| TRAM | T. Reddy |
| Internet-Draft | P. Patil |
| Intended status: Standards Track | R. Ravindranath |
| Expires: January 22, 2015 | Cisco |
| J. Uberti | |
| July 21, 2014 |
TURN Extension for Third Party Authorization
draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz-00
This document proposes the use of OAuth to obtain and validate ephemeral tokens that can be used for TURN authentication. The usage of ephemeral tokens ensure that access to a TURN server can be controlled even if the tokens are compromised, as is the case in WebRTC where TURN credentials must be specified in Javascript.
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Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) TURN [RFC5766] is a protocol that is often used to improve the connectivity of P2P applications. By providing a cloud-based relay service, TURN ensures that a connection can be established even when one or both sides is incapable of a direct P2P connection. However, as a relay service, it imposes a nontrivial cost on the service provider. Therefore, access to a TURN service is almost always access-controlled.
TURN provides a mechanism to control access via "long-term" username/ password credentials that are provided as part of the TURN protocol. It is expected that these credentials will be kept secret; if the credentials are discovered, the TURN server could be used by unauthorized users or applications. However, in web applications, ensuring this secrecy is typically impossible. To address this problem and the ones described in [I-D.ietf-tram-auth-problems], this document proposes the use of third party authorization using OAuth for TURN.
To achieve third party authorization, a resource owner e.g. WebRTC server, authorizes a TURN client to access resources on the TURN server.
Using OAuth, a client obtains an ephemeral token from an authorization server e.g. WebRTC server, and the token is presented to the TURN server instead of the traditional mechanism of presenting username/password credentials. The TURN server validates the authenticity of the token and provides required services.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This specification uses the token type 'Assertion' (aka self-contained token) described in [RFC6819] where all the information necessary to authenticate the validity of the token is contained within the token itself. This approach has the benefit of avoiding a protocol between the TURN server and the authorization server for token validation, thus reducing latency. The exact mechanism used by a client to obtain a token from the OAuth authorization server is outside the scope of this document. For example, a client could make an HTTP request to an authorization server to obtain a token that can be used to avail TURN services. The TURN token is returned in JSON, along with other OAuth Parameters like token type, mac_key, kid, token lifetime etc. The client is oblivious to the content of the token. The token is embedded within a TURN request sent to the TURN server. Once the TURN server has determined the token is valid, TURN services are offered for a determined period of time.
+-------------------+ +--------+ +---------+
| ......... TURN | | TURN | | WebRTC |
| .WebRTC . Client | | | | |
| .Client . | | Server | | Server |
| ......... | | | | |
+-------------------+ +--------+ +---------+
| | Allocate request | |
| |------------------------------------------>| |
| | | |
| | Allocate error response | |
| |<------------------------------------------| |
| | THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | HTTP Request for token | |
|------------------------------------------------------------>|
| | HTTP Response with token parameters | |
|<------------------------------------------------------------|
|OAuth | | |
Attributes | |
|------>| | |
| | Allocate request ACCESS-TOKEN | |
| |------------------------------------------>| |
| | | |
| | Allocate success response | |
| |<------------------------------------------| |
| | TURN Messages | |
| | ////// integrity protected ////// | |
| | ////// integrity protected ////// | |
| | ////// integrity protected ////// | |
Figure 1: TURN Third Party Authorization
Note : An implementation may choose to contact the WebRTC server to obtain a token even before it makes an allocate request, if it knows the server details before hand. For example, once a client has learnt that a TURN server supports Third Party authorization from a WebRTC server, the client can obtain the token before making subsequent allocate requests.
For example, the client learns the TURN server name “turn1@example.com” from THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION attribute value and makes the following HTTP request for the access token using transport-layer security (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Audience: turn1@example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
timestamp=1361471629
grant_type=implicit
Figure 2: Request
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token":
"U2FsdGVkX18qJK/kkWmRcnfHglrVTJSpS6yU32kmHmOrfGyI3m1gQj1jRPsr0uBb
HctuycAgsfRX7nJW2BdukGyKMXSiNGNnBzigkAofP6+Z3vkJ1Q5pWbfSRroOkWBn",
"token_type":"mac",
"expires_in":1800,
"kid":"22BIjxU93h/IgwEb",
"mac_key":"v51N62OM65kyMvfTI08O"
}
Figure 3: Response
Access token and other attributes issued by the authorization server are explained in Section 6.2.
A TURN client should know the authentication capability of the TURN server before deciding to use third party authorization with it. A TURN client initially makes a request without any authorization. If the TURN server supports or mandates third party authorization, it will return an error message indicating support for third party authorization. The TURN server includes an ERROR-CODE attribute with a value of 401 (Unauthorized), a nonce value in a NONCE attribute and a SOFTWARE attribute that gives information about the TURN server's software. The TURN servers also includes additional STUN attribute THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION signaling the TURN client that the TURN server supports third party authorization.
The following mapping of OAuth concepts to WebRTC is used :
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| OAuth | WebRTC |
+======================+============================+
| Client | WebRTC client |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| Resource owner | WebRTC server |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| Authorization server | Authorization server |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| Resource server | TURN Server |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
Figure 4: OAuth terminology mapped to WebRTC terminology
Using the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework, a WebRTC client (third-party application) obtains limited access to a TURN (resource server) on behalf of the WebRTC server (resource owner or authorization server). The WebRTC client requests access to resources controlled by the resource owner (WebRTC server) and hosted by the resource server (TURN server). The WebRTC client obtains access token, lifetime, session key (in the mac_key parameter) and key id (kid). The TURN client conveys the access token and other OAuth parameters learnt from the authorization server to the resource server (TURN server). The TURN server obtains the session key from the access token. The TURN server validates the token, computes the message integrity of the request and takes appropriate action i.e permits the TURN client to create allocations. This is shown in an abstract way in Figure 5.
+---------------+
| +<******+
+------------->| Authorization | *
| | Server | *
| +----------|(WebRTC Server)| * AS-RS,
| | | | * AUTH keys
(2) | | +---------------+ * (1)
Access | | (3) *
Token | | Access Token *
Request | | + *
| | Session Key *
| | *
| V V
+-------+---+ +-+----=-----+
| | (4) | |
| | TURN Request + Access | |
| WebRTC | Token | TURN |
| Client |---------------------->| Server |
| (Alice) | Allocate Response | |
| |<----------------------| |
+-----------+ +------------+
User : Alice
****: Out-of-Band Long-Term Key Establishment
Figure 5: Interactions
OAuth in [RFC6749] defines four grant types. This specification uses the OAuth grant type "Implicit" explained in section 1.3.2 of [RFC6749] where the WebRTC client is issued an access token directly. The scope of the access token explained in section 3.3 of [RFC6749] MUST be TURN.
The TURN and authorization servers MUST establish a symmetric key (K), using an out of band mechanism. Symmetric key MUST be chosen to ensure that the size of encrypted token is not large because usage of asymmetric keys will result in large encrypted tokens which may not fit into a single STUN message. The AS-RS, AUTH keys will be derived from K. AS-RS key is used for encrypting the self-contained token and message integrity of the encrypted token is calculated using the AUTH key. The TURN and authorization servers MUST establish the symmetric key over an authenticated secure channel. The establishment of symmetric key is outside the scope of this specification. For example, implementations could use one of the following mechanisms in to establish a symmetric key.
The two servers could choose to use Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) [RFC6063] to establish a symmetric key (K). The encryption and MAC algorithms will be negotiated using the KeyProvClientHello, KeyProvServerHello messages. A unique key identifier (referred to as KeyID) for the symmetric key is generated by the DSKPP server (i.e. Authorization server) and signalled to the DSKPP client (i.e TURN server) which is equivalent to the kid defined in this specification. The AS-RS, AUTH keys would be derived from the symmetric key using (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF) [RFC5869] and the default hash function is SHA-256. For example if the input symmetric key (K) is 32 octets length, encryption algorithm is AES_128_CBC and HMAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA-256-128 then the secondary keys AS-RS, AUTH are generated from the input key K as follows
The two servers could choose to use REST API to establish a symmetric key. To retrieve a new symmetric key, the TURN server makes an HTTP GET request to the authorization server, specifying TURN as the service to allocate the symmetric keys for, and specifying the name of the TURN server. The response is returned with content-type "application/json", and consists of a JSON object containing the symmetric key.
Request
-------
service - specifies the desired service (turn)
name - TURN server name be associated with the key
example: GET /?service=turn&name=turn1@example.com
Response
--------
key - Long-term key (K)
ttl - the duration for which the key is valid, in seconds.
example:
{
"key" :
"ESIzRFVmd4iZABEiM0RVZgKn6WjLaTC1FXAghRMVTzkBGNaaN496523WIISKerLi",
"ttl" : 86400,
"kid" :"22BIjxU93h/IgwEb"
}
The AS-RS, AUTH keys are derived from K using HKDF as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Authorization server must also signal a unique key identifier (kid) to the TURN server which will be used to select the appropriate keying material for decryption. The default encryption algorithm to encrypt the self-contained token could be Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode (AES_128_CBC). The default HMAC algorithm to calculate the integrity of the token could be HMAC-SHA-256-128. In this case AS-RS key length must be 128-bit, AUTH key length must be 256-bit (section 2.6 of [RFC4868]).
TURN and authorization servers could be manually configured with a symmetric key (K) and kid. The default encryption and HMAC algorithms could be AES_256_CBC, HMAC-SHA-256-128.
Note : The mechanisms specified in Section 4.1.2 Section 4.1.3 are easy to implement and deploy compared to DSKPP but lack encryption and HMAC algorithm agility.
When a TURN server responds that third party authorization is required, a TURN client re-attempts the request, this time including access token and kid values in ACCESS-TOKEN and USERNAME STUN attributes. The TURN client includes a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute as the last attribute in the message over the contents of the TURN message. The HMAC for the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute is computed as described in section 15.4 of [RFC5389] where the mac_key is used as the input key for the HMAC computation. The TURN client and server will use the mac_key to compute the message integrity and doesn't have to perform MD5 hash on the credentials.
The following new STUN attributes are introduced by this specification to accomplish third party authorization.
This attribute is used by the TURN server to inform the client that it supports third party authorization. This attribute value contains the TURN server name. The TURN server may have tie-up with multiple authorization servers and vice versa, so the client MUST provide the TURN server name to the authorization server so that it can select the appropriate keying material to generate the self-contained token. The THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION attribute is a comprehension-optional attribute (see Section 15 from [RFC5389]).
The access token is issued by the authorization server. OAuth does not impose any limitation on the length of the access token but if path MTU is unknown then STUN messages over IPv4 would need to be less than 548 bytes (Section 7.1 of [RFC5389]), access token length needs to be restricted to fit within the maximum STUN message size. Note that the self-contained token is opaque to the client and it MUST NOT examine the ticket. The ACCESS-TOKEN attribute is a comprehension-optional attribute (see Section 15 from [RFC5389]).
The token is structured as follows:
struct {
opaque {
ushort key_length;
opaque mac_key[key_length];
opaque timestamp[8];
long lifetime;
} encrypted_block;
opaque mac[mac_length];
} token;
Figure 6: Self-contained token format
The fields are described below:
For example the encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here C, N denote the ciphertext and TURN server name.
The token MUST be encoded as defined in Section 4 of [RFC4648] and then encrypted using the symmetric long-term key established between the resource server and the authorization server, as shown in Figure 5 as AS-RS key. HMAC is computed using the encrypted portion of the token and TURN server name to ensure that the client does not use the same token to gain illegal access to other TURN servers provided by the same administrative domain. This attack is possible when multiple TURN servers in a single administrative domain share the same symmetric key with the authorization server. Since the access token is valid for a specific period of time the resource server MUST cache it so that it need not to be provided in every request within an existing allocation. The access token can be re-used for multiple Allocate requests to the same TURN server.
The TURN client MUST include the ACCESS-TOKEN attribute only in Allocate and Refresh requests.
The TURN server, on receiving a request with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute, performs checks listed in section 10.2.2 of [RFC5389] in addition to the following steps to verify that the access token is valid:
The lifetime provided by the TURN server in the Allocate and Refresh responses MUST be less than or equal to the lifetime of the token.
When OAuth is used the interaction between the client and the authorization server requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a ciphersuite offering confidentiality protection. The session key MUST NOT be transmitted in clear since this would completely destroy the security benefits of the proposed scheme. If an attacker tries to replay message with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute then the server can detect that the transaction ID as used for an old request and thus prevent the replay attack.
Security considerations discussed in [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac] and [RFC5766] are to be taken into account.
IANA is requested to add the following attributes to the STUN attribute registry [iana-stun],
Authors would like to thank Dan Wing, Pal Martinsen, Oleg Moskalenko and Charles Eckel for comments and review. The authors would like to give special thanks to Brandon Williams for his help.
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC4648] | Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. |
| [RFC4868] | Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007. |
| [RFC5389] | Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P. and D. Wing, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389, October 2008. |
| [RFC6749] | Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, October 2012. |
| [iana-stun] | IANA, , "IANA: STUN Attributes", April 2011. |