| secevent | M. Scurtescu |
| Internet-Draft | |
| Intended status: Informational | June 29, 2017 |
| Expires: December 31, 2017 |
Security Events RISC Use Cases
draft-scurtescu-secevent-risc-use-cases-00
This document describes the RISC use cases for security events and helps with defining the requirements for token format and event distribution.
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Simplest use case, IdPs send security events to relevant RPs.
RP can make control plane calls to the IdP and can authenticate with access tokens issued by IdP.
The RP can also send RISC events back to IdP. We want to make it very easy for the RP to do that, no complicated registration steps and crypto of possible.
IdP can document well-known endpoint for data plane (where it receives events). RP can use access token when sending events on data plane and maybe does not need to sign SETs.
If RP is sophisticated and is exposing its own control plane then during RP stream registration with IdP (either manual or programmatic) it can advertise its own issuer and that issuer through .well-known can specify full transmitter functionality of RP.
Example: Google and Amazon, Amazon account can be backed by gmail address. Amazon acts as implicit RP to Google in this case.
Google and Amazon need legal agreement, When Amazon account is created or updated with gmail address Amazon makes REST call to Google to enroll this new email address for RISC events. If enrollment succeeds then RISC events will flow bidirectionally (see next section, for simplicity only unidirectional is considered in this section).
Assumption: Amazon/RP is registered with Google/IdP as an OAuth 2 client and can use access tokens for control plane.
Open question: what are the implications of unverified email addresses?
Open question: discovery of hosted domains, how does Google know that example.com is managed by Oracle and that subject enrollment should be sent to them?
No enrollent call is strictly necessary. The RP can start sending events to IdP as new identifiers show up.
Common email address or phone number used by two different RPs.
Example: Amazon and PayPal, both Amazon and PayPal each have an account with the same gmail address.
Mutual discovery by exchanging email address hashes.
Open question: legal and privacy implications
Example: Google Firebear, IdaaS manages large number of RPs and implements RP functionality on their behalf.
IdaaS should be able to manage SET distribution configuration for its RPs with a given IdP using the credentials already established between the RP and the IdP. Control plane operation to create/update stream allows that.
Assumption: IdaaS can impersonate RP at IdP (can obtain access token on behalf of RP)
Similar to IdaaS described in previous estion, but the service provider has its own set of credentials different from the credentials and RP is using. The SP cannot impersonate the RP at IdP. The IdP must define delegation rules and allow the SP to make requests on behalf of the RP.
The RP (receiver) is behind a firewall and cannot be reached through HTTP. The only way to deliver events is if the RP periodically polls an endpoint provided by the transmitter.