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This document describes mechanisms for linear protection of Multi-Protocol Label Switching Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) Label Switched Paths (LSP) and Pseudowires (PW) on multiple layers. Linear protection provides a fast and simple protection switching mechanism that is especially optimized for a mesh topology. It provides a clear indication of the protection status. The mechanisms are described both at the architectural level as well as providing a protocol that is used to control and coordinate the protection switching.
1.
Introduction
1.1.
Contributing authors
2.
Conventions used in this document
2.1.
Acronyms
2.2.
Definitions and Terminology
3.
Network objectives
4.
Protection architectures
4.1.
1+1 Protection architecture
4.2.
1:1 Protection architecture
4.3.
Protection of P2MP networks
4.4.
Extension to 1:n protection
4.5.
Revertive and non-revertive switching
5.
Protection switching logic
5.1.
Protection switching trigger mechanisms
5.2.
Hold-off timer
5.3.
Protection switching control logical architecture
5.3.1.
PSC Status Module
6.
Protection switching coordination (PSC) protocol
6.1.
Protocol format
6.1.1.
PSC Requests
6.1.2.
Path Fault Identifier
6.1.3.
Active path indicator
6.1.4.
Current Protection Type
6.2.
Addressing of PSC requests
6.3.
Principles of Operation
6.3.1.
PSC States
6.3.2.
Failure or Degraded condition (Working path)
6.3.3.
Lockout of Protection
6.3.4.
Failure or Degraded condition (Recovery path)
6.3.5.
Operator Controlled Switching
6.3.6.
Recovery from switching
7.
IANA Considerations
8.
Security Considerations
9.
Acknowledgements
10.
References
10.1.
Normative References
10.2.
Informative References
§
Authors' Addresses
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As noted in the architecture for Multi-Protocol Label Switching Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) [7] (Bocci, M., Bryant, S., and L. Levrau, “A Framework for MPLS in Transport Networks,” July 2009.), the overall architecture framework for MPLS-TP is based on a profile of the MPLS and Pseudowire (PW) procedures as specified for the MPLS and (MS-)PW architectures defined in RFC 3031 [3] (Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon, “Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture,” Jan 2001.), RFC 3985 [5] (Bryant, S. and P. Pate, “Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3) Architecture,” March 2005.) and [6] (Nadeau, T. and C. Pignataro, “Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV): A Control Channel for Pseudowires,” December 2007.). One of the basic survivability functions, pointed out by the Survivability Framework document [11] (Sprecher, N., Farrel, A., and H. Shah, “Multi-protocol Label Switching Transport Profile Survivability Framework,” Feb 2009.), is that of simple and rapid protection switching mechanisms for Label Switched Paths (LSP) and Pseudo-wires (PW).
Protection switching is a fully allocated survivability mechanism. It is fully allocated in the sense that the route and bandwidth of the recovery path is reserved for a selected working path. It provides a fast and simple survivability mechanism, that allows the network operator to easily grasp the active state of the network, compared to other survivability mechanisms.
This draft proposes an architecture and protocol to provide protection for the different types of point-to-point (p2p) paths supported by MPLS-TP. These include LSP, PW, Path Segment Tunnels (PST), and Tandem Connections (TC). For unidirectional protection switching a 1+1 architecture is described. For bidirectional switching both a 1+1 and a 1:1 architecture are described.
In 1+1 unidirectional architecture, a recovery transport path is dedicated to each working transport path. Normal traffic is bridged and fed to both the working and the recovery transport entities by a permanent bridge at the source of the protection domain. The sink of the protection domain selects which of the working or recovery entities to receive the traffic from, based on a predetermined criteria, e.g. server defect indication. When used for bidirectional switching the 1+1 protection architecture must also support a Protection Switching Coordination (PSC) protocol. This protocol is used to help synchronize the decisions of both ends of the protection domain in selecting the proper traffic flow.
In the 1:1 architecture, a recovery transport path is dedicated to the working transport path. However, the normal traffic is transmitted only once, on either the working or the recovery path, by using a selector bridge at the source of the protection domain. A selector at the sink of the protection domain then selects the path that carries the normal traffic. Since the source and sink need to be coordinated to ensure that the selector bridge at both ends select the same path, this architecture must support the PSC protocol.
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Hao Long (Huawei)
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [1] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
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This draft uses the following acronyms:
DNR | Do not revert |
FS | Forced Switch |
GACH | Generic Associated Channel Header |
LSR | Label Switching relay |
MPLS-TP | Transport Profile for MPLS |
MS | Manual Switch |
P2P | Point-to-point |
P2MP | Point-to-multipoint |
PDU | Packet Data Unit |
PSC | Protection Switching Coordination Protocol |
PST | Path Segment Tunnel |
SD | Signal Degrade |
SF | Signal Fail |
SLA | Service Level Agreement |
WTR | Wait-to-Restore |
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Protection domain: Transport path (e.g. LSP, PW, PST, TC) that provides protection for its normal traffic. The protection domain consists of the following elements – Two end points (East and West) that in each direction one acts as the source and the other as the sink, a working path, and a recovery path.
Recovery path: A transport path dedicated to transport normal user traffic in case of a failure of the Working path.
Working path: A transport path used for transport of normal user traffic, under normal conditions.
The terminology used in this document is based on the terminology defined in [10] (Mannie, E. and D. Papadimitriou, “Recovery Terminology for Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching,” Mar 2006.). In addition, we use the term LSR to refer to a MPLS-TP Network Element, whether it is a LSR, LER, T-PE, or S-PE.
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Linear protection for MPLS-TP should comply with the following network objectives:
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The protection mechanism defined here supports transport paths (as defined in [2] (Niven-Jenkins, B., Brungard, D., Betts, M., Sprecher, N., and S. Ueno, “Requirements for the Trasport Profile of MPLS,” June 2009.)') within a mesh-based network. This includes support for unidirectional, both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint, and bidirectional point-to-point paths. This protection may be supported by different protection architectures as described in the following subsections.
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The 1+1 protection architecture provides for a fully dedicated recovery path in addition to the configured working path. Both the recovery and working path MUST support the full SLA requirements for the traffic between the two end points of the protection domain.
In this architecture (see Figure 1 (1+1 Unidirectional protection architecture)), all traffic from LSR A to LSR Z is bridged, using the permanent bridge at LSR A, to both transport entities, and LSR Z employs a selector bridge to receive the data from the working path, discarding the packets from the recovery path.
In case of a condition, e.g. a failure condition or an operator command, where protection switching is indicated, LSR Z SHOULD select the data packets from the recovery path and discard any data packets from the working path.
It should be further noted that OAM packets for monitoring the protection domain, or control plane packets, may be transmitted on the "non-active" transport path. These packets SHALL NOT be discarded.
|-------------Protection Domain-----------------| ============================== /**********Working path************\ +--------+ ============================== +--------+ | LSR /| |\ LSR | | A {< | | >} Z | | PB \| | SB | +--------+ ============================== +--------+ \***********Recovery path***********/ ============================== PB: Permanent Bridge SB: Selector Bridge
Figure 1: 1+1 Unidirectional protection architecture |
When using the 1+1 architecture for bidirectional switching, each of the end-points would have both a permanent bridge and a selector bridge one for each direction.
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Another option to protect a bidirectional connection is a 1:1 architecture. This architecture provides for a fully allocated recovery transport path in addition to the working transport path used for normal user data. In principle, this recovery path MUST support the full capacity and bandwidth of the SLA but may be degraded from the normal working path.
In this architecture both ends of the protection domain employ a Selector bridge (SB) that selects the transport path to transmit the data packets over. Under normal conditions the SB selects the working path for transmission of the data packets. When a condition that triggers protection switching is active, the SB at either end need to select the recovery path for data transmission.
|-------------Protection Domain-----------------| ============================== /**********Working path***********\ +--------+ ============================== +--------+ | LSR /| |\ LSR | | A {< | | >} Z | | SB | | SB | +--------+ ============================== +--------+ Recovery path ============================== SB: Selector Bridge
Figure 2: 1:1 Bidirectional protection architecture using working path |
In principle, the recovery path could be used for "extra traffic", i.e. preemptible traffic. However, if protection switching is in force then this traffic SHALL be pre-empted by the protected data that is being transmitted on this path. In any case, the recovery path MUST support OAM and protection coordination traffic (see section 6).
This architecture requires communication between the end-points of the protection domain to coordinate the protection state. In general bidirectional protection switching requires coordination between the end-points and verification that both transmission directions remain on a co-routed bidirectional path.
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[2] (Niven-Jenkins, B., Brungard, D., Betts, M., Sprecher, N., and S. Ueno, “Requirements for the Trasport Profile of MPLS,” June 2009.) specifies that all P2MP MPLS-TP connections are unidirectional by nature. It further requires that these connections should be supported by both 1+1 and 1:1 protection architectures.
When protecting a P2MP network using a 1+1 protection architecture, the basic protection mechanism is still relevant. The root LSR will bridge the user traffic (using a permanent bridge) to both the working and recovery transport entities. Each leaf LSR will select the traffic from one transport path according to its own local triggers. This may lead to a situation where, due to a failure condition on one branch of the network, that some leaf LSRs may select the working transport path, while other leaf LSRs may select traffic from the recovery transport path.
When protecting a P2MP network using 1:1 protection architecture, there is a need for the root LSR to identify the existence of a failure condition on any of the branches of the network.
Editor's note: This requires the use of tools from the OAM toolset [9] (Vigoureux, M., Betts, M., and D. Ward, “Requirements for OAM in MPLS Transport Networks,” April 2009.), and also a return path that can pass the indication back to the root LSR. This protection architecture, in the P2MP case, also requires that each leaf LSR selects the traffic from the same incoming transport entity that was selected by the root LSR. When protection switching is triggered, the root LSR selects the recovery transport path to transfer the traffic and each leaf LSR needs to select this same transmission. Endof Editor's note!!
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This is for further study
Editor's note: definition of 1:n protection should be that there is one recovery path that is given a different label relative to each working path that is being protected. When any one of the working paths indicates a failure, then the traffic is redirected to the recovery path, using the dedicated recovery label. When more than one working path reports a failure, then the path with the highest priority will have its traffic redirected to the recovery path and traffic from other paths will not be protected. It should be noted further that 1:n protection cannot be supported using a single phase protocol, since the coordination of which is the highest priority path and notification to other paths needs acknowledgement, i.e. at least a second phase.
There is a suggestion to have a separate draft for the extension to 1:n protection, that would include a definition to the two-phased protocol. This draft should only prepare the groundwork of the protocol so as not to preclude the 1:n protection.
This is still under discussion. End of Editor's note
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In revertive operation, the normal traffic signal is restored to the working transport path after the condition that triggered the switching has cleared. When a manual operator command (e.g. Forced Switch) has cleared, then the reversion happens immediately. When a failure or degradation of service has cleared, the reversion may be delayed until the expiry of a Wait-to-restore timer, used to neutralize the effect of intermittent defects.
In non-revertive mode of operation, the normal traffic continues to use the recovery transport path, even after the condition that triggered has cleared. Eventually, the network may be reverted to use the working transport path, by using an explicit operator command (see section 6.3.5).
The 1+1 protection architecture is often provisioned to operate as non-revertive, since the recovery transport path is fully dedicated in any case and continuing to select it on the sink avoids a second disturbance to the traffic. There may, however, be certain operator policies that dictate provisioning revertive operation for 1+1 protection.
The 1:1 protection architecture is often provisioned to operate in revertive mode. This takes advantage of the (typically) more optimized working transport path, even at the cost of the additional disturbance to traffic from the additional switch.
The configuration of revertive or non-revertive operation SHOULD be the same at both ends of the protection domain.
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The protection switching should be initiated in reaction to any of the following triggers:
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In order to coordinate timing of protection switches at multiple layers, a hold-off timer may be required. Its purpose is to allow, for example, a server layer protection switch to have a chance to fix the problem before switching at a client layer.
Each protection group should have a provisionable holdoff timer. The suggested range of the holdoff timer is 0 to 10 seconds in steps of 100 ms with an accuracy within 5 ms. The default duration for the holdoff timer is 0 seconds.
When a failure condition is detected, this will not immediately activate protection switching if the provisioned hold-off timer value is non-zero. Rather, the hold-off timer will be started. When the hold-off timer expires, we check if a failure condition is still present. If there is still a failure condition, then the protection switching is activated, regardless if it is the same failure condition that caused the activation the hold-off timer.
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Protection switching processes the triggers described above together with the inputs received from the far-end LSR. These inputs cause the LSR to take certain actions, e.g. switching the Selector Bridge to select the working or recovery path, and to transmit different protocol messages.
+-------------+ Operator Command Local PSC +-----------+ | External |-----------------+ +-----------------| PSC Status| | Interface | | | request +---| Module | +-------------+ | | | +-----------+ V V V Prot. Stat. ^ +----------+ Local OAM +---------------+Highest +------------+ | | OAM |----------->| Local Request |------->| PSC Mess. | | | Module | request | logic |local R.| Generator | | +----------+ +------->+---------------+ +------------+ | +----------+ | | | | | Svr/CP |---+ Highest local|request | | +----------+ V V | +-------------+ +-----------------+ PSC Message | | Remote Req. | Remote PSC | global Request | | | Receiver |------------>| logic | | +-------------+ Request +-----------------+ | ^ | | | Highest global request| | | V | | +-----------------+ PSC status | Remote PSC message | PSC Process |-----------------+ | logic |--------> Action | | +-----------------+
Figure 3: Protection switching control logic |
Figure 3 (Protection switching control logic) describes the logical architecture of the protection switching control. The Local Request logic unit accepts the triggers from the OAM, external operator commands, and from the local control plane (when present) and determines the highest priority request. This high-priority request is passed to both the PSC Message generator, that will generate the appropriate protocol message to be sent to the far-end LSR, and the Global Request logic, that will cross-check this local request with the information received from the far-LSR. The Global Request logic then processes these two PSC requests that determines the highest priority request that is passed to the PSC Process logic. The PSC Process logic uses this input to determine what actions need to be taken, e.g. switching the Selector Bridge, and the current status of the protection domain.
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The PSC Control Logic must retain the status of the protection domain. The possible different states indicate the current status of the protection environment, and can be in one of three states:
This state may affect the actions taken by the control logic, and therefore, the PSC Status Module transfers the current status to the Local Request Logic.
See section 6.3.1 for details on what actions are affected by the PSC state.
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Bidirectional protection switching requires coordination between the two end-points in determining which of the two possible paths, the working or recovery path, is operational in any given situation. When protection switching is triggered as described in section 5.1, the end-points must inform each other of the switch-over from one path to the other in a coordinated fashion.
There are different possibilities for the type of coordinating protocol. One possibility is a two-phased coordination in which the MEP that is initiating the protection switching sends a protocol message indicating the switch but the actual switch-over is performed only after receiving an 'Ack' from the far-end MEP. The other possibility is a single-phased coordination, in which the initiating MEP switches over to the alternate path and informs the far-end of the switch, and the far-end must complete the switch-over.
In the following sub-sections we describe the protocol messages that should be used between the two end-points of the protection domain.
For the sake of simplicity of the protocol, this protocol is based on the single-phase approach described above.
The protocol messages SHOULD be transmitted over the recovery path only. This allows the transmission of the messages without affecting the normal traffic in the most prevalent case, i.e. the normal state. In addition, limiting the transmission to a single path avoids possible conflicts and race conditions that could develop if the PSC messages were sent on both paths.
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The protocol messages SHALL be sent over the GACH as described in [8] (Vigoureux,, M., Bocci, M., Swallow, G., Aggarwal, R., and D. Ward, “MPLS Generic Associated Channel,” May 2009.). There is a single channel type for the set of PSC messages, each message will be identified by the first field of the ACH payload as described below. PSC messages SHOULD support addressing by use of the method described in [8] (Vigoureux,, M., Bocci, M., Swallow, G., Aggarwal, R., and D. Ward, “MPLS Generic Associated Channel,” May 2009.). The following figure shows the format for the full PSC message.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| MPLS-TP PSC Channel Code | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ACH TLV Header | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | + Addressing TLV + : ... : +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ PSC Control Packet ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Format of PSC packet with a GACH header |
Where:
Editor's note: There is a suggestion that this format should be aligned with the format used by G.8031/G.8131/Y.1731 in ITU. The argument being that this would make it easier to pass review from ITU and allow easier transfer of technology.
The counter-argument is that the ITU format is based upon an attempt to find a common format for different functionality and therefore involves different fields that are not necessary for the protection switching. Defining a new dedicated format would make for a simpler and more intuitive protocol. End of editor's note.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |Ver|Request|Typ| FPath | Path | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Format of the PSC control packet |
Where:
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The Protection Switching Coordination (PSC) protocol SHALL support the following request types, in order of priority from highest to lowest:
See section 6.3 for a description of the operation of the different requests.
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The Fpath field of the PSC control SHALL be used only in a Signal fault (0101) or Signal degrade (0100) control packet. Its value indicates on which path the signal anomaly was detected. The following are the possible values:
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The Path field of the PSC control SHALL be used to indicate which path the source MEP is currently using for data transmission. The MEP should compare the value of this bit with the path that is locally selected for data transmission to verify that there is no inconsistency between the two end-points of the protected domain. If an inconsistency is detected then an alarm should be raised. The following are the possible values:
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The Typ field indicates the currently configured protection architecture type, this should be validated to be consistent for both ends of the protected domain. If an inconsistency is detected then an alarm should be raised. The following are the possible values:
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The PSC request should include the following addressing information, in ACH-TLV fields (as described in [8] (Vigoureux,, M., Bocci, M., Swallow, G., Aggarwal, R., and D. Ward, “MPLS Generic Associated Channel,” May 2009.)):
The format for the TLV fields are as specified in [8] (Vigoureux,, M., Bocci, M., Swallow, G., Aggarwal, R., and D. Ward, “MPLS Generic Associated Channel,” May 2009.).
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In all of the following sub-sections, assume a protected domain between LSR-A and LSR-Z, using paths W (working) and R (recovery).
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When the protected domain has no special condition in effect, the ingress LSR SHOULD forward the user data along the working path, and, in the case of 1+1 protection, the Permanent Bridge will bridge the data to the recovery path as well. The receiving LSR SHOULD read the data from the working path.
The ingress LSR MAY transmit a No Request PSC packet with the Path field set to 0 for the recovery path.
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When the protection mechanism has been triggered and the protected domain has performed a protection switch, the domain is in the protecting state. In this state the normal traffic is transmitted and received on the recovery path.
If the protection domain is currently in a protecting state, then the LSRs SHOULD NOT accept a Manual Switch request.
If the protection domain is currently in a protecting state, and a Forced Switch is requested then the normal traffic SHALL continue to be transmitted on the recovery path even if the original protection trigger is cleared.
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When the recovery path is unavailable – either as a result of a Lockout operator command (see section 6.3.3), or as a result of a SF or SD detected on the recovery path (see section 6.3.4) – then the protection domain is in the unavailable state. In this state, the normal traffic is transmitted and received on the working path.
While in unavailable state any event that would trigger a protection switching SHOULD be ignored with the following exception – If a Signal Degrade request is received, then protection switching will be activated only if the recovery path can guarantee a better signal than the working path.
The protection domain will exit the unavailable state and revert to the normal state when, either the operator clears the Lockout command or the recovery path recovers from the signal fault or degraded situation. Both ends will resume sending the PCS packets over the recovery path, as a result of this recovery.
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If one of the LSRs (for example, LSR-A) detects a failure condition or a serious degradation condition on the working path that warrants invoking protection switching, then it SHOULD take the following actions:
When the far-end LSR (in this example LSR-Z) receives the PCS packet informing it that other LSR (LSR-A) has switched, it SHOULD perform the following actions:
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If one of the LSRs (for example, LSR-A) receives a management command indicating that the protection is disabled, then it SHOULD indicate this to the far-end LSR (for example, LSR-Z) that it is not possible to use the recovery path. The following actions MUST be taken:
Transmit a PCS control packet, using GACH, with the Request code set to Lockout of protection (1010), the Fpath set to 0, and the Path set to 0.
All normal traffic packets should be transmitted on the working path only.
Verify that the far-end LSR (for example LSR-Z) is forwarding the data packets on the working path. Raise alarm in case of mismatch.
The PSC control logic should go into Unavailable state.
When the far-end LSR (in this example LSR-Z) receives the PCS packet informing it that other LSR (LSR-A) has switched, it SHOULD perform the following actions:
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If one of the LSRs (for example, LSR-A) detects a failure condition or a serious degradation condition on the recovery path, then it SHOULD take the following actions:
When the far-end LSR (in this example LSR-Z) receives the PCS packet informing it that other LSR (LSR-A) has become Unavailable, it SHOULD perform the following actions:
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If the management system indicated to one of the LSRs (for example LSR-A) that a switch is necessary, e.g. either a Forced Switch or a Manual Switch, then the LSR SHOULD switch the traffic to the recovery path and perform the following actions:
When the far-end LSR (in this example LSR-Z) receives the PCS packet informing it that other LSR (LSR-A) has switched, it SHOULD perform the following actions:
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The operator may clear the switching condition by issuing a Clear request. This command will cause immediate recovery from the switch that was initiated by any of the previous operator commands, i.e. Forced Switch or Manual Switch. In addition, a Clear command after a Lockout Protection command should clear the Unavailable state and return the protection domain to the normal state.
If the Clear request is issued in the absence of a Manual Switch, Forced Switch, or Lockout protection, then it SHALL be ignored. In the presence of any of these commands, the Clear request SHALL clear the state affected by the operator command.
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When the condition that triggered the protection switching clears, e.g. the cause of the failure condition has been corrected, the operator clears a Manual Switch, then the protection domain SHOULD follow the following procedures:
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In revertive mode, in order to prevent frequent activation of protection switching due to an intermittent defect, the working transport path must become stable and fault-free before reverting to the normal condition. In order to verify that this is the case a fixed period of time must elapse before the normal traffic uses the working transport path. This period, called the WTR period, should be configurable by the operator in 1-minute intervals within the range 1-12 minutes. The default value is 5 minutes.
During this period, if a failure condition is detected on the working transport path, then the WTR timer is stopped and the normal traffic SHALL continue to be transported over the recovery transport path. If the WTR timer expires without being pre-empted by a failure, then the traffic SHOULD be returned to use the working transport path (as above).
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This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.
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This document does not by itself raise any particular security considerations.
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The authors would like to thank all members of the teams (the Joint Working Team, the MPLS Interoperability Design Team in IETF and the T-MPLS Ad Hoc Group in ITU-T) involved in the definition and specification of MPLS Transport Profile.
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[1] | Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 792, March 1997. |
[2] | Niven-Jenkins, B., Brungard, D., Betts, M., Sprecher, N., and S. Ueno, “Requirements for the Trasport Profile of MPLS,” ID draft-ietf-mpls-tp-requirements-09, June 2009. |
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[3] | Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon, “Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture,” RFC 3031, Jan 2001. |
[4] | Rosen, E., Tappan, D., Fedorkow, G., Rekhter, Y., and T. Li, “MPLS Label Stack Encoding", RFC 3032, January 2001,” RFC 3032, Jan 2001 (TXT). |
[5] | Bryant, S. and P. Pate, “Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3) Architecture,” RFC 3985, March 2005 (TXT). |
[6] | Nadeau, T. and C. Pignataro, “Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV): A Control Channel for Pseudowires,” RFC 5085, December 2007 (TXT). |
[7] | Bocci, M., Bryant, S., and L. Levrau, “A Framework for MPLS in Transport Networks,” ID draft-ietf-mpls-tp-framework-02.txt, July 2009. |
[8] | Vigoureux,, M., Bocci, M., Swallow, G., Aggarwal, R., and D. Ward, “MPLS Generic Associated Channel,” RFC 5586, May 2009. |
[9] | Vigoureux, M., Betts, M., and D. Ward, “Requirements for OAM in MPLS Transport Networks,” ID draft-ietf-mpls-tp-oam-requirements-01, April 2009. |
[10] | Mannie, E. and D. Papadimitriou, “Recovery Terminology for Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching,” RFC 4427, Mar 2006. |
[11] | Sprecher, N., Farrel, A., and H. Shah, “Multi-protocol Label Switching Transport Profile Survivability Framework,” ID draft-ietf-mpls-tp-survive-fwk-00.txt, Feb 2009. |
[12] | Lang, J., Papadimitriou, D., and Y. Rekhter, “RSVP-TE Extensions in Support of End-to-End Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) Recovery,” RFC 4872, May 2007. |
[13] | Mannie, E., “Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) Architecture,” RFC 3945, Oct 2004. |
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Stewart Bryant (editor) | |
Cisco | |
United Kingdom | |
Email: | stbryant@cisco.com |
Nurit Sprecher (editor) | |
Nokia Siemens Networks | |
3 Hanagar St. Neve Ne'eman B | |
Hod Hasharon, 45241 | |
Israel | |
Email: | nurit.sprecher@nsn.com |
Huub van Helvoort (editor) | |
Huawei | |
Kolkgriend 38, 1356 BC Almere | |
Netherlands | |
Phone: | +31 36 5316076 |
Email: | hhelvoort@huawei.com |
Annamaria Fulignoli | |
Ericsson | |
Italy | |
Phone: | |
Email: | annamaria.fulignoli@ericsson.com |
Yaacov Weingarten | |
Nokia Siemens Networks | |
3 Hanagar St. Neve Ne'eman B | |
Hod Hasharon, 45241 | |
Israel | |
Phone: | +972-9-775 1827 |
Email: | yaacov.weingarten@nsn.com |