Internet DRAFT - draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties

draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties







Network Working Group                                   A.A. Bozhko, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                 CryptoPro
Intended status: Informational                          24 November 2022
Expires: 28 May 2023


                     Properties of AEAD algorithms
                  draft-bozhko-cfrg-aead-properties-02

Abstract

   Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
   provide confidentiality and integrity of data.  The extensive use of
   AEAD algorithms in various high-level applications has caused the
   need for AEAD algorithms with additional properties and motivated
   research in the area.  This document gives definitions for the most
   common of those properties intending to improve consistency in the
   field.

Status of This Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.











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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  AEAD properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Security properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Data integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.3.  Blockwise security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.4.  Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.5.  Key commitment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.6.  Leakage resistance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.7.  Multi-user security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.8.  Nonce misuse  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
         3.1.8.1.  Nonce misuse resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
         3.1.8.2.  Nonce misuse resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.9.  Reforgeability resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.10. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security  . . .   6
     3.2.  Implementation properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Inverse-free  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  Lightweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.3.  Online  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.4.  Parallelizable  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.5.  Single pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.6.  Static Associated Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.7.  ZK-friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Additional functionality properties . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.3.1.  Incremental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.3.2.  Nonce-hiding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.3.3.  Remotely-keyed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.3.4.  Robust  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13



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   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm is
   an extension of authenticated encryption, which provides
   confidentiality for the plaintext to be encrypted and integrity for
   the plaintext and some Associated Data (sometimes called Header).
   AEAD algorithms are used in numerous applications and have become an
   important field in cryptographic research.

1.1.  Background

   AEAD algorithms are formally defined in [RFC5116].  The main benefit
   of AEAD algorithms is that they provide both data confidentiality and
   data integrity and have a simple unified interface.

   The importance of the AEAD algorithms is mainly explained by their
   exploitation simplicity: they have a unified interface, easy-to-
   understand security guarantees, and are much easier to implement
   properly than MAC and encryption schemes separately.  Therefore,
   their embedding into high-level schemes and protocols is highly
   transparent since, for example, there is no need for additional key
   derivation procedures.  Apart from that, when using the AEAD
   algorithm, it is possible to reduce the key and state sizes and
   improve the data processing speed.  For instance, such algorithms are
   mandatory for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], IPsec ESP [RFC4303] [RFC8221], and
   QUIC [RFC9000].  Hence, the research and standardization efforts in
   the field are extremely active.  Most AEAD algorithms usually come
   with security guarantees, formal proofs, usage guidelines, and
   reference implementations.

   Even though providing core properties of AEAD algorithms is enough
   for use in many applications, some environments require other unusual
   cryptographic properties, which commonly require additional analysis
   and research.  With the growing number of such properties and
   research papers, misunderstanding and confusion inevitably appear.
   Some properties might be understood in different ways, for some only
   non-trivial formal security notions are provided, others require
   modification or extension of the standard AEAD interface to support
   additional functionality.  Therefore, the risk of misuse of AEAD
   algorithms increases which can lead to security issues.









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1.2.  Scope

   In the following document, we provide a short overview of the most
   common properties of AEAD algorithms, by giving high-level
   definitions of these properties in Section 3.  The document aims to
   improve clarity and establish a common language in the field.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  AEAD properties

3.1.  Security properties

3.1.1.  Confidentiality

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data is available only
   to those authorized to obtain it.  That property is required for the
   AEAD algorithm to be called secure.

   Synonyms.  Privacy.

   Further reading.  [R2002], [BN2000]

3.1.2.  Data integrity

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data has not been
   changed or forged by those who are not authorized to.  That property
   is required for the AEAD algorithm to be called secure.

   Synonyms.  Message authentication.

   Further reading.  [R2002], [BN2000]

3.1.3.  Blockwise security

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an adversary
   can adaptively choose the next block of the plaintext (ciphertext)
   depending on already computed blocks of the ciphertext (plaintext)
   during an encryption (decryption) operation.

   Further reading.  [JMV2002], [FJMV2004]




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3.1.4.  Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm provides security even when key-
   dependent plaintexts are encrypted.

   Notes.  KDM-security is achievable only if nonces are chosen randomly
   and associated data is key-independent.

   Further reading.  [BK2011]

3.1.5.  Key commitment

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is difficult to
   find a tuple of the nonce, associated data, and ciphertext such that
   it can be decrypted correctly with more than one key.

   Synonyms.  Key-robustness, key collision resistance.

   Further reading.  [FOR17], [LGR21], [GLR17]

3.1.6.  Leakage resistance

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm provides security even if some
   additional information about computations of an encryption (and
   possibly decryption) operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.

   Further reading.  [GPPS19], [B20]

3.1.7.  Multi-user security

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm security level degrades sublinearly in
   the number of users.  Here the level of security is understood in the
   sense of Authenticated Encryption Advantage (AEA) as given in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].

   Further reading.  [BT16]

3.1.8.  Nonce misuse

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or
   resistance) even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption
   queries.

3.1.8.1.  Nonce misuse resilience

   Definition.  Security is provided only for messages encrypted with
   unique nonces.




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   Further reading.  [ADL17], [RS06]

3.1.8.2.  Nonce misuse resistance

   Definition.  Security is provided for all messages.

   Further reading.  [RS06]

3.1.9.  Reforgeability resilience

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful
   forgery for the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find
   any subsequent forgery.

   Further reading.  [BC09], [FLLW17]

3.1.10.  Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm provides security even if the
   plaintext is released for every ciphertext, including those with
   failed integrity verification.

   Further reading.  [A14]

3.2.  Implementation properties

3.2.1.  Inverse-free

   Definition.  A block cipher-based AEAD algorithm can be securely
   implemented without evaluating the block cipher inverse.

3.2.2.  Lightweight

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely
   implemented on resource-constrained devices.  In particular, it meets
   the criteria required in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography
   competition [MBTM17].

   Further reading.  [MBTM17]

3.2.3.  Online

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
   be implemented with a constant memory and a single one-direction pass
   over the plaintext (ciphertext), writing out the result during that
   pass.

   Further reading.  [HRRV15] [FJMV2004]



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3.2.4.  Parallelizable

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm can fully exploit the parallel
   computation infrastructure.

   Further reading.  [C20]

3.2.5.  Single pass

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
   be implemented with a single pass over the plaintext (ciphertext).

3.2.6.  Static Associated Data

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm allows pre-computation for static (or
   repeating) associated data so that static AD doesn't significantly
   contribute to the computational cost of encryption.

3.2.7.  ZK-friendly

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm operates on binary and prime fields
   with a low number of non-linear operations (often called
   multiplicative complexity).  Thus, it allows efficient implementation
   using a domain-specific language (DSL) for writing zk-SNARKs
   circuits.

   Synonyms.  ZK-focused, Arithmetization-oriented, Low Multiplicative
   Complexity

   Further reading.  [DGGK21]

3.3.  Additional functionality properties

3.3.1.  Incremental

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm allows encrypting a message, which
   only partly differs from some other previously encrypted message,
   faster than processing it from scratch.

   Further reading.  [SY16], [BKY02]

3.3.2.  Nonce-hiding

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm decryption operation doesn't need the
   nonce value to perform the decryption.  Thus, the algorithm provides
   privacy for the nonce value.

   Further reading.  [BNT19]



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3.3.3.  Remotely-keyed

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm can be securely implemented with most
   of the operations in encryption/decryption performed by an insecure
   (i.e., it leaks all intermediate values) device, which has no access
   to the key, while another secure device performs operations involving
   the key.

   Further reading.  [BFN98], [DA03]

3.3.4.  Robust

   Definition.  An AEAD algorithm allows the user to choose an arbitrary
   value l >= 0 for every plaintext and then encrypts it into a
   ciphertext, which is l bits longer.

   Further reading.  [HKR2015]

4.  Security Considerations

   This document defines the properties of AEAD algorithms.  However,
   the document does not describe any concrete mechanisms providing
   these properties, neither it describes how to achieve them.  In fact,
   one can claim that an AEAD algorithm provides any of the defined
   properties only if its analysis in the relevant models was carried
   out.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.




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6.2.  Informative References

   [A14]      Forler, C., List, E., Forler, C., List, E., List, E., and
              E. List, "How to Securely Release Unverified Plaintext in
              Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology –
              ASIACRYPT 2014. ASIACRYPT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer
              Science, vol 8873. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6, 2014,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6>.

   [ADL17]    Ashur, T., Dunkelman, O., and A. Luykx, "Boosting
              Authenticated Encryption Robustness with Minimal
              Modifications", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017.
              CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10403.
              Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1, 2017,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1>.

   [B20]      Bellizia, D., Bronchain, O., Cassiers, G., Grosso, V.,
              Guo, C., Momin, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX.
              Standaert, "Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical
              Security in Symmetric Cryptography: A Practical Guide
              Through the Leakage-Resistance Jungle", Advances in
              Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. CRYPTO 2020. Lecture Notes in
              Computer Science, vol 12170. Springer, Cham,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13, 2020,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13>.

   [BC09]     Forler, C. and E. List, "MAC Reforgeability", Fast
              Software Encryption. FSE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer
              Science, vol 5665. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21, 2009,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21>.

   [BFN98]    Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., and M. Naor, "A formal
              treatment of remotely keyed encryption", Advances in
              Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'98. EUROCRYPT 1998. Lecture Notes
              in Computer Science, vol 1403. Springer, Berlin,
              Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/BFb0054131, 1998,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054131>.

   [BK2011]   Bellare, M. and S. Keelveedhi, "Authenticated and Misuse-
              Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data", Advances in
              Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011. CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in
              Computer Science, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35, 2011,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35>.





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   [BKY02]    Buonanno, E., Katz, J., and M. Yung, "Incremental
              Unforgeable Encryption", Fast Software Encryption. FSE
              2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2355.
              Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9,
              2002, <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9>.

   [BN2000]   Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
              Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic
              Composition Paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
              Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545,
              DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, 2000,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x>.

   [BNT19]    Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
              AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019.
              CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11692.
              Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.

   [BT16]     Bellare, M. and B. Tackmann, "The Multi-User Security of
              Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3", Advances in
              Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016. CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in
              Computer Science, vol 9814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10, 2016,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10>.

   [C20]      Chakraborti, A., Datta, N., Jha, A., Mancillas-López, C.,
              Nandi, M., and Y. Sasaki, "INT-RUP Secure Lightweight
              Parallel AE Modes", IACR Transactions on Symmetric
              Cryptology, 2019(4), 81–118,
              DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118, 2020,
              <https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118>.

   [DA03]     Dodis, Y. and JH. An, "Concealment and Its Applications to
              Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology —
              EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer
              Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
              DOI 10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19, 2003,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19>.

   [DGGK21]   Dobraunig, C., Grassi, L., Guinet, G., and K. Kuijsters,
              "CIMINION: Symmetric Encryption Based on Toffoli-Gates
              over Large Finite Fields", Advances in Cryptology –
              EUROCRYPT 2021. EUROCRYPT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer
              Science(), vol 12697. Springer, Cham,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1, 2021,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1>.




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   [FJMV2004] Valette, PA., Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette,
              "Authenticated On-Line Encryption", Selected Areas in
              Cryptography. SAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
              vol 3006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11, 2004,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11>.

   [FLLW17]   Forler, C., List, E., Lucks, S., and J. Wenzel,
              "Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes",
              Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture
              Notes in Computer Science, vol 10343. Springer, Cham,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2, 2017,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2>.

   [FOR17]    Farshim, P., Orlandi, C., and R. Rosie, "Authenticated and
              Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent DataSecurity
              of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys",
              IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(1),
              449–473., DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473, 2017,
              <https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473>.

   [GLR17]    Grubbs, P., Lu, J., and T. Ristenpart, "Message Franking
              via Committing Authenticated Encryption.", Advances in
              Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017. CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in
              Computer Science, vol 10403. Springer, Cham,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3, 2017,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3>.

   [GPPS19]   Guo, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX. Standaert,
              "Authenticated Encryption with Nonce Misuse and Physical
              Leakages: Definitions, Separation Results and Leveled
              Constructions", Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019.
              LATINCRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol
              11774. Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8,
              2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8>.

   [HKR2015]  Hoang, VT., Krovetz, T., and P. Rogaway, "Robust
              Authenticated-Encryption AEZ and the Problem That It
              Solves", Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2015.
              EUROCRYPT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol
              9056. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_2, 2015,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_2>.

   [HRRV15]   Hoang, VT., Reyhanitabar, R., Rogaway, P., and D. Vizár,
              "Online Authenticated-Encryption and its Nonce-Reuse
              Misuse-Resistance", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2015.
              CRYPTO 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9215.



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              Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24, 2015,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24>.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
              Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
              AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-05, 11 July 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
              aead-limits-05>.

   [JMV2002]  Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette, "Blockwise-
              Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some
              Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC",
              Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2002. CRYPTO 2002. Lecture
              Notes in Computer Science, vol 2442. Springer, Berlin,
              Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2, 2002,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2>.

   [LGR21]    Len, J., Grubbs, P., and T. Ristenpart, "Partitioning
              Oracle Attacks", 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
              Security 21), 195--212, 2021.

   [MBTM17]   McKay, K., Bassham, L., Turan, MS., and N. Mouha, "Report
              on Lightweight Cryptography", DOI 10.6028/NIST.IR.8114,
              2017, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8114>.

   [R2002]    Rogaway, P., "Authenticated-encryption with associated-
              data.", Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer
              and communications security (CCS '02), Association for
              Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 98–107,
              DOI 10.1145/586110.586125, 2002,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/586110.586125>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC8221]  Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
              Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
              Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
              Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.



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Internet-Draft        Properties of AEAD algorithms        November 2022


   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

   [RS06]     Rogaway, R. and T. Shrimpton, "A Provable-Security
              Treatment of the Key-Wrap Problem", Advances in Cryptology
              - EUROCRYPT 2006. EUROCRYPT 2006. Lecture Notes in
              Computer Science, vol 4004. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
              DOI 10.1007/11761679_23, 2016,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_23>.

   [SY16]     Sasaki, Y. and K. Yasuda, "A New Mode of Operation for
              Incremental Authenticated Encryption with Associated
              Data", Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2015. SAC
              2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9566.
              Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_23, 2016,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_23>.

Appendix A.  Contributors

Author's Address

   Andrey Bozhko (editor)
   CryptoPro
   Email: andbogc@gmail.com

























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