| MILE Working Group | J. Field |
| Internet-Draft | Pivotal |
| Intended status: Informational | S. Banghart |
| Expires: December 5, 2016 | NIST |
| June 3, 2016 |
Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange
draft-ietf-mile-rolie-02
This document defines a resource-oriented approach to cyber security information sharing. Using this approach, operators may share and exchange representations of cyber security incidents, attack indicators, software vulnerabilities, and other related information as Web-addressable resources. Furthermore, consumers and other stakeholders may access and search this security content as needed, establishing a rapid and on-demand information exchange network for restricted internal use or public access repositories. This specification builds on and extends the Atom Publishing Protocol and Atom Syndication Format to transport and share cyber security resource representations. This document leverages the existing representations IODEF and RID where appropriate, and supports related cyber security representation standards.
The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/CISecurity/ROLIE>. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantial issues need to be discussed on the MILE mailing list.
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This document defines a resource-oriented approach to cyber security information sharing that follows the REST [REST] architectural style. In this approach, cyber security resources are maintained in web-accessible repositories structured as Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287] feeds. Representations of content are categorized and organized into indexed collections, which are requested by the consumer. As the set of resource collections are forward facing, the consumer may search all available content for which they are authorized to view and request that which is desired. Granular authentication and access controls permit only authorized consumers the ability to view, read, or write to a given feed. This approach is in contrast to, and meant to improve on, the traditional point-to-point messaging system, in which consumers must request individual pieces of information from a server following a triggering event. This traditional approach creates a closed system of information sharing that encourages duplication of efforts and hinders automated cyber security systems.
The goal of this document is to define the RESTful approach to cyber security communication with the intent of increasing communication and sharing of incident reports, vulnerability assessments, and other security content between producers, operators, and consumers.
In order to exchange information as web-addressable resources, the resource representations leverage the existing IODEF [RFC5070] and RID [RFC6545] specifications and other representation standards as appropriate. The transport protocol binding is specified as HTTP(S) with a media type of Atom+XML. An appropriate set of link relation types specific to cyber security information sharing is defined.
Coexistence with deployments that conform to existing specifications including RID [RFC6545] and Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546] is supported via appropriate use of HTTP status codes.
The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT," "SHOULD," "SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Definitions for some of the common computer security-related terminology used in this document can be found in Section 2 of [RFC5070].
It is well known that the field of threats to computer security is evolving ever more rapidly as time goes on. As software increases in complexity, the number of vulnerabilities in our systems and networks increase exponentially. Threat actors looking to exploit these vulnerabilities are making more frequent and more widely distributed attacks across a large variety of systems. The adoption of liberal information sharing amongst attackers creates a window of as little as a few hours between the discovery of a vulnerability and attacks on the vulnerable system. As the skills and knowledge required to identify and combat these attacks become more and more specialized, even a well established and secure system may find itself unable to quickly respond to an incident. Effective identification of and response to a sophisticated attack requires open cooperation and collaboration between defending operators, software vendors, and even end-users.
Existing approaches to cyber security information sharing are based upon message exchange patterns that are point-to-point, and event-driven. Sometimes, information that may be useful to, and sharable with multiple peers is only made available to peers after they have specifically requested it. Unfortunately, a sharing peer may not know, a priori, what information to request from another peer. Sending unsolicited RID reports does provide a mechanism for alerting, however these reports are again sent point-to-point, and must be reviewed for relevance and then prioritized for action by the recipient. Thus, distribution of some relevant incident and indicator information may exhibit significant latency.
In order to adequately combat the evolving threats, computer security resource producers should be enabled to share selected information proactively as appropriate. Proactive sharing greatly aids knowledge dissemination as well as improving on response times and usability.
For example, a cyber security analyst would benefit by having the ability to search a comprehensive collection of attack indicators that have been published by a government agency, or by another member of a sharing consortium. The representation of each indicator may include links to the related resources, enabling an appropriately authenticated and authorized analyst to freely navigate the information space of indicators, incidents, vulnerabilities, and other cyber security domain concepts, as needed. In general, a more Web-centric sharing approach will enable a more dynamic and agile collaboration amongst a broader, and varying constituency.
The following sections discuss additional specific technical issues that motivate the development of an alternative approach.
The existing approaches to cyber security information sharing are based upon message-oriented interactions. The following paragraphs explore some of the architectural constraints associated with message-oriented interactions and consider the relative merits of an alternative model based on a Resource-oriented architecture for use in some use case scenarios.
ROLIE specifies a resource-oriented architecture.
In general, message-based integration architectures may be based upon either an RPC-style or a document-style binding. The message types defined by RID represent an example of an RPC-style request. This approach imposes implied requirements for conversational state management on both of the communicating RID endpoint(s). Experience has shown that this state management frequently becomes the limiting factor with respect to the runtime scalability of an RPC-style architecture.
In addition, the practical scalability of a peer-to-peer message-based approach will be limited by the administrative procedures required to manage O(N^2) trust relationships and at least O(N) policy groups.
As long as the number of participating entities in an information sharing consortium is limited to a relatively small number of nodes (i.e., O(2^N), where N < 5), these scalability constraints may not represent a critical concern. However, when there is a requirement to support a significantly larger number of participating peers, a different architectural approach will be required. One alternative to the message-based approach that has demonstrated scalability is the REST [REST] architectural style.
Applying the REST architectural style to the problem domain of cyber security information sharing would take the approach of exposing incidents, indicators, and any other relevant types as simple Web-addressable resources. By using this approach, an organization can more quickly and easily share relevant incident and indicator information with a much larger and potentially more diverse constituency. A consumer may leverage virtually any available HTTP user agent in order to make requests of the service provider. This improved ease of use could enable more rapid adoption and broader participation, thereby improving security for everyone.
A key interoperability aspect of any RESTful Web service will be the choices regarding the available resource representations. For example, clients may request that a given resource representation be returned as either XML or JSON. In order to enable back-compatibility and interoperability with existing implementations, IODEF [RFC5070] is specified for this transport binding as a mandatory to implement (MTI) data representation for incident and indicator resources. In addition to the REQUIRED representation, an implementation MAY support additional representations if and as needed such as IODEF extensions, the RID schema, or other schemas. For example, an implementation may choose to provide support for returning a JSON representation of an incident resource.
Finally, an important principle of the REST architectural style is the use of hypertext links as the embodiment of application state (HATEOAS). Rather than the server maintaining conversational state for each client context, the server will instead include a suitable set of hyperlinks in the resource representation that is returned to the client. In this way, the server remains stateless with respect to a series of client requests. The included hyperlinks provide the client with a specific set of permitted state transitions. Using these links the client may perform an operation, such as updating or deleting the resource representation. The client may also be provided with hypertext links that can be used to navigate to any related resource. For example, the resource representation for an incident object may contain links to the related indicator resource(s).
This document specifies the use of Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287] and Atom Publishing Protocol [RFC5023] as the mechanism for representing the required hypertext links.
In this section we consider a non-normative example use case scenario for creating a cyber security "mashup".
Any operator can authorize any or all members of the sharing community to quickly and easily navigate through any of the cyber security information that that provider is willing to share. An analyst may then make HTTP(S) requests to collect vulnerability information known at one producer and threat actor data being made available from another producer. The resulting correlations may yield new insights that enable a more timely and effective defensive response. Of course, this report may, in turn, be made available to others as a new Web-addressable resource, reachable via another URL. By employing the RESTful Web service approach the effectiveness of the collaboration amongst a consortium of cyber security stakeholders can be greatly improved.
As described in Atom Publishing Protocol [RFC5023], an Atom Service Document is an XML-based document format that allows a client to dynamically discover the collections provided by a publisher.
As described in Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287], Atom is an XML-based document format that describes lists of related information items known as collections, or "feeds". Each feed document contains a collection of zero or more related information items called "member entries" or "entries".
When applied to the problem domain of cyber security information sharing, an Atom feed may be used to represent any meaningful collection of information resources such as a set of incidents, or indicators. Each entry in a feed could then represent an individual incident, or indicator, or some other resource, as appropriate. Additional feeds could be used to represent other meaningful and useful collections of cyber security resources. A feed may be categorized, and any feed may contain information from zero or more categories. The naming scheme and the semantic meaning of the terms used to identify an Atom category are application-defined.
This document assumes that the reader has an understanding of both Atom documents. Further discussion of Atom's application to this domain a well of examples of its use are provided in the BCG document.
This section provides the NORMATIVE requirements for using Atom format and Atom Pub as a RESTful binding for cyber security information sharing.
Implementations of this specification MUST implement all requirements specified in Atom Publishing Protocol and the Atom Syndication Format. (TODO: work on a more normative and perhaps constrained requirement.)
Implementations MUST support server-authenticated TLS.
Implementations MAY support mutually authenticated TLS.
A feed can contain an arbitrary number of entries. In some cases, the complete response to a given query may consist of a logical result set that contains a large number of entries. As a practical matter, the full result set will likely need to be divided into more manageable portions. For example, a query may produce a full result set that may need to be grouped into logical pages, for purposes of rendering on a user interface.
An historical feed may need to be stable, and/or divided into some defined epochs. Implementations SHOULD support the mechanisms described in Feed Paging and Archiving [RFC5005] to provide capabilities for paging and archiving of feeds.
It is frequently the case that an organization will need to triage their investigation and response activities based upon, e.g., the state of the current threat environment, or simply as a result of having limited resources.
In order to enable operators to effectively prioritize their response activity, it is RECOMMENDED that feed implementers provide Atom categories that correspond to the IODEF Expectation and Impact classes. The availability of these feed categories will enable clients to more easily retrieve and prioritize cyber security information that has already been identified as having a specific potential impact, or having a specific expectation.
Support for these categories may also enable efficiencies for organizations that already have established (or plan to establish) operational processes and workflows that are based on these IODEF classes.
Implementations MUST support user authentication. User authentication MAY be enabled for specific feeds.
Implementations MAY support more than one client authentication method.
Servers participating in an information sharing consortium and supporting interactive user logins by members of the consortium SHOULD support client authentication via a federated identity scheme as per SAML 2.0.
Implementations MAY support client authenticated TLS.
This document does not mandate the use of any specific user authorization mechanisms. However, service implementers SHOULD provide appropriate authorization checking for all resource accesses, including individual Atom Entries, Atom Feeds, and Atom Service Documents.
Authorization for a resource MAY be adjudicated based on the value(s) of the associated Atom <category> element(s).
When the content model for the Atom <content> element of an Atom Entry contains an <IODEF-Document>, then authorization MUST be adjudicated based upon the Atom <category> element(s), whose values have been mapped as per Section 5.10.
Any use of the <category> element(s) as an input to an authorization policy decision MUST include both the "scheme" and "term" attributes contained therein. As described in Section 5.10 below, the namespace of the "term" attribute is scoped by the associated "scheme" attribute.
Member entry resources providing a representation of an incident resource (e.g., as specified in the link relation type) MUST use the IODEF schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.
Member Entry resources providing a representation of an indicator resource (e.g., as specified in the link relation type) MUST use the IODEF schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.
The resource representation MAY include an appropriate indicator schema type within the <AdditionalData> element of the IODEF Incident class. Supported indicator schema types SHALL be registered via an IANA table (todo: IANA registration/review).
Member Entry resources providing a representation of a RID report resource (e.g., as specified in the link relation type) MUST use the RID schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.
Member Entry resources providing representation of other types, SHOULD use the schema appropriate for their data category as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element. These data categories SHALL be registered via an IANA table.
The <content> element of the Atom entry MUST contain an appropriate XML namespace declaration.
The following table defines the HTTP [RFC7235] uniform interface methods supported by this specification:
| HTTP method | Description |
|---|---|
| GET | Returns a representation of an individual member entry resource, or a feed collection. |
| PUT | Replaces the current representation of the specified member entry resource with the representation provided in the HTTP request body. |
| POST | Creates a new instance of a member entry resource. The representation of the new resource is provided in the HTTP request body. |
| DELETE | Removes the indicated member entry resource, or feed collection. |
| HEAD | Returns metadata about the member entry resource, or feed collection, contained in HTTP response headers. |
| PATCH | Support TBD. |
Clients MUST be capable of recognizing and prepared to process any standard HTTP status code, as defined in [RFC7235]
This specification requires that a implementation MUST publish an Atom Service Document that describes the set of cyber security information sharing feeds that are provided.
The service document SHOULD be discoverable via the organization's Web home page or another well-known public resource.
The service document MAY include multiple workspaces. Any producer providing both public feeds and private consortium feeds MUST place these different classes of feeds into different workspaces, and provide appropriate descriptions and naming conventions to indicate the intended audience of each workspace.
An implementation MAY provide any number of collections within a given Workspace. It is RECOMMENDED that each collection appear in only a single Workspace. It is RECOMMENDED that at least one collection be provided that accepts new incident reports from users. At least one collection MUST provide a feed of incident information for which the content model for the entries uses the IODEF schema. The title of this collection SHOULD be "Incidents".
Access to the service document MUST be protected via server-authenticated TLS and a server-side certificate.
When deploying a service document for use by a closed consortium, the service document MAY also be digitally signed and/or encrypted, using XML DigSig and/or XML Encryption, respectively.
This section defines normative requirements for mapping IODEF metadata to corresponding Atom category elements. (todo: decide between IANA registration of scheme, or use a full URI).
An Atom collection MAY hold entries from one or more categories. The collection category set MUST contain at least the union of all the member entry categories. A collection MAY have additional category metadata that are unique to the collection, and not applicable to any individual member entry. A collection containing IODEF incident content MUST contain at least two <category> elements. One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "restriction". One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "purpose". The value of the "fixed" attribute for both of these category elements MUST be "yes". When the category scheme="restriction", the allowable values for the "term" attribute are constrained as per section 3.2 of IODEF, e.g. public, need-to-know, private, default. When the category scheme="purpose", the allowable values for the "term" attribute are constrained as per section 3.2 of IODEF, e.g. traceback, mitigation, reporting, other.
An Atom entry containing IODEF content MUST contain at least two <category> elements. One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "restriction". One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "purpose". When the category scheme="restriction", the value of the "term" attribute must be exactly one of ( public, need-to-know, private, default). When the category scheme="purpose", the value of the "term" attribute must be exactly one of (traceback, mitigation, reporting, other). When the purpose is "other"....
Any member entry MAY have any number of additional categories.
The ID element for an Atom entry SHOULD be established via the concatenation of the value of the name attribute from the IODEF <IncidentID> element and the corresponding value of the <IncidentID> element. This requirement ensures a simple and direct one-to-one relationship between an IODEF incident ID and a corresponding Feed entry ID and avoids the need for any system to maintain a persistent store of these identity mappings.
(todo: Note that this implies a constraint on the IODEF document that is more restrictive than the current IODEF schema. IODEF section 3.3 requires only that the name be a STRING type. Here we are stating that name must be an IRI. Possible request to update IODEF to constrain, or to support a new element or attribute).
The <content> element of an Atom <entry> SHOULD include an IODEF document. The <entry> element SHOULD include an appropriate XML namespace declaration for the IODEF schema. If the content model of the <entry> element does not follow the IODEF schema, then the <entry> element MUST include an appropriate XML namespace declaration.
A client MAY ignore content that is not using the IODEF schema.
In addition to the standard Link Relations defined by the Atom specification, this specification defines the following additional Link Relation terms, which are introduced specifically in support of the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange protocol.
| Name | Description | Conformance |
|---|---|---|
| service | Provides a link to an atom service document associated with the collection feed. | MUST |
| search | Provides a link to an associated Open Search document that describes a URL template for search queries. | MUST |
| history | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more historical entries that are associated with the resource. | MUST |
| incidents | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more instances of incident representations associated with the resource. | MUST |
| indicators | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more instances of cyber security indicators that are associated with the resource. | MUST |
| information | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more instances of cyber security information that is associated with the resource. | MUST |
| evidence | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides some proof of attribution for an incident. The evidence may or may not have any identified chain of custody. | SHOULD |
| campaign | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides a representation of the associated cyber attack campaign. | SHOULD |
| attacker | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides a representation of the attacker. | SHOULD |
| vector | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that provides a representation of the method used by the attacker. | SHOULD |
| assessments | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent the results of executing a benchmark. | SHOULD |
| reports | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent RID reports. | SHOULD |
| traceRequests | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent RID traceRequests. | SHOULD |
| investigationRequests | Provides a link to a collection of zero or more resources that represent RID investigationRequests. | SHOULD |
Unless specifically registered with IANA these short names MUST be fully qualified via concatenation with a base-uri. An appropriate base-uri could be established via agreement amongst the members of an information sharing consortium. For example, the rel="indicators" relationship would become rel="http://www.example.org/rolie/incidents/relationships/indicators."
An IODEF document that is carried in an Atom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <relatedActivity> element. Instead, the related activity SHOULD be available via a link rel=related.
An IODEF document that is carried in an Atom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <history> element. Instead, the related history SHOULD be available via a link rel="history" (todo: or a fully qualified link rek name). The associated href MAY leverage OpenSearch to specify the required query.
An Atom Entry MAY include additional link relationships not specified here. If a client encounters a link relationship of an unknown type the client MUST ignore the offending link and continue processing the remaining resource representation as if the offending link element did not appear.
As described in Authorization Policy Enforcement a RESTful model for cyber security information sharing requires that all of the required security enforcement for feeds and entries MUST be enforced at the source system, at the point the representation of the given resource(s) is created. A provider SHALL NOT return any feed content or member entry content for which the client identity has not been specifically authenticated, authorized, and audited.
Sharing communities that have a requirement for forward message security (such that client systems are required to participate in providing message level security and/or distributed authorization policy enforcement), MUST use the RID schema as the content model for the member entry <content> element.
The Atom feed <updated> element MUST be populated with the current time at the instant the feed representation was generated. The Atom entry <published> element MUST be populated with the same time value as the <reportTime> element from the IODEF document.
Implementers MUST support OpenSearch 1.1 [opensearch] as the mechanism for describing how clients may form search requests.
Implementers MUST provide a link with a relationship type of "search". This link SHALL return an Open Search Description Document as defined in OpenSearch 1.1.
Implementers MUST support an OpenSearch 1.1 compliant search URL template that enables a search query via Atom Category, including the scheme attribute and terms attribute as search parameters.
Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the IODEF AlternativeID class as a search parameter.
Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the four timestamp elements of the IODEF Incident class: <startTime>, <EndTime>, <DetectTime>, and <ReportTime>.
Implementers MAY support additional search capabilities based upon any of the remaining elements of the IODEF Incident class, including the <Description> element.
Collections that support use of the RID schema as a content model in the Atom member entry <content> element (e.g. in a report resource representation reachable via the "report" link relationship) MUST support search operations that include the RID MessageType as a search parameter, in addition to the aforementioned IODEF schema elements, as contained within the <ReportSchema> element.
Implementers MUST fully qualify all OpenSearch URL template parameter names using the defined IODEF or RID XML namespaces, as appropriate.
The "/" resource MAY be provided for compatibility with existing deployments that are using Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546]. Consistent with RFC6546 errata, a client requesting a GET on "/" MUST receive an HTTP status code 405 Method Not Allowed. An implementation MAY provide full support for RFC6546 such that a POST to "/" containing a recognized RID message type just works. Alternatively, a client requesting a POST to "/" MAY receive an HTTP status code 307 Temporary Redirect. In this case, the location header in the HTTP response will provide the URL of the appropriate RID endpoint, and the client may repeat the POST method at the indicated location. This resource could also leverage the new draft by reschke that proposes HTTP status code 308 (cf: draft-reschke-http-status-308-07.txt).
This document defines a resource-oriented approach to lightweight information exchange using HTTP, TLS, Atom Syndicate Format, and Atom Publishing Protocol. As such, implementers must understand the security considerations described in those specifications.
In addition, there are a number of additional security considerations that are unique to this specification.
The approach described herein is based upon all policy enforcements being implemented at the point when a resource representation is created. As such, producers sharing cyber security information using this specification must take care to authenticate their HTTP clients using a suitably strong user authentication mechanism. Sharing communities that are exchanging information on well-known indicators and incidents for purposes of public education may choose to rely upon, e.g. HTTP Authentication, or similar. However, sharing communities that are engaged in sensitive collaborative analysis and/or operational response for indicators and incidents targeting high value information systems should adopt a suitably stronger user authentication solution, such as TLS client certificates, or a risk-based or multi-factor approach. In general, trust in the sharing consortium will depend upon the members maintaining adequate user authentication mechanisms.
Collaborating consortiums may benefit from the adoption of a federated identity solution, such as those based upon SAML-core [SAML-core] and SAML-bind [SAML-bind] and SAML-prof [SAML-prof] for Web-based authentication and cross-organizational single sign-on. Dependency on a trusted third party identity provider implies that appropriate care must be exercised to sufficiently secure the Identity provider. Any attacks on the federated identity system would present a risk to the CISRT, as a relying party. Potential mitigations include deployment of a federation-aware identity provider that is under the control of the information sharing consortium, with suitably stringent technical and management controls.
Authorization of resource representations is the responsibility of the source system, i.e. based on the authenticated user identity associated with an HTTP(S) request. The required authorization policies that are to be enforced must therefore be managed by the security administrators of the source system. Various authorization architectures would be suitable for this purpose, such as RBAC and/or ABAC, as embodied in XACML [XACML]. In particular, implementers adopting XACML may benefit from the capability to represent their authorization policies in a standardized, interoperable format.
Additional security requirements such as enforcing message-level security at the destination system could supplement the security enforcements performed at the source system, however these destination-provided policy enforcements are out of scope for this specification. Implementers requiring this capability should consider leveraging, e.g. the <RIDPolicy> element in the RID schema. Refer to RFC6545 section 9 for more information.
When security policies relevant to the source system are to be enforced at both the source and destination systems, implementers must take care to avoid unintended interactions of the separately enforced policies. Potential risks will include unintended denial of service and/or unintended information leakage. These problems may be mitigated by avoiding any dependence upon enforcements performed at the destination system. When distributed enforcement is unavoidable, the usage of a standard language (e.g. XACML) for the expression of authorization policies will enable the source and destination systems to better coordinate and align their respective policy expressions.
Adoption of the information sharing approach described in this document will enable users to more easily perform correlations across separate, and potentially unrelated, cyber security information providers. A client may succeed in assembling a data set that would not have been permitted within the context of the authorization policies of either provider when considered individually. Thus, providers may face a risk of an attacker obtaining an access that constitutes an undetected separation of duties (SOD) violation. It is important to note that this risk is not unique to this specification, and a similar potential for abuse exists with any other cyber security information sharing protocol. However, the wide availability of tools for HTTP clients and Atom feed handling implies that the resources and technical skills required for a successful exploit may be less than it was previously. This risk can be best mitigated through appropriate vetting of the client at account provisioning time. In addition, any increase in the risk of this type of abuse should be offset by the corresponding increase in effectiveness that this specification affords to the defenders.
While it is a goal of this specification to enable more agile cyber security information sharing across a broader and varying constituency, there is nothing in this specification that necessarily requires this type of deployment. A cyber security information sharing consortium may chose to adopt this specification while continuing to operate as a gated community with strictly limited membership.
TODO.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of Tom Maguire, Kathleen Moriarty, and Vijayanand Bharadwaj. These individuals provided detailed review comments on earlier drafts, and many suggestions that have helped to improve this document .
| [XACML] | Rissanen, E., "eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 3.0", August 2010. |
| [REST] | Fielding, R., "Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures", 2000. |
| [RFC6546] | Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546, DOI 10.17487/RFC6546, April 2012. |
Changes since draft-field-mile-rolie-01 version, December, 2015 to May 27, 2016:
Changes made in draft-ietf-mile-rolie-01 since draft-field-mile-rolie-02 version, August 15, 2013 to December 2, 2015: