVD options in the response message. The Client or Requesting router MUST then include all or subset of the received OPTION_PVD options in the REQUEST message so that it will be responsible for the configuration information selected.
If DHCPv6 client or requesting router receives OPTION_PVD options but does not support PVD, it SHOULD ignore the received option(s).
If the relay agent supports both the Relay-Supplied DHCP Option (RSOO) [RFC6422] and the PVD, and it is configured to request configuration data for clients in one or more provisioning domains, then the relay agent MAY include the RSOO in the Relay-Forward message. The RSOO MAY contain zero or more OPTION_PVD options. The relay agent MUST NOT include any OPTION_PVD options into the RSOO unless the client has indicated support for the PVD as described in Section Section 7.1.
If the Server or Delegating router supports PVD and it is configured to provide configuration data in one or more provisioning domains, it selects configuration for the PVD based allocation in the following way:
When PVD information and configuration are selected for address and prefix allocation the server or delegating router responds with an ADVERTISE message after populating OPTION_PVD.
If OPTION_PVD is not included, then the server or delegating router MAY allocate the prefix and provide configuration as specified in [RFC3315] and[RFC3633] and MUST NOT include OPTION_PVD option in the response.
If OPTION_ORO option includes the OPTION_PVD option code but the server or delegating router does not support PVD, then it SHOULD ignore the OPTION_PVD and OPTION_PVD_ID options received.
If both client/requesting router and server/delegating router support PVD but cannot offer configuration with PVD for any other reason, it MUST respond to client/requesting router with appropriate status code as specified in [RFC3315] and [RFC3633].
Similarly, if the OPTION_PVD is received in the RSOO from the relay agent the above described procedures apply for including the PVD specific configuration information back to the client.
An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using the DHCPv6 AUTH option [RFC3315] that would detect any form of tampering with the DHCPv6 message contents.
A compromised DHCPv6 server or relay agent may insert configuration information related to PVDs it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop DHCPv6 server may provide configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to avoid this is that the PVD container contains embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the PVD. Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the PVD owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).
A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided information.
This document defines three new DHCPv6 options to be allocated out of the registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/
OPTION_PVD (TBA1)
OPTION_PVD_ID (TBA2)
OPTION_PVD_AUTH (TBA3)
This document also adds OPTION_PVD (TBA1) into the "Options Permitted in the Relay-Supplied Options Option" registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/
The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design team for their comments that led to the creation of this draft. The authors would also thank Ian Farrer for his reviews and comments.
| [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-arch] | Anipko, D., "Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-arch-10, February 2015. |