| Network Working Group | J. Richer, Ed. |
| Internet-Draft | Bespoke Engineering |
| Intended status: Standards Track | February 18, 2020 |
| Expires: August 21, 2020 |
Transactional Authorization
draft-richer-transactional-authz-05
This document defines a mechanism for delegating authorization to a piece of software, and conveying that delegation to the software.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC 2119 RFC 8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
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This protocol allows a piece of software to request delegated authorization to an API, protected by an authorization server usually on behalf of a resource owner.
The Authorization Server (AS) manages the transactions. It is defined by its transaction endpoint, a single URL that accepts a POST request with a JSON payload. The AS MAY also have other endpoints, including interaction endpoints and user code endpoints, and these are introduced to the RC as needed during the transaction process.
The Resource Client (RC) requests tokens from the AS and uses tokens at the RS.
The Resource Server (RS) accepts tokens from the RC and validates them (potentially at the AS).
The Resource Owner (RO) authorizes the request from the RC to the RS, often interactively at the AS.
To start a transaction, the RC makes a transaction request to the transaction endpoint of the AS. The RC creates a JSON [RFC8259] document with five primary sections, included as members of a root JSON object.
Each section consists of either a JSON object or an array of JSON objects, as described in the subsections below. Many sections MAY be represented by an appropriate handle instead as described in Section 9. In such cases, the section is replaced entirely by the handle presentation, which is a single string instead of a JSON object. The RC MAY present additional sections as defined by extensions of this specification. The AS MUST ignore any sections that it does not understand.
A non-normative example of a transaction request is below:
{
"resources": [
{
"actions": [
"read",
"write",
"dolphin"
],
"locations": [
"https://server.example.net/",
"https://resource.local/other"
],
"datatypes": [
"metadata",
"images"
]
},
"dolphin-metadata"
],
"key": {
"proof": "jwsd",
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kty": "RSA",
"e": "AQAB",
"kid": "xyz-1",
"alg": "RS256",
"n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeL...."
}
]
}
},
"interact": {
"redirect": true,
"callback": {
"uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
"nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
}
},
"display": {
"name": "My Client Display Name",
"uri": "https://example.net/client"
},
"capabilities":
["ext1", "ext2"],
"claims": {
"subject": true,
"email": true,
"oidc_id_token": true
}
}
This section provides descriptive details of the RC software making the call, useful for displaying information about the client to the user during the authorization request. This section is a JSON object, and all fields are OPTIONAL. The RC MAY send additional fields, and the AS MUST ignore all fields that it does not understand.
"display": {
"name": "My Client Display Name",
"uri": "https://example.net/client"
}
The AS SHOULD use this information in presenting any authorization screens to the RO during interaction.
The display information MAY instead be presented as a display handle reference Section 9.4.
This section identifies what the RC wants to do with the API hosted at the RS. This section is a JSON array of objects, each object representing a single resource or resource set. That AS MUST interpret the request as being for all of the resources listed.
"resources": [
{
"actions": [
"read",
"write",
"dolphin"
],
"locations": [
"https://server.example.net/",
"https://resource.local/other"
],
"datatypes": [
"metadata",
"images"
]
},
"dolphin-metadata"
]
This can also be presented as a set of resource handle references Section 9.5, or a combination of handles and resource structures.
This section provides a verifiable assertion about the person interacting with the RC on behalf of the request. This person MAY be the RO or MAY be another party.
"user": {
"assertion": "eyJraWQiOiIxZTlnZGs3IiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.ewogImlzcyI6ICJodHRwOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiwKICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDEzMTEyODA5NzAsCiAibmFtZSI6ICJKYW5lIERvZSIsCiAiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6ICJKYW5lIiwKICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6ICJEb2UiLAogImdlbmRlciI6ICJmZW1hbGUiLAogImJpcnRoZGF0ZSI6ICIwMDAwLTEwLTMxIiwKICJlbWFpbCI6ICJqYW5lZG9lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJwaWN0dXJlIjogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9qYW5lZG9lL21lLmpwZyIKfQ.rHQjEmBqn9Jre0OLykYNnspA10Qql2rvx4FsD00jwlB0Sym4NzpgvPKsDjn_wMkHxcp6CilPcoKrWHcipR2iAjzLvDNAReF97zoJqq880ZD1bwY82JDauCXELVR9O6_B0w3K-E7yM2macAAgNCUwtik6SjoSUZRcf-O5lygIyLENx882p6MtmwaL1hd6qn5RZOQ0TLrOYu0532g9Exxcm-ChymrB4xLykpDj3lUivJt63eEGGN6DH5K6o33TcxkIjNrCD4XB1CKKumZvCedgHHF3IAK4dVEDSUoGlH9z4pP_eWYNXvqQOjGs-rDaQzUHl6cQQWNiDpWOl_lxXjQEvQ",
"type": "oidc_id_token"
}
This can also be presented as a user handle reference Section 9.6.
This section provides details of how the RC can interact with the RO. All fields are OPTIONAL, and the RC MAY include multiple possible interaction modes. If a field is not present, it is interpreted as negative support for that feature.
This section MUST NOT be represented by a handle reference. (Note: this decision is largely due to the "callback" section being variable per transaction. We could allow a handle but restrict it to non-callback methods -- but in that case, it's simpler and shorter to just send the booleans instead of having a special case.)
The following example is from an RC that can redirect to the interaction endpoint and receive returns on a callback URI:
"interact": {
"redirect": true,
"callback": {
"uri": "https://example.com/client/123456",
"nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO"
}
}
This section lists the keys that the RC can present proof of ownership. The RC MUST send at least one key format. The RC MAY send more than one key format, but all keys MUST be equivalent.
The RC MUST provide proof of possession of all presented keysSection 10. All presented keys MUST be validated by the AS using the method defined by proof.
This section MAY also be presented as a key handle reference Section 9.7. The keys referenced by a handle MUST be validated by the AS.
The following non-normative example shows three key types, with the detached JWS proofing mechanism:
"keys": {
"proof": "jwsd",
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kty": "RSA",
"e": "AQAB",
"kid": "xyz-1",
"alg": "RS256",
"n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8xY..."
}
]
},
"cert": "MIIEHDCCAwSgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFA...",
"did": "did:example:CV3BVVXK2PWWLCRQLRFU#xyz-1"
}
This section lists the extensions and special features supported by the RC. Values of extensions MUST be listed in [[ a registry ]].
"capabilities": ["ext1", "ext2"]
This section allows the RC to request identity and authentication information about the RO. All fields are OPTIONAL and consist of boolean values. A "true" value indicates that the RC is requesting that claim be returned in the transaction response. A "false" or omitted value indicates that the RC is not requesting that claim be returned.
The following non-normative example shows how to request the subject and email address of the current user.
"claims": {
"subject": true,
"email": true
}
When evaluating a transaction request, the AS MAY determine that it needs to have the RO present to interact with the AS before issuing a token. This interaction can include the RO logging in to the AS, authorizing the transaction, providing proof claims, determining if the transaction decision should be remembered for the future, and other items.
The AS responds to the RC based on the type of interaction supported by the RC in the transaction request. The AS MAY respond with multiple possible interaction methods to be chosen by the RC. For example, if the RC indicates that it can handle redirects and user codes and has a callback URI, it would send a transaction request like this:
{
"interact": {
"redirect": true,
"user_code": true,
"callback": {
"uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455",
"nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC"
}
},
"resources": [
"dolphin-metadata"
],
"key": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO",
"display": {
"name": "My Client Display Name",
"uri": "https://example.net/client"
}
}
The AS would then respond with a transaction response like this:
{
"interaction_url": "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKMXKHQ",
"server_nonce": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH",
"user_code": {
"url": "https://server.example.com/interact/device",
"code": "A1BC-3DFF"
},
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
This response MUST include a transaction handle as described in Section 9.3 so that the transaction can continue after the user has interacted.
If the RC supports a "redirect" style interaction, the AS creates a unique interaction URL and returns it to the RC. This URL MUST be associated with the current transaction and no other transaction.
{
"interaction_url": "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKMXKHQ",
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
When the RC receives this response, it MUST launch the system browser, redirect the RO through an HTTP 302 response, display the URL through a scannable barcode, or otherwise send the RO to the interaction URL. The RC MUST NOT modify the interaction URL or append anything to it, including any query parameters, fragments, or special headers.
The interaction URL MUST be reachable from the RO's browser, though note that the RO MAY open the interaction URL on a separate device from the RC itself. The interaction URL MUST be accessible from an HTTP GET request, and MUST be protected by HTTPS or equivalent means.
Upon receiving an incoming request at the interaction URL, the AS MUST determine the transaction associated with this unique URL. If the transaction is not found, an error is returned to the end user through the browser and the AS MUST NOT attempt to redirect to a callback URL. When interacting with the RO, the AS MAY perform any of the behaviors in the User Interaction section Section 5.
If the RC has supplied a callback URL in its interact request Section 2.4, the AS returns a nonce in its interaction response.
This example also includes the interaction URL from Section 3.1.
{
"interaction_url": "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKMXKHQ",
"server_nonce": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH",
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
When interaction has concluded, the AS returns the user to the RC by redirecting the RO's browser to the RC's callback URL presented at the start of the transaction, with the addition of two query parameters.
The AS MUST properly process the callback parameter from the interaction request as a URL, adding these values as query parameters. The AS MUST NOT use simple string concatenation. For example, for the callback URL of "https://example.com/client/123456", the AS would add query parameters as follows (newlines added for display purposes only):
https://example.com/client/123456 ?hash=p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1
Upon processing this request to the callback URL, the RC MUST calculate the expected value of the "hash" parameter as described in Section 3.3 and compare that value to the "hash" parameter on the incoming request.
The RC also sends (the hash of? example here is not hashed) the interaction reference as the "interact_ref" field of the transaction continuation requestSection 7, using the transaction handle Section 9.3 returned in the most recent transaction response from the AS.
{
"handle": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1"
}
The "hash" parameter in the interaction response ties the front channel response to a transaction by using values known only to the parties in the transaction. To calculate the "hash" value for the interaction response, the party doing the calculation first takes the "nonce" value sent by the RC in the interaction section of the initial transaction request Section 2.4, the "server_nonce" value returned in the transaction response Section 3.2, and the "interact_ref" returned in the callback response Section 3.2. These three values are concatenated to each other in this order using a single newline character as a separator between the fields. There is no padding or whitespace before or after any of the lines, and no trailing newline character.
VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH 4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1
The party then hashes this string with the appropriate algorithm based on the "hash_method" parameter of the "callback" section of the interaction request. If the "hash_method" value is not present in the RC's request, the AS defaults to "sha3".
The "sha3" hash method consists of hashing the string with the 512-bit SHA3 algorithm. The byte array is then encoded using URL Safe Base64 with no padding. The resulting string is the hash value.
p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A
The "sha2" hash method consists of hashing the string with the 512-bit SHA2 algorithm. The byte array is then encoded using URL Safe Base64 with no padding. The resulting string is the hash value.
62SbcD3Xs7L40rjgALA-ymQujoh2LB2hPJyX9vlcr1H6ecChZ8BNKkG_HrOKP_Bpj84rh4mC9aE9x7HPBFcIHw
If the RC supports a "user_code" style interaction, the AS creates a unique user interaction code and returns it to the RC. The RC communicates this code to the RO and instructs the RO to enter the code at a URL hosted by the AS.
{
"user_code": {
"url": "https://server.example.com/interact/device",
"code": "A1BC-3DFF"
},
"wait": 30,
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
When the RC receives this response, it MUST communicate the user code to the RO. If possible the RC SHOULD communicate the interaction URL to the user as well. However, the URL is generally understood to be stable over time for a given service, and this URL MAY be communicated through a static means such as the device's documentation or packaging.
When the RO enters the unique user code at the user code URL, the AS MUST determine which active transaction is associated with the user code. If a transaction is not found, the AS MUST return an error page to the user and MUST NOT attempt to redirect to a callback URL. The AS MAY use any mechanism to interact with the RO as listed in Section 5.
Note that this method is strictly for allowing the user to enter a code at a static URL. If the AS wishes to communicate a pre-composed URL to the RO containing both the user code and the URL at which to enter it, the AS MUST use the "interaction_url" Section 3.1 redirect mechanism instead as this allows the client to communicate an arbitrary interaction URL to the RO.
If the AS needs the RC to wait before it can give a definitive response to a transaction continue requestSection 7, the AS replies to the transaction request with a wait response. This tells the RC that it can poll the transaction after a set amount of time.
This response includes a transaction handle as in Transaction Handle Section 9.3.
{
"wait": 30,
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
When the RO is interacting with the AS at the interaction uri, the AS MAY perform whatever actions it sees fit, including but not limited to:
When the AS has concluded interacting with the RO, the AS MUST determine if the RC has registered a callback URL and nonce parameter for this transaction. If so, the AS MUST redirect the RO's browser to the callback URL as described in Section 3. If the AS detects an error condition, such as an unknown transaction, an untrustworthy callback URL, an untrustworthy client, or suspicious RO behavior, the AS MUST return an error to the RO's browser and MUST NOT redirect to the callback URL.
If the AS determines that the token cannot be issued for any reason, it responds to the RC with an error message. This message does not include a transaction handle, and the RC can no longer poll for this transaction. The RC MAY create a new transaction and start again.
{
"error": "user_denied"
}
TODO: we should have a more robust error mechanism. Current candidate list of errors:
Once a transaction has begun, the AS associates that transaction with a transaction handleSection 9.3 which is returned to the RC in one of the transaction responses Section 3.1, Section 3.4, Section 4. This handle MUST be unique, MUST be associated with a single transaction, and MUST be one time use.
The RC continues the transaction by making a request with the transaction handle in the body of the request. The RC MAY add additional fields to the transaction continuation request, such as the interaction reference return in the callback response Section 3.
{
"handle": "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh"
}
The RC MUST prove all keys initially sent in the transaction requestSection 2.5 as described in Section 10.
[[ Note: should we allow the client to mutate the transaction at this point? We already allow the presentation of the interaction handle, and any messaging protocols like DIDComm would allow additional work to be done here. But do we want the client to be able to specify additional resources, or new interaction methods, or anything like that? I'm inclined not to so that's been left out for now. ]]
{
"access_token": {
"value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0",
"type": "bearer"
},
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
},
"claims": {
"subject": "UR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP-MHKUR6",
"email": "alice@example.com"
}
}
A bearer style access token MUST be presented using the Header method of OAuth 2 Bearer Tokens [RFC6750]. A sha3 style access token is hashed as described in Section 9.1 and presented using the Header method of OAuth 2 Bearer Tokens [RFC6750].
An access token MAY be bound to any keys presented by the client during the transaction request. A bound access token MUST be presented with proof of the key as described in Section 10.
Additional user information MAY be made available to the RC through use of an access token at a protected resource representing the user. This endpoint could be an OpenID Connect UserInfo Endpoint, a SCIM endpoint, or another similar resource. Specification of this resource is outside the scope of this specification.
A handle in this protocol is a value presented from one party to another as proof that they are the appropriate party for part of the transaction. Handles can be used to reference the transaction as a whole, or one of its constituent parts. When a handle is used to represent a part of a transaction request, the handle presentation replaces the original value. In practical terms, this often means that the values of a transaction request are either an object (when the full value is used) or a single string (when the handle is used).
Bearer handles are presented by giving the exact string value of the handle in the appropriate place.
SHA3 handles are validated by taking the SHA3 hash of the handle value and encoding it in Base64URL with no padding, and presenting the encoded value.
Bearer handles are validated by doing an exact byte comparison of the string representation of the handle value.
SHA3 handles are validated by taking the SHA3 hash of the handle value and encoding it in Base64URL with no padding, and comparing that using an exact byte comparison with the presented value.
Transaction handles are issued by the AS to the RC to allow the RC to continue a transaction after every step. A transaction handle MUST be discarded after it is used by both the AS and the RC. A transaction MUST have only a single handle associated with it at any time. If the AS determines that the RC can still continue the transaction after a handle has been used, a new transaction handle will be issued in its place. If the AS does not issue a transaction handle in its response to the RC, the RC MUST NOT continue that transaction.
Transaction handles always represent the current state of the transaction which they reference.
Transactions can be continued by the RC if the AS needs to interact with the ROSection 5 and the RC is expecting a callbackSection 3 or if the AS is still waiting on some external conditionSection 4 while the RC is polling. The transaction MAY also be continued after an access token is issued Section 8 as a means of refreshing an access token with the same rights associated with the transaction.
RC handles stand in for the display section of the initial transaction requestSection 2.1. The AS MAY issue a display handle to a RC as part of a static registration process, analogous to a client ID in OAuth 2, allowing the RC to be associated with an AS-side configuration that does not change at runtime. Such static processes SHOULD be bound to a set of keys known only to the RC software.
Display handles MAY be issued by the RS in response to a transaction request. The AS MAY associate the display handle to the interact, resource, and key handles issued in the same response, requiring them to be used together. When the RC receives this handle, it MAY present the handle in future transaction requests instead of sending its information again.
{
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
},
"display_handle": {
"value": "VBUEOIQA82PBY2ZDJW7Q",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the display block of the transaction request:
{
"display": "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89"
}
Resource handles stand in for the detailed resource request in the transaction requestSection 2.2. Resource handles MAY be created by the authorization server as static stand-ins for specific resource requests, analogous to OAuth2 scopes.
Resource handles MAY be issued by the RS in response to a transaction request. In such cases, the resource handle returned represents the total of all resources
{
"wait": 30,
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
},
"resources_handle": {
"value": "KLKP36N7GPOKRF3KGH5N",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the resource block of the future transaction request:
{
"resources": ["KLKP36N7GPOKRF3KGH5N"]
}
Note that handles and object values MAY be combined in a single request.
{
"resources": [
{
"actions": [
"read",
"write",
"dolphin"
],
"locations": [
"https://server.example.net/",
"https://resource.local/other"
],
"datatypes": [
"metadata",
"images"
]
},
"dolphin-metadata",
"KLKP36N7GPOKRF3KGH5N"
]
}
[[ Strawman idea: ]]
In order to facilitate dynamic API protection, an RS MAY pre-register a resource handle in response to an unauthorized request from the RC. In this scenario, the RS creates a transaction request with no client information but describing the resources being protected [[Note: this is currently at odds with the required format above, perhaps this should be a special mode or flag? We could still use the "keys" section here though.]] The AS returns a resource handle to the RS, which then communicates both the resource handle and the AS transaction endpoint to the RC. The RC then begins its transaction as normal, using the resource handle as one of perhaps several resources it requests.
User handles MAY be issued by the AS in response to validating a specific RO during a transaction and stand in for the user section of a transaction requestSection 2.3. This handle MAY refer to the RO that interacted with the AS, the user presented by claims in the transaction request, or a combination of these. This handle can be used in future transactions to represent the current user, analogous to the persistent claims token of UMA 2.
{
"wait": 30,
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
},
"user_handle": {
"value": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the user block of the transaction request:
{
"user": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM"
}
Key handles stand in for the keys section of the initial transaction requestSection 2.5. The AS MAY issue a key handle to a RC as part of a static registration process, allowing the RC to be associated with an AS-side configuration that does not change at runtime.
Key handles MAY be issued by the AS in response to a transaction request. The AS SHOULD bind this handle to the display, resource, and user handles issued in the same response. When the RC receives this handle, it MAY present the handle in future transaction requests instead of sending its information again.
{
"wait": 30,
"handle": {
"value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"type": "bearer"
},
"key_handle": {
"value": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO",
"type": "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the keys block of the transaction request:
{
"keys": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO"
}
When the AS receives a key handle, it MUST validate that the keys referenced by the handle are bound to the current transaction request using the proof method referenced by the handle.
Any keys presented by the RC to the AS or RS MUST be validated as part of the transaction in which they are presented.The type of binding used is indicated by the proof parameter of the keys section in the transaction request. Values defined by this specification are as follows:
Additional values can be defined by a registry.
All keys presented by the RC in the transaction requestSection 2 MUST be proved in all transaction continuation requestsSection 7 for that transaction. The AS MUST validate all keys presented by the RC or referenced in the transaction at each call to the transaction endpoint. The client MUST NOT use a different key during the transaction.
This method is indicated by jwsd in the proof field of a key request. To sign a request to the transaction endpoint, the RC takes the serialized body of the request and signs it using detached JWS [RFC7797]. The header of the JWS MUST contain the kid field of the key bound to this RC during this transaction. The JWS header MUST contain an alg field appropriate for the key identified by kid and MUST NOT be none.
The RC presents the signature in the JWS-Signature HTTP Header field. [Note: this is a custom header field, do we need this?]
JWS-Signature: eyj0....
When the AS receives the JWS-Signature header, it MUST parse its contents as a detached JWS object. The HTTP Body is used as the payload for purposes of validating the JWS, with no transformations.
This method is indicated by mtls in the proof field of a key request. The RC presents its client certificate during TLS negotiation with the server (either AS or RS). The AS or RS takes the thumbprint of the client certificate presented during mutual TLS negotiation and compares that thumbprint to the thumbprint presented by the RC application as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] section 3.
This method is indicated by dpop in the proof field of a key request. The RC creates a DPoP signature header as described in [I-D.fett-oauth-dpop] section 2.
This method is indicated by httpsig in the proof field of a key request. The RC creates an HTTP Signature header as described in [I-D.cavage-http-signatures] section 4. The RC MUST calculate and present the Digest header as defined in [RFC3230].
This method is indicated by oauthpop in the proof field of a key request. The RC creates an HTTP Authorization PoP header as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request] section 4, with the following additional requirements:
[We'll want a registry for key proof types, and maybe some other field names. We'll need to register at least one header and maybe some others?]
All requests have to be over TLS or equivalent. Many handles act as shared secrets, though they can be combined with a requirement to provide proof of a key as well.
Handles are passed between parties and therefore should be stateful and not contain any internal structure or information, which could leak private data.
| [BCP195] | Sheffer, Y., Holz, R. and P. Saint-Andre, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015. |
| [I-D.cavage-http-signatures] | Cavage, M. and M. Sporny, "Signing HTTP Messages", Internet-Draft draft-cavage-http-signatures-12, October 2019. |
| [I-D.fett-oauth-dpop] | Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M. and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)", Internet-Draft draft-fett-oauth-dpop-03, October 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] | Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N. and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-17, August 2019. |
| [I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request] | Richer, J., Bradley, J. and H. Tschofenig, "A Method for Signing HTTP Requests for OAuth", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request-03, August 2016. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC3230] | Mogul, J. and A. Van Hoff, "Instance Digests in HTTP", RFC 3230, DOI 10.17487/RFC3230, January 2002. |
| [RFC6749] | Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012. |
| [RFC6750] | Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012. |
| [RFC7519] | Jones, M., Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015. |
| [RFC7662] | Richer, J., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015. |
| [RFC7797] | Jones, M., "JSON Web Signature (JWS) Unencoded Payload Option", RFC 7797, DOI 10.17487/RFC7797, February 2016. |
| [RFC8126] | Cotton, M., Leiba, B. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017. |
| [RFC8174] | Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017. |
| [RFC8259] | Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017. |
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