Internet DRAFT - draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-state-unverified
draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-state-unverified
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) O. Borchert
Internet-Draft D. Montgomery
Updates: 8205 (if approved) USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 19, 2021 January 15, 2021
BGPsec Validation State Unverified
draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-state-unverified-04
Abstract
In case operators decide to delay BGPsec path validation, none of the
available states do properly represent this decision. This document
introduces "Unverified" as a well-defined validation state which
allows to properly identify a non-evaluated BGPsec routes as not
verified.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Initializing BGPsec route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Changes to RFC 8205 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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1. Introduction
BGPsec path validation [RFC8205] provides well defined validation
states. Though, there are instances in which BGPsec routes are not
immediately validated upon receiving them. This could be due to
configuration where the operator chose to perform "Lazy Evaluation"
or due to instances where router configuration could enable the
operator to delay route validation during situations of unexpectedly
high loads such as DDOS attacks or others. Here, the absence of a
well-defined initialization state requires to use a validation state,
that is otherwise well-defined and therefore "waters" down the
meaning of that state.
Hence, this document updates the RFC 8205 by adding the proposed
validation state "Unverified".
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271] and BGPsec
Protocol Specification [RFC8205]
3. Initializing BGPsec route
This document introduces the validation state "Unverified" to be used
for BGPsec routes that are not evaluated otherwise.
To allow proper initialization the following state is introduced:
o Unverified: Specifies the state of a BGPsec route where no
evaluation has been performed.
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3.1. Changes to RFC 8205
The BGPsec protocol specification as specified in [RFC8205] suffers
the limitation described above in this document. [Section 5.1] of
RFC 8205 specifies two states for BGPsec path validation:
The validation procedure results in one of two states:
'Valid' and 'Not Valid'.
Also, [Section 5.1] makes it clear that:
BGPsec validation need only be performed at the eBGP edge.
This document updates RFC 8205 in such that:
BGPsec routes MUST be initialized using the BGPsec validation state
"Unverified" until proper evaluation of the BGPsec route has been
performed.
3. Usage Considerations
The validation state "Unverified" allows to distinguish between
evaluated BGPsec routes and non-evaluated BGPsec routes. This allows
the operator to create policies to treat such routes different from
routes labeled with either validation state "Valid" or "Not Valid"
4. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is
described in [RFC8205]
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI
10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed., and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI
10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
suggestions from K. Sriram on this document.
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Authors' Addresses
Oliver Borchert
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov
Doug Montgomery
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: dougm@nist.gov
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