Internet DRAFT - draft-acee-rtg-yang-key-chain
draft-acee-rtg-yang-key-chain
Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed.
Internet-Draft Y. Qu
Intended status: Standards Track D. Yeung
Expires: April 17, 2016 Cisco Systems
I. Chen
Ericsson
J. Zhang
Juniper Networks
Y. Yang
Cisco Systems
October 15, 2015
Key Chain YANG Data Model
draft-acee-rtg-yang-key-chain-09.txt
Abstract
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept
lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be
gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key
distribution can be automated. Key chains are commonly used for
routing protocol authentication and other applications. In some
applications, the protocols do not use the key chain element key
directly, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a
short-lived key from the key chain element key.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2016.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Relationship to other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept
lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be
gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key
distribution can be automated. Key chains are commonly used for
routing protocol authentication and other applications. In some
applications, the protocols do not use the key chain element key
directly, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a
short-lived key from the key chain element key.
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1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-KEYWORDS].
2. Problem Statement
This document describes a YANG [YANG] data model for key chains. Key
chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of
network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will
facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key
rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core
routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].
A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a
Key ID, key, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication
or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or
application requiring authentication or encryption. In essence, the
key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced where ever
it is required. The key-chain construct has been implemented by most
networking vendors and deployed in many networks.
A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well
as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the
key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment
model where the details of the applications or services requiring
authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The
YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection
criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does
not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes
augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection
criteria.
2.1. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains
Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key and/or algorithm
used by an application for authentication or encryption. This MAY be
accomplished by accepting all the keys that have a valid accept
lifetime and sending the key with the most recent send lifetime. One
scenario for facilitating key rollover is to:
1. Distribute a key chain with a new key to all the routers or other
network devices in the domain of that key chain. The new key's
accept lifetime should be such that it is accepted during the key
rollover period. The send lifetime should be a time in the
future when it can be assured that all the routers in the domain
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of that key are upgraded. This will have no immediate impact on
the keys used for transmission.
2. Assure that all the network devices have been updated with the
updated key chain and that their system times are roughly
synchronized. The system times of devices within an
administrative domain are commonly synchronized (e.g., using
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [NTP-PROTO]). This also may be
automated.
3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network
devices within the domain of key chain will start sending the new
key.
4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key
removed may be distributed to the network devices within the
domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the
next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always
include two keys; either the current and future key (during key
rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key
rollovers).
3. Design of the Key Chain Model
The ietf-keychain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed
by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the
Key-Id is used to identify the key chain entry to be used. In
addition to the Key-ID, each key chain entry includes a key-string
and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain entries
include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is
unspecified, the key is always considered valid.
Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for
transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key
chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not
valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time).
Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various
vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Additionally, the
key-chain is made a grouping so that an implementation could support
scoping other than at the global level. Finally, the crypto-
algorithm-types grouping is provided for reuse when configuring
legacy authentication and encryption not using key-chains.
A key-chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the
network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other
YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key-chain.
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3.1. Key Chain Operational State
The key chain operational state is maintained in the key-chain
entries along with the configuration state. The key string itself is
omitted from the operational state to minimize visibility similar to
what was done with keys in SNMP MIBs. This is an area for further
discussion. Additionally, the operational state includes an
indication of whether or not a key chain entry is valid for sending
or acceptance.
3.2. Key Chain Model Features
Features are used to handle differences between vendor
implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration
an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in
hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements
(e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by
vendors or only a single vendor.
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree
+--rw key-chains
+--rw key-chain-list* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--ro name-state? string
| +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?
| | +--rw duration? uint32
| +--ro accept-tolerance-state
| | +--ro duration? uint32
| +--rw key-chain-entry* [key-id]
| +--rw key-id uint64
| +--ro key-id-state? uint64
| +--rw key-string
| | +--rw (key-string-style)?
| | +--:(keystring)
| | | +--rw keystring? string
| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
| | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string
| +--rw lifetime
| | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)
| | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime
| | | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | | +--:(always)
| | | | +--rw always? empty
| | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--rw start-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
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| | | +--rw (end-time)?
| | | +--:(infinite)
| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--rw end-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)
| | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?
| | +--rw send-lifetime
| | | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | | +--:(always)
| | | | +--rw always? empty
| | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--rw start-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
| | | +--rw (end-time)?
| | | +--:(infinite)
| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--rw end-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--rw accept-lifetime
| | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | +--:(always)
| | | +--rw always? empty
| | +--:(start-end-time)
| | +--rw start-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--rw (end-time)?
| | +--:(infinite)
| | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | +--:(duration)
| | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | +--:(end-date-time)
| | +--rw end-date-time?
| | yang:date-and-time
| +--ro lifetime-state
| | +--ro send-lifetime
| | | +--ro (lifetime)?
| | | +--:(always)
| | | | +--ro always? empty
| | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | +--ro (end-time)?
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| | | +--:(infinite)
| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--ro duration? uint32
| | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--ro end-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--ro send-valid? boolean
| | +--ro accept-lifetime
| | | +--ro (lifetime)?
| | | +--:(always)
| | | | +--ro always? empty
| | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | +--ro (end-time)?
| | | +--:(infinite)
| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--ro duration? uint32
| | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--ro end-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--ro accept-valid? boolean
| +--rw crypto-algorithm
| | +--rw (algorithm)?
| | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}?
| | | +--rw hmac-sha1-12? empty
| | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}?
| | | +--rw aes-cmac-prf-128? empty
| | +--:(md5)
| | | +--rw md5? empty
| | +--:(sha-1)
| | | +--rw sha-1? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-1)
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-1? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-256)
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-256? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-384)
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-384? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-512)
| | +--rw hmac-sha-512? empty
| +--ro crypto-algorithm-state
| +--ro (algorithm)?
| +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}?
| | +--ro hmac-sha1-12? empty
| +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}?
| | +--ro aes-cmac-prf-128? empty
| +--:(md5)
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| | +--ro md5? empty
| +--:(sha-1)
| | +--ro sha-1? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-1)
| | +--ro hmac-sha-1? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-256)
| | +--ro hmac-sha-256? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-384)
| | +--ro hmac-sha-384? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-512)
| +--ro hmac-sha-512? empty
+--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
| +--rw enable? boolean
+--ro aes-key-wrap-state {aes-key-wrap}?
+--ro enable? boolean
4. Key Chain YANG Model
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-key-chain@2015-10-15.yang"
module ietf-key-chain {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain";
// replace with IANA namespace when assigned
prefix "key-chain";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix "yang";
}
organization
"IETF RTG (Routing) Working Group";
contact
"Acee Lindem - acee@cisco.com";
description
"This YANG module defines the generic configuration
data for key-chain. It is intended that the module
will be extended by vendors to define vendor-specific
key-chain configuration parameters.
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2015-10-15 {
description
"Updated version, organization, and copyright.
Added aes-cmac-prf-128 and aes-key-wrap features.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
}
revision 2015-06-29 {
description
"Updated version. Added Operation State following
draft-openconfig-netmod-opstate-00.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
}
revision 2015-02-24 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
}
typedef key-chain-ref {
type leafref {
path "/key-chain:key-chains/key-chain:key-chain-list/"
+ "key-chain:name";
}
description
"This type is used by data models that need to reference
configured key-chains.";
}
/* feature list */
feature hex-key-string {
description
"Support hexadecimal key string.";
}
feature accept-tolerance {
description
"To specify the tolerance or acceptance limit.";
}
feature independent-send-accept-lifetime {
description
"Support for independent send and accept key lifetimes.";
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}
feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12 {
description
"Support for TCP HMAC-SHA-1 12 byte digest hack.";
}
feature aes-cmac-prf-128 {
description
"Support for AES Cipher based Message Authentication Code
Pseudo Random Function.";
}
feature aes-key-wrap {
description
"Support for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap.";
}
/* groupings */
grouping lifetime {
description
"Key lifetime specification.";
choice lifetime {
default always;
description
"Options for specifying key accept or send lifetimes";
case always {
leaf always {
type empty;
description
"Indicates key lifetime is always valid.";
}
}
case start-end-time {
leaf start-date-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description "Start time.";
}
choice end-time {
default infinite;
description
"End-time setting.";
case infinite {
leaf no-end-time {
type empty;
description
"Indicates key lifetime end-time in infinite.";
}
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}
case duration {
leaf duration {
type uint32 {
range "1..2147483646";
}
units seconds;
description "Key lifetime duration, in seconds";
}
}
case end-date-time {
leaf end-date-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description "End time.";
}
}
}
}
}
}
grouping crypto-algorithm-types {
description "Cryptographic algorithm types.";
choice algorithm {
description
"Options for cryptographic algorithm specification.";
case hmac-sha-1-12 {
if-feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12;
leaf hmac-sha1-12 {
type empty;
description "The HMAC-SHA1-12 algorithm.";
}
}
case aes-cmac-prf-128 {
if-feature aes-cmac-prf-128;
leaf aes-cmac-prf-128 {
type empty;
description "The AES-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm - required
by RFC 5926 for TCP-AO key derivation
functions.";
}
}
case md5 {
leaf md5 {
type empty;
description "The MD5 algorithm.";
}
}
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case sha-1 {
leaf sha-1 {
type empty;
description "The SHA-1 algorithm.";
}
}
case hmac-sha-1 {
leaf hmac-sha-1 {
type empty;
description "HMAC-SHA-1 authentication algorithm.";
}
}
case hmac-sha-256 {
leaf hmac-sha-256 {
type empty;
description "HMAC-SHA-256 authentication algorithm.";
}
}
case hmac-sha-384 {
leaf hmac-sha-384 {
type empty;
description "HMAC-SHA-384 authentication algorithm.";
}
}
case hmac-sha-512 {
leaf hmac-sha-512 {
type empty;
description "HMAC-SHA-512 authentication algorithm.";
}
}
}
}
grouping key-chain {
description
"key-chain specification grouping.";
leaf name {
type string;
description "Name of the key-chain.";
}
leaf name-state {
type string;
config false;
description "Configured name of the key-chain.";
}
container accept-tolerance {
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if-feature accept-tolerance;
description
"Tolerance for key lifetime acceptance (seconds).";
leaf duration {
type uint32;
units seconds;
default "0";
description
"Tolerance range, in seconds.";
}
}
container accept-tolerance-state {
config false;
description
"Configured tolerance for key lifetime
acceptance (seconds).";
leaf duration {
type uint32;
description
"Configured tolerance range, in seconds.";
}
}
list key-chain-entry {
key "key-id";
description "One key.";
leaf key-id {
type uint64;
description "Key ID.";
}
leaf key-id-state {
type uint64;
config false;
description "Configured Key ID.";
}
container key-string {
description "The key string.";
choice key-string-style {
description
"Key string styles";
case keystring {
leaf keystring {
type string;
description "Key string in ASCII format.";
}
}
case hexadecimal {
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if-feature hex-key-string;
leaf hexadecimal-string {
type yang:hex-string;
description
"Key in hexadecimal string format.";
}
}
}
}
container lifetime {
description "Specify a key's lifetime.";
choice lifetime {
description
"Options for specification of send and accept
lifetimes.";
case send-and-accept-lifetime {
description
"Send and accept key have the same lifetime.";
container send-accept-lifetime {
uses lifetime;
description
"Single lifetime specification for both send and
accept lifetimes.";
}
}
case independent-send-accept-lifetime {
if-feature independent-send-accept-lifetime;
description
"Independent send and accept key lifetimes.";
container send-lifetime {
uses lifetime;
description
"Separate lifetime specification for send
lifetime.";
}
container accept-lifetime {
uses lifetime;
description
"Separate lifetime specification for accept
lifetime.";
}
}
}
}
container lifetime-state {
config false;
description "Configured key's lifetime.";
container send-lifetime {
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uses lifetime;
description
"Configured send-lifetime.";
}
leaf send-valid {
type boolean;
description
"Status of send-lifetime.";
}
container accept-lifetime {
uses lifetime;
description
"Configured accept-lifetime.";
}
leaf accept-valid {
type boolean;
description
"Status of accept-lifetime.";
}
}
container crypto-algorithm {
uses crypto-algorithm-types;
description "Cryptographic algorithm associated with key.";
}
container crypto-algorithm-state {
config false;
uses crypto-algorithm-types;
description "Configured cryptographic algorithm.";
}
}
}
container key-chains {
list key-chain-list {
key "name";
description
"List of key-chains.";
uses key-chain;
}
container aes-key-wrap {
if-feature aes-key-wrap;
leaf enable {
type boolean;
default false;
description
"Enable AES Key Wrap encryption.";
}
description
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"AES Key Wrap password encryption.";
}
container aes-key-wrap-state {
if-feature aes-key-wrap;
config false;
leaf enable {
type boolean;
description "AES Key Wrap state.";
}
description "Status of AES Key Wrap.";
}
description "All configured key-chains for the device.";
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
5. Relationship to other Work
6. Security Considerations
This document enables the automated distribution of industry standard
key chains using the NETCONF [NETCONF] protocol. As such, the
security considerations for the NETCONF protocol are applicable.
Given that the key chains themselves are sensitive data, it is
RECOMMENDED that the NETCONF communication channel be encrypted. One
way to do accomplish this would be to invoke and run NETCONF over SSH
as described in [NETCONF-SSH].
When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key
Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is
not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent
of key-chain configuration.
The key strings are not included in the operational state. This is a
practice carried over from SNMP MIB modules and is an area for
further discussion.
7. IANA Considerations
This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry
[XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in RFC 3688, the following
registration is requested to be made:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
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This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [YANG].
name: ietf-acl namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-
chain prefix: ietf-key-chain reference: RFC XXXX
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC
6241, June 2011.
[NETCONF-SSH]
Wasserman, M., "Using NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell
(SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC-KEYWORDS]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFC's to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[XML-REGISTRY]
Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[YANG] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
8.2. Informative References
[AES-KEY-WRAP]
Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, August
2009.
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang,
"Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014.
[IAB-REPORT]
Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC
4948, August 2007.
Lindem, et al. Expires April 17, 2016 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft YANG Key Chain October 2015
[NTP-PROTO]
Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[OSPFV3-AUTH]
Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014.
[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]
Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", draft-chen-
rtg-key-table-yang-00.txt (work in progress), June 2010.
[YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", draft-
chen-rtg-key-table-yang-00.txt (work in progress), March
2015.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The RFC text was produced using Marshall Rose's xml2rfc tool.
Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security
requirements.
Authors' Addresses
Acee Lindem (editor)
Cisco Systems
301 Midenhall Way
Cary, NC 27513
USA
Email: acee@cisco.com
Yingzhen Qu
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: yiqu@cisco.com
Lindem, et al. Expires April 17, 2016 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft YANG Key Chain October 2015
Derek Yeung
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: myeung@cisco.com
Ing-Wher Chen
Ericsson
Email: ing-wher.chen@ericsson.com
Jeffrey Zhang
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive
Westford, MA 01886
USA
Email: zzhang@juniper.net
Yi Yang
Cisco Systems
7025 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
USA
Email: yiya@cisco.com
Lindem, et al. Expires April 17, 2016 [Page 19]
