Network Working Group | M. Pala |
Internet-Draft | CableLabs |
Intended status: Experimental | February 5, 2019 |
Expires: August 9, 2019 |
Online Certificate Status Protocol - Version 2 (OCSPv2)
draft-pala-ocspv2-00
With the increase number of protocols and applications that rely on digital certificates to authenticate either the communication channel (TLS) or the data itself (PKIX), the need for providing an efficient revocation system is paramount. Although the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) allows for efficient lookup of the revocation status of a certificate, the distribution of this information via HTTP (or very rarely) HTTPS is not particularly efficient for high volume websites without incurring in high distribution costs (e.g., CDN).
In particular, this specification defines a new set of messages (i.e., OCSPv2 Request and OCSPv2 Response) that address the inefficiencies of OCSPv1 by (a) providing range-based responses to optimize (reduce) the number of pre-computed responses required by a CA, and (b) allowing the inclusion of other (certificate chain) responses in the same response for round-trip and caching optimization.
The deployment of OCSPv2 to validate the status of a certificate is meant to lower the costs of providing revocation services and increase the efficiency of the service, thus allowing for short-lived responses (i.e., hours instead of days).
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2019.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Introduction
Explains the limitations of OCSPv1 when it comes to efficiency.
Provides a description of the protocol with particular emphasis on the different approach (range vs. one-by-one).
The OCSPv2 Request.
The OCSPv2 Response.
No special considerations for IANA.
Several security considerations need to be explicitly considered for the system administrators and application developers to understand the weaknesses of the overall architecture.
The authors would like to thank everybody who provided insightful comments and helped in the definition of the deployment considerations. Last but not least, the authors would like to thank all the people that expressed interest in implementing support for this proposal.