| Network Working Group | M. Msahli, Ed. |
| Internet-Draft | Telecom ParisTech |
| Intended status: Experimental | N. Cam-Winget, Ed. |
| Expires: January 24, 2020 | Cisco |
| July 23, 2019 |
TLS Authentication using IEEE 1609.2 certificates
draft-msahli-ise-ieee1609-00
This document specifies the use of a new certificate type to authenticate TLS entities. The goal is to enable the use of a certificate specified by the IEEE and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). This specification defines an experimental change of TLS to support a new certificate type.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 24, 2020.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The TLS protocol [RFC8446] uses X.509 and Raw Public Key in order to authenticate servers and clients. This document describes an experimental use of the certificate specified by the IEEE in [IEEE1609.2] and profiled by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in [TS103097]. These standards specify secure communications in vehicular environments. The certificate types are optimized for bandwidth and processing time to support delay-sensitive applications, and also to provide both authentication and authorization information to enable fast access control decisions in ad hoc networks such as are found in Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). We define an experimental extension following the [RFC7250].
This document describes an experimental extension of TLS security model. We are using a form of certificate that has not traditionally been used in IETF works. Systems using this Experimental approach are segregated from system using standard TLS by the use of a new Certificate Type value, reserved through IANA. The implementation of TLS is not involved in the Experiment and it will not be able to interact with an Experimental implementation. In fact, an implementation of TLS can recognize that the Certificate Type value used in this document is unknown. This design has been requested by stakeholders in the Cooperative ITS community including ISO internationally, and SAE in the US and ETSI in EU , in order to support the deployment of a number of use cases in cooperative ITS and it is anticipated that its use will be widespread.
There is no IPR that needs to be disclosed by the authors or contributors under the IETF's rules set out in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174]when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
/* Managed by IANA */
enum {
X509(0),
RawPublicKey(2),
1609Dot2(3),
(255)
} CertificateType;
struct {
select (certificate_type) {
/* certificate type defined in this document.*/
case 1609Dot2:
opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
/* RawPublicKey defined in RFC 7250*/
case RawPublicKey:
opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
/* X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246*/
case X.509:
opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
};
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateEntry;
For TLS 1.2[RFC5246], the "extension_data" field SHALL follow the [RFC7250]. In case of TLS 1.3, the "extension_data" field SHALL contain a list of supported certificate types proposed by the client as provided in the figure below:
In case where the TLS server accepts the described extension, it selects one of the certificate types. Note that a server MAY authenticate the client using other authentication methods. The end-entity certificate's public key MUST be compatible with one of the certificate types listed in the extension described above.
Client Server
Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + server_certificate_type*
| + client_certificate_type*
| + key_share*
v + signature_algorithms* -------->
ServerHello ^ Key
+ key_share* v Exch
{EncryptedExtensions} ^ Server
{+ server_certificate_type*}| Params
{+ client_certificate_type*}|
{CertificateRequest*} v
{Certificate*} ^
{CertificateVerify*} | Auth
{Finished} v
<------- [Application Data*]
^ {Certificate*}
Auth | {CertificateVerify*}
v {Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
+ Indicates noteworthy extensions sent in the
previously noted message.
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages/extensions that are not always sent.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from a [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N.
Figure 1: Message Flow with certificate type extension for Full TLS 1.3 Handshake
The "client_certificate_type" and "server_certificate_type" extensions MUST be sent in handshake phase as illustrated in figure 1 below.
In case of TLS 1.3 and in order to negotiate the support of IEEE 1609.2 or ETSI TS 103097 certificate-based authentication, the clients and the servers MAY include the extension of type "client_certificate_type" and "server_certificate_type" in the extended Client Hello and "EncryptedExtensions". In case of TLS 1.2, used extensions are in Client Hello and Server Hello.
In order to indicate the support of IEEE 1609.2 or ETSI TS 103097 certificates, client MUST include an extension of type "client_certificate_type" and "server_certificate_type" in the extended Client Hello message. The Hello extension is described in Section 4.1.2 of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].
The extension 'client_certificate_type' sent in the client hello MAY carry a list of supported certificate types, sorted by client preference. It is a list in the case where the client supports multiple certificate types.
In both TLS 1.2 and 1.3, the rules if client Certificate and CertificateVerify messages appear is as follows:
All implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which MUST be first.
When the server receives the Client Hello containing the client_certificate_type extension and/or the server_certificate_type extension, the following options are possible:
It is worth to mention that the TLS client or server public keys are obtained from an online repository.
Verification of an IEEE 1609.2/ ETSI TS 103097 certificates or certificate chain is described in section 5.1 of [IEEE1609.2]. In the case of TLS 1.3 and when the certificate_type is 1609Dot2, the CertificateVerify contents and processing are different than for the CertificateVerify message specified for other values of certificate_type in [RFC8446]. In this case, the CertificateVerify message contains a Canonical Octet Encoding Rules (COER)-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signed as specified in [IEEE1609.2], [IEEE1609.2b], where:
All other fields in the headerInfo are omitted.
The message input to the signature calculation is the usual message input for TLS 1.3, as specified in [RFC8446] section 4.4.3, consisting of pad, context string, separator and content, where content is Transcript- Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate).
The signature and verification are carried out as specified in [IEEE1609.2].
Some of exchanged messages examples are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Client Server
ClientHello,
client_certificate_type*=1609Dot2,
server_certificate_type*=1609Dot2, --------> ServerHello,
{EncryptedExtensions}
{client_certificate_type*=1609Dot2}
{server_certificate_type*=1609Dot2}
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}
{Certificate*} <------- [Application Data*]
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 2: TLS Client and TLS Server use the IEEE 1609.2 certificate
This section shows an example where the TLS client as well as the TLS server use the IEEE 1609.2 certificate. In consequence, both the server and the client populate the client_certificate_type and server_certificate_type with extension IEEE 1609.2 certificates as mentioned in figure 2.
Client Server
ClientHello,
client_certificate_type*=(1609Dot2),
server_certificate_type*=(1609.9Dot,
X509,RawPublicKey), -----------> ServerHello,
{EncryptedExtensions}
{client_certificate_type*=1609Dot2}
{server_certificate_type*=X509}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}
<--------- [Application Data*]
{Finished} --------->
[Application Data] <--------> [Application Data]
Figure 3: TLS Client uses the IEEE 1609.2 certificate and TLS Server uses the X.509 certificate
This example shows the TLS authentication, where the TLS Client populates the server_certificate_type extension with the X.509 certificate and Raw Public Key type as presented in figure 3. the client indicates its ability to receive and to validate an X.509 certificate from the server. The server chooses the X.509 certificate to make its authentication with the Client.
This section provides an overview of the basic security considerations which need to be taken into account before implementing the necessary security mechanisms. The security considerations described throughout [RFC8446] regarding the supported groups and signature algorithms apply here as well.
TLS extensions to be considered are:
For privacy considerations in a vehicular environment the use of IEEE 1609.2/ETSI TS 103097 certificate is recommended for many reasons:
IANA is requested to update the registry to reference the RFC.
Existing IANA references have not been updated yet to point to this document.
The authors wish to thank Eric Rescola and Ilari Liusvaara for their feedback and suggestions on improving this document. Thanks are due to Sean Turner for his valuable and detailed comments. Special thanks to Panos Kampanakis, Jasja Tijink and Maik Seewald for their guidance and support of the draft.
| [draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-00] | KAISER, A., LABIOD, H., LONC, B., MSAHLI, M. and A. SERHROUCHNI, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication using ITS ETSI and IEEE certificates", august 2017. |