| Network Working Group | M. Jenkins |
| Internet-Draft | L. Zieglar |
| Intended status: Informational | NSA |
| Expires: October 25, 2019 | April 23, 2019 |
Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Profile of Certificate Management over CMS
draft-jenkins-cnsa-cmc-profile-03
This document specifies a profile of the Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) protocol for managing X.509 public key certificates in applications that use the Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite published by the United States Government.
The profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of all components of US National Security Systems that manage X.509 public key certificates over CMS. It is also appropriate for all other US Government systems that process high-value information.
The profile is made publicly available here for use by developers and operators of these and any other system deployments.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2019.
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This document specifies a profile of the Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) protocol to comply with the United States National Security Agency's Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite [CNSA]. The profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of all components of US National Security Systems [SP80059]. It is also appropriate for all other US Government systems that process high-value information. It is made publicly available for use by developers and operators of these and any other system deployments.
This document does not define any new cryptographic algorithm suite; instead, it defines a CNSA compliant profile of CMC. CMC is defined in [RFC5272], [RFC5273], and [RFC5274], and is updated by [RFC6402]. This document profiles CMC to manage X.509 public key certificates in compliance with the CNSA Suite Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile [ID.cnsa-cert-profile]. This document specifically focuses on defining CMC interactions for both initial enrollment and rekey of CNSA Suite public key certificates between a client and a Certification Authority (CA). One or more Registration Authorities (RAs) may act as intermediaries between the client and the CA. This profile may be further tailored by specific communities to meet their needs. Specific communities will also define Certificate Policies that implementations need to comply with.
The National Security Agency (NSA) profiles commercial cryptographic algorithms and protocols as part of its mission to support secure, interoperable communications for US Government National Security Systems. To this end, it publishes guidance both to assist with the US Government transition to new algorithms, and to provide vendors - and the Internet community in general - with information concerning their proper use and configuration.
Recently, cryptographic transition plans have become overshadowed by the prospect of the development of a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer. NSA has established the Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite to provide vendors and IT users near-term flexibility in meeting their IA interoperability requirements. The purpose behind this flexibility is to avoid vendors and customers making two major transitions in a relatively short timeframe, as we anticipate a need to shift to quantum-resistant cryptography in the near future.
NSA is authoring a set of RFCs, including this one, to provide updated guidance concerning the use of certain commonly available commercial algorithms in IETF protocols. These RFCs can be used in conjunction with other RFCs and cryptographic guidance (e.g., NIST Special Publications) to properly protect Internet traffic and data-at-rest for US Government National Security Systems.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The terminology in [RFC5272] Section 2.1 applies to this profile.
The term "Certificate Request" is used to refer to a single PKCS #10 or CRMF structure. All PKI Requests are Full PKI Requests, and all PKI Responses are Full PKI Responses; the respective set of terms should be interpreted synonymously in this document.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key pairs are on the curve P-384. FIPS 186-4 [DSS], Appendix B.4, provides useful guidance for elliptic curve key pair generation that SHOULD be followed by systems that conform to this document.
RSA key pairs (public, private) are identified by the modulus size expressed in bits; RSA-3072 and RSA-4096 are computed using moduli of 3072 bits and 4096 bits, respectively.
RSA signature key pairs used in CNSA Suite compliant implementations are either RSA-3072 or RSA-4096. The RSA exponent e MUST satisfy 2^16<e<2^256 and be odd per [DSS].
It is recognized that, while the vast majority of RSA signatures are currently made using the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm, the preferred RSA signature scheme for new applications is RSASSA-PSS. CNSA Suite compliant X.509 certificates will be issued in accordance with [ID.cnsa-cert-profile], and while those certificates must be signed and validated using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, the subject's key pair can be used to generate and validate signatures appropriate for either signing scheme. Where use of RSASSA-PSS is indicated in this document, the following parameters apply: [RFC4056]. Application developers are obliged to ensure that the chosen signature scheme is appropriate for the application and will be interoperable within the intended operating scope of the application.
These parameters will not appear in a certificate and MUST be securely communicated with the signature as specified in
This document assumes that the required trust anchors have been securely provisioned to the client and, when applicable, to any RAs.
All requirements in [RFC5272], [RFC5273], [RFC5274], and [RFC6402] apply, except where overridden by this profile.
This profile was developed with the scenarios described in Appendix A in mind. However, use of this profile is not limited to just those scenarios.
The term "client" in this profile typically refers to an end-entity. However, it may instead refer to a third party acting on the end-entity's behalf. The client may or may not be the entity that actually generates the key pair, but it does perform the CMC protocol interactions with the RA and/or CA. For example, the client may be a token management system that communicates with a cryptographic token through an out-of-band secure protocol.
This profile uses the term "rekey" in the same manner as does CMC (defined in Section 2 of [RFC5272]). The profile makes no specific statements about the ability to do "renewal" operations; however, the statements applicable to rekey should be applied to renewal as well.
This profile may be used to manage RA and/or CA certificates. In that case, the RA and/or CA whose certificate is being managed is considered to be the end-entity.
This profile does not support key establishment certification requests from cryptographic modules that cannot generate a one-time signature with a key establishment key for proof-of-possession purposes. In that case, a separate profile would be needed to define the use of another proof-of-possession technique.
This section specifies the conventions employed when a client requests a certificate from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The Full PKI Request MUST be used; it MUST be encapsulated in a SignedData; and the SignedData MUST be constructed in accordance with [ID.cnsa-smime-profile]. The PKIData content type defined in [RFC5272] is used with the following additional requirements:
The private signing key used to generate the encapsulating SignedData MUST correspond to the public key of an existing signature certificate unless an appropriate signature certificate does not yet exist, such as during initial enrollment.
The encapsulating SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and either ECDSA on P-384, or RSA using either RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS with an RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 key.
If an appropriate signature certificate does not yet exist, and if a Full PKI Request includes one or more certification requests and is authenticated using a shared-secret (because no appropriate certificate exists yet to authenticate the request), the Full PKI Request MUST be signed using the private key corresponding to the public key of one of the requested certificates. When necessary (i.e., because there is no existing signature certificate and there is no signature certification request included), a Full PKI Request MAY be signed using a key pair intended for use in a key establishment certificate. However, servers are not required to allow this behavior.
The reqSequence tcr choice conveys PKCS #10 syntax. The CertificateRequest MUST comply with [RFC5272], Section 3.2.1.2.1, with the following additional requirements:
The reqSequence crm choice conveys Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) syntax. The CertReqMsg MUST comply with [RFC5272], Section 3.2.1.2.2, with the following additional requirements:
The CertTemplate MUST comply with [RFC5272], Section 3.2.1.2.2, with the following additional requirements:
This section addresses the optional case where one or more RAs act as intermediaries between clients and a CA as described in Section 7 of [RFC5272]. In this section, the term "client" refers to the entity from which the RA received the PKI Request. This section is only applicable to RAs.
RAs conforming to this document MUST ensure that only the permitted signature, hash, and MAC algorithms described throughout this profile are used in requests; if they are not, the RA MUST reject those requests. The RA SHOULD return a CMCFailInfo with the value of badAlg [RFC5272].
When processing end-entity-generated SignedData objects, RAs MUST NOT perform Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints (CCC) certificate extension processing [RFC6010].
Other RA processing is as in [RFC5272].
RAs mediate the certificate request process by collecting Client requests in batches. The RA MUST encapsulate client-generated PKI Requests in a new RA-signed PKI Request, it MUST create a Full PKI Request encapsulated in a SignedData, and the SignedData MUST be constructed in accordance with [ID.cnsa-smime-profile]. The PKIData content type complies with [RFC5272] with the following additional requirements:
SignedData (applied by the RA)
PKIData
controlSequence (Transaction ID, Sender Nonce,
Batch Requests)
cmsSequence
SignedData (applied by Client)
PKIData
controlSequence (Transaction ID, Sender Nonce)
reqSequence
TaggedRequest
{TaggedRequest}
{SignedData (second Client request)
PKIData...}
Authorization to sign RA-generated Full PKI Requests SHOULD be indicated in the RA certificate by inclusion of the id-kp-cmcRA EKU from [RFC6402]. The RA certificate MAY also include the CCC certificate extension [RFC6010], or it MAY indicate authorization through inclusion of the CCC certificate extension alone. The RA certificate may also be authorized through local configuration.
If the RA is authorized via the CCC extension, then the CCC extension MUST include the object identifier for the PKIData content type. CCC SHOULD be included if constraints are to be placed on the content types generated.
The outer SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and either ECDSA on P-384 or RSA using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS with an RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 key.
If the Full PKI Response is a successful response to a PKI Request that only contained a Get Certificate or Get CRL control, then the algorithm used in the response and MUST match the algorithm used in the request.
RA certificates authorized with the CCC certificate extension [RFC6010] MUST include the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type to authorize them to generate responses.
This section specifies the requirements for CAs that receive PKI Requests and that generate PKI Responses.
CAs conforming to this document MUST ensure that only the permitted signature, hash, and MAC algorithms described throughout this profile are used in requests; if they are not, the CA MUST reject those requests. The CA SHOULD return a CMCStatusInfoV2 control with CMCStatus of failed and a CMCFailInfo with the value of badAlg [RFC5272].
For requests involving an RA (i.e., batched requests), the CA MUST verify the RA's authorization. The following certificate fields MUST NOT be modifiable using the Modify Certification Request control: publicKey and the Key Usage extension. The request MUST be rejected if an attempt to modify those certification request fields is present. The CA SHOULD return a CMCStatusInfoV2 control with CMCStatus of failed and a CMCFailInfo with a value of badRequest.
When processing end-entity-generated SignedData objects, CAs MUST NOT perform CCC certificate extension processing [RFC6010].
If a client-generated PKI Request includes the ChangeSubjectName attribute as described in Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 above, the CA MUST ensure that name change is authorized. The mechanism for ensuring that the name change is authorized is out of scope. A CA that performs this check and finds that the name change is not authorized MUST reject the PKI Request. The CA SHOULD return an Extended CMC Status Info control (CMCStatusInfoV2) with CMCStatus of failed.
Other processing of PKIRequests is as in [RFC5272].
CAs send PKI Responses to both Client-generated requests and RA-generated requests. If a Full PKI Response is returned in direct response to a Client-generated request, it MUST be encapsulated in a SignedData, and the SignedData MUST be constructed in accordance with [ID.cnsa-smime-profile].
If the PKI Response is in response to an RA-generated PKI Request, then the above PKI Response is encapsulated in another CA-generated PKI Response. That PKI Response MUST be encapsulated in a SignedData and the SignedData MUST be constructed in accordance with [ID.cnsa-smime-profile]. The above PKI Response is placed in the encapsulating PKI Response cmsSequence field. The other fields are as above with the addition of the batch response control in controlSequence. The following illustrates a successful CA response to an RA-encapsulated PKI Request, both of which include Transaction IDs and Nonces:
SignedData (applied by the CA)
PKIResponse
controlSequence (Transaction ID, Sender Nonce, Recipient
Nonce, Batch Response)
cmsSequence
SignedData (applied by CA and includes returned
certificates)
PKIResponse
controlSequence (Transaction ID, Sender Nonce,
Recipient Nonce)
The same private key used to sign certificates MUST NOT be used to sign Full PKI Response messages. Instead, a separate certificate indicating authorization to sign CMC responses MUST be used.
Authorization to sign Full PKI Responses SHOULD be indicated in the CA certificate by inclusion of the id-kp-cmcCA EKU from [RFC6402]. The CA certificate MAY also include the CCC certificate extension [RFC6010], or it MAY indicate authorization through inclusion of the CCC certificate extension alone. The CA certificate may also be authorized through local configuration.
If the CA is authorized via the CCC extension, then the CCC extension MUST include the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type. CCC SHOULD be included if constraints are to be placed on the content types generated.
Signatures applied to individual certificates are as required in [ID.cnsa-cert-profile].
The signature on the SignedData of a successful response to a Client-generated request, or each individual inner SignedData on the successful response to a RA-generated request, MUST be generated using SHA-384 and either ECDSA on P-384 or RSA using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS with an RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 key. An unsuccessful response MUST be signed using the same key-type and algorithm that signed the request.
The outer SignedData on the Full PKI Response to any RA-generated PKI Request MUST be signed with the same key-type and algorithm that signed the request.
The SignedData on a successful Full PKI Response to a PKI Request that only contained a Get Certificate or Get CRL control MUST be signed with the same key-type and algorithm that signed the request.
Clients conforming to this document MUST ensure that only the permitted signature, hash, and MAC algorithms described throughout this profile are used in responses; if they are not, the client MUST reject those responses.
Clients MUST authenticate all Full PKI Responses. This includes verifying that the PKI Response is signed by an authorized CA or RA whose certificate validates back to a trust anchor. The authorized CA certificate MUST include the id-kp-cmcCA EKU and/or include a CCC extension that includes the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type. Or, the CA is determined to be authorized to sign responses through an implementation-specific mechanism. The PKI Response can be signed by an RA if it is an error message, if it is a response to a Get Certificate or Get CRL request, or if the PKI Response contains an inner PKI Response signed by a CA. In the last case, each layer of PKI Response MUST still contain an authorized, valid signature signed by an entity with a valid certificate that verifies back to an acceptable trust anchor. The authorized RA certificate MUST include the id-kp-cmcRA EKU and/or include a CCC extension that includes the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type. Or, the RA is determined to be authorized to sign responses through local configuration.
When a newly issued certificate is included in the PKI Response, the client MUST verify that the newly issued certificate's public key matches the public key that the client requested. The client MUST also ensure that the certificate's signature is valid and that the signature validates back to an acceptable trust anchor.
Clients MUST reject PKI Responses that do not pass these tests. Local policy will determine whether the client returns a Full PKI Response with an Extended CMC Status Info control (CMCStatusInfoV2) with CMCStatus set to failed to a user console, error log, or the server.
If the Full PKI Response contains an Extended CMC Status Info control with a CMCStatus set to failed, then local policy will determine whether the client resends a duplicate certification request back to the server or an error state is returned to a console or error log.
When the Identity Proof V2 and POP Link Witness V2 controls are used, the shared-secret MUST be randomly generated and securely distributed. The shared-secret MUST provide at least 192 bits of strength.
Protocol security considerations are found in [RFC2986], [RFC4211], [ID.cnsa-smime-profile], [RFC5272], [RFC5273], [RFC5274], [ID.cnsa-cert-profile], and [RFC6402]. When CCC is used to authorize RA and CA certificates, then the security considerations in [RFC6010] also apply. Algorithm security considerations are found in [ID.cnsa-smime-profile].
Compliant with NIST Special Publication 800-57 [SP80057], this profile defines proof-of-possession of a key establishment private key by performing a digital signature. Except for one-time proof-of-possession, a single key pair MUST NOT be used for both signature and key establishment.
This specification requires implementations to generate key pairs and other random values. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) can result in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. NIST Special Publication 800-90 [SP80090], FIPS 186-3 [DSS], and [RFC4086] offer random number generation guidance.
When RAs are used, the list of authorized RAs MUST be securely distributed out-of-band to CAs.
Presence of the POP Link Witness Version 2 and POP Link Random attributes protects against substitution attacks.
The Certificate Policy for a particular environment will specify whether expired certificates can be used to sign certification requests.
This document has no IANA actions.
| [SP80057] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General", January 2016. |
| [SP80059] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System", Special Publication 800 59, August 2003. |
| [SP80090] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators", June 2015. |
This section illustrates several potential certificate enrollment and rekey scenarios supported by this profile. This section does not intend to place any limits or restrictions on the use of CMC.
This section describes three scenarios for authenticating initial enrollment requests:
In this scenario, the end-entity has a private signing key, and a corresponding public key certificate obtained from a cryptographic module manufacturer recognized by the CA. The end-entity signs a Full PKI Request with the private key that corresponds to the subject public key of the previously installed signature certificate. The CA will verify the authorization of the previously installed certificate and issue an appropriate new certificate to the end-entity.
In this scenario, the CA distributes a shared-secret out-of-band to the end-entity that the end-entity uses to authenticate its certification request. The end-entity signs the Full PKI Request with the private key for which the certification is being requested. The end-entity includes the Identity Proof Version 2 control to authenticate the request using the shared-secret. The CA uses either the Identification control or the Subject in the end-entity's enclosed PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request message to identify the request. The end-entity performs either the POP Link Witness Version 2 mechanism as described in [RFC5272], Section 6.3.1.1, or the Shared-Subject/Subject Distinguished Name (DN) linking mechanism as described in [RFC5272], Section 6.3.2. The Subject in the enclosed PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request does not necessarily match the issued certificate, as it may be used just to help identify the request (and corresponding shared-secret) to the CA.
In this scenario, the end-entity does not automatically authenticate its enrollment request to the CA, either because the end-entity has nothing to authenticate the request with or because organizational policy requires an RA's involvement. The end-entity creates a Full PKI Request and sends it to an RA. The RA verifies the authenticity of the request, then, if approved, encapsulates and signs the request as described in Section 5.2, forwarding the new request on to the CA. The Subject in the PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request is not required to match the issued certificate, it may be used just to help identify the request to the RA and/or CA.
There are two scenarios to support the rekey of certificates that are already enrolled. One addresses the rekey of signature certificates and the other addresses the rekey of key establishment certificates. Typically, organizational policy will require certificates to be currently valid to be rekeyed, and it may require initial enrollment to be repeated when rekey is not possible. However, some organizational policies might allow a grace period during which an expired certificate could be used to rekey.
When a signature certificate is rekeyed, the PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request message enclosed in the Full PKI Request will include the same Subject as the current signature certificate. The Full PKI Request will be signed by the current private key corresponding to the current signature certificate.
When a key establishment certificate is rekeyed, the Full PKI Request will generally be signed by the current private key corresponding to the current signature certificate. If there is no current signature certificate, one of the initial enrollment options in Appendix A.1 may be used.