Index - Month Index of IDs
All IDs - sorted by date)
| Compression Dictionary Transport | ||||||||||||||
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This document specifies a mechanism for dictionary-based compression in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). By utilizing this technique, clients and servers can reduce the size of transmitted data, leading to improved performance and reduced bandwidth consumption. This document extends existing HTTP compression methods and provides guidelines for the delivery and use of compression dictionaries within the HTTP protocol. | |||||||||||||
| Applicability of Abstraction and Control of Traffic Engineered Networks (ACTN) to IETF Network Slicing | ||||||||||||||
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Network abstraction is a technique that can be applied to a network domain to obtain a view of potential connectivity across the network by utilizing a set of policies to select network resources. Network slicing is an approach to network operations that builds on the concept of network abstraction to provide programmability, flexibility, and modularity. It may use techniques such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) to create multiple logical or virtual networks, each tailored for a set of services that share the same set of requirements. Abstraction and Control of Traffic Engineered Networks (ACTN) is described in RFC 8453. It defines an SDN-based architecture that relies on the concept of network and service abstraction to detach network and service control from the underlying data plane. This document outlines the applicability of ACTN to network slicing in a Traffic Engineered (TE) network that utilizes IETF technologies. It also identifies the features of network slicing not currently within the scope of ACTN and indicates where ACTN might be extended. | |||||||||||||
| Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles for IoT Devices | ||||||||||||||
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This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification to allow manufacturers to define (D)TLS profile parameters. This allows a network security service to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which can indicate the presence of unauthorized software, malware, or security policy-violating traffic on an endpoint. | |||||||||||||
| A Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for Sources of Law (LEX) | ||||||||||||||
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This document describes a Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace Identifier for identifying, naming, assigning, and managing persistent resources in the legal domain. This specification is published to allow adoption of a common convention by multiple jurisdictions to facilitate ease of reference and access to resources in the legal domain. This specification is an independent submission to the RFC series. It is not a standard, and does not have the consensus of the IETF. | |||||||||||||
| YANG Data Model for Routing in Fat Trees (RIFT) | ||||||||||||||
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This document defines a YANG data model for the configuration and management of Routing in Fat Trees (RIFT) Protocol. The model is based on YANG 1.1 as defined in RFC7950 and conforms to the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as described in RFC8342. | |||||||||||||
| The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture | ||||||||||||||
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The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol (I-D.ietf-mls-protocol) provides a Group Key Agreement protocol for messaging applications. MLS is meant to protect against eavesdropping, tampering, message forgery, and provide Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS). This document describes the architecture for using MLS in a general secure group messaging infrastructure and defines the security goals for MLS. It provides guidance on building a group messaging system and discusses security and privacy tradeoffs offered by multiple security mechanisms that are part of the MLS protocol (e.g., frequency of public encryption key rotation). The document also provides guidance for parts of the infrastructure that are not standardized by MLS and are instead left to the application. While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, they affect the overall security guarantees that are achieved by a messaging application. This is especially true in the case of active adversaries that are able to compromise clients, the delivery service, or the authentication service. | |||||||||||||