Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps) Internet Drafts


      
 Header Protection for Cryptographically Protected E-mail
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-24.txt
 Date: 04/09/2024
 Authors: Daniel Gillmor, Bernie Hoeneisen, Alexey Melnikov
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
S/MIME version 3.1 introduced a mechanism to provide end-to-end cryptographic protection of e-mail message headers. However, few implementations generate messages using this mechanism, and several legacy implementations have revealed rendering or security issues when handling such a message. This document updates the S/MIME specification (RFC8551) to offer a different mechanism that provides the same cryptographic protections but with fewer downsides when handled by legacy clients. Furthermore, it offers more explicit usability, privacy, and security guidance for clients when generating or handling e-mail messages with cryptographic protection of message headers. The Header Protection scheme defined here is also applicable to messages with PGP/MIME cryptographic protections.
 Guidance on End-to-End E-mail Security
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-16.txt
 Date: 16/03/2024
 Authors: Daniel Gillmor, Bernie Hoeneisen, Alexey Melnikov
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
End-to-end cryptographic protections for e-mail messages can provide useful security. However, the standards for providing cryptographic protection are extremely flexible. That flexibility can trap users and cause surprising failures. This document offers guidance for mail user agent implementers to help mitigate those risks, and to make end-to-end e-mail simple and secure for the end user. It provides a useful set of vocabulary as well as recommendations to avoid common failures. It also identifies a number of currently unsolved usability and interoperability problems.
 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-15.txt
 Date: 18/11/2024
 Authors: Hendrik Brockhaus, David von Oheimb, Mike Ounsworth, John Gray
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management. CMP provides interactions between client systems and PKI components such as a Registration Authority (RA) and a Certification Authority (CA). This document adds support for management of KEM certificates and use EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue. This document also includes the updates specified in Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of RFC 9480. The updates maintain backward compatibility with CMP version 2 wherever possible. Updates to CMP version 2 are improving crypto agility, extending the polling mechanism, adding new general message types, and adding extended key usages to identify special CMP server authorizations. CMP version 3 is introduced for changes to the ASN.1 syntax, which are support of EnvelopedData, certConf with hashAlg, POPOPrivKey with agreeMAC, and RootCaKeyUpdateContent in ckuann messages. This document obsoletes RFC 4210 and together with I-D.ietf-lamps- rfc6712bis and it also obsoletes RFC 9480. Appendix F of this document updates the Section 9 of RFC 5912.
 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-09.txt
 Date: 29/11/2024
 Authors: Hendrik Brockhaus, David von Oheimb, Mike Ounsworth, John Gray
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document describes how to layer the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) over HTTP. It includes the updates to RFC 6712 specified in RFC 9480 Section 3. These updates introduce CMP URIs using a Well-known prefix. It obsoletes RFC 6712 and together with I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis and it also obsoletes RFC 9480.
 Clarification and enhancement of RFC7030 CSR Attributes definition
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-13.txt
 Date: 06/11/2024
 Authors: Michael Richardson, Owen Friel, David von Oheimb, Dan Harkins
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
The Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST, RFC7030) is ambiguous in its specification of the CSR Attributes Response. This has resulted in implementation challenges and implementor confusion. This document updates RFC7030 (EST) and clarifies how the CSR Attributes Response can be used by an EST server to specify both CSR attribute OIDs and also CSR attribute values, in particular X.509 extension values, that the server expects the client to include in subsequent CSR request. Moreover, it provides new convenient and straightforward approach: using a template for CSR contents that may be partially filled in by the server. This also allows specifying a subject Distinguished Name (DN).
 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-06.txt
 Date: 04/11/2024
 Authors: Sean Turner, Panos Kampanakis, Jake Massimo, Bas Westerbaan
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
The Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) is a quantum-resistant key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM). This document describes the conventions for using the ML-KEM in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. The conventions for the subject public keys and private keys are also described.
 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for ML-DSA
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-05.txt
 Date: 04/11/2024
 Authors: Jake Massimo, Panos Kampanakis, Sean Turner, Bas Westerbaan
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
Digital signatures are used within X.509 certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and to sign messages. This document describes the conventions for using FIPS 204, the Module-Lattice- Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) in Internet X.509 certificates and certificate revocation lists. The conventions for the associated signatures, subject public keys, and private key are also described.
 Use of the SLH-DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus-17.txt
 Date: 30/11/2024
 Authors: Russ Housley, Scott Fluhrer, Panos Kampanakis, Bas Westerbaan
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
SLH-DSA is a stateless hash-based signature scheme. This document specifies the conventions for using the SLH-DSA signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax are provided.
 Related Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a Protocol
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-06.txt
 Date: 10/12/2024
 Authors: Alison Becker, Rebecca Guthrie, Michael Jenkins
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document defines a new CSR attribute, relatedCertRequest, and a new X.509 certificate extension, RelatedCertificate. The use of the relatedCertRequest attribute in a CSR and the inclusion of the RelatedCertificate extension in the resulting certificate together provide additional assurance that two certificates each belong to the same end entity. This mechanism is particularly useful in the context of non-composite hybrid authentication, which enables users to employ the same certificates in hybrid authentication as in authentication done with only traditional or post-quantum algorithms.
 Use of ML-KEM in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kyber-07.txt
 Date: 13/12/2024
 Authors: Julien Prat, Mike Ounsworth, Daniel Van Geest
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) is a quantum-resistant key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Three parameters sets for the ML-KEM algorithm are specified by NIST in FIPS 203. In order of increasing security strength (and decreasing performance), these parameter sets are ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024. This document specifies the conventions for using ML- KEM with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) using the KEMRecipientInfo structure.
 Use of the RSA-KEM Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5990bis-10.txt
 Date: 30/07/2024
 Authors: Russ Housley, Sean Turner
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
The RSA Key Encapsulation Mechanism (RSA-KEM) Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward) cryptographic mechanism for an originator to securely send keying material to a recipient using the recipient's RSA public key. The RSA-KEM Algorithm is specified in Clause 11.5 of ISO/IEC: 18033-2:2006. This document specifies the conventions for using the RSA-KEM Algorithm as a standalone KEM algorithm and the conventions for using the RSA-KEM Algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) using KEMRecipientInfo as specified in RFC XXXX. This document obsoletes RFC 5990. RFC EDITOR: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number assigned to draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri.
 Composite ML-KEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure and CMS
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem-05.txt
 Date: 21/10/2024
 Authors: Mike Ounsworth, John Gray, Massimiliano Pala, Jan Klaussner, Scott Fluhrer
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document defines combinations of ML-KEM [FIPS.203] in hybrid with traditional algorithms RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, and X448. These combinations are tailored to meet security best practices and regulatory requirements. Composite ML-KEM is applicable in any application that uses X.509, PKIX, and CMS data structures and protocols that accept ML-KEM, but where the operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs in ML-KEM. For use within CMS, this document is intended to be coupled with the CMS KEMRecipientInfo mechanism in [RFC9629].
 Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-14.txt
 Date: 21/10/2024
 Authors: Mike Ounsworth, Hannes Tschofenig, Henk Birkholz, Monty Wiseman, Ned Smith
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
A PKI end entity requesting a certificate from a Certification Authority (CA) may wish to offer trustworthy claims about the platform generating the certification request and the environment associated with the corresponding private key, such as whether the private key resides on a hardware security module. This specification defines an attribute and an extension that allow for conveyance of Evidence in Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) such as PKCS#10 or Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) payloads which provides an elegant and automatable mechanism for transporting Evidence to a Certification Authority. Including Evidence along with a CSR can help to improve the assessment of the security posture for the private key, and can help the Certification Authority to assess whether it satisfies the requested certificate profile. These Evidence Claims can include information about the hardware component's manufacturer, the version of installed or running firmware, the version of software installed or running in layers above the firmware, or the presence of hardware components providing specific protection capabilities or shielded locations (e.g., to protect keys).
 Updates to Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5019bis-12.txt
 Date: 13/09/2024
 Authors: Tadahiko Ito, Clint Wilson, Corey Bonnell, Sean Turner
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This specification defines a profile of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) that addresses the scalability issues inherent when using OCSP in large scale (high volume) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) environments and/or in PKI environments that require a lightweight solution to minimize communication bandwidth and client- side processing. This specification obsoletes RFC 5019. The profile specified in RFC 5019 has been updated to allow and recommend the use of SHA-256 over SHA-1.
 Encryption Key Derivation in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) using HKDF with SHA-256
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-cek-hkdf-sha256-05.txt
 Date: 19/09/2024
 Authors: Russ Housley
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document specifies the derivation of the content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) using HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) with SHA-256. The use of this mechanism provides protection against where the attacker manipulates the content-encryption algorithm identifier or the content-authenticated- encryption algorithm identifier.
 X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-04.txt
 Date: 09/12/2024
 Authors: Rohan Mahy
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines Instant Messaging (IM) identity KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key certificates
 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa-03.txt
 Date: 22/11/2024
 Authors: Kaveh Bashiri, Scott Fluhrer, Stefan-Lukas Gazdag, Daniel Van Geest, Stavros Kousidis
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
Digital signatures are used within X.509 Public Key Infrastructure such as X.509 certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and to sign messages. This document describes the conventions for using the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA) in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. The conventions for the associated signatures, subject public keys, and private keys are also described.
 Use of the HSS and XMSS Hash-Based Signature Algorithms in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-13.txt
 Date: 12/12/2024
 Authors: Daniel Van Geest, Kaveh Bashiri, Scott Fluhrer, Stefan-Lukas Gazdag, Stavros Kousidis
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for the stateful hash-based signature (HBS) schemes Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and XMSS^MT, a multi-tree variant of XMSS. This specification applies to the Internet X.509 Public Key infrastructure (PKI) when those digital signatures are used in Internet X.509 certificates and certificate revocation lists.
 Nonce-based Freshness for Remote Attestation in Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) for the Certification Management Protocol (CMP) and for Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-attestation-freshness-03.txt
 Date: 05/11/2024
 Authors: Hannes Tschofenig, Hendrik Brockhaus
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
When an end entity includes attestation Evidence in a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), it may be necessary to demonstrate the freshness of the provided Evidence. Current attestation technology commonly achieves this using nonces. This document outlines the process through which nonces are supplied to the end entity by an RA/CA for inclusion in Evidence, leveraging the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) and Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST)
 Composite ML-DSA For use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure and CMS
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-03.txt
 Date: 21/10/2024
 Authors: Mike Ounsworth, John Gray, Massimiliano Pala, Jan Klaussner, Scott Fluhrer
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document defines combinations of ML-DSA [FIPS.204] in hybrid with traditional algorithms RSA-PKCS#1v1.5, RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448. These combinations are tailored to meet security best practices and regulatory requirements. Composite ML-DSA is applicable in any application that uses X.509, PKIX, and CMS data structures and protocols that accept ML-DSA, but where the operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs in ML-DSA.
 Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis-03.txt
 Date: 19/09/2024
 Authors: Russ Housley
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document specifies the conventions for using the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax are provided. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital signature; it is described in RFC 8554. This document obsoletes RFC 8708.
 Use of Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1 (PBMAC1) in PKCS #12 Syntax
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc9579bis-03.txt
 Date: 17/10/2024
 Authors: Alicja Kario
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document specifies additions and amendments to RFCs 7292 and 8018. It obsoletes the RFC 9579. It defines a way to use the Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1 (PBMAC1), defined in RFC 8018, inside the PKCS #12 syntax. The purpose of this specification is to permit the use of more modern Password-Based Key Derivation Functions (PBKDFs) and allow for regulatory compliance.
 Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5272bis-01.txt
 Date: 29/09/2024
 Authors: Joe Mandel, Sean Turner
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document defines the base syntax for CMC, a Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) community:
 Certificate Management over CMS (CMC): Transport Protocols
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5273bis-01.txt
 Date: 29/09/2024
 Authors: Joe Mandel, Sean Turner
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document defines a number of transport mechanisms that are used to move CMC (Certificate Management over CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax)) messages. The transport mechanisms described in this document are HTTP, file, mail, and TCP. This document obsoletes RFCs 5273 and 6402.
 Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5274bis-01.txt
 Date: 29/09/2024
 Authors: Joe Mandel, Sean Turner
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
This document provides a set of compliance statements about the CMC (Certificate Management over CMS) enrollment protocol. The ASN.1 structures and the transport mechanisms for the CMC enrollment protocol are covered in other documents. This document provides the information needed to make a compliant version of CMC. This document obsoletes RFCs 5274 and 6402.
 Use of the ML-DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-ml-dsa-01.txt
 Date: 22/11/2024
 Authors: Ben S, Adam R, Daniel Van Geest
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
The Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), as defined in FIPS 204, is a post-quantum digital signature scheme that aims to be secure against an adversary in possession of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC). This document specifies the conventions for using the ML-DSA signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax are provided.
 X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Automation
 
 draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages-01.txt
 Date: 16/12/2024
 Authors: Hendrik Brockhaus, David Goltzsche
 Working Group: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines KeyPurposeIds for general-purpose and trust anchor configuration files, for software and firmware update packages, and for safety- critical communication to be included in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key certificates used by industrial automation and the ERJU System Pillar.


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Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)

WG Name Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME
Acronym lamps
Area Security Area (sec)
State Active
Charter charter-ietf-lamps-06 Approved
Status update Show Changed 2017-11-16
Document dependencies
Additional resources Issue tracker, Wiki, Zulip stream
Personnel Chairs Russ Housley, Tim Hollebeek
Area Director Deb Cooley
Mailing list Address spasm@ietf.org
To subscribe https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
Archive https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/
Chat Room address https://zulip.ietf.org/#narrow/stream/lamps

Charter for Working Group

The PKIX and S/MIME Working Groups have been closed for some time. Some
updates have been proposed to the X.509 certificate documents produced
by the PKIX Working Group and the electronic mail security documents
produced by the S/MIME Working Group.

The LAMPS (Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME) Working
Group is chartered to make updates where there is a known constituency
interested in real deployment and there is at least one sufficiently
well specified approach to the update so that the working group can
sensibly evaluate whether to adopt a proposal.

The LAMPS WG is now tackling these topics:

  1. Specify the use of short-lived X.509 certificates for which no
    revocation information is made available by the Certification Authority.
    Short-lived certificates have a lifespan that is shorter than the time
    needed to detect, report, and distribute revocation information. As a
    result, revoking short-lived certificates is unnecessary and pointless.

  2. Update the specification for the cryptographic protection of email
    headers -- both for signatures and encryption -- to improve the
    implementation situation with respect to privacy, security, usability
    and interoperability in cryptographically-protected electronic mail.
    Most current implementations of cryptographically-protected electronic
    mail protect only the body of the message, which leaves significant
    room for attacks against otherwise-protected messages.

  3. The Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) is specified in RFC 4210,
    and it offers a vast range of certificate management options. CMP is
    currently being used in many different industrial environments, but it
    needs to be tailored to the specific needs of such machine-to-machine
    scenarios and communication among PKI management entities. The LAMPS
    WG will develop a "lightweight" profile of CMP to more efficiently
    support of these environments and better facilitate interoperable
    implementation, while preserving cryptographic algorithm agility. In
    addition, necessary updates and clarifications to CMP will be
    specified in a separate document. This work will be coordinated with
    the LWIG WG.

  4. Provide concrete guidance for implementers of email user agents to
    promote interoperability of end-to-end cryptographic protection of
    email messages. This may include guidance about the generation,
    interpretation, and handling of protected messages; management of
    the relevant certificates; documentation of how to avoid common
    failure modes; strategies for deployment in a mixed environment; as
    well as test vectors and examples that can be used by implementers
    and interoperability testing. The resulting robust consensus
    among email user agent implementers is expected to provide more
    usable and useful cryptographic security for email users.

  5. Recent progress in the development of quantum computers pose a
    threat to widely deployed public key algorithms. As a result,
    there is a need to prepare for a day when cryptosystems such as
    RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, ECDH, and EdDSA cannot be depended
    upon in the PKIX and S/MIME protocols.

5.a. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) effort to produce one or more
quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithm standards.
The LAMPS WG will specify the use of these new PQC public key
algorithms with the PKIX certificates and the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS). These specifications will use object identifiers
for the new algorithms that are assigned by NIST.

5.b. A lengthy transition from today's public key algorithms to
PQC public key algorithms is expected. Time will be needed to gain
full confidence in the new PQC public key algorithms.

5.b.i. The LAMPS WG will specify formats, identifiers, enrollment,
and operational practices for "hybrid key establishment" that
combines the shared secret values one or more traditional
key-establishment algorithm and one or more NIST PQC
key-establishment algorithm or a PQC key-establishment algorithm
vetted by the CFRG. The shared secret values will be combined using
HKDF (see RFC 5869), one of the key derivation functions in NIST
SP 800-56C, or a key derivation function vetted by the CFRG.

5.b.ii. The LAMPS WG will specify formats, identifiers, enrollment,
and operational practices for "dual signature" that combine one or
more traditional signature algorithm with one or more NIST PQC
signature algorithm or a PQC algorithm vetted by the CFRG.

In addition, the LAMPS WG may investigate other updates to documents
produced by the PKIX and S/MIME WG. The LAMPS WG may produce
clarifications where needed, but the LAMPS WG shall not adopt
anything beyond clarifications without rechartering.

Milestones

Date Milestone Associated documents
Dec 2022 Send draft for rfc4210bis to IESG for standards track publication draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis
Dec 2022 Send draft for rfc6712bis to IESG for standards track publication draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis
Jul 2022 End-to-end email user agent guidance sent to IESG for informational publication draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance
Mar 2022 Short-lived certificate conventions sent to IESG for BCP publication
Dec 2021 CMP algorithms sent to IESG for standards track publication rfc9481 (was draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms)
Dec 2021 Adopt draft for dual signature in CMS
Dec 2021 Adopt draft for dual signatures in PKIX certificates
Dec 2021 Adopt draft for hybrid key establishment in CMS
Dec 2021 Adopt draft for public keys for hybrid key establishment in PKIX certificates
Dec 2021 Adopt draft for PQC signatures in PKIX certificates
Dec 2021 Lightweight CMP profile sent to IESG for informational publication rfc9483 (was draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile)
Dec 2021 CMP updates sent to IESG for standards track publication rfc9480 (was draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates)
Dec 2021 Adopt draft for PQC signatures in CMS
Nov 2021 Header protection conventions sent to IESG for standards track publication draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection
Oct 2021 Adopt draft for PQC KEM algorithms in CMS
Oct 2021 Adopt draft for PQC KEM public keys in PKIX certificates
Jul 2021 Adopt a draft for short-lived certificate conventions

Done milestones

Date Milestone Associated documents
Done Adopt draft for rfc4210bis draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis
Done Adopt draft for rfc6712bis draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis
Done Adopt a draft for end-to-end email user agent guidance draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance