| NETCONF Working Group | K. Watsen |
| Internet-Draft | Juniper Networks |
| Intended status: Standards Track | October 17, 2017 |
| Expires: April 20, 2018 |
YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-03
This document defines a YANG module for a system-level mechanism, called a "keystore", containing security-sensitive data including private keys, pinned certificates, and pinned SSH host-keys.
This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
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Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for a system-level mechanism, herein called a "keystore". The keystore provides a centralized location for security sensitive data, as described below.
This module has the following characteristics:
Special consideration has been given for systems that have Trusted Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that the TPM must be directed to generate new keys (it is not possible to load a key into a TPM) and it is not possible to backup/restore the TPM's private keys as configuration.
It is not required that a system has an operating system level keystore utility to implement this module.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as follows:
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option, would enable a backwards compatible solution.
In order to use YANG identities for algorithm identifiers, only the most commonly used RSA key lengths are supported for the RSA algorithm. Additional key lengths can be defined in another module or added into a future version of this document.
This document limits the number of elliptical curves supported. This was done to match industry trends and IETF best practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional algorithms are needed, they can be defined by another module or added into a future version of this document.
For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.
module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore
+--rw keys
| +--rw key* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw algorithm identityref
| | +--rw private-key union
| | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw certificates
| | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw value? binary
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | +---w input
| | | +---w subject binary
| | | +---w attributes? binary
| | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
| +---x generate-private-key
| +---w input
| +---w name string
| +---w algorithm identityref
+--rw pinned-certificates* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string
| +--rw pinned-certificate* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw data binary
+--rw pinned-host-keys* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw description? string
+--rw pinned-host-key* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw data binary
notifications:
+---n certificate-expiration
+--ro certificate instance-identifier
+--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time
The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram.
The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore might look like. This keystore has three keys, four sets of trusted certificates, and one set of trusted host keys.
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<keys>
<key>
<name>ex-rsa-key</name>
<algorithm>rsa1024</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
<key>
<name>tls-ec-key</name>
<algorithm>secp256r1</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>tls-ec-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
<key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
</keys>
<!-- Manufacturer's trust root CA certs -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Certificates built into the device for authenticating
manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates,
vouchers, etc.. Note, though listed here, these are not
configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 1</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 2</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>
<!-- pinned netconf/restconf client certificates -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
<description>
Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly
trusted clients. These are needed for client certificates
that are not signed by a pinned CA.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>George Jetson</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>
<!-- pinned netconf/restconf server certificates -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name>
<description>
Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly
trusted servers. These are needed for server certificates
that are not signed by a pinned CA.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>Fred Flintstone</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for authenticating clients -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate
client connections. Clients are authenticated if their
certificate has a chain of trust to one of these configured
CA certificates.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>ca.example.com</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>common-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
These certificates are similar to those that might be
shipped with a web browser.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>
<!-- pinned SSH host keys -->
<pinned-host-keys>
<name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
<description>
Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers.
These host keys would be analogous to those stored in
a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
</description>
<pinned-host-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-host-key>
</pinned-host-keys>
</keystore>
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
-------
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<keys>
<key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<generate-certificate-signing-request>
<subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
<attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
</generate-certificate-signing-request>
</key>
</keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<certificate-signing-request
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
base64encodedvalue==
</certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
-------
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<keys>
<generate-private-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">ks:secp521r1</algorithm>
</generate-private-key>
</keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<ok/>
</rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<certificate xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
/ks:keystore/ks:keys/ks:key[ks:name='ex-rsa-key']/ks:certificates/ks:certificate[ks:name='ex-rsa-cert']
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] and [RFC6991]. This module uses data types defined in [RFC2315], [RFC2986], [RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5915], and [ITU.X690.1994]. This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-10-18.yang"
module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix "ks";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access
Control Model";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module defines a keystore to centralize management
of security credentials.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2017-10-18" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
// Identities
identity key-algorithm {
description
"Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
}
identity rsa1024 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa2048 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa3072 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa4096 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa7680 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa15360 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity secp192r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp192r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp256r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp256r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp384r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp384r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp521r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp521r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
// protocol accessible nodes
container keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"The keystore contains private keys, X.509 certificates, and
SSH host keys.";
container keys {
description
"A list of public-private key pairs.";
list key {
key name;
description
"A public-private key pair.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the key.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically, this
leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key'
binary leafs are encoded.";
}
leaf private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type union {
type binary;
type enumeration {
enum "hardware-protected" {
description
"The private key is inaccessible due to being
protected by a cryptographic hardware module
(e.g., a TPM).";
}
}
}
mandatory true;
description
"A binary that contains the value of the private key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
leaf public-key {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
[RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
container certificates {
description
"Certificates associated with this private key. More
than one certificate per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate {
key name;
description
"A certificate for this private key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate. The name
must be unique across all keys, not just within
this key, as otherwise leafrefs to a certificate
might be ambiguous.";
}
leaf value {
type binary;
description
"A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
(no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.
This structure contains the certificate itself as well
as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY
be included as well.";
reference
"RFC 2315:
PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated private key using the passed subject and
attribute values. The specified assertions need to be
appropriate for the certificate's use. For example,
an entity certificate for a TLS server SHOULD have
values that enable clients to satisfy RFC 6125
processing.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary;
description
"The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC
2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
} // end key
action generate-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to
support cryptographic processors that must generate
the private key themselves. The resulting key is
considered operational state and hence only present
in the <operational>.";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name the key should have when listed in
/keys/key, in <operational>.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
mandatory true;
description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
}
}
} // end generate-private-key
} // end keys
list pinned-certificates {
key name;
description
"A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be
used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients to
authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates
SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole
may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a
NETCONF server's configuration might use a specific list
of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF
client connections.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary description for this list of pinned
certificates.";
}
list pinned-certificate {
key name;
description
"A pinned certificate.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The
name must be unique across all lists of pinned
certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs
from another module can resolve to unique values.";
}
leaf data {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
list pinned-host-keys {
key name;
description
"A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can
be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each
list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose,
so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules.
For instance, a NETCONF client's configuration might
point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when
authenticating specific SSH servers.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host
keys.";
}
list pinned-host-key {
key name;
description
"A pinned host key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be
unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just
this list) so that a leafref to it from another module
can resolve to unique values.";
}
leaf data {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
string certificate or public key format
identifier
byte[n] key/certificate data.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol";
}
}
}
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month
for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once
a day thereafter.";
leaf certificate {
type instance-identifier;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
}
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the following registration is requested:
name: ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore prefix: ks reference: RFC VVVV
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balázs Kovács, David Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.