| NETCONF Working Group | K. Watsen |
| Internet-Draft | S. Hanna |
| Intended status: Standards Track | Juniper Networks |
| Expires: April 30, 2015 | J. Clarke |
| Cisco Systems | |
| M. Abrahamsson | |
| T-Systems | |
| October 27, 2014 |
Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home (ZeroTouch)
draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-01
This draft presents a technique for establishing a secure NETCONF connection between a newly deployed IP-based device, configured with just its factory default settings, and the new owner's Network Management System (NMS).
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2015.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
A fundamental business requirement is to reduce operational costs where possible. Deploying new IP-based devices is many times one of the largest costs in running a network, as sending trained specialists to each site to do an installation is both cost prohibitive and does not scale.
Both networking vendors and standard bodies have tried to address this issue, with varying levels of success. For instance, the Broadband Forum TR-069 specification [TR069] relies solely on DHCP for NMS discovery, but this can only work in environments where the DHCP server is locally administered, which is not the case when the device is connected to an ISP's network. In another example, some network vendors have enabled their devices to load an initial configuration from removable storage media (e.g., a USB flash drive), but not all devices have such ports.
The solution presented herein, ZeroTouch, enables a device to securely obtain an initial configuration from the network without any operator intervention. The discovered configuration initiates the device to "call home" using either SSH or TLS, as described in [NETCONF-CALL-HOME].
fetches Configlet and
+----------+ boot-image, if needed
+------------| Device |---------------------+
| +----------+ |
| ^ |
| | V
| call home | manufactures +----------+
| | with necessary | Config |
| | default state | Server |<----+
| | for ZeroTouch +----------+ |
| | |
| | |
| +----------+ delegates trust |
| | Vendor |-------------------+ |
| +----------+ | |
| ^ ^ | |
| | | V |
| | | +----------+ |
| imports | | validate owner | Config | |
| trust | +-----------------| Signer | |
| anchor | +----------+ |
| | ^ |
| | | |
| +---------+ requests signing | |
+----------->| NMS |--------------------+ |
+---------+ |
| |
+----------------------------------------+
signed Configlet and boot-image file
Though not represented as a box in the diagram, the Configlet is also a first-class object in the solution.
A Configuration Server is the entity hosting configurations that can be downloaded over a network. This section describes the service interface a Configuration Server MUST implement as well as what's needed for transport security.
Configuration Servers are known to devices in the form of a URI. Configuration Servers MUST support the URI schemes "https" and "http". Other URI schemes are not supported.
When accessing a Configuration Server, the device appends its unique device identifier (UID) to the URI. The unique identifier MUST be the same as the identifier stored within the device's IDevID certificate, which is described in Section 4.2.
http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/
https://example.com/zerotouch?id=
http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/<uid>
https://example.com/zerotouch?id=<uid>
For instance, if the URI were:
When accessing the Configuration Server, the HTTP Accept-Type MUST be set to either "application/zerotouch-configlet" or "application/zerotouch-bootimage". Please see Section 9.2. A wildcard Accept-Type (e.g., */*) SHOULD default to "application/zerotouch-configlet".
The Configuration server SHOULD provide a user-facing interface to enable the end-user to provide a Configlet and, optionally, a bootimage file. How the Configlet and bootimage file are provided to the Configuration Server is outside the scope of this document.
As described in Section 3, configurations MUST be signed and MAY be encrypted. As such, transport-level security is not needed to assure authenticity or confidentiality of the configuration itself. However, transport-level security enables devices to authenticate the Configuration Server and also extends confidentiality to the application-level protocol. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that only secure URL schemes are used (see Section 2.1).
If a Configuration Server uses X.509-based encryption, then its X.509 certificate MUST have a chain of trust to a trust anchor known to devices (see Section 4.2. More specifically, the Configuration Server MUST possess all the intermediate certificates leading to the trust anchor.
When a Configuration Server negotiates encryption with the device, it provides the chain of certificates, from its server specific certificate to, but not including, its trust anchor. Including the trust anchor's certificate is unnecessary since the device MUST be pre-provisioned with it. Devices need the chain of certificates to be passed so they can validate the server using only a simple list of Configuration Server trust anchors.
An expiration policy is needed to limit how long a Configuration Server needs to retain a configuration and, in turn, how many configurations it might need to retain at a given time.
It is expected that Configuration Servers will enable retention information to be given at the same time as when the configuration is provided to it. Options should be temporal in nature, not based on access counts, so as to thwart a DoS attack whereby the configuration is accessed by an entity other than the device. Configuration Servers SHOULD put a limit on the maximum amount of time it will hold onto a configuration before purging it, even if the configuration had never been accessed.
In order to facilitate troubleshooting and auditing, the Configuration Server SHOULD record into a log a record of the various Configlet download requests. This draft does not define what information should be kept or for how long.
A Configuration Signer MUST be able to sign configurations. This function requires the Configuration Signer be able to authenticate that the requestor is the true owner of the device, as identified within the contents of the configuration being signed.
The user interface a Configuration Signer provides to perform its role is outside the scope of this document. However, in order to meet operational expectations, the time it takes to respond to a request should be as expeditious as possible.
A Configuration Signer does not need to retain a configuration after signing it. The Configuration Signer SHOULD retain an audit log for indemnification purposes.
A Configuration Signer MUST have an X.509 certificate with Key Usage capable of signing data (digitalSignature) and be signed by a certificate authority having a chain of trust leading to a trust anchor known to the devices loading its Configlets. The Configuration Signer MUST possess all intermediate certificates leading to its trust anchor.
When a Configuration Signer signs a Configlet, it attaches both the signature and the chain of X.509 certificates, including its own, but not necessarily including the trust anchor's certificate. This chain of certificates is needed so a device can validate a Configlet using only the Configuration Signer trust anchors known to it.
A Configuration Signer MAY optionally encrypt configurations prior to signing them. This function requires the Configuration Signer know the device's unique public key, as encoded within its secure device identity certificate.
A device's vendor is the root of trust for all of its devices. That is, the vendor's devices implicitly trust the vendor for such things as software images, subscription updates, and licenses. As such, the vendor is the ultimate Configuration Signer for its devices.
However, both vendors and its customers may prefer that this role be performed by another entity. For instance, a vendor may not want this role due to it being outside its primary business function, and customers may not want the vendor to have this role for privacy reasons.
It is therefore provided that a vendor MAY delegate the Configuration Signer role to other entities. Using X.509 certificates, the Vendor need only sign the delegate's certificate signing request (CSR), providing back to the delegate a signed X.509 certificate authenticating its ability to perform the signing function.
In order enable a delegate to fulfill its operational role, as described in Section 3.1, the vendor MUST provide a mechanism that can be used to authenticate if a given requestor is the true owner of a specific device. Additionally, to support Configuration Signers that want to encrypt configurations, the vendor MUST also provide a means for the Configuration Signer to know the public key for a given device. How the vendor provides this information to Configuration Signers is outside the scope of this document.
The general expectation is that the Configuration Signer is an impartial 3rd-party. However, certain deployments may want to be able to perform the function for themselves. Yet without constraints, that deployment could sign configurations for devices that do not belong to it.
Resolving this concern is possible when 1) the deployment specific Configuration Signer's certificate is annotated with a customer identifier and 2) the devices sold to that customer have that same identifier encoded into their secure device identifier.
This entails the vendor augmenting its manufacturing process for these special devices, which would likely be sold directly to the customer, as opposed to through a sales channel. This takes extraordinary effort and likely only implemented for the most important customers, if at all.
While the wholistic solution, ZeroTouch, involves a number of entities, a device being powered-on is the essential event that sets things in motion.
Whenever a device boots with its factory default settings, it initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of finding a configuration to initialize itself with. Once a configuration is found, the device initializes its running datastore with it and then enters normal operation. Since the configuration initializes the device to call home upon entering its normal operating mode, the device immediately begins trying to establish a secure connection with the deployment specific NMS.
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ | <device> | | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | <immutable storage> | | | | | | | | list of Configuration Signer trust anchor certs | | | | list of Configuration Server trust anchor certs | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | | | <other storage> | | | | | | | | two sets of Configuration Server URIs | | | | IDevID entity & associated intermediate certificate(s) | | | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +----------------------+ | | | <secure storage> | | | | | | | | IDevID private key | | | +----------------------+ | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------+
Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST have a manufacturer-provisioned secure device identifier, as defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009]. This identifier is known by the IEEE standard as the Initial Device Identifier (IDevID). The IDevID includes both an X.509 certificate, encoding a globally unique per-device identifier, and a chain of X.509 certificates leading to the manufacturer's well-known trust anchor. The IDevID is needed in order for the NMS to positively authenticate a device. The IDevID certificate MUST be used by the NETCONF server as its SSH host-key (see [RFC6187]) or its TLS server certificate, depending on which protocol is used.
Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST be pre-provisioned with one or more URIs for Internet-based Configuration Servers. These URIs SHOULD be partitioned into one set that contains secure schemes (e.g. https://) and another set that contains insecure schemes (e.g., http://). The reason for partitioning the URIs is so all the secure schemes can attempted before any of the insecure schemes (see Section 4.3). When using a secure scheme, the Configuration Server MUST be authenticated using a trust anchor the device possesses. As each Configuration Server may use a different trust anchor, this generalizes to a list of Configuration Server trust anchor certificates.
In order to verify the signature on retrieved configurations, devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST also possess the trust anchor for the Configuration Signer that signed the configuration. Generally, only the manufacturer's trust anchor is needed, as it can then delegate trust for 3rd-party Configuration Signers (see Section 3.4). However, for various reasons, there may be a need for more than one root anchor and therefore this generalizes to a list of Configuration Signer trust anchor certificates.
Devices SHOULD ensure that the certificates for its trust anchors are protected from external modification. It is for this reason that the diagram shows the Configuration Signer and Configuration Server certificates in immutable storage. Similarly, per [Std-802.1AR-2009], the IDevID private key shall be stored confidentially and not available outside the IDevID module, hence the diagram shows it is held within secure storage.
DEVICE DHCP CONFIGURATION NMS
| SERVER/RELAY SERVERS |
| | | |
+-->| | | |
| | | | |
| |--[if running config != factory default, boot normally]--+ |
| | | | | |
<---------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |--(discovery)-->| [if no dhcp server found, boot normally] |
| | | | |
| | +---(offer)---| | |
| | | | | |
| | +--[add any listed config servers to built-in list]--+ |
| | | | | |
| |<------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | (iterate until match, else boot normally) | |
| |------------------------------------------------>| |
| | | | |
| |<------------------------------(zerotouch info)--| |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |--[if current image != expected, get image]----->| |
| | | | |
| | +-------------------------------------(image)--| |
| | | | | |
| | +--[if image valid, install & reboot]--+ | |
| | | | | |
+---------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
|--[get config]---------------------------------->| |
| | | |
| +------------------------------------(config)--| |
| | | | |
| +--[if config valid, merge into running]--+ | |
| | | | |
| +--------------------------------------+ | |
| | | | |
| +--[per new configuration, call home]----------------->|
| | | |
| | | |
Whenever a device boots with its factory default settings, it initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of finding a configuration that will enable it to call home to its deployment-specific NMS.
The process begins with the device using the DHCP protocol to obtain a dynamic assignment for its networking stack. When broadcasting the DISCOVERY request, the device may provide any DHCP options to identify itself or the type of device it is (e.g. IPV4 options 60 or 61).
If the DHCP servers reside on a locally administered network (see Section 1.3), then their OFFER responses MAY include the ZeroTouch Information DHCP option defined in Section 9.1, as well as the legacy DHCP options for TFTP server name, bootfile name, and/or vendor specific information (e.g. IPv4 options 43, 66, 67).
If a DHCP server provides both the ZeroTouch Information and the vendor specific information DHCP options, then the ZeroTouch Information option MUST be processed first. After exhausting all ZeroTouch options without being able to call home, a device MAY then process the information provided by the legacy DHCP options.
The ZeroTouch Information option Section 9.1 provides a set of Configuration Server URIs. If returned by the DHCP server, the device MUST append each URI to the end of one of its two sets of Configuration Server URIs, depending on if the URI's scheme is secure or not. URIs added this way MUST remain distinguishable from those URIs the device was shipped with, for reasons discussed next.
The device then iterates over its two sets of Configuration Server URIs. The device MUST first try all the URIs from the set having secure schemes before trying any of the URIs from the set having insecure schemes. For each URI, until a match is found and successfully loaded, the device attempts to initialize itself from the URI. If the URI uses a secure scheme (e.g., https), the device MUST validate the Configuration Server's certificate using one of its Configuration Server trust anchors. If the device is unable to verify the server's certificate, the device MUST skip that URI. If the device reaches the end of all its URIs without finding a usable match, it SHOULD continue its normal boot sequence using its factory default configuration.
When the device is accessing a Configuration Server URI that it was shipped with (i.e. not discovered while initializing its networking), it MUST do so by appending its UID to the URI string and using the Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-configlet", as described in Section 2. For URIs discovered via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device MAY also try the raw URI after trying the permutation using its UID.
If the Configuration Server returns a configuration, the device MUST first verify it before use. Configuration verification entails both verifying the configuration's signature using the device's list of Configuration Signer trust anchors, and also verifying that the unique identifier within the Configlet matches the device's unique identifier.
Once the configuration is authenticated, the device MUST compare its software image version with the expected version specified within the configuration. If there is a mismatch, the device MUST download the correct image version from the Configuration Server, by appending its UID to the Configuration Server's URI string and using the Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-bootimage", as described in Section 2. For URIs discovered via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device MAY also try the raw URI after first trying the permutation using its UID. Once the image has been downloaded, the device MUST install it and reboot, still with the factory default settings configured, so that ZeroTouch restarts when the device comes back up.
If the device is running the correct software image version, it merges the Configlet's contents into its running configuration. This step effectively modifies the device so that it is no longer having its factory default setting. Thus, at this point, a reboot is no longer expected to start the ZeroTouch process.
Though not technically required, the Configlet is presumed to have configured the device to "call home". As soon as this configuration is merged into the running configuration, the device SHOULD immediately begin trying to establish the call home connection, as specified by the Configlet.
If configured to establish a SSH connection, the the device MUST use its IDevID and associated intermediate X.509 certificates as its host key per RFC 6187 [RFC6187]. If configured to establish a TLS connection, the device MUST use its IDevID and associated intermediate X.509 certificates as its server-side certificate for the TLS connection.
In order to facilitate troubleshooting, the device SHOULD record into a log information relating to its stepping through the ZeroTouch sequence of steps. This draft does not define any specific log messages, for instance, for Syslog or SNMP.
The NMS is the ultimate destination of ZeroTouch for a device. It is the NMS's network address configured in the Configlet. The device will initiate a call home connection to the NMS, using either SSH or TLS, as configured by the Configlet loaded.
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ | <nsm> | | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | <immutable storage> | | | | | | | | list of IDevID trust anchor certificates | | | | list of expected device unique identifiers | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +--------------------------------------------------+ | | | <secure storage> | | | | | | | | map of device identifiers to login credentials | | | +--------------------------------------------------+ | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------+
In order to authenticate the device, the NMS MUST possess the X.509 certificate for the trust anchor leading to the device's entity certificate. The NMS uses this certificate to validate the server-certificate the device presents during SSH or TLS transport negotiation. Because an NMS may interoperate with multiple vendors, and a vendor may have more than one trust anchor for signing its devices IDevID certificates, this generalizes into the NMS needing a list of trust anchor certificates. This certificates SHOULD be stored in a way that prevents tampering, which is why they are shown in immutable storage in the diagram.
In order for the NMS to validate that the specific device connecting to it is expected, it MUST have a list of unique device identifiers that it can use to validate the device's IDevID certificate with. The list SHOULD be protected from external modification, which is why it is shown in immutable storage in the diagram. In order for the NMS to know the unique identifiers, device manufacturers will need to provide a mechanism to convey this information to its customers. This draft not specify a format for this information exchange.
In addition to authenticating the device, the NMS must also authenticate itself to the device. How this is done is deployment specific, but generalizes to the NMS needing to have login credentials for each device. These credentials will entail knowing a secret (e.g., password, private key). For this reason the diagram shows the NMS storing a map of device credentials in secure storage.
When receiving a NETCONF call home connection from a device, the NSM completes the connection as specified NETCONF Call Home [NETCONF-CALL-HOME].
In order for a Vendor's customers to configure their NMSs with what devices are expected, as well as to know how to set the "unique-identifier" field within a Configlet when requesting a signing, Vendors need to provide a mechanism for customers to obtain the unique identifier value for the devices they have ordered. For instance, customers could receive emails containing shipping information for their devices.
Additionally, to facilitate workflows where the devices are initially received by a customer-specific warehouse, or moved after having been unboxed, it is ideal for the unique identifier to be easily tracked through labels affixed to the device as well as the box it is packaged in. A device's serial number is commonly treated this way and would be suitable for this purpose, so long as it is directly related to its IDevID identity.
In order for Configuration Signers to validate that a requestor is the true owner of a device (i.e. its IDevID identity), Vendors need to provide a mechanism enabling a near real-time lookup. The interface used to implement this lookup is outside the scope of this document.
A Configlet is an XML file, containing specific YANG-defined configuration, that has been signed by a trusted signer known to the device (e.g., the device's manufacturer).
The Configlet data-model, defined by the XSD schema in Section 7.5, contains information for the device to ensure that it's safe for it to load the configlet (i.e. target-requirements) along with a payload, the configuration the device is to merge into its running datastore.
In order for the device to call home, the configuration contained within the Configlet MUST at least configure a local user account and configure the connection information for the NMS the device is to call home to. This configuration MAY use IETF-defined modules "ietf-system" [RFC7317] and "ietf-netconf-server" [NETCONF-SERVER-MODEL].
The signature on the Configlet is enveloped, meaning that the signature is contained inside the XML file itself. The signature block also contains the X.509 certificate of the Configuration Signer and its chain of trust.
Once a device authenticates the signature on a Configlet and matches the unique identifier (e.g., serial number) within the Configlet, it merges the configuration contained in the Configlet into its running datastore.
module: ietf-netconf-zerotouch
+--rw configlet
+--rw target-requirements
| +--rw unique-identifier string
| +--rw software-version string
+--rw configuration
The Configlet's data model is no more than a wrapper around a header (i.e. <target-requirements>) and a payload (i.e. <configuration>).
The <target-requirements> element contains information that MUST be validated by the device prior to processing the <configuration> element. Specifically, it contains:
The <configuration> element contains the configuration that is to be committed to the device's running datastore. This element uses the "anyxml" type, enabling it to contain either vendor-specific or standards-based data models. When using standard models, in order to complete a call home connection, only the following is needed:
All Configlets MUST be signed by a Configuration Signer in order to be authentic. Devices MUST reject any Configlet that is either unsigned or having an invalid signature. Configlets are signed using the W3C standard "XML Signature Syntax and Processing" [XMLSIG]. The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be signed. The signature block must also include the Configuration Signer's certificate and any intermediate certificates leading to a Configuration Signer trust anchor. A signed Configlet example is in section Appendix A.2.
Configlets MAY optionally be encrypted prior to being signed. Encrypting the Configlet provides confidentiality for the Configlet's contents without relying on transport-level security. Configlets are encrypted using the W3C standard "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing" [XMLENC]. The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be encrypted. An encrypted Configlet example is in section Appendix A.4.
Following is the XSD for the Configlet:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ietf-netconf-zerotouch"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ietf-netconf-zerotouch"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<xs:element name="configlet">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="target-requirements">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="unique-identifier" type="xs:string">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
Specifies the unique identifier of the device that
is to process this Configlet. The value MUST be
the same as the 'subject' field in the device's
DevID credential, as specified by section 7.2.8
in IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="software-version" type="xs:string">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
In order to process this Configlet, the device
MUST must be running this version of software.
The value is device-specific, but it MUST be
an exact match (e.g., 14.1R2.5)
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="configuration">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
The configuration to be committed to the device's
running datastore. The configuration MUST be valid
for the target device.
Devices supporting ZeroTouch SHOULD support the
following standard data-models:
ietf-system // RFC 7317
ietf-netconf-server // RFC YYYY
These two data models contain everything needed to
support NETCONF call home using either SSH or TLS.
References:
RFC 7317: A YANG Data Model for System Management
RFC YYYY: NETCONF Server Configuration Model
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:any processContents="skip"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
Devices SHOULD ensure that all its trust anchor certificates, including those for the Configuration Signer and Configuration Server, are protected from external modification. It is for this reason that the diagram in Section 4.2 shows them in immutable storage.
However, it may be necessary to update these certificates over time (e.g., the vendor wants to delegate trust to a new CA). It is therefore expected that devices MAY update these trust anchors when needed through a verifiable process, such as a software upgrade using signed software images.
It is generally not possible to substitute a Configlet created for a different device, since devices assert that the Configlet contains their unique identifier (e.g., serial number).
However, it is possible to substitute a Configlet created for a device with a different Configlet created for the same device. Generally, unless imposed by the Configuration Signers, there is no limit to the number of Configlets that may be generated for a given device. This could be resolved, in part, by placing a timestamp into the Configlet and ensuring devices do not load Configlets older than some amount, but this requires the devices have an accurate clock when validating a Configlet and for Configuration Signers to not sign a Configlet when another Configlet is still active.
This draft allows devices to use insecure schemes when doing a Configuration Server lookup. This is deemed acceptable because the Configlet is tamper-proof, since it MUST be signed, only confidentiality is lost.
Confidentiality of a Configlet's contents is assured when either the Configlet is encrypted or when the a secure scheme is used when accessing the Configuration Server.
Some confidentiality is lost when an insecure scheme is used to access a Configuration Server, as then the device's unique identifier is in the clear.
Given the fairly regular format for unique identifiers, it is possible that an adversary to guess unique identifiers and access a device's Configlet. Configlets that have been encrypted do not disclose any confidential information.
Section 7.2.7.2 of the IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009 standard says that IDevID certificate should never expire (i.e. having a notAfter 99991231235959Z). Given the long-lived nature of these certificates, it is paramount to use a strong key length (e.g., 512-bit ECC). Vendors SHOULD deploy Online Certificate State Protocol (OCSP) responders or CRL Distribution Points (CDP) to revoke certificates in case necessary.
This draft mentions using the device's serial number as its unique identifier in its IDevID certificate. This is because serial numbers are ubiquitous and prominently contained in invoices and on labels affixed to devices and their packaging. That said, serial numbers many times encode revealing information, such as the device's model number, manufacture date, and/or sequence number. Knowledge of this information may provide an adversary with details needed to launch an attack. To address this concern, the certificate could contain the hash of the serial number instead, which the NMS could also compute, but doing so is much less intuitive and raises questions if it is just security through obscurity.
The following registration is in accordance to RFC 2939 for "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options" registry maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters.
Tag: XXX
Name: Zero Touch Information
Description: Returns a list of null-terminated Configuration
Server URIs
Code Len
+-----+-----+------+------+----
| XXX | n | url1 | url2 | ...
+-----+-----+------+------+----
Reference: RFC XXXX
Tag: YYY
Name: Zero Touch Information
Description: Returns a list of null-terminated Configuration
Server URIs
Code Len
+-----+-----+------+------+----
| YYY | n | url1 | url2 | ...
+-----+-----+------+------+----
Reference: RFC XXXX
The following registrations are in accordance to RFC 6838.
Type name: application
Subtype name: zerotouch-configlet
Required parameters: None
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: 8-bit
Security considerations: See Security Considerations in RFC XXXX
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: RFC XXXX
Applications that use this media type:
Configuration servers and NETCONF servers.
Fragment identifier considerations: None
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): xml
Macintosh file type code(s): 'TEXT'
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kent Watsen <kwatsen@juniper.net>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Author:
This specification is a work item of the IETF NETCONF working
group, with mailing list address <netconf@ietf.org>.
Change controller: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No
Type name: application
Subtype name: zerotouch-bootimage
Required parameters: None
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See Security Considerations in RFC XXXX
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: RFC XXXX
Applications that use this media type:
Configuration servers and NETCONF servers.
Fragment identifier considerations: None
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): None
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kent Watsen <kwatsen@juniper.net>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Author:
This specification is a work item of the IETF NETCONF working
group, with mailing list address <netconf@ietf.org>.
Change controller: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): David Harrington, Dean Bogdanovic, Martin Bjorklund, Wes Hardaker, Russ Mundy, Reinaldo Penno, Randy Presuhn, Juergen Schoenwaelder.
Special thanks goes to Russ Mundy and Wes Hardaker for brainstorming the original I-D's solution during the IETF 87 meeting in Berlin.
| [NETCONF-CALL-HOME] | Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home (work in progress)", October 2014. |
| [NETCONF-SERVER-MODEL] | Watsen, K., "NETCONF Server Model (work in progress)", September 2014. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC6187] | Igoe, K. and D. Stebila, "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication", RFC 6187, March 2011. |
| [RFC7317] | Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for System Management", RFC 7317, August 2014. |
| [Std-802.1AR-2009] | IEEE SA-Standards Board, IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", December 2009. |
| [XMLENC] | XML Encryption Syntax and Processing", April 2013. | , "
| [XMLSIG] | XML Signature Syntax and Processing", April 2013. | , "
| [TR069] | The Broadband Forum, , "TR-069 Amendment 3, CPE WAN Management Protocol", November 2010. |
This example illustrates a Configlet configuring both a local user account and call home using SSH. Note, this is not a valid Configlet because it isn't signed.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">
<target-requirements>
<unique-identifier>0123456789</unique-identifier>
<software-version>14.1R3.5</software-version>
</target-requirements>
<configuration>
<!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
<system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
<authentication>
<user>
<name>admin</name>
<ssh-key>
<name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
<algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
<key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRC
jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mwj
E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcC
WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5
vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWq
EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6
gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
</ssh-key>
</user>
</authentication>
</system>
<!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
<netconf-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
<call-home>
<application>
<name>config-mgr</name>
<ssh>
<endpoints>
<endpoint>
<name>east-data-center</name>
<address>11.22.33.44</address>
</endpoint>
<endpoint>
<name>west-data-center</name>
<address>55.66.77.88</address>
</endpoint>
</endpoints>
<host-keys>
<host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
</host-keys>
</ssh>
</application>
</call-home>
</netconf-server>
</configuration>
</configlet>
This example illustrates the above unsigned Configlet signed as if by a Configuration Signer. Note that in addition to the signature itself, the signed Configlet embeds two certificates, the chain of certificates from the signer's certificate up to but not including the trust anchor certificate.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">
<target-requirements>
<unique-identifier>0123456789</unique-identifier>
<software-version>14.1R3.5</software-version>
</target-requirements>
<configuration>
<!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
<system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
<authentication>
<user>
<name>admin</name>
<ssh-key>
<name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
<algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
<key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRC
jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mwj
E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcC
WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5
vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWq
EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6
gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
</ssh-key>
</user>
</authentication>
</system>
<!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
<netconf-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
<call-home>
<application>
<name>config-mgr</name>
<ssh>
<endpoints>
<endpoint>
<name>east-data-center</name>
<address>11.22.33.44</address>
</endpoint>
<endpoint>
<name>west-data-center</name>
<address>55.66.77.88</address>
</endpoint>
</endpoints>
<host-keys>
<host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
</host-keys>
</ssh>
</application>
</call-home>
</netconf-server>
</configuration>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<Reference>
<Transforms>
<Transform
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>t9OdNsxPsjyzrKu7kO0ydcFK6xU=</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>
AS/dlRNk/DDy2baDfQXspstvQzOxZo/goZ+Z9iiW5dbOZ+wiZwxMlJuMYlxuNrfL
o38JzJ+KnY1XexfRkFmSaaShyMJ0N9kianxaYWJgvF7+/lx5U6isFxpfIwvo9YkQ
27w/i9xb5e/tl+PzVr+FMKyUuyitdy5yjVGpa3y8Gqlk7YSo4df4LWzmR4hAYWTN
P7cuV516tHakKpyTi9FweBrqEUNT7W7BNb6Js0Q1twrEIR4lFwpQn/iWUM5KqxAu
QzP7YG/d58oWzdILeCXZ2CX3RHhhtm/Brwa9UFN9TFS3D9WLIx1pO+L0HNt5gIiu
eOMq1vN6sazkMtm6Z1NMqg==
</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<X509Data>
<X509Certificate>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</X509Certificate>
<X509Certificate>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</X509Certificate>
</X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</configlet>
This example illustrates the above unsigned Configlet that has been encrypted using the device's public key. Note, this is not a valid Configlet because it isn't signed.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">
<EncryptedData xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
<EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<CipherData>
<CipherValue>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</CipherValue>
</CipherData>
</EncryptedData>
</configlet>
This example illstrates the above encrypted Configlet that has been signed by a Configuration Signer's private key.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">
<EncryptedData xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
<EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<CipherData>
<CipherValue>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