| Internet Engineering Task Force | H. Stenn |
| Internet-Draft | Network Time Foundation |
| Intended status: Standards Track | March 14, 2016 |
| Expires: September 15, 2016 |
Network Time Protocol IPv6 REFID Hash
draft-stenn-ntp-ipv6-refid-hash-00
RFC 5905 [RFC5905], section 7.3, "Packet Header Variables", defines the value to be used as the REFID for network associations. For IPv4 associations the IPv4 address is used, and for IPv6 associations four octets of the MD5 hash of the IPv6 are used. Often, the REFID is simplistically and incorrectly used to identify upstream servers. While this works in an IPv4 network, it doesn't work for IPv6 associations and may have other problems in an environment with mixed use of IPv4 and IPv6. Specifically, the NTP Project has received a report where the generated IPv6 hash decoded to the IPv4 address of a different machine on the system peer's network.
This proposal offers a way for a system to generate a REFID for a system peer that communicates over IPv6 that does not conflict with a valid IPv4-based REFID.
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RFC 5905 [RFC5905], section 7.3, "Packet Header Variables", defines the value to be used as the REFID for network associations. It says:
Often, the REFID is simplistically and incorrectly used to identify upstream servers. While this works in an IPv4 network, it doesn't work for IPv6 associations and may have other problems in an environment with mixed use of IPv4 and IPv6. Specifically, the NTP Project has received a report where the generated IPv6 hash decoded to the IPv4 address of a different machine on the system peer's network.
This proposal offers a way for a system to generate a REFID for a system peer that communicates over IPv6 that does not conflict with a valid IPv4-based REFID.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
When generating a REFID based on a network system peer, the NTPv4 specification says:
This means that the IPv4 representation of the IPv6 hash would be: b1.b2.b3.b4 . The proposal is that the system MAY also use 255.b2.b3.b4 as its REFID.
When using the REFID to check for a timing loop for an IPv6 association, if the code that checks the first four-octets of the hash fails to match then the code must check again, using 0xFF as the first octet of the hash.
There is a 1 in 16,777,216 chance that the REFID hashes of two IPv6 addresses will be identical, producing a false-positive loop detection. With a sufficient number of servers, the risk of this problem becomes a non-issue. The use of the "REFID Suggestion" extension field is also a way to mitigate this potential situation.
Unrealistically, if only two instances of NTP are communicating via IPv6 and one side implements this new IPv4 REFID hash and the other side does not, the "other side" will not be able to detect this loop condition. In this case, the two machines will slowly increase their Stratum until they reach S16 and become unsynchronized. This situation is considered to be unrealistic because the only current way this could happen would be for there to only be these two instances of NTP available as time sources in a misconfigured "orphan mode" setup. There is no risk of this happening in an NTP network with 3 or more time sources, or in a properly-configured "time island" setup.
Should we ask IANA to allocate a pseudo Extension Field Type of 0xFFFF (for example) so the proposed "I-Do" exchange can report whether or not the "IPv6 REFID Hash" is supported?
The author wishes to acknowledge Dan Mahoney (and perhaps others) for suggesting the idea of using an "impossible" first-octet value to indicate an IPv6 refid hash. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Joey Saccadonuts.
This memo makes no requests of IANA.
Additional information TBD
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC5905] | Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J. and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010. |