The Camellia-CMAC-96 and Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 Algorithms and Its Use with IPsec
draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-cmac96and128-01

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Abstract

This memo specifies two new alogorithms. One is the usage of Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) with Camellia block cipher on the authentication mechanism of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload and Authentication Header protocols. This algoritm is called Camellia-CMAC-96. Latter is pseudo-random function based on CMAC with Camellia block cipher for Internet Key Exchange. This algoritm is called Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128.

Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Terminology
2.  Definitions
3.  Camellia-CMAC
4.  Camellia-CMAC-96
5.  Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
6.  Test Vectors
    6.1.  Camellia-CMAC-96
    6.2.  Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
7.  Security Considerations
8.  IANA Considerations
9.  Acknowledgements
10.  References
    10.1.  Normative
    10.2.  Informative
§  Authors' Addresses
§  Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements

1.  Introduction

This memo specifies two new alogorithms. One is the usage of CMAC based on Camellia block cipher on the authentication mechanism of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [4] (Kent, S., “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” December 2005.) and Authentication Header protocols (AH) [3] (Kent, S., “IP Authentication Header,” December 2005.). This algorithm is called Camellia-CMAC-96. Latter is Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) based on CMAC with Camellia block cipher for Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [5] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.). This algoritm is called Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128.

Camellia is a symmetric cipher with a Feistel structure. Camillia was developed jointly by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in 2000. It was designed to withstand all known cryptanalytic attacks, and it has been scrutinized by worldwide cryptographic experts. Camellia is suitable for implementation in software and hardware, offering encryption speed in software and hardware implementations that is comparable to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [17] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.).

Camellia supports 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key lengths, i.e., the same interface specifications as the AES. Therefore developers can implement Camellia based alogorithms without large amount of modification by replacing AES block of AES based algorithms to Camellia block.

Camellia is adopted as IETF and several international standardization organizations. Camellia is already adopted as IPSec [14] (Kato, A., Moriai, S., and M. Kanda, “The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec,” December 2005.), TLS [12] (Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, “Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS),” July 2005.), S/MIME [9] (Moriai, S. and A. Kato, “Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS),” January 2004.) and XML [10] (Eastlake, D., “Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs),” April 2005.). Camellia is adopted for the one of three ISO/IEC international standard cipher [20] (International Organization for Standardization, “Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption algorithms - Part 3: Block ciphers,” July 2005.) as 128bit block cipher (Camellia AES and SEED). Camellia was selected as a recommended cryptographic primitive by the EU NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption) project [18] (, “The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption),” .) and was included in the list of cryptographic techniques for Japanese e-Government systems that was selected by the Japan CRYPTREC (Cryptography Research Evaluation Committees) [19] (Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees,” .).

Since optimized source code is provided by several open source lisences, Camellia is also adopted by several open source projects(Openssl, FreeBSD, Linux and Gran Paradiso). Additional API for Network Security Services (NSS) and IPsec stack of Linux and Free BSD are prepared or working progress for release.

The algorithm specification and object identifiers are described in [7] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.).

The Camellia homepage contains a wealth of information about Camellia, including detailed specification, security analysis, performance figures, reference implementation, optimized implementetion, test vectors, and intellectual property information.

This doucment specifies the usage of CMAC with Camellia Block cipher on the authentication mechanism of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload [4] (Kent, S., “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” December 2005.) and Authentication Header [3] (Kent, S., “IP Authentication Header,” December 2005.) protocols. This new algorithm is named Camellia-CMAC-96.

NIST CMAC specification document [1] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:The CMAC Mode for Autentication,” May 2005.) describes a method to use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a Message Authentication Code (MAC) that has a 128-bit output length. The 128-bit output is useful as a long-lived pseudo- random function (PRF). This document also specifies a PRF based on CMAC with Camellia block cipher that supports fixed and variable key sizes for IKEv2 [5] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.) Key Derivation Function (KDF) and authentication. This new alogrithm is named Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128. For further information on IKE, AH and ESP, refer to [5] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.), [3] (Kent, S., “IP Authentication Header,” December 2005.), [4] (Kent, S., “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),” December 2005.) and [6] (Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., and R. Glenn, “IP Security Document Roadmap,” November 1998.).

This document does not cover implementation details of CMAC. Those details can be found in [1] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:The CMAC Mode for Autentication,” May 2005.).

1.1.  Terminology

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).

2.  Definitions

CBC

Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation for message authentication code.

MAC

Message Authentication Code. A bit string of a fixed length, computed by the MAC generation algorithm, that is used to establish the authority and, hence, the integrity of a message.

CMAC

Cipher-based MAC based on a symmetric key block cipher.

Key (K)

128-bit (16-octet) key for Camellia cipher block. Denoted by K.

Variable-length Key (VK)

Variable-length key for Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128, denoted by VK.

Message (M)

Message to be authenticated. Denoted by M.

Length (len)

The length of message M in octets. Denoted by len. The minimum value is 0. The maximum value is not specified in this document.

VKlen

The length of VK in octets.

truncate(T,l)

Truncate T (MAC) in most-significant-bit-first (MSB-first) order to a length of l octets.

T

The output of Camellia-CMAC.

Truncated T

The truncated output of Camellia-CMAC-128 in MSB-first order.

Camellia-CMAC

CMAC generation function based on Camellia block cipher with 128-bit key.

Camellia-CMAC-96

IPsec AH and ESP MAC generation function based on Camellia-CMAC, which truncates the 96 most significant bits of the 128-bit output.

Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128

IPsec AH and ESP PRF based on Camellia-CMAC, which removes 128-bit key length restriction.

3.  Camellia-CMAC

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC). CMAC [1] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:The CMAC Mode for Autentication,” May 2005.) is a keyed hash function that is based on a symmetric key block cipher, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard [17] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.). The CMAC algorithm provides a framework for inserting various block cipher algorithm.

Camellia-CMAC uses the Camellia block cipher [7] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.) as a building block in CMAC [1] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:The CMAC Mode for Autentication,” May 2005.). To generate a MAC, Camelllia-CMAC takes a secret key, a message of variable length, and the length of the message in octets as inputs and returns a fixed-bit string.

4.  Camellia-CMAC-96

For IPsec message authentication on AH and ESP, Camellia-CMAC-96 MAY be used. Camellia-CMAC-96 is a Camellia-CMAC with 96-bit truncated output in MSB-first order. The output is a 96-bit MAC that will meet the default authenticator length as specified in [3] (Kent, S., “IP Authentication Header,” December 2005.). The result of truncation is taken in MSB-first order.

Figure 1 (Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-96) describes Camellia-CMAC-96 algorithm:

In step 1, Camellia-CMAC is applied to the message M in length len with key K.

In step 2, the output block T is truncated to 12 octets in MSB-first order, and Truncated T (TT) is returned.

   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
   +                    Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-96                     +
   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
   +                                                                   +
   +   Input    : K (128-bit Key)                                      +
   +            : M    (message to be authenticated)                   +
   +            : len  (length of message in octets)                   +
   +   Output   : Truncated T  (truncated output to length 12 octets)  +
   +                                                                   +
   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
   +                                                                   +
   +   Step 1.  T  := Camellia-CMAC (K,M,len);                         +
   +   Step 2.  TT := truncate (T, 12);                                +
   +            return TT;                                             +
   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

5.  Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128

The Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm is identical to Camellia-CMAC except that the 128-bit key length restriction is removed.

IKEv2 [5] (Kaufman, C., “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,” December 2005.) uses PRFs for multiple purposes, most notably for generating keying material and authentication of the IKE_SA. The IKEv2 specification differentiates between PRFs with fixed key sizes and those with variable key sizes.

When using Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 as the PRF described in IKEv2, Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 is considered to take fixed size (16 octets) keys for generating keying material but it takes variable key sizes for authentication.

That is, when generating keying material, "half the bits must come from Ni and half from Nr, taking the first bits of each" as described in IKEv2, section 2.14; but for authenticating with shared secrets (IKEv2, section 2.16), the shared secret does not have to be 16 octets and the length may vary.

   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
   +                        Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128                      +
   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
   +                                                                   +
   + Input  : VK (Variable-length key)                                 +
   +        : M (Message, i.e., the input data of the PRF)             +
   +        : VKlen (length of VK in octets)                           +
   +        : len (length of M in octets)                              +
   + Output : PRV (128-bit Pseudo-Random Variable)                     +
   +                                                                   +
   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
   + Variable: K (128-bit key for Camellia-CMAC)                       +
   +                                                                   +
   + Step 1.   If VKlen is equal to 16                                 +
   + Step 1a.  then                                                    +
   +               K := VK;                                            +
   + Step 1b.  else                                                    +
   +               K := Camellia-CMAC(0^128, VK, VKlen);               +
   + Step 2.   PRV := Camellia-CMAC(K, M, len);                        +
   +           return PRV;                                             +
   +                                                                   +
   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

In step 1, the 128-bit key, K, for Camellia-CMAC is derived as follows:

o

If the key, VK, is exactly 128 bits, then we use it as-is.

o

If it is longer or shorter than 128 bits, then we derive the key, K, by applying the Camellia-CMAC algorithm using the 128-bit all-zero string as the key and VK as the input message. This step is described in step 1b.

In step 2, we apply the Camellia-CMAC algorithm using K as the key and M as the input message. The output of this algorithm is returned.

6.  Test Vectors

6.1.  Camellia-CMAC-96

This section contains four test vectors(TV), which can be used to confirm that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-CMAC-96.

 ----------------
 K                2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c

 Mlen = 0
 M                <empty string>
 T                ba925782 aaa1f5d9 a00f8964

 ----------------
 K                2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c

 Mlen = 16
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
 T                6d962854 a3b9fda5 6d7d45a9

 ----------------
 K                2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c

 Mlen = 40
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411
 T                5c18d119 ccd67661 44ac1866

 ----------------
 K                2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c

 Mlen = 64
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
                  f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
 T                c2699a6e ba55ce9d 939a8a4e

6.2.  Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128

This section contains twelve test vectors(TV), which can be used to confirm that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128. The first four test vectors use 128 bit VK; the next four test vectors use 192 bit VK; and the last four test vectors use 256 bit VK.

VKlen = 16
 ----------------
 VK               2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c


 Mlen = 0
 M                <empty string>
 T                ba925782 aaa1f5d9 a00f8964 8094fc71

 ----------------
 VK               2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c


 Mlen = 16
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
 T                6d962854 a3b9fda5 6d7d45a9 5ee17993

 ----------------
 VK               2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c


 Mlen = 40
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411
 T                5c18d119 ccd67661 44ac1866 131d9f22

 ----------------
 VK               2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c


 Mlen = 64
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
                  f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
 T                c2699a6e ba55ce9d 939a8a4e 19466ee9

 ------------------------------------------------------------
 VKlen = 24
 ----------------
 VK               8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
                  62f8ead2 522c6b7b

 K                abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91

 Mlen = 0
 M                <empty string>
 T                f4739892 c70bd23e 891f66c0 5fefbf27

 ----------------
 VK               8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
                  62f8ead2 522c6b7b

 K                abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91

 Mlen = 16
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
 T                60a33814 53babaed 1a11dfd3 d24c1410

 ----------------
 VK               8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
                  62f8ead2 522c6b7b

 K                abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91

 Mlen = 40
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411
 T                42b9d47f 4f58bc29 85b6f82c 23b121cb

 ----------------
 VK               8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
                  62f8ead2 522c6b7b

 K                abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91

 Mlen = 64
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
                  f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
 T                d078729f dcae9abc ff1ea4d6 18ed4501

 ------------------------------------------------------------
 VKlen = 32
 ----------------
 VK               603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
                  1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4

 K                b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597

 Mlen = 0
 M                <empty string>
 T                c96d7d40 d4aaab78 ac906b91 c82bd690

 ----------------
 VK               603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
                  1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4

 K                b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597

 Mlen = 16
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
 T                104de4b9 0da6baf1 fa73945b e614f032

 ----------------
 VK               603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
                  1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4

 K                b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597

 Mlen = 40
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411
 T                2d3684e9 1cb1b303 a7db8648 f25ee16c

 ----------------
 VK               603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
                  1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4

 K                b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597

 Mlen = 64
 M                6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
                  ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
                  30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
                  f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
 T                d6b0f1b7 dda2b62a eca6d51d da63fdda

7.  Security Considerations

The security provided by Camellia-CMAC-96 Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 is built on the strong cryptographic algorithm Camellia and CMAC. At the time of this writing, there are no known practical cryptographic attacks against Camellia or CMAC.

However, as is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its strength lies in the secret key, K, and the correctness of the implementation in all of the participating systems. If the secret key is compromised or inappropriately shared, it guarantees neither authentication nor integrity of message at all. The secret key shall be generated in a way that meets the pseudo randomness requirement of RFC 4086 [11] (Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, “Randomness Requirements for Security,” June 2005.) and should be kept safe. If and only if Camellia-CMAC-96 Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 are used properly it provides the authentication and integrity that meet the best current practice of message authentication.

8.  IANA Considerations

The IANA has allocated value <TBD1> for IKEv2 Transform Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm) to the AUTH_CAMELLIA_CMAC_96 algorithm, and has allocated a value of <TBD2> for IKEv2 Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-Random Function) to the PRF_CAMELLIA128_CMAC algorithm.

9.  Acknowledgements

Portions of this text were borrowed from [15] (Song, JH., Poovendran, R., and J. Lee, “The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec,” June 2006.) and [16] (Song, J., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, “The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE),” August 2006.).

10.  References

10.1. Normative

10.2. Informative

Authors' Addresses

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