Internet DRAFT - draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties
draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties
Network Working Group A.A. Bozhko, Ed.
Internet-Draft CryptoPro
Intended status: Informational 24 November 2022
Expires: 28 May 2023
Properties of AEAD algorithms
draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties-02
Abstract
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
provide confidentiality and integrity of data. The extensive use of
AEAD algorithms in various high-level applications has caused the
need for AEAD algorithms with additional properties and motivated
research in the area. This document gives definitions for the most
common of those properties intending to improve consistency in the
field.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. AEAD properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Security properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. Data integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. Blockwise security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.4. Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.5. Key commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.6. Leakage resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.7. Multi-user security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.8. Nonce misuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.8.1. Nonce misuse resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.8.2. Nonce misuse resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.9. Reforgeability resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.10. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security . . . 6
3.2. Implementation properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Inverse-free . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Lightweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.3. Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.4. Parallelizable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.5. Single pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.6. Static Associated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.7. ZK-friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Additional functionality properties . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Incremental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. Nonce-hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.3. Remotely-keyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.4. Robust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm is
an extension of authenticated encryption, which provides
confidentiality for the plaintext to be encrypted and integrity for
the plaintext and some Associated Data (sometimes called Header).
AEAD algorithms are used in numerous applications and have become an
important field in cryptographic research.
1.1. Background
AEAD algorithms are formally defined in [RFC5116]. The main benefit
of AEAD algorithms is that they provide both data confidentiality and
data integrity and have a simple unified interface.
The importance of the AEAD algorithms is mainly explained by their
exploitation simplicity: they have a unified interface, easy-to-
understand security guarantees, and are much easier to implement
properly than MAC and encryption schemes separately. Therefore,
their embedding into high-level schemes and protocols is highly
transparent since, for example, there is no need for additional key
derivation procedures. Apart from that, when using the AEAD
algorithm, it is possible to reduce the key and state sizes and
improve the data processing speed. For instance, such algorithms are
mandatory for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], IPsec ESP [RFC4303] [RFC8221], and
QUIC [RFC9000]. Hence, the research and standardization efforts in
the field are extremely active. Most AEAD algorithms usually come
with security guarantees, formal proofs, usage guidelines, and
reference implementations.
Even though providing core properties of AEAD algorithms is enough
for use in many applications, some environments require other unusual
cryptographic properties, which commonly require additional analysis
and research. With the growing number of such properties and
research papers, misunderstanding and confusion inevitably appear.
Some properties might be understood in different ways, for some only
non-trivial formal security notions are provided, others require
modification or extension of the standard AEAD interface to support
additional functionality. Therefore, the risk of misuse of AEAD
algorithms increases which can lead to security issues.
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1.2. Scope
In the following document, we provide a short overview of the most
common properties of AEAD algorithms, by giving high-level
definitions of these properties in Section 3. The document aims to
improve clarity and establish a common language in the field.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. AEAD properties
3.1. Security properties
3.1.1. Confidentiality
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data is available only
to those authorized to obtain it. That property is required for the
AEAD algorithm to be called secure.
Synonyms. Privacy.
Further reading. [R2002], [BN2000]
3.1.2. Data integrity
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data has not been
changed or forged by those who are not authorized to. That property
is required for the AEAD algorithm to be called secure.
Synonyms. Message authentication.
Further reading. [R2002], [BN2000]
3.1.3. Blockwise security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an adversary
can adaptively choose the next block of the plaintext (ciphertext)
depending on already computed blocks of the ciphertext (plaintext)
during an encryption (decryption) operation.
Further reading. [JMV2002], [FJMV2004]
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3.1.4. Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even when key-
dependent plaintexts are encrypted.
Notes. KDM-security is achievable only if nonces are chosen randomly
and associated data is key-independent.
Further reading. [BK2011]
3.1.5. Key commitment
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is difficult to
find a tuple of the nonce, associated data, and ciphertext such that
it can be decrypted correctly with more than one key.
Synonyms. Key-robustness, key collision resistance.
Further reading. [FOR17], [LGR21], [GLR17]
3.1.6. Leakage resistance
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if some
additional information about computations of an encryption (and
possibly decryption) operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.
Further reading. [GPPS19], [B20]
3.1.7. Multi-user security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm security level degrades sublinearly in
the number of users. Here the level of security is understood in the
sense of Authenticated Encryption Advantage (AEA) as given in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
Further reading. [BT16]
3.1.8. Nonce misuse
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or
resistance) even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption
queries.
3.1.8.1. Nonce misuse resilience
Definition. Security is provided only for messages encrypted with
unique nonces.
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Further reading. [ADL17], [RS06]
3.1.8.2. Nonce misuse resistance
Definition. Security is provided for all messages.
Further reading. [RS06]
3.1.9. Reforgeability resilience
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful
forgery for the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find
any subsequent forgery.
Further reading. [BC09], [FLLW17]
3.1.10. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if the
plaintext is released for every ciphertext, including those with
failed integrity verification.
Further reading. [A14]
3.2. Implementation properties
3.2.1. Inverse-free
Definition. A block cipher-based AEAD algorithm can be securely
implemented without evaluating the block cipher inverse.
3.2.2. Lightweight
Definition. An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely
implemented on resource-constrained devices. In particular, it meets
the criteria required in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography
competition [MBTM17].
Further reading. [MBTM17]
3.2.3. Online
Definition. An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
be implemented with a constant memory and a single one-direction pass
over the plaintext (ciphertext), writing out the result during that
pass.
Further reading. [HRRV15] [FJMV2004]
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3.2.4. Parallelizable
Definition. An AEAD algorithm can fully exploit the parallel
computation infrastructure.
Further reading. [C20]
3.2.5. Single pass
Definition. An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
be implemented with a single pass over the plaintext (ciphertext).
3.2.6. Static Associated Data
Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows pre-computation for static (or
repeating) associated data so that static AD doesn't significantly
contribute to the computational cost of encryption.
3.2.7. ZK-friendly
Definition. An AEAD algorithm operates on binary and prime fields
with a low number of non-linear operations (often called
multiplicative complexity). Thus, it allows efficient implementation
using a domain-specific language (DSL) for writing zk-SNARKs
circuits.
Synonyms. ZK-focused, Arithmetization-oriented, Low Multiplicative
Complexity
Further reading. [DGGK21]
3.3. Additional functionality properties
3.3.1. Incremental
Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows encrypting a message, which
only partly differs from some other previously encrypted message,
faster than processing it from scratch.
Further reading. [SY16], [BKY02]
3.3.2. Nonce-hiding
Definition. An AEAD algorithm decryption operation doesn't need the
nonce value to perform the decryption. Thus, the algorithm provides
privacy for the nonce value.
Further reading. [BNT19]
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3.3.3. Remotely-keyed
Definition. An AEAD algorithm can be securely implemented with most
of the operations in encryption/decryption performed by an insecure
(i.e., it leaks all intermediate values) device, which has no access
to the key, while another secure device performs operations involving
the key.
Further reading. [BFN98], [DA03]
3.3.4. Robust
Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows the user to choose an arbitrary
value l >= 0 for every plaintext and then encrypts it into a
ciphertext, which is l bits longer.
Further reading. [HKR2015]
4. Security Considerations
This document defines the properties of AEAD algorithms. However,
the document does not describe any concrete mechanisms providing
these properties, neither it describes how to achieve them. In fact,
one can claim that an AEAD algorithm provides any of the defined
properties only if its analysis in the relevant models was carried
out.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
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6.2. Informative References
[A14] Forler, C., List, E., Forler, C., List, E., List, E., and
E. List, "How to Securely Release Unverified Plaintext in
Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology –
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Science, vol 8873. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
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<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6>.
[ADL17] Ashur, T., Dunkelman, O., and A. Luykx, "Boosting
Authenticated Encryption Robustness with Minimal
Modifications", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017.
CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10403.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1>.
[B20] Bellizia, D., Bronchain, O., Cassiers, G., Grosso, V.,
Guo, C., Momin, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX.
Standaert, "Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical
Security in Symmetric Cryptography: A Practical Guide
Through the Leakage-Resistance Jungle", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. CRYPTO 2020. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 12170. Springer, Cham,
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<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13>.
[BC09] Forler, C. and E. List, "MAC Reforgeability", Fast
Software Encryption. FSE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 5665. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21, 2009,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21>.
[BFN98] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., and M. Naor, "A formal
treatment of remotely keyed encryption", Advances in
Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'98. EUROCRYPT 1998. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol 1403. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/BFb0054131, 1998,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054131>.
[BK2011] Bellare, M. and S. Keelveedhi, "Authenticated and Misuse-
Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011. CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35, 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35>.
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[BKY02] Buonanno, E., Katz, J., and M. Yung, "Incremental
Unforgeable Encryption", Fast Software Encryption. FSE
2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2355.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9,
2002, <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9>.
[BN2000] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic
Composition Paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545,
DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, 2000,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x>.
[BNT19] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019.
CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11692.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.
[BT16] Bellare, M. and B. Tackmann, "The Multi-User Security of
Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016. CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 9814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10, 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10>.
[C20] Chakraborti, A., Datta, N., Jha, A., Mancillas-López, C.,
Nandi, M., and Y. Sasaki, "INT-RUP Secure Lightweight
Parallel AE Modes", IACR Transactions on Symmetric
Cryptology, 2019(4), 81–118,
DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118, 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118>.
[DA03] Dodis, Y. and JH. An, "Concealment and Its Applications to
Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology —
EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19, 2003,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19>.
[DGGK21] Dobraunig, C., Grassi, L., Guinet, G., and K. Kuijsters,
"CIMINION: Symmetric Encryption Based on Toffoli-Gates
over Large Finite Fields", Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2021. EUROCRYPT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science(), vol 12697. Springer, Cham,
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<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1>.
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[FJMV2004] Valette, PA., Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette,
"Authenticated On-Line Encryption", Selected Areas in
Cryptography. SAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol 3006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11, 2004,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11>.
[FLLW17] Forler, C., List, E., Lucks, S., and J. Wenzel,
"Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes",
Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 10343. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2>.
[FOR17] Farshim, P., Orlandi, C., and R. Rosie, "Authenticated and
Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent DataSecurity
of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys",
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(1),
449–473., DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473>.
[GLR17] Grubbs, P., Lu, J., and T. Ristenpart, "Message Franking
via Committing Authenticated Encryption.", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017. CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 10403. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3>.
[GPPS19] Guo, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX. Standaert,
"Authenticated Encryption with Nonce Misuse and Physical
Leakages: Definitions, Separation Results and Leveled
Constructions", Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019.
LATINCRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol
11774. Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8,
2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8>.
[HKR2015] Hoang, VT., Krovetz, T., and P. Rogaway, "Robust
Authenticated-Encryption AEZ and the Problem That It
Solves", Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2015.
EUROCRYPT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol
9056. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_2, 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_2>.
[HRRV15] Hoang, VT., Reyhanitabar, R., Rogaway, P., and D. Vizár,
"Online Authenticated-Encryption and its Nonce-Reuse
Misuse-Resistance", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2015.
CRYPTO 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9215.
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Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24, 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-05, 11 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aead-limits-05>.
[JMV2002] Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette, "Blockwise-
Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some
Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC",
Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2002. CRYPTO 2002. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 2442. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2>.
[LGR21] Len, J., Grubbs, P., and T. Ristenpart, "Partitioning
Oracle Attacks", 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 21), 195--212, 2021.
[MBTM17] McKay, K., Bassham, L., Turan, MS., and N. Mouha, "Report
on Lightweight Cryptography", DOI 10.6028/NIST.IR.8114,
2017, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8114>.
[R2002] Rogaway, P., "Authenticated-encryption with associated-
data.", Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security (CCS '02), Association for
Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 98–107,
DOI 10.1145/586110.586125, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/586110.586125>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RS06] Rogaway, R. and T. Shrimpton, "A Provable-Security
Treatment of the Key-Wrap Problem", Advances in Cryptology
- EUROCRYPT 2006. EUROCRYPT 2006. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 4004. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/11761679_23, 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_23>.
[SY16] Sasaki, Y. and K. Yasuda, "A New Mode of Operation for
Incremental Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data", Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2015. SAC
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Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_23, 2016,
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Appendix A. Contributors
Author's Address
Andrey Bozhko (editor)
CryptoPro
Email: andbogc@gmail.com
Bozhko Expires 28 May 2023 [Page 13]
