| Network Working Group | P. Saint-Andre |
| Internet-Draft | M. Miller |
| Intended status: Standards Track | Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| Expires: August 26, 2013 | February 22, 2013 |
Domain Name Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
draft-saintandre-xmpp-dna-01
This document improves the security of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) in two ways. First, it specifies how "prooftypes" can establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream. Second, it describes how to securely delegate a source domain to a derived domain, which is especially important in virtual hosting environments.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2013.
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
The need to establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream arises in both client-to-server and server-to-server communication using the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), because XMPP servers are typically identified by DNS domain names. However, a client or peer server needs to verify the identity of a server to which it connects. To date, such verification has been established based on information obtained from the Domain Name System (DNS), the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), or similar sources. This document (1) generalizes the model currently in use so that additional prooftypes can be defined, (2) provides a basis for modernizing some prooftypes to reflect progress in underlying technologies such as DNS Security [RFC4033], and (3) describes the flow of operations for establishing a domain name association.
Furthermore, the process for resolving the domain name of an XMPP service into the IP address at which an XML stream will be negotiated (defined in [RFC6120]) can involve delegation of a source domain (say, example.com) to a derived domain (say, hosting.example.net). If such delegation is not done in a secure manner, then the domain name association cannot be authenticated. Therefore, this document provides guidelines for defining secure delegation methods.
This document does not define any DNA prooftypes or secure delegation methods; such technologies are defined in companion documents.
This document inherits XMPP terminology from [RFC6120] and [XEP-0220], DNS terminology from [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC2782] and [RFC4033], and security terminology from [RFC4949] and [RFC5280]. The terms "source domain", "derived domain", "reference identity", and "presented identity" are used as defined in the "CertID" specification [RFC6125]. The terms "permissive federation", "verified federation", and "encrypted federation" are derived from [XEP-0238], although we substitute the term "authenticated federation" for the term "trusted federation" from that document.
The following flow chart illustrates the protocol flow for establishing domain name associations between Server A and Server B, as described in the remaining sections of this document.
|
|
(Section 4: A Simple Scenario)
|
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-------------STREAM HEADERS--------------------+
| |
| A: <stream from='a.example' to='b.example'> |
| |
| B: <stream from='b.example' to='a.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-------------TLS NEGOTIATION-------------------+
| |
| B: Server Certificate |
| [B: Certificate Request] |
| [A: Client Certificate] |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
(A establishes DNA for b.example!)
|
+-------------AUTHENTICATION--------------------+
| | |
| {client certificate?} ----+ |
| | | |
| | yes no | |
| v | |
| SASL EXTERNAL | |
| (mutual auth!) | |
+------------------------------------|----------+
|
+----------------+
| B needs to auth A
|
(Section 5: One-Way Authentication)
|
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-------------STREAM HEADERS--------------------+
| |
| B: <stream from='b.example' to='a.example'> |
| |
| A: <stream from='a.example' to='b.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-------------TLS NEGOTIATION-------------------+
| |
| A: Server Certificate |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
(B establishes DNA for a.example!)
|
|
(Section 6.1: Piggybacking Assertion)
|
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY ASSERTION----------+
| |
| B: <db:result from='c.example' |
| to='a.example'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DNA DANCE AS ABOVE------------------+
| |
| DNS RESOLUTION, STREAM HEADERS, |
| TLS NEGOTIATION, AUTHENTICATION |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY VERIFICATION-------+
| |
| A: <db:verify from='a.example' |
| to='c.example' |
| type='valid'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
|
(Section 6.2: Piggybacking Supposition)
|
|
+-----------SUBSEQUENT CONNECTION---------------+
| |
| B: <stream from='c.example' |
| to='chatrooms.a.example'> |
| |
| A: <stream from='chatrooms.a.example' |
| to='c.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DNA DANCE AS ABOVE------------------+
| |
| DNS RESOLUTION, STREAM HEADERS, |
| TLS NEGOTIATION, AUTHENTICATION |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DIALBACK OPTIMIZATION---------------+
| |
| B: <db:result from='c.example' |
| to='chatrooms.a.example'/> |
| |
| B: <db:verify from='chatrooms.a.example' |
| to='c.example' |
| type='valid'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
To illustrate the problem, consider the simplified order of events (see [RFC6120] for details) in establishing an XML stream between Server A (a.example) and Server B (b.example):
Several simplifying assumptions underlie the happy scenario just outlined:
Let's consider each of these "wrinkles" in turn.
If Server A does not present its PKIX certificate during TLS negotiation (perhaps because it wishes to verify the identity of Server B before presenting its own credentials), Server B is unable to mutually authenticate Server A. Therefore, Server B needs to negotiate and authenticate a stream to Server A, just as Server A has done:
Unfortunately, now the servers are using two TCP connections instead of one, which is somewhat wasteful. However, there are ways to tie the authentication achieved on the second TCP connection to the first TCP connection; see [XEP-0288] for further discussion.
Consider the common scenario in which Server B hosts not only b.example but also a second domain c.example. If a user of Server B associated with c.example wishes to communicate with a friend at a.example, Server B needs to send XMPP stanzas from the domain c.example rather than b.example. Although Server B could open an new TCP connection and negotiate new XML streams for the domain pair of c.example and a.example, that too is wasteful. Server B already has a connection to a.example, so how can it assert that it would like to add a new domain pair to the existing connection?
The traditional method for doing so is the Server Dialback protocol, first specified in [RFC3920] and since moved to [XEP-0220]. Here, Server B can send a <db:result/> element for the new domain pair over the existing stream.
<db:result from='c.example' to='a.example'>
some-dialback-key
</db:result>
This element functions as Server B's assertion that it is (also) c.example, and thus is functionally equivalent to the 'from' address of an initial stream header as previously described.
In response to this assertion, Server A needs to obtain some kind of proof that Server B really is also c.example. It can do the same thing that it did before:
Now that Server A accepts the domain name association, it informs Server B of that fact by sending verification of the Server Dialback key over the original connection:
<db:verify from='a.example' to='c.example' type='valid'/>
The parties can then terminate the second connection, since it was used only for Server A to associate a stream over the same IP:port combination with the domain name c.example (dialback key links the original stream to the new association).
Piggybacking can also occur in the other direction. Consider the common scenario in which Server A provides XMPP services not only for a.example but also for a subdomain such as a groupchat service at chatrooms.a.example (see [XEP-0045]). If a user from c.example at Server B wishes to join a room on the groupchat sevice, Server B needs to send XMPP stanzas from the domain c.example to the domain chatrooms.a.example rather than a.example. Therefore, Server B needs to negotiate and authenticate a stream to chatrooms.a.example:
As before, the parties now have two TCP connections open. So that they can close the now-redundant connection, Server B sends a dialback key to Server A over the new connection.
<db:result from='c.example' to='chatrooms.a.example'>
some-dialback-key
</db:result>
Server A then informs Server B that it accepts the domain name association by sending verification of the dialback key over the original connection:
<db:verify from='chatrooms.a.example' to='c.example' type='valid'/>
Server B can now close the connection over which it tested the domain name association for chatrooms.a.example.
The foregoing protocol flows assumed that domain name associations were proved using the standard PKI prooftype specified in [RFC6120]: that is, the server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate that is checked according to a profile of the matching rules from [RFC6125], the client's verification material is obtained out of band in the form of a trusted root, and secure DNS is not necessary.
However, sometimes XMPP server administrators are unable or unwilling to obtain valid PKIX certificates for their servers (e.g., the administrator of im.cs.podunk.example can't receive certification authority verification messages sent to mailto:hostmaster@podunk.example, or hosting.example.net does not want to take on the liability of holding the certificate and private key for example.com). In these circumstances, prooftypes other than PKIX are desirable. Two companion documents, [XMPP-DANE] and [XMPP-POSH], define alternate prooftypes:
One common method for deploying XMPP services is virtual hosting: e.g., the XMPP service for example.com is actually hosted at hosting.example.net. Such an arrangement is relatively convenient in XMPP given the use of DNS SRV records [RFC2782], such as the following pointer from example.com to hosting.example.net:
_xmpp-server._tcp.example.com. 0 IN SRV 0 0 5269 hosting.example.net
To improve security and limit liability, in typical deployments the administrators of hosting.example.net do not wish to hold the certificate and private key for example.com and the owners of example.com do not wish to share their certificate and private key with the administrators of hosting.example.net. In practice this means that server-to-server communications to example.com go unencrypted or the communications are TLS-encrypted but the certificates are not checked (which is functionally equivalent to an unencrypted connection). This is also true of client-to-server communications, forcing end users to override certificate warnings or configure their clients to accept certificates for hosting.example.net instead of example.com. The fundamental problem here is that if DNSSEC is not used the act of delegation is inherently insecure.
This document does not describe how to achieve secure delegation. However, [XMPP-DANE] explains how to use DNSSEC for secure delegation in the PKI and DANE prooftypes and [XMPP-POSH] explains how to use HTTPS redirects for secure delegation in the POSH prooftype.
In general, a DNA prooftype conforms to the following definition:
The PKI, DANE, and POSH prooftypes adhere to this model. In addition, other prooftypes are possible (examples might include PGP keys rather than PKIX certificates, or a token mechanism such as Kerberos or OAuth).
Some prooftypes depend on (or are enhanced by) secure DNS and therefore also need to describe how secure delegation occurs for that prooftype.
This document supplements but does not supersede the security considerations provided in [RFC6120] and [RFC6125].
This document has no actions for the IANA.
| [RFC3920] | Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004. |
| [XEP-0045] | Saint-Andre, P., "Multi-User Chat", XSF XEP 0045, February 2012. |
| [XEP-0238] | Saint-Andre, P., "XMPP Protocol Flows for Inter-Domain Federation", XSF XEP 0238, March 2008. |
| [XEP-0288] | Hancke, P. and D. Cridland, "Bidirectional Server-to-Server Connections", XSF XEP 0288, August 2012. |