Internet DRAFT - draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state
draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state
Network Working Group J. Bradley, Ed.
Internet-Draft Yubico
Intended status: Experimental T. Lodderstedt
Expires: May 9, 2019 YES.com AG
H. Zandbelt
ZmartZone
November 05, 2018
Encoding claims in the OAuth 2 state parameter using a JWT
draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state-09
Abstract
This draft provides a method for a client to encode one or more
elements encoding information about the session into the OAuth 2
"state" parameter.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 9, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The state JSON Web Token claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Validating the state parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Creating a Request Forgery Protection (rfp) claim value. . . 5
4.1. Stateful Clients. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Stateless Clients. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Responses Initiated by the Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. State Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. State Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.3. State Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.4. Passing paramaters to the AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
In the OAuth 2.0 Authorization protocol [RFC6749] , the Authorization
server SHOULD perform an exact string comparison of the
"redirect_uri" parameter with the "redirect_uri" parameter registered
by by the client. This is essential for preventing token leakage to
third parties in the OAuth implicit flow.
As a result of this clients can not safely add extra query parameters
to the "redirect_uri" parameter that encode additional client state
information.
The Client MUST use the "state" parameter to encode both Cross Site
Request Forgery protection and any other state information it wishes
to preserve for itself regarding the authorization request.
This draft proposes a mechanism whereby multiple state attributes can
be encoded into a JSON Web Token JWT [RFC7519] for use as the value
of the "state" parameter.
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The JWT may be sent without integrity protection, with integrity
protection JWS [RFC7515], or with both integrity and confidentiality
protection JWE [RFC7516]. The client is free to choose the
appropriate protection for its use-case as the "state" parameter is
treated as opaque by the Authorization Server (AS).
2. The state JSON Web Token claims
The OAuth Authorization request "state" parameter consists of a JWT
[RFC7519], optionally signed with JWS [RFC7515] or encrypted with JWE
[RFC7516], whose payload contains claims as defined here.
rfp
REQUIRED. string containing a verifiable identifier for the
browser session, that cannot be guessed by a third party. The
verification of this element by the client protects it from
accepting authorization responses generated in response to forged
requests generated by third parties.
kid
RECOMMENDED if signed or encrypted. Identifier of the key used to
sign this state token at the issuer. Identifier of the key used
to encrypt this JWT state token at the issuer. This SHOULD be
included in the JWE [RFC7516] header.
iat
OPTIONAL. Timestamp of when this Authorization Request was
issued.
exp
OPTIONAL. The "exp" (expiration time) claim identifies the
expiration time on or after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for
processing. The processing of the "exp" claim requires that the
current date/time MUST be before the expiration date/time listed
in the "exp" claim. Implementers MAY provide for some small
leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock
skew. Its value MUST be a number containing an IntDate value.
Use of this claim is OPTIONAL. This is RECOMMENDED if the JWT
[RFC7519] state token is being produced by the AS.
iss
OPTIONAL. string identifying the party that issued this state
value.
aud
OPTIONAL. string identifying the client that this state value is
intended for.
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target_link_uri
OPTIONAL. URI containing the location the user agent is to be
redirected to after authorization.
as
OPTIONAL. string identifying the authorization server that this
request was sent to.
jti
RECOMMENDED. The "jti" (JWT ID) claim provides a unique
identifier for the JWT. The identifier value MUST be assigned in
a manner that ensures that there is a negligible probability that
the same value will be accidentally assigned to a different data
object. The "jti" claim can be used to prevent the JWT from being
replayed. The "jti" value is a case-sensitive string. Use of
this claim is OPTIONAL.
at_hash
OPTIONAL. Access Token hash value. Its value is the base64url
encoding of the left-most half of the hash of the octets of the
ASCII representation of the "access_token" value, where the hash
algorithm used is the hash algorithm used in the "alg" parameter
of the State Token's JWS [RFC7515] header. For instance, if the
"alg" is "RS256", hash the "access_token" value with SHA-256, then
take the left-most 128 bits and base64url encode them. The
"at_hash" value is a case sensitive string. This is REQUIRED if
the JWT [RFC7519] state token is being produced by the AS and
issued with a "access_token" in the authorization response.
c_hash
OPTIONAL. Code hash value. Its value is the base64url encoding
of the left-most half of the hash of the octets of the ASCII
representation of the "code" value, where the hash algorithm used
is the hash algorithm used in the "alg" header parameter of the
State Token's JWS [RFC7515] header. For instance, if the "alg" is
"HS512", hash the "code" value with SHA-512, then take the left-
most 256 bits and base64url encode them. The "c_hash" value is a
case sensitive string. This is REQUIRED if the JWT [RFC7519]
state token is being produced by the AS and issued with a "code"
in the authorization response.
The issuer may add additional claims to the token. The producer and
the consumer of the JWT are the same or closely related entities so
collision resistance of claim names should not be a concern.
The issuer SHOULD sign the JWT [RFC7519] with JWS [RFC7515] in such a
way that it can verify the signature. The JWA [RFC7518] algorithm
HS256 with a key of 256bits is recommended.
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The issuer MAY sign the JWT [RFC7519] with JWS [RFC7515] using JWA
[RFC7518] algorithm "none" if integrity protecting the contents of
the "state" parameter is not required.
If the "state" parameter contains information the client doesn't want
to disclose to the Authorization server or user, the issuer MAY
encrypt the JWT [RFC7519] with JWE [RFC7516]. The JWA [RFC7518]
algorithm ("alg") of "dir" and encryption algorithm ("enc") of
"A128CBC-HS256" are recommended for symmetric encryption.
In the case of the "state" value being created by the Issuer the
"iss" and "aud" claims MUST be included in the JWT. The jwt MUST
also be signed with JWT [RFC7515]. If the State token is issued with
a code "c_hash" MUST be included. If the State Token is issued with
a Access Token "at_hash" MUST be included.
3. Validating the state parameter
Upon receiving a state parameter the client must validate its
integrity. The client parses it as a JWT. It then verifies the
signature of the JWT (if signed) using JWS [RFC7515]. The key used
to sign the JWT [RFC7519] MAY be indicated by the kid field. The
client MAY use other means to validate the JWT and determine its
authenticity.
The client then reads the fields inside the JWT [RFC7519] and uses
these to configure the user experience and security parameters of the
authorization.
The "rfp" claim MUST be validated by the client by comparing it to
the secret information that it used to create the "rfp" value.
The "as" claim if present MUST correspond to the URI endpoint
registered as the "redirect_uri" for that AS.
4. Creating a Request Forgery Protection (rfp) claim value.
The client MUST create a value that cannot be guessed by a third
party attacker and used to forge requests. There are many possible
ways to create this value. For reference two common ways will be
listed.
It is completely up to the purview of the particular client which
generation methods, and which claims, they will accept.
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4.1. Stateful Clients.
Many clients that are web servers maintain session state for browsers
in a server side store.
These clients can generate a random value with sufficient entropy
that an attacker cannot guess future values. This value can be
stored in the server side store and used directly as the value of
"rfp".
4.2. Stateless Clients.
Some clients that are web servers maintain session state for browsers
using browser stored cookies or HTML5 local storage.
These clients can generate a hash value based on a HTTPS: bound
session cookie or other browser side information that is not
accessible to third parties. This hash value can be used as the
value of "rfp".
While OAuth strongly recommends that clients use TLS to secure their
endpoints, if a client is not using TLS it MUST produce the value of
"rfp" by using a HMAC algorithm with a secret known only to itself
over the browser stored information.
4.3. Responses Initiated by the Issuer
Some clients may be willing to rely on the Authorization server
providing protection for Cross Site Request Forgery. In Cases where
the Authorization server and the client have a pre-established
relationship, and the client is willing to accept flows initiated by
the Authorization server, the string "iss" may be used as the value
of "rfp".
5. IANA Considerations
[ maybe we register the "rfp" claim above? ]
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
6. Security Considerations
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6.1. State Redirection
A client Authorization request might be redirected from the AS
intended by the client, as part of an attack to confuse the client,
and cause it to deliver a code or access tokens to a endpoint that
the attacker can intercept them from. A Client that has multiple
client_id issued by more than one AS SHOULD register a distinct
"redirect_uri" value with each AS.
The "redirect_uri" that the Authorization response is received on
MUST match the AS identified in the "as" claim.
If the AS allows pattern matching of query paramaters in the
"redirect_uri" the identifier for the AS MUST be contained in the URI
path component.
6.2. State Modification
Some information in the state JWT such as target_link_uri value for
redirecting the user to the application might have some security
impact is the user modifies them intentionally or unintentionally.
To prevent tampering with the "state" value the client may integrity
protect the contents of the JWT.
6.3. State Confidentiality
The client may have information that it wants to protect from
disclosure to the Authorization server, in logs, to proxies, or to
the user. In this case encrypting the JWT as a JWE is required to
protect the confidentiality of the state information.
6.4. Passing paramaters to the AS
OAuth Signed Authorization request
[I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request] should be used to integrity
protect paramaters sent by the client to the authorization server.
The state paramater is intended for the consumption of the client,
and to be opaque to the AS. Signed State should not be used to pass
paramaters from the client to the AS.
7. Acknowledgements
8. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request]
Richer, J., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "A Method for
Signing HTTP Requests for OAuth", draft-ietf-oauth-signed-
http-request-03 (work in progress), August 2016.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
Appendix A. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-05
o Added reference to OAuth Signed request
-04
o Updated references to JOSE/JWT
Authors' Addresses
John Bradley (editor)
Yubico
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
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Dr.-Ing. Torsten Lodderstedt
YES.com AG
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Hans Zandbelt
ZmartZone IAM
Email: hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu
URI: http://hanszandbelt.wordpress.com
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