| Network Working Group | T. King |
| Internet-Draft | D. Kopp |
| Intended status: Standards Track | DE-CIX |
| Expires: June 16, 2016 | A. Lambrianidis |
| AMS-IX | |
| A. Fenioux | |
| France-IX | |
| December 14, 2015 |
Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
draft-kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-00
This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] to signal RPKI validation results from a route-server to its peers. Upon reception of RPKI validation results peers can use this information in their local routing decision process.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English words, without normative meaning.
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RPKI-based route origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to boost acceptance and usage of RPKI and ultimately increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may provide RPKI-based route origin validation at the route-server [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this route origin validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community as introduced in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling].
Peers receiving the route origin validation result from the route-server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic engineering purposes of a particular route.
The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for signaling RPKI validation result from a route-server to peers.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of the RPKI validation result [RFC6811] as follows:
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | Valid |
| 1 | Not found |
| 2 | Invalid |
This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based route origin validation set the validation state according to the RPKI validation result (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered]).
A peer receiving an RPKI validation result from the route server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811].
A peer receiving an RPKI validation result from the route server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.
An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing RPKI origin validation or not.
Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes tagged with arbitrary RPKI validation results via a route-server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route-server peers.
A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.
A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the validation result field and disregard the other values. Values larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.
None.
A route-server could be misused to spread malicious RPKI validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to other peers.
The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-servers and peers.
| [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered] | Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Martinez, C., Bruijnzeels, T., Newton, A. and A. Aina, "RPKI Validation Reconsidered", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-02, October 2015. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC4360] | Sangli, S., Tappan, D. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, February 2006. |
| [RFC6811] | Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R. and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013. |
| [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] | Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R. and N. Bakker, "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-09, October 2015. |
| [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] | Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D. and R. Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07, November 2015. |
| [RFC6480] | Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012. |