Network Working Group | J. Schaad |
Internet-Draft | Soaring Hawk Consulting |
Intended status: Standards Track | February 14, 2014 |
Expires: August 18, 2014 |
Plasma Service Trust Processing
draft-schaad-plasma-service-05
RFC TBD describes a new model and set of requirements to implement a labeling system on Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) objects where the entity in charge of doing the label enforcement is under the control of a central authority rather than the recipient of the object.
This document describes a protocol to be used by senders and recipients of CMS objects to communicate with a centralized label enforcement server. The document outlines how a client will get the set of labels or policies that it can use for sending messages, composes a secure CMS object with a label on it and gets the necessary keys to decrypt a CMS object from the server. This document is designed to be used with RFC TBD2 which describes the extensions used in CMS objects to hold the label information.
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RFC TBD [I-D.freeman-plasma-requirements] describes a new model and set of requirements to implement a labeling system on Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) objects where the entity in charge of doing the label enforcement is under the control of a central authority rather than the recipient of the object.
This document describes a protocol to be used by senders and recipients of CMS objects to communicate with a centralized label enforcement server. The document outlines how a client will get the set of labels or policies that it can use for sending messages, composes a secure CMS object with a label on it and gets the necessary keys to decrypt a CMS object from the server. This document is designed to be used with RFC TBD [I-D.schaad-plasma-cms] which describes the extensions used in CMS objects to hold the label information.
The following name spaces are used in this document:
Prefix | Namespace | Specification(s) |
---|---|---|
eps | http://ietf.org/2011/plasma/ | This Specification |
wst | http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512 | [WS-TRUST] |
xacml | http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-core-spec-cs-01-en.html | [XACML] |
ds2 | http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig# | [XML-Signature] |
xs | http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema | [XML-Schema1][XML-Schema2] |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
When the words appear in lower case, their natural language meaning is used.
In designing this specification we used a number of pre-existing specifications as building blocks. In some cases we use the entirety of the specification and in other case we use only select pieces.
The XACML specification (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) [XACML] provides a framework for writing access control policies and for creating standardized access control queries and responses. The request and response portion of the specification is used to build the request (Section 5.2) and response (Section 6.1) messages in this specification. The structure for writing the access control policies is out of scope for this document, but XACML is one of the possibilities that can be used for that purpose.
A number of different methods for carrying both identification and attributes of the party requesting access is permitted in this specification. SAML is one of the methods that is permitted for that purpose.
SAML has defined three different types of assertions in it's core specification [OASIS-CORE]:
While a PDP can use an Authorization Decision as input, this is unexpected and MAY be supported. In addition there are three different ways that the subject of a SAML statement can be identified:
We cannot pass a SAML assertion with attributes as a single attribute in the XACML request as XACML wants each of the different attributes to be individually listed in the request. This greatly simplifies the XACML code, but means that one needs to do a mapping process from the SAML attributes to the XACML attributes. This process has been discussed in Section 2 of [SAML-XACML]. This mapping process MUST be done by a trusted agent, as there are a number of steps that need to be done including the validation of the signature on the SAML assertion. This process cannot be done by the PEP that is residing on the Plasma client's system as this is considered to be an untrusted entity by the Plasma system as a whole. One method for this to be addressed is to treat the Plasma server as both a PDP (for the Plasma client) and a PDP for the true XACML policy evaluator. In this model, the Plasma server becomes the trusted PEP party and has the ability to do the necessary signature validation and mapping processes. A new XACML request is then created and either re-submitted to itself for complete evaluation or to a third party which does the actual XACML processing.
The WS-Trust 1.4 [WS-TRUST] standard provides for methods for issuing, renewing, and validating security tokens. This specification uses only a small portion of that standard, specifically the structure that returns a trust token from the issuer to the requester.
This specification makes no statements on the content and format of the token returned from the Plasma server to the Plasma client in the wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse field. These tokens may be parseable by the client, but there is no requirement that the client be able to understand the token. The token can always be treated as an opaque blob by the client which is simply reflected back to the server at a later time. The attributes that client needs to understand in order to use the token, such as the life time, are returned as fields of the token response.
TODO: need to discuss the content model and say what elements need to be supported and what elements can be ignored -- safely.
To be supplied from the problem statement document.
(1)(3) +----------+ +----------->|Sending |<------------+ | |Agent | | (2) v +----------+ v +----------+ ^ +---------+ |Email | | |Mail | |Policy |<----------+ |Transfer | |Service | |Agent | +----------+ +---------+ () ^ +----------+ ^ | |Receiving | | +----------->|Agent |<------------+ ()() +----------+
Figure 1: Message Access Control Actors
List the boxes above and give some info about them.
We layout the general steps that need to be taken by the sender of an EPS message. The numbers in the steps below refer to the numbers in the upper half of Figure 1. A more detailed description of the processing is found in Section 7 for obtaining the security policies that can be applied to a messages and Section 8 for sending a message.
We layout the general steps that need to be taken by the sender of an EPS message. The numbers in the steps below refer to the numbers in the lower half of Figure 1. A more detailed description of the processing is found in Section 9.
The protocol defined in this document is designed to take place between a Plasma server and a Plasma client. The protocol takes place in terms of a request/response dialog from the client to the server. A single dialog can consist of more than one request/response message pair. Multiple round trips within allow a client to provide additional authentication, authorization and attribute information to the server.
Each dialog contains one or more action attributes specifying what actions the client wishes the server to take. Depending on the action requested, additional attributes may be present providing data for the action to use as input. Finally, each dialog will contain authentication and attributes supplied by one or more authorities that the server can use either as input to the action or as input to policy decisions about whether to perform the action.
The protocol MUST be run over a secure transport, the secure transport is responsible for providing the confidentiality and integrity protection services over the entire message. The protocol allows for signature operations to occur on sub-sections of the message structure, howewever this is used for creation of identity proofs and not for integrity protection.
Multiple dialogs may be run over a single secure transport session. Before a new dialog may be started, the previous dialog MUST have completed to a state of success, failure or not applicable. A new dialog MUST NOT be started after receiving a response with an indeterminate status. If a new dialog is desired in these circumstances, then the transport session MUST to be closed and re-opened.
The specification is written using XACML as the basic structure to frame a request for an operation. The request for operations to occur are written using XACML action items. This specification defines actions specific to Plasma in a CMS environment. Other specifications can define additional action items for other environments (for example the XML encryption environment) or other purposes. (Future work could use this basic structure to standardize the dialogs between PDPs and PAPs or to facilitate legal signatures on emails.)
In addition to the XACML action request there is a set of structures to allow for a variety of authentication mechanisms to be used. By allowing for the use of SAML and GSS-API as base authentication mechanisms, the mechanism used is contained in a sub-system and thus does not directly impact the protocol.
The request message uses a single XML structure. This structure is the eps:PlasmaRequest object. The XML Schema used to describe this structure is:
<xs:element name="PlasmaRequest" type="eps:RequestType"/> <xs:complexType name="RequestType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="eps:Authentication" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Request"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:string" default="1.0"/> </xs:complexType>
The RequestType has two elements in it:
For some operations, display string values are returned as part of the response from the server. The xml:lang attribute SHOULD be included in the RequestType element to inform the server as to what language client wishes to have the strings in. The server SHOULD attempt to return strings in the language requested or a related language if at all possible.
One of the major goals in the Plasma work is to detach the process of authentication specifics from the Plasma protocol. In order to accomplish this we are specifying the use of two general mechanisms (SAML and GSS-API) which can be configured and expanded without changing the core Plasma protocol itself. The authentication element has two main purposes: 1) to process the authentication being used by the client and 2) to carry authenticated attributes for use in the policy evaluation.
When transporting the authentication information, one needs to recognize that there may be a single or multiple messages in the dialog in order to complete the authentication process. In performing the process of authenticating, any or all of the elements in this structure can be used. If there are multiple elements filled out, the server can choose to process the elements in any order. This means that the Plasma protocol itself does not favor any specific mechanism. The current set of mechanisms that are built into the Plasma specification are:
More than one authentication element can be present in any single message. This is because a client may need to provide more than one piece of data to a server in order to authenticate, for example a holder of key SAML Assertion along with a signature created with that key. Additionally a client may want to provide the server an option of different ways of doing the authentication. In a federated scenario, an X.509 certificate with a signature can be presented and the server may not be able to build a trust path to it's set of trust anchors. In this case the client may need to use the GSS-API/EAP protocol for doing the authentication. The client may want to provide the server with one or more SAML Assertion that binds a number of attributes to it's identities so that the server does not need to ask for those attributes at a later time. Finally, multiple entities may need to be validated (for example the user and the user's machine).
When transporting the attribute information, one needs to recognize that there may be single or multiple messages in the dialog in order to complete the authorization process. The server will return a status code of urn:oasis:names:xacml:1.0:status:missing-attribute in the event that one or more attributes are needed in order to complete the authorization process. The details on how XACML returns missing attribute information is found in Section 7.17.3 of [XACML]. When the list of attributes is returned, the client has two choices: 1) It can close the dialog, look for a source of the missing attributes and then start a new dialog, 2) it can just get an assertion for the missing attributes and send the new assertion as in a new request message within the same dialog. The decision of which process to use will depend in part on how long it is expected to take to get the new attribute assertion to be returned.
The same authentication data does not need to be re-transmitted to the server in a subsequent message within a single dialog. The server MUST retain all authenticated assertion information during a single dialog.
The schema for the Authentication element directly maps to the ability to hold the above elements. The schema for the Authentication element is:
<xs:element name="Authentication" type="eps:AuthenticationType"/> <xs:complexType name="AuthenticationType"> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element ref="saml:Assertion"/> <xs:element name="GSSAPI" type="xs:hexBinary"/> <xs:element name="RoleToken"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:element ref="ds2:Signature"/> <xs:element name="Other"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##other"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:choice> </xs:complexType>
The schema allows for multiple authentication elements to occur in any order. It is suggested, but not required, that the ds2:Signature element occur after the authentication element that has an assoicated key. This makes it easier for servers to make a one pass validate of all authentication elements.
The Other element is provided to allow for additional authentication elements, include SAML version 1.1, to be used.
SAML Assertions can provide authentication or attribute information to the server. A SAML statement only needs to be provided once during a single dialog, the server MUST remember all attributes during the dialog.
When a SAML Assertion contains a SubjectConformation element using the KeyInfoConfirmationDataType as a subject conformation element, the confirmation shall be performed by the creation of an XML Signature authentication element. The signature element shall be created using an appropriate algorithm for the key referenced in the SAML statement.
Identify a SAML statement in the delegation/subject/environment space - need text for this
WS Trust tokens are used in two different ways by this specification. They can be used as the primary introduction method of a client to the server, or they can be used by the server to allow the client to be re-introduced to the server in such a way that the server can use cached information.
WS Trust tokens come in two basic flavors: Bearer tokens and Holder of Key tokens. With the first flavor, presentation of the token is considered to be sufficient to allow the server to validate the identity of the presenter and know the appropriate attributes to make a policy decision. In the second flavor some type of cryptographic operation (usually a signature or MAC computation) is needed in addition to just presenting the token. The Signature element (Section 5.1.3) provides necessary infrastructure to permit the cryptographic result to be passed to the server.
This document does not define the content or structure of any tokens to be used. This is strictly an implementation issue for the servers in question. This is because the client can treat the WS Token value presented to it as an opaque blob.
When a holder of key credential is used to determine the attributes associated with an entity, there is a requirement that the key be used in a proof of possession step so that the Plasma server can validate that the entity does hold the key. The credentials can hold either asymmetric keys (X.509 certificates and SAML Assertions) or symmetric keys (WS Trust Tokens and SAML Assertions) which use Digital Signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) respectively to create and validate a key usage statement. The XML signature standard [XML-Signature] provides an infrastructure to for conveying the proof of possession information.
The signature is computed over the XACML request element as a detached signature. When a signature element exists in the message, the ChannelBinding attribute (Section 10.1.1) MUST be included in the request. By the use of a value which is derived from the cryptographic keys used in for protecting the tunnel, it is possible for the server to verify that the authentication values computed were done specifically for this specific dialog and are not replayed.
When creating either a signature or a MAC, the following statements hold:
GSS-API [RFC2743] provides a security services to callers in a generic fasion, supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms and technologies. GSS-API has been extended by providing a mechanism for EAP [RFC7055] which is designed to work in a federated environment. This effort was done by the Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) working group. In this document the mechanism is referred to as ABFAB. This is the same type of environment that the Plasma protocol is expected to operate as well.
GSS-API offers a number of security services that are not currently used by the Plasma system. At this point in time we are only looking at the initial authentiction methods and not using the message encryption or encryption services.
TBD - rules for using GSS-API in general and the EAP version from ABFAB particularly.
Not all GSS-API mechanisms have the required features to support the necessary security that is needed by Plasma. GSS-API mechanisms need to support the following features:
When forming a mechnism name for GSS-API the following guidelines SHOULD be followed:
Clients MUST use a tunneling EAP method that supports channel binding between the tunnel and the inner EAP methods. At this point in time only the TEAP method [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method] provides the necessary support. While any inner EAP method can be used, it is strongly recommended that only those methods that support generation of EMSK (extended master session keys) be used, however methods tht only support generation of a MSK (master session key) can be used. (A discussion of why EMSKs should be generated can be found in [RFC7029].)
IdPs MUST support the EAP channel binding that is part of TEAP. At a minimum the service name, host name and real names MUST be checked for matches between the information provided by the TEAP channel binding and the RADIUS attributes.
The calls to GSS_Init_sec_content and GSS_Accept_sec_context take a chan_bindings parameter. The value is a GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS structure [RFC5554].
The initiator-address-type and acceptor-address-type fields of the GSS-CHANNEL-BINDINGS structure MUST be set to 0. The initiator-address and acceptor-address fields MUST be the empty string.
The application-data field MUST be set to the channel binding value defined in Section 10.1.1.
The request for an action to be performed by the Plasma server along with the data that needs to be supplied by the client in order for the server to complete the action are placed into the xacml:Request element of the request. This document defines a set of actions that are to be understood by the Plasma server. One (or more) action is to be placed in the request message.
In addition to the request for a specific action to occur, the client can place additional attributes in the request as well. These attributes are provided in order to assist the server either in identifying who the various agents on the client side are or to provide suggestions of attributes for using in making control decisions. Any data provided by the client in this manner is to be considered as a self-asserted value and to be treated as if it comes from the client as oppose to a trusted attribute agent.
For convenience the schema for the xacml:Request element is reproduced here:
<xs:element name="Request" type="xacml:RequestType"/> <xs:complexType name="RequestType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="xacml:RequestDefaults" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Attributes" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:MultiRequests" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="ReturnPolicyIdList" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="CombinedDecision" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/> </xs:complexType>
The RequestDefaults element of the XACML Request MUST be omitted by the clients. If present servers MUST ignore the RequestDefaults element. The use of the MultiRequest element is current not defined for a Plasma server and SHOULD be omitted by clients.
Clients MAY set ReturnPolicyIdList to true in order to find out which policies where used by the server in making the decision. Server MAY ignore this field and not return the policy list even if requested.
A number of different entities may need to be identified to Plasma server as part of a request. These entities include:
There is a single top level structure that is used by the server to respond to a client request.
The XML Schema used to describe the top level response is as follows:
<xs:element name="PlasmaResponse" type="eps:ResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="ResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="xacml:Response"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PlasmaReturnToken" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:string" default="1.0"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="PlasmaReturnToken" type="eps:PlasmaReturnTokenType"/> <xs:complexType name="PlasmaReturnTokenType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="DecisionId" type="xs:string"/> </xs:complexType>
A Plasma Response has two elements:
A Plasma Return Token is a wrapper for the actual token being returned. The returned token may be any content. This document defines the following elements that are to be returned in this location
The PlasmaReturneTokenType has an optional attribute DecisionId. This attribute is used when in the case multiple requests are made at the same time in order to assoicate the rquest and the response tokens.
The xacml:Response element has the ability to return both a decision, but additionally information about why a decision was not made.
The schema for the xacml:Response element is reproduced here for convenience:
<xs:element name="Response" type="xacml:ResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="ResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="xacml:Result" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="Result" type="xacml:ResultType"/> <xs:complexType name="ResultType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="xacml:Decision"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Status" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Obligations" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:AssociatedAdvice" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Attributes" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyIdentifierList" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
The xacml:Response element consists of one child the Result.
The xacml:Response element consists of the following elements:
In order to send an email using a Plasma server, the first step is to obtain a role token that provides the description of the labels that can be applied and the authorization to send an email using one or more of the labels. The process of obtaining the role token is designed to be a request/response round trip to the Plasma server. In practice a number of round trips may be necessary in order to provide all of the identity and attributes to the Plasma server that are needed to evaluate the policies for the labels.
When a Plasma server receives a role token request from a client, it needs to perform a policy evaluation for all of the policies that it arbitrates along with all of the options for those policies. In general, the first time that a client requests a role token from the server, it will not know the level of authentication that is needed or the set of attributes that needs to be presented in order to get the set of tokens. A server MUST NOT issue a role token without first attempting to retrieve from an attribute source (either the client or a back end server) all of the attributes required to check all policies. Since the work load required on the server is expected to be potentially extensive for creating the role token, it is expected that the token returned will be valid for a period of time. This will allow for the frequency of the operation to be reduced. While the use of an extant role token can be used for identity proof, it is not generally suggested that a new token be issued without doing a full evaluation of the attributes of the client as either the policy or the set of client attributes may have changed in the mean time.
The process starts by a client sending a server a role token request. Generally, but not always, the request will include some type of identity proof information and a set of attributes. It is suggested that, after the first successful conversation, the client cache hints about the identity and attributes needed for a server. This allows for fewer round trips in later conversations. An example of a request token can be found in Appendix B.
The role token request, as with all requests, uses the eps:PlasmaRequest XML structure. The eps:Authentication MAY be included on the first message and MUST be included on subsequent authentication round trips.
A role token request by a client MUST include the GetRoleTokens Plasma action request as an attribute of the xacml:Request element. Details on the action can be found in section Section 15.1. When role tokens are requested, no additional data needs to be supplied by the requester.
An example of a message requesting the set of policy information is:
<esp:PlasmaRequest> <eps:Authentication>...</eps:Authentication> <xacml:Request> <xacml:Attributes Category="...:action"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:plasma:action-id"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> GetRoleToken</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> </xacml:Request> </esp:PlasmaRequest>
In response to a role token request, the Plasma server returns a role token response. The response uses the eps:PlasmaResponse XML structure. When a response is create the following should be noted:
An xacml:Decision is always included in a response. The values permitted are:
<eps:PlasmaResponse> <xacml:Response> <xacml:Result> <xacml:Decision>Permit</xacml:Decision> </xacml:Result> </xacml:Response> <eps:PlasmaTokens> <eps:PlasmaToken> <eps:PolicyList> <eps:Policy> Details of a policy </eps:Policy> ... More policies ... <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> <wst:TokenType>urn:...:plasma:roleToken</wst:TokenType> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>...</wst:RequestedSecurityToken> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> </eps:PolicyList> </eps:PlasmaToken> </eps:PlasmaTokens> </eps:PlasmaResponse>
An example of a response returning the set of policy information is:
The process of getting role tokens has a problem that is not part of the normal XACML design. It is possible to compute a partial result based on the current set of attributes that have been supplied by the client, while having other role tokens that cannot be provided to the client since required attributes have not been provided. Since this is not part of the standard XACML model, one only has a single access/deny decision and if the attributes have not been provided then the response would be deny, we need to look at it in a bit more detail here.
In the process of discussions three different solutions to the problem were considered:
The normal mode that Plasma servers are expected to operate in is returning incremental results, however they can also keep internal state looking at what additional attributes are being provided by the client. If the client provides no new attributes, then the server can return a set of role tokens close down the conversation. If the server expects to get all attributes from the back end, and just get authentication from client, then it can return a set of role tokens immediately without providing a list of attributes to the client for it to try and satisfy.
The eps:PlasmaReturnToken element is used to return a role token to the client. Multiple role tokens can be returned by using multiple eps:PlasmaReturnToken elements. Each role token returned contains one or more policies that can be asserted, the role token, and optionally one or more set of obligations or advice that need to be observed when creating messages. Additionally the name of a Plasma server to be used with the token can be included as well as cryptographic information to be used with the token.
The schema used for the PlasmaTokens element is:
<xs:element name="RoleToken" type="eps:RoleTokenType"/> <xs:complexType name="RoleTokenType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="FriendlyName" type="xs:string"/> <xs:element name="PDP" type="xs:anyURI" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="PolicyList"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Policy" type="eps:PolicyDescType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:element ref="eps:Policy"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PolicySet"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element ref="wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Obligations" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:AssociatedAdvice" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="PolicyDescType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="FriendlyName" type="xs:string"/> <xs:element name="Options" minOccurs="0"> <xs:complexType> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="xs:anyType"> <xs:attribute name="optionsType" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="PolicyId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:complexType>
The eps:RoleToken element contains the following items:
The eps:PolicyType type is used to represent the elements of a policy to the client. The elements in this type are:
When building the wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse element, the following should be noted:
Some policies are designed to be restricted to a set of explicitly named people by the sender of the message. This policy is used for the set of basic policies defined in [PlasmaBasicPolicy]. In these cases the creator of the message specifies a set of recipients by using email address names without any decoration.
The Email Address List Option is identified by the uri "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:options:emailAddrs". The type associated with the structure is a string. The string contains a space separated set of internalized email addresses. Domains SHOULD be encoded as U-labels rather than using puny code.
All Plasma clients and servers MUST be able to create, parse and use the Email Address List Option for any policy.
As of the release of this document, Plasma clients and servers are not expected to understand any other options.
After having obtained a role token from a Plasma server, the client can then prepare to send an Email by requesting a message token from the Plasma server. As part of the preparatory process, the client will construct the label to be applied to the Email from the set of policies that it can assert, determine the optional elements for those policies which have options, generate the random key encryption key and possible create the key recipient structures for the email. Although this section is written in terms of a CMS Encrypted message, there is nothing to prevent the specification of different formats and still use this same basic protocol. An example of a send mail request token can be found in Appendix D.
The send message request is built using the eps:PlasmaRequest XML structure. When building the request, the following applies:
<eps:PlasmaRequest> <eps:Authentication> <eps:WS_Token> Role Token goes here </eps:WS_Token> <xacml:Request> <xacml:Attributes Category="...:action"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:plasma:action-id"> <xacml:AttributeValue> GetSendCMSToken </xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attributes Category="...:data"> <xcaml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:plasma:data-id"> <xacml:AttributeValue> Label and keys </xacml:AttributeValue> </xcaml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> </xacml:Request> </eps:Authentication> </eps:PlasmaRequest>
A message requesting that a CMS message token be created looks like this:
The message token data structure is used as an attribute to carry the necessary information to issue a CMS message token. The schema that describes the structure is:
<xs:element name="GetCMSToken" type="eps:CMSTokenRequestType"/> <xs:complexType name="CMSTokenRequestType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice> <xs:element ref="eps:Policy"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PolicySet"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element name="Hash"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="ds2:DigestMethod"/> <xs:element ref="ds2:DigestValue" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:element name="LockBox" type="eps:LockBoxType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="CEK" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="LockBox" type="eps:LockBoxType"/> <xs:complexType name="LockBoxType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Subject" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:complexType> <xs:simpleContent> <xs:extension base="xs:anySimpleType"> <xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string" use="required"/> </xs:extension> </xs:simpleContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="CMSLockBox" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="XMLLockBox" type="xenc:EncryptedKeyType"/> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> </xs:choice> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
When used in an xacml:Attribute, the structure is identified by:
Category = "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data"
AttributeId = "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data:CMSTokenRequest"
DataType = "urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:plasma:1.0#CMSTokenRequestType"
The elements of the structure are used as:
One or both of CEK and Recipients elements MUST be present.
The elements of the LockBoxType structure are:
In addition, the structure allows for other formats of encrypted data structures to be included as well. Servers which do not recognize the name space and data structure MUST return an unrecognized data structure error and not process the request.
A client is allowed to build a complex label to be sent to the Plasma server for evaluation. While there are some cases that a simple single policy is applied to a message, it is expected that many, if not most, messages will have more than one policy applied to it with logical statements connected those policies.
<xs:element name="PolicySet" type="eps:PolicySetType"/> <xs:complexType name="PolicySetType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element ref="eps:Policy"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PolicySet"/> </xs:choice> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="PolicyCombiningAlgId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="Policy" type="eps:PolicyType"/> <xs:complexType name="PolicyType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##any" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="PolicyId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:complexType>
The schema for specifying a label is:
The Policy and the PolicySet elements are used when specifying a policy for a message depending on whether a single policy or multiple policies are to be evaluated.
The Policy element is used to specify a single policy to the server along with any options that are defined for that policy. The Policy element contains:
The PolicySet element is used to specify a logical set of policies to be applied to the message. This element allows one to specify multiple policies along with a logic operation to combine them together.
In response to a send message request, the Plasma server returns a send message response message. The response messages uses the eps:PlasmaResponse XML structure. When the response message is created, the following should be noted:
<eps:PlasmaResponse> <xacml:Response> <xacml:Result> <xacml:Decision>Permit</xacml:Decision> </xacml:Result> </xacml:Response> <eps:CMSToken>234e34d3</eps:CMSToken> </eps:PlasmaResponse>
An example of a message returning the set of policy information is:
The schema use for returning a CMS token is:
<xs:element name="CMSToken" type="eps:CMSTokenResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="CMSTokenResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="CMSLockBox" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:complexType> <xs:simpleContent> <xs:extension base="xs:base64Binary"> <xs:attribute name="CMSType" type="xs:string"/> </xs:extension> </xs:simpleContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
This schema fragment extends the Plasma response token type and allows for the return of one or more base64 encoded RecipientInfo structures. The Plasma server can return recipient info information for any recipient that it pre-authorizes to receive the message (see Section ### of [I-D.freeman-plasma-requirements] for examples of when this would occur). Additionally the Plasma server can return a KEKRecipientInfo structure with the Plasma Other Key attribute. (For details see [I-D.schaad-plasma-cms].) In some extremely rare cases where the Plasma server can pre-authorize the entire set of recipients , the KEKRecipientInfo structure with the Plasma Other Key Attribute may not be included in the returned set of recipients. The recipient info structure for the plasma server SHOULD be placed last in the list of recipients infos.
The CMSTokenResponse type has the following:
It is possible to do a send message request for an XML rather than a CMS message structure. The send message request is built using the eps:PlasmaRequest XML structure. When building the request, the following applies:
In response to a send message request, the Plasma server returns a send message response message. The response messages uses the eps:PlasmaResponse XML structure. When the response message is created, the following should be noted:
<xs:element name="XMLToken" type="eps:XMLTokenResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="XMLTokenResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="XMLLockBox" maxOccurs="unbounded" type="xenc:EncryptedKeyType"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
When the receiving agent is ready to decrypt the email, it identifies that there is a KEKRecipientInfo object which contains a key attribute identified by id-keyatt-eps-token. It validates the signature, determines that communicating with the Plasma Service is within local policy, and then sends a request to the service to obtain the decryption key for the message.
In some cases the recipient of a message is not authorized to use the same set of labels for sending a message. For this purpose a token can be returned in the message along with the key so that recipient of the can reply to the message using the same set of security labels.
The client sends a request to the Plasma server that is identified in the token. For the CMS base tokens, the address of the Plasma server to use is defined in [I-D.schaad-plasma-cms] this is located in the aa-eps-url attribute.
The request uses the eps:PlasmaRequest XML structure. When building the request, the following should be noted:
<eps:PlasmaRequest> <eps:Authentication>...</eps:Authentication> <xacml:Request> <xacml:Attributes Category="...:action"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="..:action-id"> <xacml:AttributeValue>ParseCMSToken</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attribute Category="...:data"> <xacml:Attribute AttreibuteId="..:data-id"> <xacml:AttributeValue> Hex encoded CMS Token Value </xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Request> </eps:PlasmaRequest>
An example of a message returning the set of policy information is:
When used in an xacml:Attribute, the structure is identified by:
Category = "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data"
AttributeId = "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data:CMSToken"
DataType = "urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:plasma:1.0#CMSTokenResponseType
In response to a message key request, the Plasma server returns a decrypted key in the message key response. The response message uses the eps:Plasma XML structure. When a response message is create the following should be noted:
<eps:PlasmaResponse> <xacml:Response> <xacml:Result> <xacml:Decision>Permit</xacml:Decision> </xacml:Result> </xacml:Response> <eps:CMSKey> <eps:DisplayString>Label TExt</eps:DisplayString> <eps:KEK>hex based KEK</eps:KEK> </eps:CMSKey> </eps:PlasmaResponse>
An example of a message returning the set of policy information is:
The schema for returning the decrypted key is:
<xs:element name="CMSKey" type="eps:CMSKeyResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="CMSKeyResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="DisplayString" type="xs:string"/> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="CEK" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="CMSLockBox" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="XMLLockBox" type="enc:EncryptedKeyType"/> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element ref="eps:RoleToken" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Attributes" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
This schema extends the Plasma response token type and restricts the content to the listed elements. The values returned are:
The structure allows for additional key types to be defined in other schemas and returned in this structure as well. The set of allows lock boxes to be returned is restricted by the XML tag nd not the schema.
In this document a number of different XACML attributes have been defined, this section provides a more detailed description of these elements.
The channel binding data attribute is used to provide for a binding of the TLS session that is being used to transport the Plasma messages with the content of the Plasma requests themselves. There is a need for the server to be able to validate that the cryptographic operations related to holder of key statements be made specifically for the current conversation and not be left over from a previous one as a replay attack. By deriving a cryptographic value from the shared TLS session key and signing that value we are able to do so.
The channel binding value to be used is created by the TLS key exporter specification defined in RFC 5705 [RFC5705]. This allows for a new cryptographic value to be derived from the existing shared secret key with additional input to defined the context in which the key is being derived. When using the exporter, the label to be input into the key exporter is "EXPORTER_PLASMA". The value to be derived is 512 bits in length, and no context is provided to the exporter.
When used as an XACML attribute in a request:
The same value is used for both the XACML channel binding data attribute and the XM1L channel binding structure defined in Section 5.1.3.
In many cases a policy states that the client is required to sign the message before encrypting it. The server cannot verify that a signature is applied to the message and included, but we can require that a signature be supplied to the server. This signature can then be validated by the server (except for the message digest attribute value), and the server can take a hash of the value and return it as part of the key returned to a decrypting agent. This agent can then validate that the signature is a part of the message and complain if it absent. This means we do not have an enforcement mechanism, but we do have a way of performing an audit at a later time to see that the signature operation was carried out correctly.
By requiring that a signature be supplied to the server as part of the authentication process, the Plasma server can also be setup so that the supplied signature is automatically feed into archival operations. One way to do archiving is to use the data records defined in [RFC4998].
The following applies when this data value is present:
Policies sometimes require that specific algorithms be used in order to meet the security needs of the policy. This attribute allows for an S/MIME Capabilities to be carried in a DER encoded SMIMECapabilities ASN.1 structure to be transmitted to the client. Details on how the S/MIME Capabilities function can be found in [RFC5751].
The following attributes are to be set for the data value:
In order for Plasma Servers to do pre-authentication in the Email environment, it is necessary for the set of recipient addresses to be delivered to the Plasma Server. The Plasma Server cannot reliably determine the set of recipients from the policies set on the message as the set of recipients and the set of people authorized to view the message may not have a one-to-one correspondance. People may be authorized to see the content who are not recipients of the message or visa versa.
The content of the attribute is a space separated list of email addresses. Each address represents an Email recipient address that the client will be placing in one or more of the recipient fields in the message submission.
The following attributes are to be set for the data value:
Some policies require that the content encryption key be transported wrapped by another key rather than being sent in plain text. This data value allows for this state to be indicated by the Plasma Server to the Plasma Client, and for the client to provide the necessary key information to the server.
This data attribute is returned as a missing attribute under the circumstances where it is required by the policy and has not been provided the client. This is an indication that the content encryption key needs to be returned in a lock box rather than as plain text. The Plasma Server MAY ignore this data value if it is provided in a situation where the policy does not require that the content encryption key be returned in an encrypted form.
The following attributes are to be set for this data value:
The schema for the type LockboxKey is:
<xs:complexType name="LockboxKey"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="X509Certificate" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="PGPKey" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element ref="ds2:KeyInfo"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element name="Capabilities" type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
The fields of this structure are as follows:
Obligations and advice consist of actions that the Plasma server either requires or requests that the client PEP perform in order to gain access or before granting access to the data. These normally represent actions or restrictions that the PDP itself cannot enforce and thus are not input attributes to the policy evaluation. The same set of values can be used either as obligations or advice, the difference being that if the PEP cannot do an obligation it is required to change the policy decision.
Many policies require that a message be signed before it is encrypted and sent. Since the unencrypted version of message is not sent to the Plasma server, the policy cannot verify that a signature has been placed onto the signed message. The attribute is not for use as a returned obligation from an XACML decisions, rather it is for a pre-request obligations used in role responses (Section 7.2).
When used as an Obligation:
Occasionally a policy requires a specific set of encryption algorithms be used for a message, when this is the case then the encryption required obligation is included in the returned set of obligations. If the default set of encryption algorithms is sufficient then the obligation is omitted.
When used as an Obligation:
This obligation will be used in one of two situations:
When used as an Obligation:
We need to put in text to express the following items:
MUST NOT have the anyPolicy EKU set
Plasma messages are sent over a TCP connection using port TBD1 on the server. The client first setups up TLS on the connection, then sends the UTF8 encoded XML message over the TLS connection as an atomic message. The XML MUST be encoded as UTF8, however the Byte Order Mark (BOM) is sent. The response comes back on the same connection. The client is responsible for closing the TLS session and the TCP connection when either no more messages are to be sent to the server or a final indeterminate state has been reached.
If a Plasma server receives an XML request which is not well formed XML, the server if free to close the connection without first sending an error reply.
The Plasma server SHOULD support TLS resumption [RFC5077].
Plasma clients and server MUST support TLS 1.1 [RFC4346] and above. Implementations SHOULD NOT allow for the use of TLS 1.0 or SSL.
The scheme name for is "plasma".
The syntax for the plasma URI Schema is:
URI = "plasma" ":" "//" authority path-empty
Using the ABNF defined in [RFC3986]. When the port component is absent, then the value of TBD1 will be used. The userinfo portion of the authority MUST be absent.
This schema is defined to provide the location of a Plasma server. The sole operation is to establish a connection to the Plasma server over which the protocol defined in this document is to run.
To be supplied after we have a better idea of what the document looks like.
TBD
We define the following name spaces
New name space for the plasma documents urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma
A new registry is established for Plasma server action identifiers using the tag "actions". The full urn for the registry is "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:actions". This registry operates under a specification required policy. All entries in this registry require the following elements:
The registry will be initially populated with the following:
Action Id | Input Structure | Output Structure |
---|---|---|
GetRoleTokens | none | eps:RoleToken |
GetSendCMSToken | eps:GetCMSToken | eps:CMSLockBox |
ParseCMSToken | eps:CMSLockBox | eps:CMSKey |
GetReplyToken | none | eps:RoleToken |
When these actions are placed in an xacml:Request,
Define a new data name space urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data
Define a new name space for status codes at urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:status. The initial set of values is
Define a new name space for obligations. The same namespace will be used both for obligations and for advice and the values may appear in either section.
We define a schema in appendix A at urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:plasma:1.0:RFCTBD
Define a new Status Code for use in the Status URI field.
We request that IANA assign a new port for the use of this protocol.
Service name: plasma
Port Number: TBD1
Transport Protocol: TCP
Description: Plasma Service Protocol
Reference: This document
Assignee: iesg@ietf.org
Contact: chair@ietf.org
Notes: The protocol requires that TLS be used to communicate over this port. There is no provision for unsecure messages to be sent to this protocol.
List of Open Issues:
This appendix represents the entirety of the XML Schema for Plasma documents.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!-- edited with XMLSpy v2007 rel. 3 sp1 (http://www.altova.com) by James Schaad (exmsft) --> <xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" xmlns:wst="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust" xmlns:eps="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0" xmlns:ds2="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0" elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified"> <xs:annotation> <xs:documentation> The PlasmaRequest element is one of two top level elements defined by this XSD schema. The PlasmaRequest element is sent from the client to the server in order to </xs:documentation> </xs:annotation> <xs:element name="PlasmaRequest" type="eps:RequestType"/> <xs:complexType name="RequestType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="eps:Authentication" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Request"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:string" default="1.0"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="PlasmaResponse" type="eps:ResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="ResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="xacml:Response"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PlasmaReturnToken" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:string" default="1.0"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="PlasmaReturnToken" type="eps:PlasmaReturnTokenType"/> <xs:complexType name="PlasmaReturnTokenType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="DecisionId" type="xs:string"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="Authentication" type="eps:AuthenticationType"/> <xs:complexType name="AuthenticationType"> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element ref="saml:Assertion"/> <xs:element name="GSSAPI" type="xs:hexBinary"/> <xs:element name="RoleToken"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:element ref="ds2:Signature"/> <xs:element name="Other"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##other"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:choice> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="RoleToken" type="eps:RoleTokenType"/> <xs:complexType name="RoleTokenType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="FriendlyName" type="xs:string"/> <xs:element name="PDP" type="xs:anyURI" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="PolicyList"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Policy" type="eps:PolicyDescType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:element ref="eps:Policy"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PolicySet"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element ref="wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Obligations" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:AssociatedAdvice" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="PolicyDescType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="FriendlyName" type="xs:string"/> <xs:element name="Options" minOccurs="0"> <xs:complexType> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="xs:anyType"> <xs:attribute name="optionsType" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="PolicyId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="PolicySet" type="eps:PolicySetType"/> <xs:complexType name="PolicySetType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element ref="eps:Policy"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PolicySet"/> </xs:choice> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="PolicyCombiningAlgId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="Policy" type="eps:PolicyType"/> <xs:complexType name="PolicyType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:any namespace="##any" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="PolicyId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="GetCMSToken" type="eps:CMSTokenRequestType"/> <xs:complexType name="CMSTokenRequestType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice> <xs:element ref="eps:Policy"/> <xs:element ref="eps:PolicySet"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element name="Hash"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="ds2:DigestMethod"/> <xs:element ref="ds2:DigestValue" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:element name="LockBox" type="eps:LockBoxType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="CEK" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="LockBox" type="eps:LockBoxType"/> <xs:complexType name="LockBoxType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Subject" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:complexType> <xs:simpleContent> <xs:extension base="xs:anySimpleType"> <xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string" use="required"/> </xs:extension> </xs:simpleContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="CMSLockBox" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="XMLLockBox" type="xenc:EncryptedKeyType"/> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> </xs:choice> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="CMSKey" type="eps:CMSKeyResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="CMSKeyResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="DisplayString" type="xs:string"/> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="CEK" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="CMSLockBox" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="XMLLockBox" type="enc:EncryptedKeyType"/> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element ref="eps:RoleToken" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="xacml:Attributes" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="CMSToken" type="eps:CMSTokenResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="CMSTokenResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="CMSLockBox" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:complexType> <xs:simpleContent> <xs:extension base="xs:base64Binary"> <xs:attribute name="CMSType" type="xs:string"/> </xs:extension> </xs:simpleContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="LockboxKey"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="X509Certificate" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="PGPKey" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element ref="ds2:KeyInfo"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element name="Capabilities" type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="XMLToken" type="eps:XMLTokenResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="XMLTokenResponseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="XMLLockBox" maxOccurs="unbounded" type="xenc:EncryptedKeyType"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:schema>
This section provides an example of a request message to obtain the set of roles for an individual named 'bart@simpsons.com'. The authentication provided in this is a SAML statement included in the SAML_Collection element.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <PlasmaRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:schema:plasma:1.0" xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:schema:plasma:1.0 C:\ietf\drafts\Schema\Plasma.xsd" > <Authentication> <WS-Token>123456</WS-Token> <!-- <saml:Assertion>....</saml:Assertion> --> </Authentication> <xacml:Request CombinedDecision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false"> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xaml:3.0:attribute-catagory:action"> <xacml:Attribute IncludeInResult="false" AttributeId="urn:plasma:action-id"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">GetRoleTokens</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:environment"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:plasma:data:channel" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#base64Binary">ABCDEFGH</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> </xacml:Request> </PlasmaRequest>
This section provides an example response to a successful request for a role sets.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <eps:PlasmaResponse xmlns:eps="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0"> <xacml:Response xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"> <xacml:Result> <xacml:Decision>Permit</xacml:Decision> </xacml:Result> </xacml:Response> <eps:PlasmaReturnToken> <eps:RoleToken> <eps:FriendlyName>Role #1</eps:FriendlyName> <eps:PDP>plasma://localhost:8080</eps:PDP> <eps:PolicyList> <eps:Policy PolicyId="urn:example:PlasmaPolicies:Policy1"> <eps:FriendlyName>Schaad Policy 1</eps:FriendlyName> </eps:Policy> </eps:PolicyList> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse xmlns:wst="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust"> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <ex:MyToken xmlns:ex="http://example.com/SecurityToken">MCgMCzxDb250ZXh0IC8+AgEBMBYYFDEvMTAvMjAxMyA0OjIyOjAwIEFN</ex:MyToken> </wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wst:Lifetime> <wsu:Expires xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd">2013-01-10T04:22:00</wsu:Expires> </wst:Lifetime> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> <Obligations xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"> <Obligation ObligationId="Obligation-Fred" /> </Obligations> </eps:RoleToken> </eps:PlasmaReturnToken> <eps:PlasmaReturnToken> <eps:RoleToken> <eps:FriendlyName>Plasma Basic Policy</eps:FriendlyName> <eps:PDP>plasma://localhost:8080</eps:PDP> <eps:PolicyList> <eps:Policy PolicyId="urn:ietf:ns:plasma:policy:basic"> <eps:FriendlyName>Plasma Basic Policy</eps:FriendlyName> </eps:Policy> <eps:Policy PolicyId="urn:example:PlasmaPolicies:Policy1"> <eps:FriendlyName>Schaad Policy 1</eps:FriendlyName> </eps:Policy> </eps:PolicyList> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse xmlns:wst="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust"> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <ex:MyToken xmlns:ex="http://example.com/SecurityToken">MCgMCzxDb250ZXh0IC8+AgEBMBYYFDEvMTAvMjAxMyA0OjIyOjAwIEFN</ex:MyToken> </wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wst:Lifetime> <wsu:Expires xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd">2013-01-10T04:22:00</wsu:Expires> </wst:Lifetime> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> </eps:RoleToken> </eps:PlasmaReturnToken> </eps:PlasmaResponse>
In this example a role is returned that has two different policies that can be used by that role. Along with the role token, a binary secret is returned that is to be used in proving that the same entity is returning to use the roles.
This section contains an example of a request from a client to a server for a CMS message token to be issued. The authentication for the request is provided by using a WS-Trust token previously issued as part of a role request/response dialog. The request contains the following elements:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <eps:PlasmaRequest xmlns:eps="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0"> <eps:Authentication> <eps:RoleToken> <ex:MyToken xmlns:ex="http://example.com/SecurityToken">MCgMCzxDb250ZXh0IC8+AgEBMBYYFDEvMTAvMjAxMyAxOjI3OjEyIEFN</ex:MyToken> </eps:RoleToken> </eps:Authentication> <xacml:Request CombinedDecision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false" id="XACMLRequest" xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:params:actions" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">GetCMSToken</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:environment"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data:channel" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#base64Binary">tls-unique</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:params:data"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:params:data:CMSTokenRequest" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0#CMSTokenRequestType"> <eps:GetCMSToken> <eps:PolicySet PolicyCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:policy-combining-algorithm:permit-overrides"> <eps:Policy PolicyId="urn:example:PlasmaPolicies:Policy1" /> </eps:PolicySet> <eps:Hash> <ds2:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256" xmlns:ds2="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" /> <ds2:DigestValue xmlns:ds2="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">AQIDBAUGBwgJCg==</ds2:DigestValue> </eps:Hash> <eps:CEK>0102030405060708090A</eps:CEK> </eps:GetCMSToken> </xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> </xacml:Request> </eps:PlasmaRequest>
This section contains an example of a response from a server to a client for a CMS message token to be issued. The token is returned in the CMSToken element. This element would then be placed into the CMS message being created by the client.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <eps:PlasmaResponse xmlns:eps="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0"> <xacml:Response xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"> <xacml:Result> <xacml:Decision>Permit</xacml:Decision> </xacml:Result> </xacml:Response> <eps:PlasmaReturnToken> <eps:CMSLockbox>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</eps:CMSLockbox> </eps:PlasmaReturnToken> </eps:PlasmaResponse>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <eps:PlasmaRequest xmlns:eps="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0"> <eps:Authentication> <eps:RoleToken> <ex:MyToken xmlns:ex="http://example.com/SecurityToken">MCgMCzxDb250ZXh0IC8+AgEBMBYYFDEvMTAvMjAxMyAxOjI3OjEyIEFN</ex:MyToken> </eps:RoleToken> </eps:Authentication> <xacml:Request CombinedDecision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false" xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:params:actions" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">GetCMSKey</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:environment"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:plasma:data:channel" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#base64Binary">tls-unique</xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> <xacml:Attributes Category="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:params:data"> <xacml:Attribute AttributeId="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:params:data:CMSKeyRequest" IncludeInResult="false"> <xacml:AttributeValue DataType="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0#CMSLockbox"> <eps:CMSLockbox>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</eps:CMSLockbox> </xacml:AttributeValue> </xacml:Attribute> </xacml:Attributes> </xacml:Request> </eps:PlasmaRequest>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <eps:PlasmaResponse xmlns:eps="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0"> <xacml:Response xmlns:xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"> <xacml:Result> <xacml:Decision>Permit</xacml:Decision> </xacml:Result> </xacml:Response> <eps:PlasmaReturnToken> <CMSKey:eps xmlns:CMSKey="urn:ietf:params:ns:plasma:1.0"> <eps:DisplayString>Schaad Policy 1</eps:DisplayString> <eps:CEK>AQIDBAUGBwgJCg==</eps:CEK> </CMSKey:eps> </eps:PlasmaReturnToken> </eps:PlasmaResponse>
NOTE: RFC Editor please remove this section prior to publication. This section exists as a note to the author to make sure that it can be done. It will be published as a separate document if desired.
One of the issues in doing multiple requests in a single message is the issue of correlation between the request and the results. We have make this issue even worse by the fact that we are return results that are not input attributes for the decision and that we are not returning as attributes of the decision.
The best way to deal with this is by putting tags into the request and reflect them in the return values for the response. The only place that this does not work is for the GSS-API response token as this element would normally be part of the response of multiple requests. You want to finish that authentication step before issuing final decisions if the input is needed as part of that decision.
With this in mind what we do is the following:
We could probably relax the restrictions if we know that the token can only be returned by one request, however using the token to correlate the request and the decision is still probably desired so that those values can be correlated.