Network Working Group | M. Richardson |
Internet-Draft | SSW |
Intended status: Informational | June 3, 2014 |
Expires: December 5, 2014 |
table of contents for security architecture
draft-richardson-6tisch-table-of-contents-00
This is a template for a security architecture.
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(storage of security material, computational cost)
other communication impacts of security protocol mechanics
dependencies on centralized or external functionality, inline and offline
and number of frames needed to contain it.
Note: RPL Root authentication is a chartered item
how is this communicated in the (extended) beacon.
(allocation of slotframes after join, network statistics, neighboetc.)
lifecycle (key management, trust management)
what prevents a node from transmitting when it is not their turn (part one: jamming)
can a node successfully communicate with a peer at a time when not supposed to, may be tied to link layer security, or will it be policed by receiver?
security architecture and fit of e.g. join protocol and provisioning into this
(SACM related work)
[RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |