Index - Month Index of IDs
All IDs - sorted by date)
Update to the ipn URI scheme | ||||||||||||||
|
This document updates the specification of the ipn URI scheme previously defined in RFC 6260, the IANA registries established in RFC 7116, and the rules for the encoding and decoding of these URIs when used as an Endpoint Identifier (EID) in Bundle Protocol Version 7 (BPv7) as defined in RFC 9171. These updates clarify the structure and behavior of the ipn URI scheme, define new encodings of ipn scheme URIs, and establish the registries necessary to manage this scheme. |
Use Cases for MPLS Network Action Indicators and MPLS Ancillary Data | ||||||||||||||
|
This document presents use cases that have a common feature that may be addressed by encoding network action indicators and associated ancillary data within MPLS packets. There is community interest in extending the MPLS data plane to carry such indicators and ancillary data to address the use cases that are described in this document. The use cases described in this document are not an exhaustive set, but rather the ones that are actively discussed by members of the IETF MPLS, PALS, and DetNet working groups from the beginning of work on the MPLS Network Action until the publication of this document. | |||||||||||||
Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Attestation Token | ||||||||||||||
|
The Arm Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware and firmware security specifications, as well as open-source reference implementations, to help device makers and chip manufacturers build best-practice security into products. Devices that are PSA compliant can produce attestation tokens as described in this memo, which are the basis for many different protocols, including secure provisioning and network access control. This document specifies the PSA attestation token structure and semantics. The PSA attestation token is a profile of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT). This specification describes what claims are used in an attestation token generated by PSA compliant systems, how these claims get serialized to the wire, and how they are cryptographically protected. This informational document is published as an independent submission to improve interoperability with Arm's architecture. It is not a standard nor a product of the IETF. |
Notification of Revoked Access Tokens in the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework | ||||||||||||||
|
This document specifies a method of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework, which allows an authorization server to notify clients and resource servers (i.e., registered devices) about revoked access tokens. As specified in this document, the method allows clients and resource servers to access a Token Revocation List on the authorization server by using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), with the possible additional use of resource observation. Resulting (unsolicited) notifications of revoked access tokens complement alternative approaches such as token introspection, while not requiring additional endpoints on clients and resource servers. |
A YANG Data Model for Syslog Configuration | ||||||||||||||
|
This document defines a YANG data model for the configuration of a syslog process. It is intended that this model be used by vendors who implement syslog collectors in their systems. |
Updates to Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments | ||||||||||||||
|
This specification defines a profile of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) that addresses the scalability issues inherent when using OCSP in large scale (high volume) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) environments and/or in PKI environments that require a lightweight solution to minimize communication bandwidth and client- side processing. This specification obsoletes RFC 5019. The profile specified in RFC 5019 has been updated to allow and recommend the use of SHA-256 over SHA-1. |
The Entity Attestation Token (EAT) | ||||||||||||||
|
An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like a smartphone, IoT device, network equipment or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server or service to determine the type and degree of trust placed in the entity. An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims. |
Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2 | ||||||||||||||
|
This document deprecates the use of RSA key exchange and Diffie Hellman over a finite field in TLS 1.2, and discourages the use of static elliptic curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites. Note that these prescriptions apply only to TLS 1.2 since TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by RFC 8996 and TLS 1.3 either does not use the affected algorithm or does not share the relevant configuration options. This document updates RFCs 9325, 4346, 5246, 4162, 6347, 5932, 5288, 6209, 6367, 8422, 5289, 5469, 4785, 4279, 5487, 6655, and 7905. |