MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices
draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-01

Abstract

This memo extends Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) to model DTLS and TLS usage. This allows a network element to notice abnormal DTLS or TLS usage which has been strong indicator of other software running on the endpoint, typically malware.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 6, 2020.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Terminology
• 3. Overview of MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices
• 4. (D)TLS 1.3 handshake
• 4.1. Full (D)TLS 1.3 handshake inspection
• 4.2. Encrypted SNI
• 5. (D)TLS profile YANG module
• 5.1. Tree Structure
• 5.2. YANG Module
• 6. MUD File Example
• 7. Security Considerations
• 8. IANA Considerations
• 9. Acknowledgments
• 10. References
• 10.1. Normative References
• 10.2. Informative References
• Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

Encryption is necessary to protect the privacy of end users using IoT devices. In a network setting, TLS [RFC8446] and DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] are the dominant protocols to provide encryption for IoT device traffic. Unfortunately in conjunction with IoT applications rise of encryption, malware is also using encryption which thwarts network-based analysis such as deep packet inspection (DPI). Other mechanisms are needed to notice malware is running on the IoT device.

Malware frequently uses its own libraries for its activities, and those libraries are re-used much like any other software engineering project. Research [malware] indicates there are observable differences in how malware uses encryption compared with non-malware uses encryption. There are several interesting findings specific to DTLS and TLS which were found common to malware:

• Older and weaker cryptographic parameters (e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA).
• TLS SNI and server certificates are composed of subjects with characteristics of a domain generation algorithm (DGA) (e.g., www.33mhwt2j.net).
• Higher use of self-signed certificates compared with typical legitimate software.
• Discrepancies in the server name indication (SNI) TLS extension in the ClientHello message and the DNS names in the SubjectAltName(SAN) X.509 extension in the server certificate message.
• Discrepancies in the key exchange algorithm and the client public key length in comparison with legitimate flows. As a reminder, Client Key Exchange message has been removed from TLS 1.3.
• Lower diversity in TLS client advertised TLS extensions compared to legitimate clients.

If observable (D)TLS profile parameters are used, the following functions are possible which have a the favorable impact on network security:

• Permit intended DTLS or TLS use and to block malicious DTLS or TLS use. This is superior to the layer 3 and layer 4 ACLs of Manufacturer Usage Description Specification (MUD) [RFC8520] which are not suitable for broad communication patterns.
• Ensure TLS certificates are valid. Several TLS deployments have been vulnerable to active Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks because of lack of certificate validation. By observing (D)TLS profile parameters, a network element can detect when the TLS SNI mismatches the SubjectAltName and detect when the server's certificate is invalid, and alert those situations. In TLS 1.2, the ClientHello, ServerHello and Certificate messages are all sent in clear-text, however in TLS 1.3, the Certificate message is encrypted thereby hiding the server identity from any intermediary. In TLS 1.3, the middle-box needs to act as a TLS proxy to validate the server certificate and to detect TLS SNI mismatch with the server certificate.
• Support new communication patterns. IoT device can learn a new capability, and the new capability changes the way the IoT device communicates with other devices located in the local network and Internet. In other words, if IP addresses and domain names the IoT device connects to rapidly changes based on a new capability and MUD rules using ACLs cannot be rapidly updated. In such a case, observable (D)TLS profile parameters can be used to permit intended use and to block malicious behaviour of IoT device.

This document extends MUD [RFC8520] to model observable (D)TLS profile parameters. Using these (D)TLS profile parameters, an active MUD-enforcing firewall can identify MUD non-compliant DTLS and TLS behavior that can indicate malware is running on the IoT device. This detection can prevent malware download, block access to malicious domains, enforce use of strong ciphers, stop data exfiltration, etc. In addition, organizations may have policies around acceptable ciphers and certificates on the websites the IoT devices connect to. Examples include no use of old and less secure versions of TLS, no use of self-signed certificates, deny-list or accept-list of Certificate Authorities, valid certificate expiration time, etc. These policies can be enforced by observing the (D)TLS profile parameters. Enterprise firewall can use the IoT device's (D)TLS profile parameters to identify legitimate flows by observation of (D)TLS sessions, and can make inferences to permit legitimate flows and to block malicious flows. The proposed technique is also suitable in deployments where decryption techniques are not ideal due to privacy concerns, non-cooperating end-points and expense.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

"(D)TLS" is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [RFC8446] and Datagram Transport Layer Security [RFC6347]. Specific terms are used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.

3. Overview of MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices

In Enterprise networks, protection and detection are typically done both on end hosts and in the network. Host agents have deep visibility on the devices where they are installed, whereas the network has broader visibility. Installing host agents may not be a viable option on IoT devices, and network-based security can only be used to protect such IoT devices. (D)TLS profile parameters of IoT device can be used by middle-boxes to detect and block malware communication, while at the same time preserving the privacy of legitimate uses of encryption. Middle-boxes need not proxy (D)TLS but can passively observe the parameters of (D)TLS handshakes from IoT devices and gain good visibility into TLS 1.0 to 1.2 parameters and partial visibility into TLS 1.3 parameters. Malicious agents can try to use the (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agents to evade detection but it becomes a challenge to mimic the behavior of various IoT device types and IoT device models from several manufacturers. In other words, malware developers will have to develop malicious agents per IoT device type, manufacturer and model (which will be several thousands), infect the device with specific malware agent and will have keep up with the updates to (D)TLS profile parameters of IoT devices. Further, the malware command and control server certificates needs to be signed by the same certifying authorities trusted by the IoT devices.

The compromised IoT devices are typically used for launching DDoS attacks (Section 3 of [RFC8576]) on victims while the owner/administrator of the network is not aware about such misbehaviors. Some of the DDoS attacks like Slowloris and Transport Layer Security (TLS) re-negotiation can be detected by observing the (D)TLS profile parameters. For example, the victim server certificate need not be signed by the same certifying authorities trusted by the IoT device.

4. (D)TLS 1.3 handshake

In (D)TLS 1.3, full (D)TLS handshake inspection is not possible since all (D)TLS handshake messages excluding the ClientHello message are encrypted. (D)TLS 1.3 has introduced new extensions in the handshake record layers called Encrypted Extensions. Using these extensions handshake messages will be encrypted and network devices (such as a firewall) are incapable deciphering the handshake, thus cannot view the server certificate. However, a few parameters in the ServerHello are still visible such as the chosen cipher.

4.1. Full (D)TLS 1.3 handshake inspection

To obtain more visibility into negotiated TLS 1.3 parameters, a middlebox needs to act as a (D)TLS 1.3 proxy. The middlebox MUST follow the behaviour explained in Section 9.3 of [RFC8446] to act as a compliant (D)TLS 1.3 proxy.

To function as a (D)TLS proxy the middlebox creates a signed certificate using itself as a certificate authority. That certificate authority has to be trusted by the (D)TLS client. The following steps explain the mechanism to automatically bootstrap IoT devices with the middlebox's CA certificate.

Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) discussed in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] provides a solution for secure automated bootstrap of devices. BRSKI specifies means to provision credentials on devices to be used to operationally access networks. In addition, BRSKI provides an automated mechanism for the bootstrap distribution of CA certificates from the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] server. The IoT device can use BRSKI to automatically bootstrap the IoT device using the IoT manufacturer provisioned X.509 certificate, in combination with a registrar provided by the local network and IoT device manufacturer's authorizing service (MASA).

1. The IoT device authenticates to the local network using the IoT manufacturer provisioned X.509 certificate. The IoT device can request and get a voucher from the MASA service via the registrar. The voucher is signed by the MASA service and includes the local network's CA public key.
2. The IoT device validates the signed voucher using the manufacturer installed trust anchor associated with the MASA, stores the CA's public key and validates the provisional TLS connection to the registrar.
3. The IoT device requests the full EST distribution of current CA certificates (Section 5.9.1 in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]) from the registrar operating as a BRSKI-EST server. The IoT device stores the CA certificates as Explicit Trust Anchor database entries. The IoT device uses the Explicit Trust Anchor database to validate the server certificate.
4. The middle-box uses the "supported_versions" TLS extension (defined in TLS 1.3 to negotiate the supported TLS versions between client and server) to determine the TLS version. During the (D)TLS handshake, If (D)TLS version 1.3 is used, the middle-box ((D)TLS proxy) modifies the certificate provided by the server and signs it with the private key from the local CA certificate. The middle-box has visibility into further exchanges between the IoT device and server which enables it to inspect the (D)TLS 1.3 handshake, enforce the MUD (D)TLS profile and can inspect subsequent network traffic.
5. The IoT device uses the Explicit Trust Anchor database to validate the server certificate.

4.2. Encrypted SNI

To increase privacy, encrypted SNI (ESNI, [I-D.ietf-tls-sni-encryption]) prevents passive observation of the TLS Server Name Indication which improves privacy. To effectively provide that privacy protection, SNI encryption needs to be used in conjunction with DNS encryption (e.g., DNS-over-(D)TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS). An in-line network device (e.g., firewall) passively inspecting an encrypted SNI (D)TLS handshake cannot observe the encrypted SNI nor observe the encrypted DNS traffic. If an IoT device is pre-configured to use public DNS-over-(D)TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS servers, the middle-box needs to act as a DNS-over-TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS proxy and replace the esni_keys in the ESNI record with the middle box’s esni_keys. Instead of an unappealing DNS-over-TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS proxy, the IoT device can be bootstrapped to discover and authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS servers provided by a local network using [I-D.reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server] and [I-D.sah-resinfo-doh]. The local DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS server replaces the sni_keys in the ESNI record with the middle box’s esni_keys.

Note that if an IoT device is pre-configured to use public DNS-over-(D)TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS servers, the MUD policy enforcement point is moved to that public server, which cannot enforce the MUD policy based on domain names (Section 8 of [RFC8520]). Thus the use of a public DNS-over-(D)TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS server is incompatible with MUD in general. A local DNS server is necessary to allow MUD policy enforcement on the local network.

5. (D)TLS profile YANG module

This document specifies a YANG module for representing (D)TLS profile. The (D)TLS profile YANG module provides a method for firewall to observe the (D)TLS profile parameters in the (D)TLS handshake to permit intended use and to block malicious behavior. This module uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991] , rules defined in [RFC8519] and cryptographic types defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].

The (D)TLS profiles and the parameters in each (D)TLS profile include the following:

• Profile name
• (D)TLS version in ClientHello.legacy_version
• (D)TLS versions supported by the IoT device. As a reminder, "supported_versions" extension defined in (D)TLS 1.3 is used by the client to indicate which versions of (D)TLS it supports and a client is considered to be attempting to negotiate (D)TLS 1.3 if the ClientHello contains a "supported_versions" extension with 0x0304 contained in its body.
• If GREASE [I-D.ietf-tls-grease] (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility) values are offered by the client or not.
• List of supported symmetric encryption algorithms
• List of supported compression methods
• List of extension types
• List of trust anchor certificates used by the IoT device. If the server certificate is signed by one of the trust anchors, the middle-box continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the middle-box will react as if the the server certificate validation has failed and takes appropriate action (e.g, block the (D)TLS session). Note that server certificate is encrypted in (D)TLS 1.3 and the middle-box without acting as (D)TLS proxy cannot validate the server certificate.
• List of SPKI pin set pre-configured on the client to validate self-signed server certificates or raw public keys. A SPKI pin set is a cryptographic digest to "pin" public key information in a manner similar to HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) [RFC7469]. If SPKI pin set is present in the (D)TLS profile of a IoT device and the server certificate does not pass the PKIX certification path validation, the middle-box computes the SPKI Fingerprint for the public key found in the server's certificate (or in the raw public key, if the server provides that instead). If a computed fingerprint exactly matches one of the SPKI pin sets in the (D)TLS profile, the middle-box continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the middle-box will act on the SPKI validation failure and takes appropriate action.
• Cryptographic hash algorithm used to generate the SPKI pinsets
• List of pre-shared key exchange modes
• List of DHE or ECDHE groups supported by the client
• List signature algorithms the client can validate in X.509 server certificates
• List of client key exchange algorithms and the client public key lengths in versions prior to (D)TLS 1.3

The (D)TLS profile parameters MUST NOT include the GREASE values for extension types, supported groups, signature algorithms, (D)TLS versions, pre-shared key exchange modes and cipher suites. Note that the GREASE values are random and peers will ignore these values and interoperate.

If the (D)TLS profile parameters are not observed in a (D)TLS session from the IoT device, the default behaviour is to block the (D)TLS session.

5.1. Tree Structure

This document augments the "ietf-mud" MUD YANG module defined in [RFC8520] for signaling the IoT device (D)TLS profile. This document defines the YANG module "reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile", which has the following tree structure:

module: reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile
  augment /mud:mud/mud:from-device-policy:
    +--rw client-profile
       +--rw tls-profiles* [profile-name]
          +--rw profile-name              string
          +--rw protocol-version?         uint16
          +--rw supported_versions*       uint16
          +--rw grease_extension?         boolean
          +--rw encryption-algorithms*    encryption-algorithm
          +--rw compression-methods*      compression-method
          +--rw extension-types*          extension-type
          +--rw acceptlist-ta-certs*      ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms
          +--rw SPKI-pin-sets*            SPKI-pin-set
          +--rw SPKI-hash-algorithm       ct:hash-algorithm-t
          +--rw psk-key-exchange-modes*   psk-key-exchange-mode
          +--rw supported-groups*         supported-group
          +--rw signature-algorithms*     signature-algorithm
          +--rw client-public-keys
          |  +--rw key-exchange-algorithms*     key-exchange-algorithm
          |  +--rw client-public-key-lengths*   client-public-key-length
          +--rw actions
             +--rw forwarding    identityref

5.2. YANG Module

module reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile {
   yang-version 1.1;
   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile";
   prefix mud-tls-profile;


   import ietf-crypto-types {
     prefix ct;
     reference "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-01: 
                Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
   }

   import ietf-inet-types {
     prefix inet;
     reference "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
   }

   import ietf-mud {
     prefix mud;
     reference "RFC 8520";
   }

   import ietf-access-control-list {
     prefix ietf-acl;
     reference
       "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
                  Control Lists (ACLs)";
   }

   organization
     "IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group Working Group";
   contact
      "Editor:  Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
               <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";

   description
     "This module contains YANG definition for the IoT device 
      (D)TLS profile. 

      Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
      authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

      Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
      without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
      to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
      set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
      Relating to IETF Documents
      (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

      This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
      the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

   revision 2019-06-12 {
     description
       "Initial revision.";
   }

   typedef compression-method {
     type uint8;
     description "Compression method.";
   }

   typedef extension-type {
     type uint16;
     description "Extension type.";
   }

   typedef encryption-algorithm {
     type uint16;
     description "Encryption algorithms.";
   }

   typedef supported-group {
     type uint16;
     description "supported DHE or ECDHE group.";
   }

   typedef SPKI-pin-set {
     type binary;
     description "Subject Public Key Info pin set.";
   }

   typedef signature-algorithm {
     type uint16;
     description "Signature algorithm";
   }

   typedef key-exchange-algorithm {
     type uint8;
     description "key exchange algorithm";
   }

   typedef psk-key-exchange-mode {
     type uint8;
     description "pre-shared key exchange mode";
   }

   typedef client-public-key-length {
     type uint8;
     description "client public key length";
   }

   augment "/mud:mud/mud:from-device-policy" {
     container client-profile {
       list tls-profiles {
         key "profile-name";
         description
          "(D)TLS version profiles supported by the client";
        leaf profile-name {
          type string {
            length "1..64";
          }
          description
            "The name of (D)TLS profile; space and special
            characters are not allowed.";
         }
         leaf protocol-version {
           type uint16;
           description "Legacy protocol version.";
         }  
         leaf-list supported_versions {
           type uint16;
           description 
             "TLS versions supported by the client indicated
              in the supported_versions extension in (D)TLS 1.3.";
         }  
         leaf Grease_extension {
           type boolean;
           description
            "If set to 'true', Grease extension values are offered by 
             the client.";
         } 
         leaf-list encryption-algorithms {
           type encryption-algorithm;   
           description "Encryption algorithms";
         }
         leaf-list compression-methods {
           type compression-method;
            description "Compression methods";
         } 
         leaf-list extension-types {
           type extension-type;
           description "Extension Types";
         }
         leaf-list acceptlist-ta-certs { 
           type ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms;
           description 
             "A list of trust anchor certificates used by the client.";
         }
         leaf-list SPKI-pin-sets { 
            type SPKI-pin-set;
            description 
             "A list of SPKI pin sets pre-configured on the client 
              to validate self-signed server certificate or 
              raw public key.";
         }
         leaf SPKI-hash-algorithm {
           type ct:hash-algorithm-t;
           description 
             "cryptographic hash algorithm used to generate the 
              SPKI pinset.";
         }
         leaf-list psk-key-exchange-modes {
           type psk-key-exchange-mode;
           description 
             "pre-shared key exchange modes";
         }
         leaf-list supported-groups { 
            type supported-group;
            description 
             "A list of DHE or ECDHE groups supported by the client.";
         }
         leaf-list signature-algorithms { 
            type signature-algorithm;
            description 
             "A list signature algorithms the client can validate 
              in X.509 certificates.";
         }
         container client-public-keys {
           leaf-list key-exchange-algorithms {
             type key-exchange-algorithm; 
             description
             "Key exchange algorithms supported by the client";
           }
           leaf-list client-public-key-lengths {
             type client-public-key-length; 
             description
             "client public key lengths";
           }
         }  
         container actions {
           description
           "Definitions of action for this profile.";
           leaf forwarding {
             type identityref {
               base ietf-acl:forwarding-action;
             }
             mandatory true;
             description
             "Specifies the forwarding action for the (D)TLS profile.";
             reference
             "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
                           Control Lists (ACLs)";
           }  
         }
       }
     }
   }
}

6. MUD File Example

This example below contains (D)TLS profile parameters for a IoT device. JSON encoding of YANG modelled data [RFC7951] is used to illustrate the example.

{
   "ietf-mud:mud": {
     "mud-version": 1,
      "mud-url": "https://example.com/IoTDevice",
      "last-update": "2019-18-06T03:56:40.105+10:00",
      "cache-validity": 100,
      "is-supported": true,
      "systeminfo": "IoT device name",
      "reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile:from-device-policy": {
        "client-profile": {
          "tls-version-profile" : [
           {
                 "protocol-version" : 771,
                 "supported_versions_ext" : "FALSE",
                 "encryption-algorithms" : [31354, 4865, 4866, 4867],  
                 "extension-types" : [10],  
                 "supported-groups" : [29],  
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
           }
          ]  
        }
      }
    }
}

7. Security Considerations

Security considerations in [RFC8520] need to be taken into consideration.

8. IANA Considerations

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:reddy-opsawg-mud-tls-profile
      Registrant Contact: The IESG.
      XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

9. Acknowledgments

Thanks to Shashank Jain and Harsha Joshi for the discussion and comments.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

10.2. Informative References

Authors' Addresses