An Encoding Parameter for HTTP Basic Authentication
draft-reschke-basicauth-enc-01

Abstract

The "Basic" authentication scheme defined in RFC 2617 does not properly define how to treat non-ASCII characters. This has lead to a situation where user agent implementations disagree, and servers make different assumptions based on the locales they are running in. There is little interoperability for characters in the ISO-8859-1 character set, and even less interoperability for any characters beyond that.

This document defines a backwards-compatible extension to "Basic", specifying the server's character encoding expectation, using a new authentication scheme parameter.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

Distribution of this document is unlimited. Although this is not a work item of the HTTPbis Working Group, comments should be sent to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) mailing list at ietf-http-wg@w3.org, which may be joined by sending a message with subject "subscribe" to ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org.

Discussions of the HTTPbis Working Group are archived at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/.

XML versions, latest edits and the issues list for this document are available from http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/#draft-reschke-basicauth-enc.

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 17, 2011.

Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
2.  Notational Conventions
3.  The 'encoding' auth-param
4.  Examples
5.  Security Considerations
6.  IANA Considerations
7.  Acknowledgements
8.  References
    8.1.  Normative References
    8.2.  Informative References
Appendix A.  Deployment Considerations
    A.1.  User Agents
        A.1.1.  Alternative approach
    A.2.  Origin Servers
Appendix B.  FAQ (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
    B.1.  Why not simply switch the default encoding to UTF-8?
    B.2.  What about Digest?
Appendix C.  Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
    C.1.  Since draft-reschke-basicauth-enc-00
Appendix D.  Resolved issues (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
    D.1.  paramcase
    D.2.  credparam
Appendix E.  Open issues (to be removed by RFC Editor prior to publication)
    E.1.  edit

1.  Introduction

The "Basic" authentication scheme defined in Section 2 of [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.) does not properly define how to treat non-ASCII characters ([USASCII] (American National Standards Institute, “Coded Character Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange,” 1986.)): it uses the Base64 [RFC4648] (Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,” October 2006.) encoding of the concatenation of username, separator character, and password without stating which character encoding to use.

This has lead to a situation where user agent implementations disagree, and servers make different assumptions based on the locales they are running in. There is little interoperability for characters in the ISO-8859-1 character set ([ISO‑8859‑1] (International Organization for Standardization, “Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1,” 1998.)), and even less interoperability for any characters beyond that.

This document defines a backwards-compatible extension to "Basic", specifying the server's character encoding expection, using a new auth-param as defined in Section 1.2 of [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.).

2.  Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).

3.  The 'encoding' auth-param

In challenges, servers MAY use the "encoding" authentication parameter (case-insensitive) to express the character encoding they expect the user agent to use.

The only allowed value is "UTF-8", to be matched case-insensitively (see [RFC2978] (Freed, N. and J. Postel, “IANA Charset Registration Procedures,” October 2000.), Section 2.3), indicating that the server expects the UTF-8 character encoding to be used ([RFC3629] (Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.)).

Other values are reserved for future use.

For credentials sent by the user agent, the "encoding" parameter is reserved for future use and MUST NOT be sent.

The reason for this is that the information that could be included does not seem to be useful to the server, but the additional complexity of parsing and processing the additional parameter might make this extension harder to deploy.

4.  Examples

In the example below, the server prompts for authentication in the "foo" realm, using Basic authentication, with a preference for the UTF-8 character encoding:

WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="foo", encoding="UTF-8"

Note that the parameter value can be either a token or a quoted string; in this case the server chose to use the quoted-string notation.

The user's name is "test", and his password is the string "123" followed by the Unicode character U+00A3 (POUND SIGN). Following Section 1.2 of [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.), but using the character encoding UTF-8, the user-pass, converted to a sequence of octets, is:

 't' 'e' 's' 't' ':' '1' '2' '3' pound
 74  65  73  74  3A  31  32  33  C2  A3

Encoding this octet sequence in Base64 ([RFC4648] (Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,” October 2006.)) yields:

  dGVzdDoxMjPCow==

Thus the Authorization header field would be:

  Authorization: Basic dGVzdDoxMjPCow==

5.  Security Considerations

This document does not introduce any new security considerations beyond those defined for the "Basic" authentication scheme ([RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.), Section 4), and those applicable to the handling of UTF-8 ([RFC3629] (Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.), Section 10).

6.  IANA Considerations

There are no IANA Considerations related to this specification.

7.  Acknowledgements

The internationalisation problem has been reported as a Mozilla bug back in the year 2000 (see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41489). It was Andrew Clover's idea to address it using a new auth-param.

Thanks to Martin Thomson for providing feedback on this document.

8.  References

8.1. Normative References

8.2. Informative References

Appendix A.  Deployment Considerations

A.1.  User Agents

User agents not implementing this specifications should continue to work as before, ignoring the new parameter.

User agents which already default to the UTF-8 encoding already implement this specification by definition.

Other user agents can keep their default behavior, and switch to UTF-8 when seeing the new parameter.

A.1.1.  Alternative approach

On the other hand, the strategy below may already improve the user-visible behavior today:

• In the first authentication request, choose the character encoding based on the user's credentials: if they do not need any characters outside the ISO-8859-1 character set, default to ISO-8859-1, otherwise use UTF-8.
• If the first attempt failed and the encoding used was ISO-8859-1, retry once with UTF-8 encoding instead.

A.2.  Origin Servers

Origin servers that do not expect non-ASCII characters in credentials do not require any changes.

Origin servers that need to support non-ASCII characters, but can't use the UTF-8 encoding will not be affected; they will continue to function as well as before.

Finally, origin servers that need to support non-ASCII characters and can use the UTF-8 encoding can opt in as described above. In the worst case, they'll continue to see either broken credentials or no credentials at all (depending on how legacy clients handle characters they can not encode).

Appendix B.  FAQ (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

B.1.  Why not simply switch the default encoding to UTF-8?

There are sites in use today that default to a locale encoding, such as ISO-8859-1, and expect user agents to use that encoding. These sites will break if the user agent uses a different encoding, such as UTF-8.

B.2.  What about Digest?

Although the solution proposed in this document may be applicable to "Digest" as well, any attempt to update this scheme may be an uphill battle hard to win.

Appendix C.  Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

C.1.  Since draft-reschke-basicauth-enc-00

Add and close issues "credparam" and "paramcase". Rewrite the deployment considerations.

Appendix D.  Resolved issues (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

Issues that were either rejected or resolved in this version of this document.

D.1.  paramcase

Type: change

julian.reschke@greenbytes.de (2010-08-12): Are auth param names case-sensitive?

Resolution (2010-08-12): Be consistent with "realm" (case-insensitive). Note that should be clarified in RFC2617bis for auth params in general.

D.2.  credparam

Type: change

julian.reschke@greenbytes.de (2010-08-12): Should "encoding" also be defined for the credentials (the UA's response)?

Resolution: Disallow (but reserve) encoding in credentials, and explain why this is the case.

Appendix E.  Open issues (to be removed by RFC Editor prior to publication)

E.1.  edit

Type: edit

julian.reschke@greenbytes.de (2010-08-11): Umbrella issue for editorial fixes/enhancements.

Author's Address