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This document describes the OpenPGP mail and news header field. The field provide information about the sender's OpenPGP key.
See <http://josefsson.org/openpgp-header/> for more information.
1.
Preface
2.
Background and Motivation
3.
OpenPGP Header Field
3.1.
Primary Key ID field: id
3.2.
Key URL field: url
3.3.
Protection Preference Field: preference
4.
Comments
5.
Examples
6.
Open Issues
7.
Acknowledgements
8.
Security Considerations
9.
IANA Considerations
10.
Copying conditions
11.
References
11.1.
Normative References
11.2.
Informative References
§
Authors' Addresses
§
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements
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This document is intended to define the "OpenPGP" message header field. This field should be considered "informational" (and "optional"), and be suitable for both mail (Resnick, P., “Internet Message Format,” April 2001.) [RFC2822] and netnews (Horton, M. and R. Adams, “Standard for interchange of USENET messages,” December 1987.) [RFC1036] messages. This field should be used to provide information about the sender's OpenPGP (Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R. Thayer, “OpenPGP Message Format,” November 2007.) [RFC4880] key. This field MAY be used in any message.
This document should be interpreted within the context of RFC 2822. In the event of a discrepancy, refer to that document.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.) [RFC2119].
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There are quite a few PGP and GnuPG users who add header fields with information about the sender's OpenPGP key. Fields in current use include "X-PGP:", "X-PGP-Key:", "X-Request-PGP:", "X-PGP-KeyID:", and "X-PGP-Fingerprint:". The fields are not standardized, so they cannot be reliably parsed automatically by applications, only parsed by humans.
Since both PGP and GnuPG rely on the OpenPGP protocol, it appear preferable to use the term "OpenPGP" rather than "PGP", or "GPG", in the field name. The latter forms appear as underhanded attempts to advocate specific applications, rather than the open standard they both share. The field specified here is named "OpenPGP".
The OpenPGP field is not a required part of successful use of OpenPGP in e-mail. It is intended as a convenience, in those situations where the user experience may be enhanced by using the information in the field. Consequently, the information in the field should not disrupt the normal OpenPGP key retrieval and web of trust mechanism. Neither the integrity nor the authenticity of the information in the field should be assumed to be correct or be trust-worthy.
No specific scenario when the field should be used, nor how it should be used in that scenario, are suggested by this document. It is acknowledged that the dominant use of the information in the field may be by humans and not applications.
To promote good use of the field, care should be taken so that applications do not trigger error messages that may annoy the user, when an error condition arise during handling of the OpenPGP field. It is generally recommended that an implementation ignore the presence of the OpenPGP fields if an error condition occur. Since the field is optional, this approach should not be difficult to implement. The philosophy here is to enable an enhanced user experience. Error messages rarely contribute to that goal.
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The OpenPGP header field is intended to present characteristics of the sender's OpenPGP key. The field may contain the Key ID and the URL where the key can be retrieved.
Because the header is typically not integrity protected, the information conveyed in the OpenPGP header field MUST NOT be trusted without additional verification. Some of the information given in this field may also be given on the OpenPGP key itself. When these two sources conflict, users SHOULD favor the information from the OpenPGP key, as that information can be cryptographically protected.
The field is of a "structured" type (see section 2.2.2 of RFC 2822). In general, the structure consist of one or more parameters, each consisting of one attribute and one value. The terminology and format of the field was inspired by MIME (Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, “Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies,” November 1996.) [RFC2045]. The various provisions of RFC 2045 apply. In particular, the value part of all parameters may be quoted; whitespace, foldoing and comments may occur in the middle of parameters. The provisions of MIME (Freed, N. and K. Moore, “MIME Parameter Value and Encoded Word Extensions: Character Sets, Languages, and Continuations,” November 1997.) [RFC2231] also apply; in particular it deals with handling parameters of excessive length.
In the Augmented BNF (Crocker, D. and P. Overell, “Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF,” January 2008.) [RFC5234] notation, the OpenPGP header field is defined as below. By itself, however, this grammar is incomplete. It refers by name to several syntax rules that are defined by RFC 2822 and the URI syntax document (Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January 2005.) [RFC3986]. Rather than reproduce those definitions here, and risk unintentional differences between the two, this document refer the reader to RFC 2822 and RFC 3986 for the definition of non-terminals.
Unrecognized parameters MUST be ignored. The grammar permit them to allow for future extensions. The field SHOULD NOT appear more than once within a message. A given parameter type (i.e., "id", "url" or "preference") MUST NOT occur more than once.
openpgp := "OpenPGP:" (openpgp-parameter *(";" openpgp-parameter)) CRLF id := 8*HEXDIG url := absoluteURI ; Defined in RFC 3986. preference := "sign" / "encrypt" / "signencrypt" / "unprotected" openpgp-parameter := ("id" "=" id) / ("url" "=" url) / ("preference" "=" preference) / parameter ; See RFC 2045 for definition of parameter.
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The "id" attribute=value pair, if present, MUST define the primary key ID. The value MUST identify the key ID (in either short or long form) or the fingerprint, all using the hex (Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,” October 2006.) [RFC4648] notation.
The length of the field imply the kind of key id, i.e., short or long form, or a v3 or v4 key.
Note that each of the following examples includes a comment, which is optional.
id=12345678 (short key ID) id=1234567890ABCDEF (long key ID) id=1234567890abcdef01234567890ABCDEF0123456 (v4 fingerprint) id=1234567890ABCDEF01234567890ABCDE (v3 fingerprint, deprecated)
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The "url" attribute=value pair, if present, MUST specify a URL where the public key can be found. It is RECOMMENDED to use a common URL family, such as HTTP (Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June 1999.) [RFC2616] or FTP (Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, “File Transfer Protocol,” October 1985.) [RFC0959]. The URL MUST be fully qualified, MUST explicitly specify a protocol and SHOULD be accessible on the public Internet.
For example:
url=http://example.org/pgp.txt
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The "preference" attribute=value pair, if present, specify the quality of protection preferred by the sender. The available choices are "unprotected" which means that the sender prefer not to receive OpenPGP protected e-mails. A "sign" token means that the sender prefer to receive digitally signed e-mails. A "encrypt" token means that the sender prefer to receive digitally encrypted e-mails. A "signencrypt" token means that the sender prefer to receive digitally encrypted and signed e-mails. Note that there is no technical requirement on the receiver to follow the stated preference.
For example:
preference=sign preference="unprotected" preference=ENCRYPT
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As discussed in section 3.2.3 of RFC 2822, comments may appear in header field bodies. Comments are not intended to be interpreted by any application, but to provide additional information for humans.
The following are examples of OpenPGP fields with comments:
id=B565716F (key stored on non-networked laptop) id=12345678 (1024 bit RSA Key for Encrypt or Sign) id=ABCD0123 (created Sun Jan 2 02:25:15 CET 2005)
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These are valid examples of how the field may be used. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but do reflect expected typical usages.
OpenPGP: id=12345678 OpenPGP: url=http://example.com/key.txt OpenPGP: preference=unprotected OpenPGP: url=http://example.com/key.txt; id=12345678 OpenPGP: id=12345678; url=http://example.com/key.txt; preference=signencrypt OpenPGP: url=http://example.com/key.txt (down 2-3pm UTC); id=12345678 (this key is only used at the office); preference=sign (unsigned emails are filtered away)
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Should there be a "supports" field, that signal whether the sender support inline PGP or PGP/MIME? As in supports="inline, mime" or similar. Should it be in preferred priority order? This draft tentatively closes this issue by ignoring the matter, until someone proposes text.
The ABNF definition is known to be under-specified.
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The content of this document builds on discussions with (in alphabetical order) Christian Biere, Patrick Brunschwig, Jon Callas, Dave Evans, Peter J. Holzer, Ingo Klocker, Werner Koch, Jochen Kupper, William Leibzon, Charles Lindsey, Aleksandar Milivojevic, Xavier Maillard, Greg Sabino Mullane, Thomas Roessler, Moritz Schulte, Olav Seyfarth, David Shaw, Thomas Sjogren, Paul Walker, and Steve Youngs. No doubt the list is incomplete. We apologize to anyone we left out.
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The OpenPGP header field is intended to be a convenience in locating public keys. They are neither secure nor intended to be. Since the message header is easy to spoof, information contained in the header should not be trusted. The information must be verified.
Applications that interpret the field MUST NOT assume that the content is correct, and MUST NOT present the data to the user in any way that would cause the user to assume that it is correct. Applications that interpret the data within the field SHOULD alert the user that this information is not a substitute for personally verifying keys and being a part of the web of trust.
If an application receives a signed message and uses the information in the field to retrieve a key, the application MAY ignore the retrieved key if it is not the same key used to sign the message. This SHOULD be done before the newly retrieved key is imported into the user's keyring.
The use of HTTPS (Rescorla, E., “HTTP Over TLS,” May 2000.) [RFC2818], DNSSEC (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “DNS Security Introduction and Requirements,” March 2005.) [RFC4033], SMTP STARTTLS (Hoffman, P., “SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security,” February 2002.) [RFC3207], IMAP/POP3 STARTTLS (Newman, C., “Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP,” June 1999.) [RFC2595] and other secure protocols, may enhance the security of information conveyed through this field, but does not guarantee any level of security or authenticity. Developers and users must remain aware of this.
Version 3 OpenPGP keys can be created with a chosen key id (aka "the 0xDEADBEEF attack"). Verifying the Key ID of a retrived key against the one provided in the field is thus not sufficient to protect against a man-in-the-middle attack. Instead, the web-of-trust mechanism should be used.
If an attacker wants to check the validity of Email addresses, he might send out junk email to arbitrary addresses and collect those that report back to the crafted OpenPGP URL. To protect against this, implementations MUST inform the user of that potential privacy issue when retrieving keys from an URL provided by the field of an inbound email message: either when the feature is enabled or to be used for the first time or every time the MUA detects an unknown key.
Given the flexibility of the syntax of the field, slightly varying the content between messages can be used as a covert channel.
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The IANA is asked to register the OpenPGP header field, using the template as follows, in accordance with RFC 3864 (Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, “Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields,” September 2004.) [RFC3864].
Header field name: OpenPGP
Applicable protocol: mail, netnews
Status: informational
Author/Change controller: IETF
Specification document(s): This document.
Related information: None
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In addition to the IETF/ISOC copying conditions, the following statement grant third parties further rights to this document.
Copyright (C) 2004 Atom Smasher Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Simon Josefsson Regarding this entire document or any portion of it, the authors makes no guarantees and is not responsible for any damage resulting from its use. The authors grants irrevocable permission to anyone to use, modify, and distribute it in any way that does not diminish the rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it, provided that redistributed derivative works do not contain misleading author or version information. Derivative works need not be licensed under similar terms.
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[RFC2045] | Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, “Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies,” RFC 2045, November 1996 (TXT). |
[RFC2231] | Freed, N. and K. Moore, “MIME Parameter Value and Encoded Word Extensions: Character Sets, Languages, and Continuations,” RFC 2231, November 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML). |
[RFC2119] | Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML). |
[RFC2822] | Resnick, P., “Internet Message Format,” RFC 2822, April 2001 (TXT). |
[RFC3986] | Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005 (TXT, HTML, XML). |
[RFC4880] | Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R. Thayer, “OpenPGP Message Format,” RFC 4880, November 2007 (TXT). |
[RFC5234] | Crocker, D. and P. Overell, “Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF,” STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008 (TXT). |
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Atom Smasher | |
Email: | atom@smasher.org (762A3B98A3C396C9C6B7582AB88D52E4D9F57808) |
Simon Josefsson | |
Email: | simon@josefsson.org (0424D4EE81A0E3D119C6F835EDA21E94B565716F) |
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