| OAuth Working Group | T. Lodderstedt, Ed. |
| Internet-Draft | Deutsche Telekom AG |
| Intended status: Informational | M. McGloin |
| Expires: April 07, 2013 | IBM |
| P. Hunt | |
| Oracle Corporation | |
| October 6, 2012 |
OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-08
This document gives additional security considerations for OAuth, beyond those in the OAuth 2.0 specification, based on a comprehensive threat model for the OAuth 2.0 Protocol.
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This document gives additional security considerations for OAuth, beyond those in the OAuth specification, based on a comprehensive threat model for the OAuth 2.0 Protocol [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. It contains the following content:
Threats include any intentional attacks on OAuth tokens and resources protected by OAuth tokens as well as security risks introduced if the proper security measures are not put in place. Threats are structured along the lines of the protocol structure to aid development teams implement each part of the protocol securely. For example all threats for granting access or all threats for a particular grant type or all threats for protecting the resource server.
Note: This document cannot assess the probability nor the risk associated with a particular threat because those aspects strongly depend on the particular application and deployment OAuth is used to protect. Similar, impacts are given on a rather abstract level. But the information given here may serve as a foundation for deployment-specific threat models. Implementors may refine and detail the abstract threat model in order to account for the specific properties of their deployment and to come up with a risk analysis. As this document is based on the base OAuth 2.0 specification, itdoes not consider proposed extensions, such as client registration or discovery, many of which are still under discussion.
The security considerations document only considers clients bound to a particular deployment as supported by [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. Such deployments have the following characteristics:
The following are considered out of scope :
The following assumptions relate to an attacker and resources available to an attacker:
This section documents the assumptions about the features, limitations, and design options of the different entities of a OAuth deployment along with the security-sensitive data-elements managed by those entity. These assumptions are the foundation of the threat analysis.
The OAuth protocol leaves deployments with a certain degree of freedom how to implement and apply the standard. The core specification defines the core concepts of an authorization server and a resource server. Both servers can be implemented in the same server entity, or they may also be different entities. The later is typically the case for multi-service providers with a single authentication and authorization system, and are more typical in middleware architectures.
The following data elements are stored or accessible on the authorization server:
The following data elements are stored or accessible on the resource server:
It is assumed that a resource server has no knowledge of refresh tokens, user passwords, or client secrets.
In OAuth a client is an application making protected resource requests on behalf of the resource owner and with its authorization. There are different types of clients with different implementation and security characteristics, such as web, user-agent-based, and native applications. A full definition of the different client types and profiles is given in [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 2.1.
The following data elements are stored or accessible on the client:
These are some of the security features which have been built into the OAuth 2.0 protocol to mitigate attacks and security issues.
OAuth makes extensive use many kinds of tokens (access tokens, refresh tokens, authorization codes). The information content of a token can be represented in two ways as follows:
Tokens can be used in two ways to invoke requests on resource servers as follows:
A Scope represents the access authorization associated with a particular token with respect to resource servers, resources and methods on those resources. Scopes are the OAuth way to explicitly manage the power associated with an access token. A scope can be controlled by the authorization server and/or the end-user in order to limit access to resources for OAuth clients these parties deem less secure or trustworthy. Optionally, the client can request the scope to apply to the token but only for lesser scope than would otherwise be granted, e.g. to reduce the potential impact if this token is sent over non secure channels. A scope is typically complemented by a restriction on a token's lifetime.
The protocol parameter expires_in allows an authorization server (based on its policies or on behalf of the end-user) to limit the lifetime of an access token and to pass this information to the client. This mechanism can be used to issue short-living tokens to OAuth clients the authorization server deems less secure or where sending tokens over non secure channels.
An access token is used by a client to access a resource. Access tokens typically have short life-spans (minutes or hours) that cover typical session lifetimes. An access token may be refreshed through the use of a refresh token. The short lifespan of an access token in combination with the usage of refresh tokens enables the possibility of passive revocation of access authorization on the expiry of the current access token.
A refresh token represents a long-lasting authorization of a certain client to access resources on behalf of a resource owner. Such tokens are exchanged between client and authorization server, only. Clients use this kind of token to obtain ("refresh") new access tokens used for resource server invocations.
A refresh token, coupled with a short access token lifetime, can be used to grant longer access to resources without involving end user authorization. This offers an advantage where resource servers and authorization servers are not the same entity, e.g. in a distributed environment, as the refresh token is always exchanged at the authorization server. The authorization server can revoke the refresh token at any time causing the granted access to be revoked once the current access token expires. Because of this, a short access token lifetime is important if timely revocation is a high priority.
The refresh token is also a secret bound to the client identifier and client instance which originally requested the authorization and representing the original resource owner grant. This is ensured by the authorization process as follows:
So as long as the confidentiality of the particular token can be ensured by the client, a refresh token can also be used as an alternative means to authenticate the client instance itself..
An authorization code represents the intermediate result of a successful end-user authorization process and is used by the client to obtain access and refresh token. Authorization codes are sent to the client's redirection URI instead of tokens for two purposes.
A redirection URI helps to detect malicious clients and prevents phishing attacks from clients attempting to trick the user into believing the phisher is the client. The value of the actual redirection URI used in the authorization request has to be presented and is verified when an authorization code is exchanged for tokens. This helps to prevent attacks, where the authorization code is revealed through redirectors and counterfeit web application clients. The authorization server should require public clients and confidential clients using implicit grant type to pre-register their redirect URIs and validate against the registered redirection URI in the authorization request.
The state parameter is used to link requests and callbacks to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks (see Section 4.4.1.8) where an attacker authorizes access to his own resources and then tricks a users into following a redirect with the attacker's token. This parameter should bind to the authenticated state in a user agent and, as per the core OAuth spec, the user agent must be capable of keeping it in a location accessible only by the client and user agent, i.e. protected by same-origin policy.
Authentication protocols have typically not taken into account the identity of the software component acting on behalf of the end-user. OAuth does this in order to increase the security level in delegated authorization scenarios and because the client will be able to act without the user being present.
OAuth uses the client identifier to collate associated request to the same originator, such as
This identifier may also be used by the authorization server to display relevant registration information to a user when requesting consent for scope requested by a particular client. The client identifier may be used to limit the number of request for a particular client or to charge the client per request. It may furthermore be useful to differentiate access by different clients, e.g. in server log files.
OAuth defines two client types, confidential and public, based on their ability to authenticate with the authorization server (i.e. ability to maintain the confidentiality of their client credentials). Confidential clients are capable of maintaining the confidentiality of client credentials (i.e. a client secret associated with the client identifier) or capable of secure client authentication using other means, such as a client assertion (e.g. SAML) or key cryptography. The latter is considered more secure.
The authorization server should determine whether the client is capable of keeping its secret confidential or using secure authentication. Alternatively, the end-user can verify the identity of the client, e.g. by only installing trusted applications.The redicrection URI can be used to prevent delivering credentials to a counterfeit client after obtaining end-user authorization in some cases, but can't be used to verify the client identifier.
Clients can be categorized as follows based on the client type, profile (e.g. native vs. web application - see [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 9) and deployment model:
This section gives a comprehensive threat model of OAuth 2.0. Threats are grouped first by attacks directed against an OAuth component, which are client, authorization server, and resource server. Subsequently, they are grouped by flow, e.g. obtain token or access protected resources. Every countermeasure description refers to a detailed description in Section 5.
This section describes possible threats directed to OAuth clients.
The attacker could try to get access to the secret of a particular client in order to:
The resulting impact would be:
Depending on the client category, the following attacks could be utilized to obtain the client secret.
Attack: Obtain Secret From Source Code or Binary:
This applies for all client types. For open source projects, secrets can be extracted directly from source code in their public repositories. Secrets can be extracted from application binaries just as easily when published source is not available to the attacker. Even if an application takes significant measures to obfuscate secrets in their application distribution one should consider that the secret can still be reverse-engineered by anyone with access to a complete functioning application bundle or binary.
Countermeasures:
Attack: Obtain a Deployment-Specific Secret:
An attacker may try to obtain the secret from a client installation, either from a web site (web server) or a particular devices (native application).
Countermeasures:
Depending on the client type, there are different ways refresh tokens may be revealed to an attacker. The following sub-sections give a more detailed description of the different attacks with respect to different client types and further specialized countermeasures. Before detailing those threats, here are some generally applicable countermeasures:
Attack: Obtain Refresh Token from Web application:
An attacker may obtain the refresh tokens issued to a web application by way of overcoming the web server's security controls. Impact: Since a web application manages the user accounts of a certain site, such an attack would result in an exposure of all refresh tokens on that site to the attacker.
Countermeasures:
Attack: Obtain Refresh Token from Native clients:
On native clients, leakage of a refresh token typically affects a single user, only.
Read from local file system: The attacker could try get file system access on the device and read the refresh tokens. The attacker could utilize a malicious application for that purpose.
Countermeasures:
Attack: Steal device:
The host device (e.g. mobile phone) may be stolen. In that case, the attacker gets access to all applications under the identity of the legitimate user.
Countermeasures:
Attack: Clone Device:
All device data and applications are copied to another device. Applications are used as-is on the target device.
Countermeasures:
Depending on the client type, there are different ways access tokens may be revealed to an attacker. Access tokens could be stolen from the device if the application stores them in a storage, which is accessible to other applications.
Impact: Where the token is a bearer token and no additional mechanism is used to identify the client, the attacker can access all resources associated with the token and its scope.
Countermeasures:
A malicious application could attempt to phish end-user passwords by misusing an embedded browser in the end-user authorization process, or by presenting its own user-interface instead of allowing trusted system browser to render the authorization user interface. By doing so, the usual visual trust mechanisms may be bypassed (e.g. TLS confirmation, web site mechanisms). By using an embedded or internal client application user interface, the client application has access to additional information it should not have access to (e.g. uid/password).
Impact: If the client application or the communication is compromised, the user would not be aware and all information in the authorization exchange could be captured such as username and password.
Countermeasures:
An open redirector is an endpoint using a parameter to automatically redirect a user-agent to the location specified by the parameter value without any validation. If the authorization server allows the client to register only part of the redirection URI, an attacker can use an open redirector operated by the client to construct a redirection URI that will pass the authorization server validation but will send the authorization code or access token to an endpoint under the control of the attacker.
Impact: An attacker could gain access to authorization codes or access tokens
Countermeasure
OAuth makes no attempt to verify the authenticity of the Authorization Server. A hostile party could take advantage of this by intercepting the Client's requests and returning misleading or otherwise incorrect responses. This could be achieved using DNS or ARP spoofing. Wide deployment of OAuth and similar protocols may cause users to become inured to the practice of being redirected to websites where they are asked to enter their passwords. If users are not careful to verify the authenticity of these websites before entering their credentials, it will be possible for attackers to exploit this practice to steal Users' passwords.
Countermeasures:
When obtaining end user authorization, the end-user may not understand the scope of the access being granted and to whom or they may end up providing a client with access to resources which should not be permitted.
Countermeasures:
Authorization servers may wish to automatically process authorization requests from clients which have been previously authorized by the user. When the user is redirected to the authorization server's end-user authorization endpoint to grant access, the authorization server detects that the user has already granted access to that particular client. Instead of prompting the user for approval, the authorization server automatically redirects the user back to the client.
A malicious client may exploit that feature and try to obtain such an authorization code instead of the legitimate client.
Countermeasures:
An attacker could use the end-user authorization endpoint and the redirection URI parameter to abuse the authorization server as an open redirector. An open redirector is an endpoint using a parameter to automatically redirect a user-agent to the location specified by the parameter value without any validation.
Impact: An attacker could utilize a user's trust in your authorization server to launch a phishing attack.
Countermeasure
Attackers may attempt to eavesdrop access token in transit from the authorization server to the client.
Impact: The attacker is able to access all resources with the permissions covered by the scope of the particular access token.
Countermeasures:
This threat is applicable if the authorization server stores access tokens as handles in a database. An attacker may obtain access tokens from the authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or launching a SQL injection attack. Impact: disclosure of all access tokens
Countermeasures:
An attacker could attempt to eavesdrop the transmission of client credentials between client and server during the client authentication process or during OAuth token requests.
Impact: Revelation of a client credential enabling phishing or impersonation of a client service.
Countermeasures:
An attacker may obtain valid client_id/secret combinations from the authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or launching a SQL injection attack. Impact: disclosure of all client_id/secret combinations. This allows the attacker to act on behalf of legitimate clients.
Countermeasures:
An attacker may try to guess valid client_id/secret pairs. Impact: disclosure of single client_id/secret pair.
Countermeasures:
This section covers threats which are specific to certain flows utilized to obtain access tokens. Each flow is characterized by response types and/or grant types on the end-user authorization and token endpoint, respectively.
An attacker could try to eavesdrop transmission of the authorization code between authorization server and client. Furthermore, authorization codes are passed via the browser which may unintentionally leak those codes to untrusted web sites and attackers in different ways:
[OASIS.sstc-saml-bindings-1.1], Section 4.1.1.9.1, [gross-sec-analysis], and [OASIS.sstc-gross-sec-analysis-response-01].
Note: A description of a similar attacks on the SAML protocol can be found at
Countermeasures:
This threat is applicable if the authorization server stores authorization codes as handles in a database. An attacker may obtain authorization codes from the authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or launching a SQL injection attack. Impact: disclosure of all authorization codes, most likely along with the respective redirect_uri and client_id values.
Countermeasures:
An attacker may try to guess valid authorization code values and send it using the grant type „code“ in order to obtain a valid access token.
Impact: disclosure of single access token, probably also associated refresh token.
Countermeasures:
A malicious client could pretend to be a valid client and obtain an access authorization that way. The malicious client could even utilize screen scraping techniques in order to simulate the user consent in the authorization flow.
Assumption: It is not the task of the authorization server to protect the end-user's device from malicious software. This is the responsibility of the platform running on the particular device probably in cooperation with other components of the respective ecosystem (e.g. an application management infrastructure). The sole responsibility of the authorization server is to control access to the end-user's resources living in resource servers and to prevent unauthorized access to them via the OAuth protocol. Based on this assumption, the following countermeasures are available to cope with the threat.
Countermeasures:
A hostile party could impersonate the client site and get access to the authorization code. This could be achieved using DNS or ARP spoofing. This applies to clients, which are web applications, thus the redirect URI is not local to the host where the user's browser is running.
Impact: This affects web applications and may lead to a disclosure of authorization codes and, potentially, the corresponding access and refresh tokens.
Countermeasures:
It is strongly recommended that one of the following countermeasures is utilized in order to prevent this attack:
A hostile party could impersonate the client site and impersonate the user's session on this client. This could be achieved using DNS or ARP spoofing. This applies to clients, which are web applications, thus the redirect URI is not local to the host where the user's browser is running.
Impact: An attacker who intercepts the authorization code as it is sent by the browser to the callback endpoint can gain access to protected resources by submitting the authorization code to the client. The client will exchange the authorization code for an access token and use the access token to access protected resources for the benefit of the attacker, delivering protected resources to the attacker, or modifying protected resources as directed by the attacker. If OAuth is used by the client to delegate authentication to a social site (e.g. as in the implementation of "Login" button to a third-party social network site), the attacker can use the intercepted authorization code to log in to the client as the user.
Note: Authenticating the client during authorization code exchange will not help to detect such an attack as it is the legitimate client that obtains the tokens.
Countermeasures:
The attack leverages the authorization code grant type in an attempt to get another user (victim) to log-in, authorize access to his/her resources, and subsequently obtain the authorization code and inject it into a client application using the attacker's account. The goal is to associate an access authorization for resources of the victim with the user account of the attacker on a client site.
The attacker abuses an existing client application and combines it with his own counterfeit client web site. The attack depends on the victim expecting the client application to request access to a certain resource server. The victim, seeing only a normal request from an expected application, approves the request. The attacker then uses the victim's authorization to gain access to the information unknowingly authorized by the victim.
The attacker conducts the following flow:
Impact: The attacker gains access to the victim's resources as associated with his account on the client site.
Countermeasures:
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web-based attack whereby HTTP requests are transmitted from a user that the website trusts or has authenticated (e.g., via HTTP redirects or HTML forms). CSRF attacks on OAuth approvals can allow an attacker to obtain authorization to OAuth protected resources without the consent of the User.
This attack works against the redirection URI used in the authorization code flow. An attacker could authorize an authorization code to their own protected resources on an authorization server. He then aborts the redirect flow back to the client on his device and tricks the victim into executing the redirect back to the client. The client receives the redirect, fetches the token(s) from the authorization server and associates the victim's client session with the resources accessible using the token.
Impact: The user accesses resources on behalf of the attacker. The effective impact depends on the type of resource accessed. For example, the user may upload private items to an attacker's resources. Or when using OAuth in 3rd party login scenarios, the user may associate his client account with the attacker's identity at the external identity provider. This way the attacker could easily access the victim's data at the client by logging in from another device with his credentials at the external identity provider.
Countermeasures:
With Clickjacking, a malicious site loads the target site in a transparent iFrame (see [iFrame]) overlaid on top of a set of dummy buttons which are carefully constructed to be placed directly under important buttons on the target site. When a user clicks a visible button, they are actually clicking a button (such as an "Authorize" button) on the hidden page.
Impact: An attacker can steal a user's authentication credentials and access their resources
Countermeasure
When a client requests access to protected resources, the authorization flow normally involves the resource owner's explicit response to the access request, either granting or denying access to the protected resources. A malicious client can exploit knowledge of the structure of this flow in order to gain authorization without the resource owner's consent, by transmitting the necessary requests programmatically, and simulating the flow against the authorization server. That way, the client may gain access to the victim's resources without her approval. An authorization server will be vulnerable to this threat, if it uses non-interactive authentication mechanisms or splits the authorization flow across multiple pages.
The malicious client might embed a hidden HTML user agent, interpret the HTML forms sent by the authorization server, and automatically send the corresponding form post requests. As a pre-requisite, the attacker must be able to execute the authorization process in the context of an already authenticated session of the resource owner with the authorization server. There are different ways to achieve this:
In all cases, such an attack is limited to clients running on the victim's device, within the user agent or as native app.
Please note: Such attacks cannot be prevented using CSRF countermeasures, since the attacker just "executes" the URLs as prepared by the authorization server including any nonce etc.
Countermeasures:
Authorization servers should decide, based on an analysis of the risk associated with this threat, whether to detect and prevent this threat.
In order to prevent such an attack, the authorization server may force a user interaction based on non-predictable input values as part of the user consent approval. The authorization server could
Alternatively in order to allow the resource owner to detect abuse, the authorization server could notify the resource owner of any approval by appropriate means, e.g. text or instant message or e-Mail.
If an authorization server includes a nontrivial amount of entropy in authorization codes or access tokens (limiting the number of possible codes/tokens) and automatically grants either without user intervention and has no limit on code or access tokens per user, an attacker could exhaust the pool of authorization codes by repeatedly directing the user's browser to request code or access tokens.
Countermeasures:
An attacker who owns a botnet can locate the redirect URIs of clients that listen on HTTP, access them with random authorization codes, and cause a large number of HTTPS connections to be concentrated onto the authorization server. This can result in a DoS attack on the authorization server.
This attack can still be effective even when CSRF defense/the 'state' parameter (see Section 4.4.1.8) is deployed on the client side. With such a defense, the attacker might need to incur an additional HTTP request to obtain a valid CSRF code/ state parameter. This apparently cuts down the effectiveness of the attack by a factor of 2. However, if the HTTPS/HTTP cost ratio is higher than 2 (the cost factor is estimated to be around 3.5x at [ssl-latency]) the attacker still achieves a magnification of resource utilization at the expense of the authorization server.
Impact: There are a few effects that the attacker can accomplish with this OAuth flow that they cannot easily achieve otherwise.
Countermeasures
An attacker could attempt to login to an application or web site using a victim's identity. Applications relying on identity data provided by an OAuth protected service API to login users are vulnerable to this threat. This pattern can be found in so-called "social login" scenarios.
As a pre-requisite, a resource server offers an API to obtain personal information about a user which could be interpreted as having obtained a user identity. In this sense the client is treating the resource server API as an "identity" API. A client utilizes OAuth to obtain an access token for the identity API. It then queries the identity API for an identifier and uses it to look up its internal user account data (login). The client asssumes that because it was able to obtain information about the user, that the user has been authenticated.
If the client uses the grant type "code", the attacker needs to gather a valid authorization code of the respective victim from the same identity provider used by the target client application. The attacker tricks the victim into login into a malicious app (which may appear to be legitimate to the Identity Provider) using the same identity provider as the target application. This results in the Identity Provider's authorization server issuing an authorization code for the respective identity API. The malicious app then sends this code to the attacker, which in turn triggers a login process within the target application. The attacker now manipulates the authorization response and substitutes their code (bound to their identity) for the victim's code. This code is then exchanged by the client for an access token, which in turn is accepted by the identity API since the audience, with respect to the resource server, is correct. But since the identifier returned by the identity API is determined by the identity in the access token (issued based on the victim's code), the attacker is logged into the target application under the victim's identity.
Impact: the attacker gains access to an application and user-specific data within the application.
Countermeasures:
In the implicit grant type flow, the access token is directly returned to the client as a fragment part of the redirection URI. It is assumed that the token is not sent to the redirection URI target as HTTP user agents do not send the fragment part of URIs to HTTP servers. Thus an attacker cannot eavesdrop the access token on this communication path and it cannot leak through HTTP referee headers.
This token might be eavesdropped by an attacker. The token is sent from server to client via a URI fragment of the redirection URI. If the communication is not secured or the end-point is not secured, the token could be leaked by parsing the returned URI.
Impact: the attacker would be able to assume the same rights granted by the token.
Countermeasures:
An attacker could obtain the token from the browser's history. Note this means the attacker needs access to the particular device.
Countermeasures:
A malicious client could attempt to obtain a token by fraud.
The same countermeasures as for Section 4.4.1.4 are applicable, except client authentication.
A hostile party could act as the client web server and replace or modify the actual implementation of the client (script). This could be achieved using DNS or ARP spoofing. This applies to clients implemented within the Web Browser in a scripting language.
Impact: The attacker could obtain user credential information and assume the full identity of the user.
Countermeasures:
CSRF attacks (see Section 4.4.1.8) also work against the redirection URI used in the implicit grant flow. An attacker could acquire an access token to their own protected resources. He could then construct a redirection URI and embed their access token in that URI. If he can trick the user into following the redirection URI and the client does not have protection against this attack, the user may have the attacker's access token authorized within their client.
Impact: The user accesses resources on behalf of the attacker. The effective impact depends on the type of resource accessed. For example, the user may upload private items to an attacker's resources. Or when using OAuth in 3rd party login scenarios, the user may associate his client account with the attacker's identity at the external identity provider. This way the attacker could easily access the victim's data at the client by logging in from another device with his credentials at the external identity provider.
Countermeasures:
An attacker could attempt to login to an application or web site using a victim's identity. Applications relying on identity data provided by an OAuth protected service API to login users are vulnerable to this threat. This pattern can be found in so-called "social login" scenarios.
As a pre-requisite, a resource server offers an API to obtain personal information about a user which could be interpreted as having obtained a user identity. In this sense the client is treating the resource server API as an "identity" API. A client utilizes OAuth to obtain an access token for the identity API. It then queries the identity API for an identifier and uses it to look up its internal user account data (login). The client asssumes that because it was able to obtain information about the user, that the user has been authenticated.
To succeed, the attacker needs to gather a valid access token of the respective victim from the same identity provider used by the target client application. The attacker tricks the victim into login into a malicious app (which may appear to be legitimate to the Identity Provider) using the same identity provider as the target application. This results in the Identity Provider's authorization server issuing an access token for the respective identity API. The malicious app then sends this access token to the attacker, which in turn triggers a login process within the target application. The attacker now manipulates the authorization response and substitutes their access token (bound to their identity) for the victim's access token. This token is accepted by the identity API since the audience, with respect to the resource server, is correct. But since the identifier returned by the identity API is determined by the identity in the access token, the attacker is logged into the target application under the victim's identity.
Impact: the attacker gains access to an application and user-specific data within the application.
Countermeasures:
The “Resource Owner Password Credentials” grant type (see [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 4.3), often used for legacy/migration reasons, allows a client to request an access token using an end-users user-id and password along with its own credential. This grant type has higher risk because it maintains the uid/password anti-pattern. Additionally, because the user does not have control over the authorization process, clients using this grant type are not limited by scope, but instead have potentially the same capabilities as the user themselves. As there is no authorization step, the ability to offer token revocation is bypassed.
Because passwords are often used for more than 1 service, this anti-pattern may also risk whatever else is accessible with the supplied credential. Additionally any easily derived equivalent (e.g. joe@example.com and joe@example.net) might easily allow someone to guess that the same password can be used elsewhere.
Impact: The resource server can only differentiate scope based on the access token being associated with a particular client. The client could also acquire long-living tokens and pass them up to a attacker web service for further abuse. The client, eavesdroppers, or end-points could eavesdrop user id and password.
Countermeasures:
If the client does not provide enough protection, an attacker or disgruntled employee could retrieve the passwords for a user.
Countermeasures:
All interaction with the resource owner is performed by the client. Thus it might, intentionally or unintentionally, happen that the client obtains a token with scope unknown for or unintended by the resource owner. For example, the resource owner might think the client needs and acquires read-only access to its media storage only but the client tries to acquire an access token with full access permissions.
Countermeasures:
All interaction with the resource owner is performed by the client. Thus it might, intentionally or unintentionally, happen that the client obtains a long-term authorization represented by a refresh token even if the resource owner did not intend so.
Countermeasures:
An attacker could attempt to eavesdrop the transmission of end-user credentials with the grant type „password“ between client and server.
Impact: disclosure of a single end-users password.
Countermeasures:
An attacker may obtain valid username/password combinations from the authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or launching a SQL injection attack.
Impact: disclosure of all username/password combinations. The impact may exceed the domain of the authorization server since many users tend to use the same credentials on different services.
Countermeasures:
An attacker may try to guess valid username/password combinations using the grant type "password“.
Impact: Revelation of a single username/password combination.
Countermeasures:
Client credentials (see [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 3) consist of an identifier (not secret) combined with an additional means (such as a matching client secret) of authenticating a client. The threats to this grant type are similar to Section 4.4.3.
An attacker may eavesdrop refresh tokens when they are transmitted from the authorization server to the client.
Countermeasures:
This threat is applicable if the authorization server stores refresh tokens as handles in a database. An attacker may obtain refresh tokens from the authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or launching a SQL injection attack.
Impact: disclosure of all refresh tokens
Countermeasures:
An attacker may try to guess valid refresh token values and send it using the grant type „refresh_token“ in order to obtain a valid access token.
Impact: exposure of single refresh token and derivable access tokens.
Countermeasures:
An attacker could try to obtain valid refresh tokens by proxying requests to the authorization server. Given the assumption that the authorization server URL is well-known at development time or can at least be obtained from a well-known resource server, the attacker must utilize some kind of spoofing in order to succeed.
Countermeasures:
An attacker could try to obtain a valid access token on transport between client and resource server. As access tokens are shared secrets between authorization and resource server, they should be treated with the same care as other credentials (e.g. end-user passwords).
Countermeasures:
An attacker could attempt to replay valid requests in order to obtain or to modify/destroy user data.
Countermeasures:
Where the token is a handle, the attacker may use attempt to guess the access token values based on knowledge they have from other access tokens.
Impact: Access to a single user's data.
Countermeasures:
An attacker may pretend to be a particular resource server and to accept tokens from a particular authorization server. If the client sends a valid access token to this counterfeit resource server, the server in turn may use that token to access other services on behalf of the resource owner.
Countermeasures:
A legitimate resource server could attempt to use an access token to access another resource servers. Similarly, a client could try to use a token obtained for one server on another resource server.
Countermeasures:
The HTTP Authorization scheme (OAuth HTTP Authorization Scheme) is optional. However, [RFC2616] relies on the Authorization and WWW-Authenticate headers to distinguish authenticated content so that it can be protected. Proxies and caches, in particular, may fail to adequately protect requests not using these headers. For example, private authenticated content may be stored in (and thus retrievable from) publicly-accessible caches.
Countermeasures:
If access tokens are sent via URI query parameters, such tokens may leak to log files and the HTTP "referer".
Countermeasures:
This section describes the countermeasures as recommended to mitigate the threats as described in Section 4.
The general section covers considerations that apply generally across all OAuth components (client, resource server, token server, and user-agents).
This is applicable to all requests sent from client to authorization server or resource server. While OAuth provides a mechanism for verifying the integrity of requests, it provides no guarantee of request confidentiality. Unless further precautions are taken, eavesdroppers will have full access to request content and may be able to mount interception or replay attacks through using content of request, e.g. secrets or tokens.
Attacks can be mitigated by using transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS [RFC5246]. A virtual private network (VPN), e.g. based on IPsec VPN [RFC4301], may considered as well.
Note: this document assumes end-to-end TLS protected connections between the respective protocol entities. Deployments deviating from this assumption by offloading TLS in between (e.g. on the data center edge) must refine this threat model in order to account for the additional (mainly insider) threat this may cause.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
HTTPS server authentication or similar means can be used to authenticate the identity of a server. The goal is to reliably bind the fully qualified domain name of the server to the public key presented by the server during connection establishment (see [RFC2818]).
The client should validate the binding of the server to its domain name. If the server fails to prove that binding, it is considered a man-in-the-middle attack. The security measure depends on the certification authorities the client trusts for that purpose. Clients should carefully select those trusted CAs and protect the storage for trusted CA certificates from modifications.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
Transparency to the resource owner is a key element of the OAuth protocol. The user should always be in control of the authorization processes and get the necessary information to meet informed decisions. Moreover, user involvement is a further security countermeasure. The user can probably recognize certain kinds of attacks better than the authorization server. Information can be presented/exchanged during the authorization process, after the authorization process, and every time the user wishes to get informed by using techniques such as:
This sections describes countermeasures used to protect all kinds of credentials from unauthorized access and abuse. Credentials are long term secrets, such as client secrets and user passwords as well as all kinds of tokens (refresh and access token) or authorization codes.
Administrators should undertake industry best practices to protect the storage of credentials (see for example [owasp]). Such practices may include but are not limited to the following sub-sections.
A server system may be locked down so that no attacker may get access to sensible configuration files and databases.
If a client identifier or other authentication component is queried or compared against a SQL Database it may become possible for an injection attack to occur if parameters received are not validated before submission to the database.
The authorization server should not store credentials in clear text. Typical approaches are to store hashes instead or to encrypt credentials. If the credential lacks a reasonable entropy level (because it is a user password) an additional salt will harden the storage to make offline dictionary attacks more difficult.
Note: Some authentication protocols require the authorization server to have access to the secret in the clear. Those protocols cannot be implemented if the server only has access to hashes. Credentials should strongly encrypted in those cases.
For client applications, insecurely persisted client credentials are easy targets for attackers to obtain. Store client credentials using an encrypted persistence mechanism such as a keystore or database. Note that compiling client credentials directly into client code makes client applications vulnerable to scanning as well as difficult to administer should client credentials change over time.
Usage of asymmetric cryptography will free the authorization server of the obligation to manage credentials.
The authorization server may decide to enforce a complex user password policy in order to increase the user passwords' entropy to hinder online password attacks. Note that too much complexity can increase the liklihood that users re-use passwords or write them down or otherwise store them insecurely.
When creating secrets not intended for usage by human users (e.g. client secrets or token handles), the authorization server should include a reasonable level of entropy in order to mitigate the risk of guessing attacks. The token value should be >=128 bits long and constructed from a cryptographically strong random or pseudo-random number sequence (see [RFC4086] for best current practice) generated by the Authorization Server.
Online attacks on passwords can be mitigated by locking the respective accounts after a certain number of failed attempts.
Note: This measure can be abused to lock down legitimate service users.
The authorization server may react on failed attempts to authenticate by username/password by temporarily locking the respective account and delaying the response for a certain duration. This duration may increase with the number of failed attempts. The objective is to slow the attackers attempts on a certain username down.
Note: this may require a more complex and stateful design of the authorization server.
The idea is to prevent programs from automatically checking huge number of passwords by requiring human interaction.
Note: this has a negative impact on user experience.
The authorization server may decide to reduce or limit the scope associated with a token. The basis of this decision is out of scope, examples are:
The authorization server may allow different scopes dependent on the grant type. For example, end-user authorization via direct interaction with the end-user (authorization code) might be considered more reliable than direct authorization via grant type username/password. This means will reduce the impact of the following threats:
Tokens should generally expire after a reasonable duration. This complements and strengthens other security measures (such as signatures) and reduces the impact of all kinds of token leaks. Depending on the risk associated with a token leakage, tokens may expire after a few minutes (e.g. for payment transactions) or stay valid for hours (e.g. read access to contacts).
The expiration time is determined by a couple of factors, including:
A short expiration time for tokens is a protection means against the following threats:
Note: Short token duration requires more precise clock synchronisation between authorization server and resource server. Furthermore, shorter duration may require more token refreshes (access token) or repeated end-user authorization processes (authorization code and refresh token).
The authorization server may restrict the number of requests or operations which can be performed with a certain token. This mechanism can be used to mitigate the following threats:
For example, if an Authorization Server observes more than one attempt to redeem an authorization code, the Authorization Server may want to revoke all access tokens granted based on the authorization code as well as reject the current request.
As with the authorization code, access tokens may also have a limited number of operations. This forces client applications to either re-authenticate and use a refresh token to obtain a fresh access token, or it forces the client to re-authorize the access token by involving the user.
Authorization servers in multi-service environments may consider issuing tokens with different content to different resource servers and to explicitly indicate in the token the target server a token is intended to be sent to. SAML Assertions (see [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]) use the Audience element for this purpose. This countermeasure can be used in the following situations:
This may be used to indicate to a resource server, which endpoint URL has been used to obtain the token. This measure will allow to detect requests from a counterfeit resource server, since such token will contain the endpoint URL of that server.
Deployments may consider only using tokens with explicitly defined scope, where every scope is associated with a particular resource server. This approach can be used to mitigate attacks, where a resource server or client uses a token for a different then the intended purpose.
An authorization server may bind a token to a certain client identifier. This identifier should be validated for every request with that token. This means can be used, to
Note: Validating the client identifier may require the target server to authenticate the client's identifier. This authentication can be based on secrets managed independent of the token (e.g. pre-registered client id/secret on authorization server) or sent with the token itself (e.g. as part of the encrypted token content).
Self-contained tokens should be signed in order to detect any attempt to modify or produce faked tokens (e.g. Hash-based Message Authentication Code or digital signatures)
Self-contained tokens may be encrypted for confidentiality reasons or to protect system internal data. Depending on token format, keys (e.g. symmetric keys) may have to be distributed between server nodes. The method of distribution should be defined by the token and encryption used.
For service providers intending to implement an assertion-based token design it is highly recommended to adopt a standard assertion format (such as SAML [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] or JWT [I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token].
The following measures should be used to protect access tokens
This section describes considerations related to the OAuth Authorization Server end-point.
If an Authorization Server observes multiple attempts to redeem an authorization grant (e.g. such as an authorization code), the Authorization Server may want to revoke all tokens granted based on the authorization grant.
The authorization server may decide based on an appropriate policy not to issue refresh tokens. Since refresh tokens are long term credentials, they may be subject theft. For example, if the authorization server does not trust a client to securely store such tokens, it may refuse to issue such a client a refresh token.
The authorization server should match every refresh token to the identifier of the client to whom it was issued. The authorization server should check that the same client_id is present for every request to refresh the access token. If possible (e.g. confidential clients), the authorization server should authenticate the respective client.
This is a countermeasure against refresh token theft or leakage.
Note: This binding should be protected from unauthorized modifications.
Refresh token rotation is intended to automatically detect and prevent attempts to use the same refresh token in parallel from different apps/devices. This happens if a token gets stolen from the client and is subsequently used by the attacker and the legitimate client. The basic idea is to change the refresh token value with every refresh request in order to detect attempts to obtain access tokens using old refresh tokens. Since the authorization server cannot determine whether the attacker or the legitimate client is trying to access, in case of such an access attempt the valid refresh token and the access authorization associated with it are both revoked.
The OAuth specification supports this measure in that the tokens response allows the authorization server to return a new refresh token even for requests with grant type "refresh_token“.
Note: this measure may cause problems in clustered environments since usage of the currently valid refresh token must be ensured. In such an environment, other measures might be more appropriate.
The authorization server may allow clients or end-users to explicitly request the invalidation of refresh tokens. A mechanism to revoke tokens is specified in [I-D.ietf-oauth-revocation].
This is a countermeasure against:
The authorization server may require to bind authentication credentials to a device identifier. The International Mobile Station Equipment Identity [IMEI] is one example of such an identifier, there are also operating system specific identifiers. The authorization server could include such an identifier when authenticating user credentials in order to detect token theft from a particular device.
Note: Any implementation should consider potential privacy implications of using device identifiers.
For newer browsers, avoidance of iFrames can be enforced server side by using the X-FRAME-OPTION header (see [I-D.gondrom-x-frame-options]). This header can have two values, "DENY" and "SAMEORIGIN", which will block any framing or framing by sites with a different origin, respectively. The value "ALLOW-FROM" allows iFrames for a list of trusted origins.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
As described in Section 3 (Security Features), clients are identified, authenticated and authorized for several purposes, such as a
Due to the different capabilities and characteristics of the different client types, there are different ways to support these objectives, which will be described in this section. Authorization server providers should be aware of the security policy and deployment of a particular clients and adapt its treatment accordingly. For example, one approach could be to treat all clients as less trustworthy and unsecure. On the other extreme, a service provider could activate every client installation individually by an administrator and that way gain confidence in the identity of the software package and the security of the environment the client is installed in. And there are several approaches in between.
Authorization servers should not issue secrets to clients that cannot protect secrets ("public" clients). This reduces probability of the server treating the client as strongly authenticated.
For example, it is of limited benefit to create a single client id and secret which is shared by all installations of a native application. Such a scenario requires that this secret must be transmitted from the developer via the respective distribution channel, e.g. an application market, to all installations of the application on end-user devices. A secret, burned into the source code of the application or a associated resource bundle, is not protected from reverse engineering. Secondly, such secrets cannot be revoked since this would immediately put all installations out of work. Moreover, since the authorization server cannot really trust the client's identifier, it would be dangerous to indicate to end-users the trustworthiness of the client.
There are other ways to achieve a reasonable security level, as described in the following sections.
Authorization servers should not allow automatic authorization for public clients. The authorization may issue an individual client id, but should require that all authorizations are approved by the end-user. This is a countermeasure for clients without secret against the following threats:
The authorization may issue a client_id and bind the client_id to a certain pre-configured redirect_uri. Any authorization request with another redirection URI is refused automatically. Alternatively, the authorization server should not accept any dynamic redirection URI for such a client_id and instead always redirect to the well-known pre-configured redirection URI. This is a countermeasure for clients without secrets against the following threats:
An authorization server may issue separate client identifiers and corresponding secrets to the different installations of a particular client (i.e. software package). The effect of such an approach would be to turn otherwise "public" clients back into "confidential" clients.
For web applications, this could mean to create one client_id and client_secret per web site a software package is installed on. So the provider of that particular site could request client id and secret from the authorization server during setup of the web site. This would also allow to validate some of the properties of that web site, such as redirection URI, website URL, and whatever proofs useful. The web site provider has to ensure the security of the client secret on the site.
For native applications, things are more complicated because every copy of a particular application on any device is a different installation. Installation-specific secrets in this scenario will require
Either approach will require an automated mechanism for issuing client ids and secrets, which is currently not defined by OAuth.
The first approach would allow to achieve a certain level of trust in the authenticity of the application, whereas the second option only allows to authenticate the installation but not to validate properties of the client. But this would at least help to prevent several replay attacks. Moreover, installation-specific client_id and secret allow to selectively revoke all refresh tokens of a specific installation at once.
An authorization server should require all clients to register their redirect_uri and the redirect_uri should be the full URI as defined in [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. The way this registration is performed is out of scope of this document. As per the core spec, every actual redirection URI sent with the respective client_id to the end-user authorization endpoint must match the registered redirection URI. Where it does not match, the authorization server should assume the inbound GET request has been sent by an attacker and refuse it. Note: the authorization server should not redirect the user agent back to the redirection URI of such an authorization request. Validating the pre-registered redirect_uri is a countermeasure against the following threats:
The underlying assumption of this measure is that an attacker will need to use another redirection URI in order to get access to the authorization code. Deployments might consider the possibility of an attacker using spoofing attacks to a victims device to circumvent this security measure.
Note: Pre-registering clients might not scale in some deployments (manual process) or require dynamic client registration (not specified yet). With the lack of dynamic client registration, pre-registered "redirect_uri" only works for clients bound to certain deployments at development/configuration time. As soon as dynamic resource server discovery is required, the pre-registered redirect_uri may be no longer feasible.
An authorization server may revoke a client's secret in order to prevent abuse of a revealed secret.
Note: This measure will immediately invalidate any authorization code or refresh token issued to the respective client. This might be unintentionally impact client identifiers and secrets used across multiple deployments of a particular native or web application.
This a countermeasure against:
By using an alternative form of authentication such as client assertion [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions], the need to distribute a client_secret is eliminated. This may require the use of a secure private key store or other supplemental authentication system as specified by the client assertion issuer in its authentication process.
This secion involves considerations for authorization flows involving the end-user.
Authorization servers should NOT automatically process repeat authorizations where the client is not authenticated through a client secret or some other authentication mechanism such as a signed authentication assertion certificate (Section 5.2.3.7 Use strong client authentication (e.g. client_assertion / client_token)) or validation of a pre-registered redirect URI (Section 5.2.3.5 Validation of pre-registered redirection URI ).
The authorization server should clearly explain to the end-user what happens in the authorization process and what the consequences are. For example, the user should understand what access he is about to grant to which client for what duration. It should also be obvious to the user, whether the server is able to reliably certify certain client properties (web site URL, security policy).
In the authorization process, the user is typically asked to approve a client's request for authorization. This is an important security mechanism by itself because the end-user can be involved in the validation of client properties, such as whether the client name known to the authorization server fits the name of the web site or the application the end-user is using. This measure is especially helpful in situations where the authorization server is unable to authenticate the client. It is a countermeasure against:
The authorization server should bind every authorization code to the id of the respective client which initiated the end-user authorization process. This measure is a countermeasure against:
Note: This binding should be protected from unauthorized modifications (e.g. using protected memory and/or a secure database).
The authorization server should be able to bind every authorization code to the actual redirection URI used as redirect target of the client in the end-user authorization process. This binding should be validated when the client attempts to exchange the respective authorization code for an access token. This measure is a countermeasure against authorization code leakage through counterfeit web sites since an attacker cannot use another redirection URI to exchange an authorization code into a token.
This section deals with considerations for client applications.
Because of the numbers of copies of client software, there is limited benefit to create a single client id and secret which is shared by all installations of an application. Such an application by itself would be considered a "public" client as it cannot be presumed to be able to keep client secrets. A secret, burned into the source code of the application or an associated resource bundle, cannot be protected from reverse engineering. Secondly, such secrets cannot be revoked since this would immediately put all installations out of work. Moreover, since the authorization server cannot really trust the client's identifier, it would be dangerous to indicate to end-users the trustworthiness of the client.
Use standard web server protection measures - Section 5.3.2
The are different way to store secrets of all kinds (tokens, client secrets) securely on a device or server.
Most multi-user operating systems segregate the personal storage of the different system users. Moreover, most modern smartphone operating systems even support to store app-specific data in separate areas of the file systems and protect it from access by other applications. Additionally, applications can implements confidential data itself using a user-supplied secret, such as PIN or password.
Another option is to swap refresh token storage to a trusted backend server. This mean in turn requires a resilient authentication mechanisms between client and backend server. Note: Applications should ensure that confidential data is kept confidential even after reading from secure storage, which typically means to keep this data in the local memory of the application.
On a typical modern phone, there are many "device lock" options which can be utilized to provide additional protection where a device is stolen or misplaced. These include PINs, passwords and other biomtric featres such as "face recognition". These are not equal in the level of security they provide.
The state parameter is used to link client requests and prevent CSRF attacks, for example against the redirection URI. An attacker could inject their own authorization code or access token, which can result in the client using an access token associated with the attacker's protected resources rather than the victim's (e.g. save the victim's bank account information to a protected resource controlled by the attacker).
The client should utilize the "state" request parameter to send the authorization server a value that binds the request to the user-agent's authenticated state (e.g. a hash of the session cookie used to authenticate the user-agent) when making an authorization request. Once authorization has been obtained from the end-user, the authorization server redirects the end-user's user-agent back to the client with the required binding value contained in the "state" parameter.
The binding value enables the client to verify the validity of the request by matching the binding value to the user- agent's authenticated state.
The following section details security considerations for resource servers.
Authorization headers are recognized and specially treated by HTTP proxies and servers. Thus the usage of such headers for sending access tokens to resource servers reduces the likelihood of leakage or unintended storage of authenticated requests in general and especially Authorization headers.
An authorization server may bind tokens to a certain client identifier and enable resource servers to be able to validate that association on resource access. This will require the resource server to authenticate the originator of a request as the legitimate owner of a particular token. There are a couple of options to implement this countermeasure:
Authenticated requests are a countermeasure against abuse of tokens by counterfeit resource servers.
A resource server may decide to accept signed requests only, either to replace transport level security measures or to complement such measures. Every signed request should be uniquely identifiable and should not be processed twice by the resource server. This countermeasure helps to mitigate:
OAuth, as a security protocol, is distinctive in that its flow usually involves significant user interaction, making the end user a part of the security model. This creates some important difficulties in defending against some of the threats discussed above. Some of these points have already been made, but it's worth repeating and highlighting them here.
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.
We would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Barry Leiba, Hui-Lan Lu, Francisco Corella, Peifung E Lam, Shane B Weeden, Skylar Woodward, Niv Steingarten, Tim Bray, and James H. Manger for their comments and contributions.
| [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] | Hammer-Lahav, E, Recordon, D and D Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-v2-25, March 2012. |
| [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer] | Jones, M, Hardt, D and D Recordon, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-21, June 2012. |
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
draft-lodderstedt-oauth-security-01
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-00
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-01
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-02
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-03
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-06
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-07