| 6man | J. Leddy |
| Internet-Draft | Unaffiliated |
| Intended status: Standards Track | R. Bonica |
| Expires: April 15, 2019 | Juniper Networks |
| I. Lubashev | |
| Akamai Technologies | |
| October 12, 2018 |
IPv6 Packet Truncation
draft-leddy-6man-truncate-05
This document defines IPv6 packet truncation procedures. These procedures make Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) more reliable. Upper-layer protocols can leverage these procedures in order to take advantage of large MTUs.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 15, 2019.
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An Internet path connects a source node to a destination node. A path can contain links and routers.
Each link is constrained by the number of bytes that it can convey in a single IP packet. This constraint is called the link Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). IPv6 requires every link to have an MTU of 1280 bytes or greater. This value is called IPv6 minimum link MTU.
Likewise, each Internet path is constrained by the number of bytes that it can convey in a single IP packet. This constraint is called the Path MTU (PMTU). For any given path, the PMTU is equal to the smallest of its link MTUs.
IPv6 allows fragmentation at the source node only. If an IPv6 source node sends a packet whose length exceeds the PMTU, an intermediate node will discard the packet. In order to prevent this, IPv6 nodes can either:
In order to maintain a running estimate of the PMTU, IPv6 nodes can execute Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) procedures. In these procedures, the source node produces an initial PMTU estimate. This initial estimate equals the MTU of the first link along the path to the destination. It can be greater than the actual PMTU.
Having produced an initial PMTU estimate, the source node sends packets to the destination node. If one of these packets is larger than the actual PMTU, an intermediate node will not be able to forward the packet through the next link along the path. Therefore, the intermediate node discards the packet and sends an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Packet Too Big (PTB) message to the source node. The ICMP PTB message indicates the MTU of the link through which the packet could not be forwarded. The source node uses this information to refine its PMTU estimate.
PMTUD relies on the network to deliver ICMP PTB messages from the intermediate node to the source node. If the network cannot deliver these messages, a persistent black hole can develop. In this scenario, the source node sends a packet whose length exceeds the PMTU. An intermediate node discards the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message to the source. However, the network cannot deliver the ICMP PTB message to the source. Therefore, the source node does not update its PMTU estimate and it continues to send packets whose length exceeds the PMTU. The intermediate node discards these packets and sends more ICMP PTB messages to the source. These ICMP PTB messages are lost, exactly as previous ICMP PTB messages were lost.
In some operational scenarios, networks cannot deliver ICMP PTB messages from an intermediate node to the source node. Therefore, enhanced procedures are required.
This document defines IPv6 packet truncation procedures. When an IPv6 source node originates a packet, it executes the following procedure:
If an intermediate node cannot forward the packet because of an MTU issue, it executes the following procedure:
When the destination node receives the packet, it executes the following procedure:
Both ICMP PTB messages, mentioned above, contain MTU information that the source node can use to refine its PMTU estimate.
The procedures described herein prevent incomplete (i.e., truncated) data from being delivered to upper-layer protocols. While IPv6 packet truncation may facilitate new upper-layer procedures, upper-layer procedures are beyond the scope of this document.
The procedures described herein make PMTUD more reliable by increasing the probability that the source node will receive ICMP PTB feedback from a downstream device. Even when the network cannot deliver ICMP PTB messages from an intermediate router to a source node, it may be able to deliver an ICMP PTB messages from the destination node to the source node.
However, the procedures described herein do not make PMTUD one hundred per cent reliable. In some operational scenarios, the network cannot deliver any ICMP messages to the source node, regardless of their origin.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The packet truncation procedures described herein make PMTUD more resilient when:
The following are common operational scenarios in which packet truncation procedures can make PMTUD more resilient:
Packet truncation procedures do not make PMTUD more resilient when the network cannot reliably deliver any ICMP messages to the source node. The following are operational scenarios where the network cannot reliably deliver any ICMP PTB messages to the source node:
This document defines the following IPv6 Destination options:
The Truncation Eligible option indicates that the packet is eligible for truncation. It also indicates that the packet has not been truncated.
The Truncation Eligible option contains the following fields:
IPv6 packets that include the Fragment header MUST NOT include the Truncation Eligible option.
IPv6 packets whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU SHOULD NOT include the Truncation Eligible option.
The IPv6 Hop-by-hop Options header SHOULD NOT include the Truncation Eligible option.
The IPv6 Destination Options header:
NOTE 1: According to [RFC8200], the highest-order two bits of the Option Type (i.e., the "act" bits) specify the action taken by a processing node that does not recognize Option Type. The required action is skip over this option and continue processing the header. Therefore, IANA is requested to assign this Option Type with "act" bits "00".
NOTE 2: According to [RFC8200], the third-highest-order bit (i.e., the "chg" bit) of the Option Type specifies whether Option Data can change on route to the packet's destination. Because this option contains no Option Data, IANA can assign this Option Type without regard to the "chg" bit.
The Truncated Packet option indicates that the packet has been truncated and is eligible for further truncation.
The Truncated Packet option contains the following fields:
IPv6 packets that include the Fragment header MUST NOT include the Truncated Packet option.
IPv6 packets whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU MUST NOT include the Truncated Packet option.
The IPv6 Hop-by-hop Options header SHOULD NOT include the Truncated Packet option.
The IPv6 Destination Options:
NOTE 1: According to [RFC8200], the highest-order two bits of the Option Type (i.e., the "act" bits) specify the action taken by a processing node that does not recognize Option Type. The required action is to discard the packet and send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option Type. Therefore, IANA is requested to assign this Option Type with "act" bits "10".
NOTE 2: According to [RFC8200], the third-highest-order bit (i.e., the "chg" bit) of the Option Type specifies whether Option Data of that option can change on route to the packet's destination. Because this option contains no Option Data, IANA can assign this Option Type without regard to the "chg" bit.
----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
| Upper | | | | | | Upper |
| Layer | | | | | | Layer |
| | | | | | | |
| IP |<-------->| IP |<-------->| IP |<-------->| IP |
| Layer | MTU | Layer | MTU | Layer | MTU | Layer |
----------- 9000 ----------- 4000 ----------- 1500 -----------
Source Router 1 Router 2 Destination
Node Node
Figure 1: Reference Topology
Figure 1 depicts a network that contains a Source Node, intermediate nodes (i.e., Router 1, Router 2), and a Destination Node. The link that connects the Source Node to Router 1 has an MTU of 9000 bytes. The link that connects Router 1 to Router 2 has an MTU of 4000 bytes, and the link that connects Router 2 to the Destination Node has an MTU of 1500 bytes. The PMTU between the Source Node and the Destination Node is 1500 bytes.
This topology is used in examples throughout the document.
In the Reference Topology, the Source Node produces an initial estimate of the PMTU between itself and the Destination Node. This initial estimate equals the MTU of the first link on the path to the Destination Node (e.g., 9000 bytes).
The Source Node refrains from sending packets whose length exceeds the above-mentioned estimate. However, the above-mentioned estimate is significantly larger than the actual PMTU (1500 bytes). Therefore, the Source Node may send packets whose length exceeds the actual PMTU.
At some time in the future, an upper-layer protocol on the Source Node causes the IP layer to emit a packet. The packet contains a Destination Options header and the Destination Options header contains a Truncation Eligible option. The total packet length, including all headers and the payload, is 1350 bytes. Because the total packet length is less than the actual PMTU, this packet can be delivered to the Destination Node without encountering any MTU issues.
The IP layer on the Source Node forwards the packet to the Router 1, Router 1 forwards the packet to Router 2, and the Router 2 forwards the packet to the Destination Node. The IP layer on the Destination Node examines the Destination Options header and finds the Truncation Eligible option. The Truncation Eligible option requires no action by the Destination Node. Therefore, the Destination Node processes the next header and delivers the packet to an upper-layer protocol.
Subsequently, the same upper-layer protocol on the Source Node causes the IP layer to emit another packet. This packet is identical to the first, except that the total packet length is 2000 bytes. Because the packet length is greater than the actual PMTU, this packet cannot be delivered without encountering an MTU issue.
The IP layer on the source node forwards the packet to Router 1. Router 1 forwards the packet to Router 2, but the Router 2 cannot forward the packet because its length exceeds the MTU of the next link in the path (i.e., 1500 bytes). Because an MTU issue has been encountered, Router 2 examines the Destination Options header, searching for either a Truncation Eligible option or a Truncated Packet option. (Normally, the Router 2 would ignore the Destination Options header).
Because Router 2 finds one of the above-mentioned options, it:
The IP layer on the Destination Node receives the packet and examines the Destination Options header. Because it finds the Truncated Packet option, it discards the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message to the Source Node. The MTU field in the ICMP PTB message represents the length of the received packet.
When the Source Node receives the ICMP PTB message, it updates its PMTU estimate, as per [RFC8201].
A packet can be truncated multiple times. In the Reference Topology, assume that the Source Node sends a 5000 byte packet to the Destination Node. Using the procedures described in Section 6, Router 1 truncates this packet to 4000 bytes and Router 2 truncates it again, to 1500 bytes.
A truncated packet MUST contain the basic IPv6 header, all extension headers and the first upper-layer header. When an intermediate node cannot forward a packet due to MTU issues, and the total length of the basic IPv6 header, all extension headers, and first upper-layer header exceeds the MTU of the next link in the path, the intermediate node MUST discard the packet and send and ICMP PTB message to the source node. It MUST NOT truncate the packet.
A truncated packet MUST NOT include the Fragment header. When an intermediate node cannot forward a packet due to MTU issues, and the packet contains a Fragment header, the intermediate node MUST discard the packet and send and ICMP PTB message to the source node. It MUST NOT truncate the packet.
A truncated packet must have a total length that is greater than or equal to the IPv6 minimum link MTU.
Section 6 of this document assumes that all nodes recognize the Truncation Eligible and Truncated Packet options. This section explores backwards compatibility issues, where one or more nodes do not recognize the above-mentioned options.
An intermediate node that does not recognize the above-mentioned options behaves exactly as described in [RFC8200]. When it receives a packet that does not cause an MTU issue, it processes the packet. When it receives a packet that causes an MTU issue, it discards the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message to the source node. In neither case does the intermediate node examine the Destination Options header or truncate the packet.
A destination node that does not recognize the Truncation Eligible option also behaves exactly as described in [RFC8200]. When it receives a packet that contains the Truncation Eligible option, its behavior is determined by the highest-order two bits of the Option Type (i.e., the "act" bits). Because the "act" bits are equal to "00", the destination node skips over the option and continues to process the packet. This is exactly what the destination node would have done if it had recognized the Truncation Eligible option.
A destination node that does not recognize the Truncated Packet option also behaves exactly as described in [RFC8200]. When it receives a packet that contains the Truncated Packet option, its behavior is determined by the highest-order two bits of the Option Type (i.e., the "act" bits). Because the "act" bits are equal to "10", the destination node discards the packet and sends an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source Address, pointing to the Truncated Packet option. The destination node does not emit an ICMP PTB message.
The source node takes appropriate action when it receives the ICMP Parameter Problem message.
When an intermediate node truncates a packet, it SHOULD update the upper-layer checksum, if possible. This is desirable because it increases the probability that the truncated packet will be delivered to the destination node.
Middleboxes residing downstream of the intermediate node may attempt to validate the upper-layer checksum. If validation fails, they may discard the packet without sending an ICMP message.
The following packet types are invalid:
[RFC8200]. The intermediate node discards the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message to the source node. It does not truncate or forward the packet.
If an intermediate node cannot forward one of the above-mentioned packets because of an MTU issue, its behavior is as described in
When the destination node receives one of the above-mentioned packets, it MUST:
The destination node MUST NOT send an ICMP PTB message.
The procedures described herein rely upon the networks ability:
Operational experience reveals that a significant number of networks drop packets that contain IPv6 destination options. Likewise, many networks drop ICMP Parameter Problem messages.
[I-D.bonica-6man-unrecognized-opt] describes procedures that upper-layer protocols can execute to verify that the above-mentioned requirements are satisfied. Upper-layer protocols can execute these procedures before emitting packets that contain the Truncation Eligible option.
An IPv6 packet can contain both:
In this case, the packet MUST contain a Destination Options header that precedes the ESP. That Destination Options header contains the truncation options and is not protected by the ESP. The packet MAY also contain another Destination Options header the follows the ESP. That Destination Options header is protected by the ESP and MUST NOT contain the truncation options.
As per RFC 4303, a packet can contain two Destination Options headers one preceding the ESP and one following the ESP.
According to [RFC8200], the following IPv6 extension headers can contain options:
[RFC2473] provides a precedent for intermediate nodes examining the Destination options on an exception basis. (See the Tunnel Encapsulation Limit.)
The Hop-by-hop option can be examined by each node along the path to a packet's destination. Destination options are examined by the destination node only. However,
The truncation options described herein are examined by:
Therefore, the above-mentioned options can be processed most efficiently when they are contained by the Destination Option header. When contained by the Destination Options header, the above-mentioned options are examined by intermediate nodes on an exception basis, only when they are relevant. If contained by the Hop-by-hop Options header, they are always examined by intermediate nodes, even when they are irrelevant.
PMTUD is vulnerable to ICMP PTB forgery attacks. The procedures described herein do nothing to mitigate that vulnerability.
The procedures described herein are susceptible to a new variation on that attack, in which an attacker forges a truncated packet. In this case, the attackers cause the Destination Node to produce an ICMP PTB message on their behalf. To some degree, this vulnerability is mitigated, because the Destination Node will not emit an ICMP PTB message in response to a truncated packet whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU.
In order to mitigate denial of service attacks, intermediate nodes MUST rate limit the number of packets that they truncate per second.
IANA is requested to allocate the following codepoints from the Destination Options and Hop-by-hop Options registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2).
Special thanks to Mike Heard, Geoff Huston, Joel Jaeggli, Tom Jones, Andy Smith, Jinmei Tatuya, and Reji Thomas who reviewed and commented on this document.
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC4303] | Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005. |
| [RFC4443] | Conta, A., Deering, S. and M. Gupta, "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
| [RFC8200] | Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017. |
| [RFC8201] | McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J. and R. Hinden, "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201, DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017. |
| [I-D.bonica-6man-unrecognized-opt] | Bonica, R. and J. Leddy, "The IPv6 Probe Option", Internet-Draft draft-bonica-6man-unrecognized-opt-03, August 2018. |
| [RFC2473] | Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/RFC2473, December 1998. |
| [RFC7690] | Byerly, M., Hite, M. and J. Jaeggli, "Close Encounters of the ICMP Type 2 Kind (Near Misses with ICMPv6 Packet Too Big (PTB))", RFC 7690, DOI 10.17487/RFC7690, January 2016. |
| [RFC7872] | Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T. and W. Liu, "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6 Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872, DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016. |